Y.L. v. L.L.

Procedural History   By Summons with Notice filed on May 14, 2015, Plaintiff Y. L. (hereinafter “Husband”) commenced this action for divorce against Defendant L. L. (hereinafter “Wife”). Some four years after this action commenced Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint on or about April 17, 2019. Wife filed an Answer with Counterclaims on or about April 22, 2019. On or about September 12, 2016 the parties agreed by Preliminary Conference Order that Husband would be granted a divorce on the grounds that the marriage had broken down irretrievably for a period of six months pursuant to DRL §170(7). The parties were married on October 29, 1969 in a civil ceremony held in Moscow, Russia. Accordingly, this is a marriage of long duration (47 years). There are two adult children of this marriage: V.L. and I.L. Husband is currently 70 years old and Wife 68 years old. The issues of equitable distribution, maintenance and counsel fees were tried before this Court over the course of seventeen days between January 15, 2019 and April 29, 2019. Throughout trial Husband was represented by Michael E. Greene, Esq. and Andrew T. Lolli, Esq. from the law firm of Robinson, Brog, Leinwald, Greene, Genovese, and Gluck, P.C. Wife was initially represented by the Law office of Raoul Felder, Esq. in relation to proceedings that took place before a Request for Judicial Intervention was filed. Once the matter appeared in Court, Wife was represented at all times by Mr. Howard File, Esq., who substituted for Mr. Felder when he withdrew as counsel. At trial, Husband testified on his own behalf and called three court appointed neutral appraisers as witnesses. Husband also placed voluminous documents into evidence (Pl. Ex. 1 to 109). Wife testified on her own behalf and called eleven witnesses, one of which was a court appointed neutral. Among the witnesses called by Wife was Plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Green. While Mr. Greene’s testimony was credible, this Court finds that it was not materially relevant to any of the issues decided in this case. Wife also placed voluminous documents into evidence (Def. Ex. A to AAAAA). Post-trial written summations were submitted by both parties. In total, five real estate appraisers and two forensic accountants testified as experts at trial along with a number of fact witnesses. The fees for all court-appointed neutral experts were paid by Husband subject to reallocation. Wife’s expert witnesses, forensic accountant Heidi Muckler and real estate appraiser Mr. Brian Gager were both paid by Wife subject to her application for expert fees. Judicial Notice was taken of several Orders (Ct. Ex. 1-20). In total, the trial record consists of over two-thousand pages. Factual Findings The parties met and started dating when they were teenagers, Husband was seventeen and Wife was fifteen. After a period of dating the parties were married in Moscow in 1969, just before Husband left to serve in the Soviet Military. Husband joined the military because they offered him a position as a wrestler on the national soviet team. While Husband was away, Wife gave birth to their first child, V.L. After Husband returned from service in 1972, they relocated from Kiev to Moscow. During his time in the USSR, Husband was trained as an electrician and obtained a degree in “technical and electrical engineering.” (Tr. 1/22/19 pg.242). During the early years of their marriage Husband was engaged in several ventures, including the purchase and re-sale of American clothing and currency, although that practice was admittedly illegal. Despite being more successful than many in Communist Russia at that time, the parties wanted to immigrate to the United States. In or around 1978, the parties began the long process of immigrating to the United States. Husband described a harrowing journey as they fled from the Soviet Union. After a brief stay in Austria where the parties learned some English, they moved to Italy. They lived in Italy for about six months during which time Wife worked as a cleaning woman and picked up cans off the beach. Husband sold coral gems he had brought with him from Russia. From Italy the parties flew to New York with only $100 dollars available between them. Once they arrived in New York with their eight-year old daughter V.L., they received assistance from a Jewish charity that helped them settle in Brooklyn. Husband went to school to master the English language while Wife worked as a seamstress. She was ultimately employed by the New York City Ballet where her expert seamstress skills were widely celebrated. She had the privilege of designing clothes for some of the world’s premier ballet dancers, including Baryshnikov, Nureyev and Godunov. While Wife was employed in this capacity, she also gave birth to the parties’ second child I.L., in 1982. Wife credibly testified that Husband was fiercely jealous. He resented the time she spent at work and the access she had to powerful men. He forced her to quit this position. This was only not the only professional opportunity Husband forced Wife to abandon due to his angry and controlling personality. Husband’s first full time employment began in 1979, when he worked for an entity known as “Frank Brent Bell and Intercom.” Soon thereafter, in or around 1980, he formed a company with his friend, Roman Katsnelson (hereinafter “Katsnelson”), known as Enterprise Bell and Intercom. At or around the same time, Husband began studying for his Electrician Master’s License which he earned in 1986. That initial business was sold in the late 1980′s and Husband and Katsnelson formed their first company known as “Enterprise Electrical Contractors Inc.” This was the start of a very long, successful and profitable association between them. In addition to various joint business ventures, they began to acquire real property as part of what evolved into a vast real estate portfolio. In or around 1985 they purchased at least three apartment buildings in Brooklyn and one property in Staten Island. As real estate investment ventures, Husband would renovate the properties and then sell them. In total, Husband and Katsnelson created more than fifteen identified companies including real estate holding entities, asset holding entities, and operating businesses. Those businesses which remained in existence at the time this action for divorce commenced will be addressed at length herein. During the marriage, and as their income increased, the parties enjoyed an opulent upper-class lifestyle. They took at least three vacations each year including destinations in Europe and the Caribbean, they also acquired expensive artwork, sculptures, custom-made furnishings and funded both daughters’ college and graduate education without loans. The parties jointly contributed to the purchase of vacant land in Monticello, New York and Staten Island, New York and constructed both their marital home and a vacation home without the need for outside financing. They also hired help staff for both properties including housekeepers, landscapers, and a full-time security guard to reside in the Monticello property when they were not using it. While the parties enjoyed wealth, there was little peace in the home. Wife feared Husband. At times, he acted erratically and displayed explosive anger. There were numerous incidents of physical violence in which Husband attacked Wife beginning very early on in the marriage. For example, in 1972, a few years after they were married, Husband accused Wife of saying a name in her sleep. Husband punched Wife in the mouth with a closed fist. He knocked out several of her teeth resulting in her hospitalization in a Moscow military hospital. He caused permanent injury, impairment and pain to her jaw and mouth which she still suffers from some 47 years later. Husband did not deny this incident at trial and only stated that it took place “a long time ago.” Wife credibly testified that she has undergone multiple surgeries and continues to incur substantial dental and medical bills due to this injury. In another depraved incident early in the marriage, Husband kicked Wife in the stomach when she was eight months pregnant with their child because Wife took $30.00 cash from the house to purchase a washing machine. Wife was hospitalized and there was great risk to the baby due to this assault. There were other incidences of violence as well which resulted in Wife filing police reports naming Husband as the perpetrator. Aside from physical violence, at times, Husband was unpredictable, angry, controlling, manipulative, secretive and cold. He forced Wife to quit jobs she loved and decline to pursue professional opportunities when he felt jealous or threatened by Wife’s contact with other men. At times during their marriage the parties temporarily separated. For example, Husband admitted that the parties were fighting so badly that in 1982 he left the marital home, resulting in Wife giving birth to I.L. alone. (Tr. 1/22/19 pg. 268). Husband’s cruel treatment of Wife began at the start of the marriage in 1969 and continued even after they stopped living together in 2012. To this point, Wife credibly testified that Husband cut tubes in her refrigerator, shut off the water to her home, and disconnected the elevator when she was recovering from knee surgery. (Tr. 3/6/19 pg. 1252). At trial, the parties’ adult daughter V.L. supported her mother’s accounts of domestic violence and abusive controlling behavior by Husband during the marriage. V.L. credibly testified that her father had a “very aggressive temper”, would “hit” her mother, and “sometimes choke her when he got very aggressive” (Tr. 3/7/19 pgs. 1347-49). Notwithstanding this abusive environment, Wife stayed in the marriage and served as the primary caretaker of the children. She continued to work full time for various employers and ultimately for herself contributing her salary to the household expenses. She was the primary caretaker for V.L. and I.L. and managed the home. From 1969 when they married until 2012 when they stopped living together, Wife also supported Husband’s business activities in a myriad of direct and indirect ways (see infra). During the early years of their marriage the parties consistently relocated to different properties that they purchased in Brooklyn and Long Island. Both parties credibly testified that they jointly contributed to the purchase of these properties. Ultimately the parties settled in a house that they custom built on a vacant plot of land in an affluent section of Staten Island in 1999. This home, located at ************ Road (“the marital home”), served as the parties’ residence until October of 2016 when Husband officially moved out. Husband credibly testified that the land cost approximately $290,000 and that the parties spent an additional $1 Million Dollars to construct the home. In addition to the marital home, the parties also purchased land to construct a vacation home in Monticello New York. The land was purchased in 2002 for approximately $75,000 and the parties constructed a “mansion” for an additional $1 Million Dollars. Prior to Husband relocating, the parties had stopped speaking to each other some four years prior in March of 2012. At or around that same time they stopped sharing a marital bedroom. Wife testified, and V.L.’s concurred, that Husband would bring various women into the marital home when Wife was traveling abroad. In 2015, V.L. confronted Husband after she found women’s undergarments and other degrading offensive personal items which she knew did not belong to her mother. V.L. demanded that her father stop disrespecting her mother by bringing women into their homes. Suffice to say Husband did not appreciate V.L. confronting him about his behavior. He told V.L. that he “was the boss” and would “do what [he] want[ed]” (Tr. 3/7/19 pg. 1323). V.L. and Husband have not spoken to each other since that encounter. While Husband remains completely estranged from V.L., he claims to have a loving relationship with I.L.. 1. Marital Business Holdings Throughout the course of the parties’ marriage Husband transformed himself from a handyman, into a successful businessman and real estate mogul. At the time this action was commenced, Husband owned titled interests in a number of operating businesses, real estate holding companies, and asset holding companies. Wife has also become a successful businesswoman in her own right, although she attempted to establish that her business interests are of little, if any, value. While both parties have tried to limit the equitable distribution of their businesses, it is undisputed that each and every one of these companies, regardless of title, were obtained during the marriage and are thus presumed to be marital property. See Fields v. Fields, 15 NY3d 158 (2010). As such, Wife seeks an equitable share of Husband’s companies, and Husband seeks the same in reverse. In an effort to clarify the nature of the parties’ business holdings, and determine their value, this court appointed Mark Gottlieb CPA as a neutral forensic evaluator by order dated October 21, 2016 (Ct. Ex. 1). This initial appointment order only directed Mr. Gottlieb to value Husband’s businesses, however, the order was supplemented and modified approximately one year later to include an appraisal of Wife’s businesses. Before the commencement of trial Mr. Gottlieb provided detailed written reports to the Court and parties as to the value of the marital business holdings. As established in those reports, Mr. Gottlieb utilized “December 31, 2015″ as a valuation date as that date represented the end of the complete financial year closest to the commencement of this action. (Tr. 1/15/19 pg. 47). When Mr. Gottlieb valued the marital real estate holding companies, he did so by relying upon the reports of another court appointed neutral appraiser, Mr. Dominick Neglia. Mr. Gottlieb testified in support of his findings on January 15, 2019 and January 17, 2019. His credentials as an expert in business valuation were stipulated to by both parties. While maintaining his status as a court appointed neutral, he was called as a witness by Husband on direct examination and was extensively cross examined by Wife’s attorney. As discussed below, the parties ultimately stipulated to most of the values found by Mr. Gottlieb except for Wife’s business interests, and Husband’s alleged ownership interest in a Ukrainian Chocolate Factory. However, despite this stipulation, Wife spent a considerable amount of trial time attempting to establish that Mr. Gottlieb’s methodology was flawed and biased in favor of Husband. Wife initially critiqued the neutral expert because he did not undertake the role of “investigator,” and rather, accepted the accuracy of financial documentation provided to him by counsel. Wife further attacked Mr. Gottlieb’s credibility as a neutral by attempting to establish that he gave the benefit of the doubt only to Husband, and that Husband’s counsel was given preferential treatment. Wife’s claims regarding Mr. Gottlieb’s credibility and neutrality are both unsupported by the record and insufficient to discredit his findings. This is especially true considering Wife’s general failure to cooperate in the valuation of her businesses. Mr. Gottlieb credibly testified that despite various requests, Wife failed to provide much of the financial documentation requested and failed to appear for a pre-report interview. Contrary to Wife’s allegations, absent a specific court directive, it is not the purview of a neutral evaluator to conduct a “lifestyle analysis,” or to conduct “investigations” to determine if the books and records provided are in fact correct. If Wife believed that such an investigation was required, she should have made an application to the Court to expand his role. When explaining how he understood his role, Mr. Gottlieb testified that his ability to obtain information is generally limited to what is provided to him by the parties, as he does not have subpoena power. (Tr. 1/17/19 pg.207). Mr. Gottlieb further testified that his professional standards allow him to rely upon the books, records, and tax filings of the companies he values, so long as those records are internally consistent, and uncontradicted. As this standard applies to the present matter, Mr. Gottlieb found that Husband’s books and records were voluminous and adequate to determine a value. Husband and /or his attorneys were also available to answer any questions that the evaluator had. In contrast, Mr. Gottlieb found Wife’s limited books and records to be incomplete and internally inconsistent. Moreover, he found that the resulting financial information was incorrectly reported on her tax returns. Finally, unlike Husband, Wife initially refused to appear for an interview or to respond to document demands, only offering partial compliance after his reports were issued. a. Husband’s Business Interests The parties agree that Husband owns an interest in various entities that are subject to equitable distribution. These business interests were characterized by Mr. Gottlieb as (a) active business entities; (b) real estate holding companies; and (c) asset holding companies. The parties stipulated to the value of Husband’s interests in many of these businesses as of December 31, 2015 as found by Mr. Gottlieb. According to the stipulation of the parties, the value of Husband’s share (thus the “marital share”) of the businesses titled in his name were: (1) Enterprise Electrical Contractors, Inc. (“Enterprise Electrical Contractors”) ($30,000); (2) Enterprise Electrical Systems (“Enterprise Electrical Systems) ($710,000); (3) Trilini International Ltd. (“Trilini”) ($908,000.); (4) Eurocandy, LLC (“Eurocandy”) ($19,000); (4) New Castle Commodities, LLC (“New Castle”) ($3,000); and (4) Transocean Capital LLC (“Transocean Capital”) ($74,000.) exclusive of the value, if any, of Delta Capital and its ownership of the Z-L Factory which is hotly disputed in this case. The parties have also stipulated to the value of Husband’s 50 percent interest in certain real estate holding companies: (1) 41 Terrace Place Corp ($700,000) and (2) Pier 69 LLC ($85,000). The parties also stipulated to the commencement date value of Byrna Court Corp. which holds property located at *** Prospect Park West. Following this stipulation however Mr. Neglia, the real estate expert relied upon by Mr. Gottlieb, indicated that he made an error in his valuation. In fact, this was one of three admitted errors made by Mr. Neglia. In light of these value revisions, Plaintiff initially argued that the parties should be bound by the original unrevised value, however, in his Summation, Husband agrees with Wife that the trial date value of Husband’s 50 percent interest in Byrna should be $1,517,000. (Ex. EEEEE); (ex. 1C). Wife also seeks equitable distribution of a real estate holding company known as 37 Terrace Place Corp. This corporation is unique amongst the others because it was formed after the commencement of this proceeding, but the land that it owns was subdivided from the plot associated with 41 Terrace Place. To further complicate matters, Husband built a residential building on the subdivided plot, and then sold the same, all after the commencement date of this divorce proceeding. In 1992, Husband and his partner Katsnelson turned their business attention to the international stage. They created an international trading company (“Trilini”) that imported and exported confectionary goods to and from the Soviet Union, Ukraine, United States and other countries. Trilini eventually acquired various other partners who invested in the business. Mr. Gottlieb concluded that Husband owned a 35 percent percent equity share in Trilini as of the date of commencement. Husband testified that this percentage is incorrect and that he actually owns 33 percent, but he agrees that he is bound by his stipulation as to Trilini’s value (Tr. 1/22/19 pg. 264-265). At times Trilini employed both of the parties’ children. V.L. worked remained on the payroll until 2012 and I.L. remains employed there. In addition to Trilini, Husband, Katsnelson, and other investors created several companies engaged in the import/export of products or the holding and development of real estate. Many of these companies are interrelated and despite days of testimony their corporate structure is difficult to comprehend. For example, one such holding company specifically relevant here is Transocean Capital. This asset holding company owns 100 percent of a company known as Transocean Capital B.V., which owns 75 percent of a company known as Delta Capital. Delta Capital at one time held a 95.7 percent ownership interest in a confectionary factory located in the Ukraine known as Zhatomirski Lasochi (the “Z-L Factory”). The ownership and value of the Z-L factory was a point of major contention during this proceeding and shall be addressed at length below. a (1). The Z-L Factory Much of this trial centered around Husband’s alleged ownership interest in the Z-L Factory and the value of that ownership interest, if any. As explained in detail herein, any interest owned by Husband was structured through two asset holding companies, Transocean and Delta Capital. Simply stated, Husband owns a percentage of Transocean, Transocean owns Delta Capital, and Delta Capital holds whatever interest Husband has in the Z-L Factory. Three relevant facts related to this factory are uncontested: (1) Delta Capital obtained an ownership interest in the factory during the marriage (2) a government takeover divested Delta Capital of its interest in 2010, and (3) some aspect of that ownership interest was restored to Delta Capital in November of 2015. The history of the parties’ involvement with the Z-L Factory begins in 1999. Husband became aware of the Z-L factory because it purchased confectionary ingredients from one of Husband’s businesses, Trilini. Equity shares in the factory were initially acquired by Husband and his business partners under a New York based holding company known as Cobico. This initial equity interest was obtained without an exchange of money because the Factory owed Trilini over $500,000 in unpaid bills. Over time, Cobico’s interest in the Z-L Factory increased to over 90 percent. In or around 2005 Husband and his partners became concerned about how the factory was being run, so they fired upper management and hired a man named Igor Boyko to manage the factory. Husband claims that he met Igor Boyko through Wife. In 2006, Husband and his partners decided that it would be preferable for a Ukrainian factory to be run out of Europe, so they closed Cobico and contemplated a new holding company. Husband and his partners then created a complex interwoven set of holding corporations based out of New York, the Netherlands and Switzerland. While admittedly an oversimplification, Cobico’s shares were transferred to a company known as Delta Capital, which was a subsidiary of Transocean Capital BV, which was a subsidiary of Transocean Capital LLC, New York. Husband testified that under this new structure he owned no direct interest in any of the abovementioned companies other than a 33 percent share of Transocean Capital LLC. (Tr. 1/22/19, pg.347). It is undisputed that the factory was very lucrative in the early years of Delta Capital’s ownership. From 2000 until the takeover in 2010, over $20,000,000 of profits were reinvested by Delta Capital back into the factory. Using these profits, the ZL Factory was expanded to include the construction of three new buildings, resulting in a factory complex consisting of seven structures. New equipment was purchased, and existing equipment was updated and maintained using these reinvested profits. The expansion of the factory also resulted in a significant increase in the labor force from approximately 700 employees to 2,800 employees. Production of the confectionary products made by the factory rose from 17,000 metric tons to 73,000 metric tons during this same ten-year period (Tr. 1/24/19 pgs. 563-70). Husband admits that in 2010, the Z-L Factory was valued at between $75-100 Million Dollars by an independent appraisal company known as “Renaissance.” At or around the same time, one of Husband’s business partners, Igor Boyko, offered to purchase all the equity shares owned by the other partners for $22 Million Dollars (4/17/19, p. 152). This offer was rejected by Husband and his partners. Husband testified that Boyko’s “offer” was not serious, and that he counteroffered with an equally unrealistic demand of $37 Million Dollars. Husband credibly testified that after Boyko’s offer was rejected, Boyko initiated a “corporate raid” aided by government forces to steal what he could not obtain through purchase. As a result of this hostile takeover, Delta Capital lost all ownership and control of the Z-L factory (Tr. 1/22/19, pgs. 351-52). At or around the same time, Husband was advised by Ukrainian friends that his life was in danger if he remained in Kiev. Wife does not contest these facts and admits that Boyko’s raid divested Husband of any ownership interest in the factory. Husband credibly testified that some of his partners blame him for this catastrophic loss, and that their relationship remains strained to this day. Following the takeover, Husband tried desperately to regain control of the factory through litigation in the Ukrainian Courts including the filing of over 300 lawsuits in different jurisdictions (Tr. 1/22/19; pg. 355). However, that litigation revealed that the factory was, in effect, “nationalized” in an action that was authorized by the highest levels of the Ukrainian government. This governmental involvement made it unlikely that the interest formerly held by Husband would ever be returned. However, some five years later, in November 2015, the Ukrainian Courts finally restored “some aspect” of the Z-L factory to Delta Capital. Notably, while it is undisputed that whatever restoration occurred happened through the Ukrainian courts, neither party has offered any Decision, Judgment, Order, or other official documentation detailing the result of that legal process. These facts are largely undisputed and found by this Court to be sufficiently proven at trial. The remaining question, which is central to this trial, however, is what exactly was restored to Transocean and its subsidiary Delta Capital regarding the Z-L Factory and what value, if any, did it have as of the date this divorce action was commenced? While the parties agree on most of the historical facts regarding the Z-L factory, they vehemently disagree on the central question as to what extent of ownership was restored to Delta in 2015, and what value that restored interest has for equitable distribution purposes, if any. As part of his business valuation Mr. Gottlieb concluded that Delta Capital’s “stake” in the Z-L factory was restored in 2015, but that the company was so heavily laden with debt that it had no value. In addition, Mr. Gottlieb testified that the physical assets of the factory were mired in litigation in the Ukrainian court system further reducing any potential value. Mr. Gottlieb identified the source of these conclusions as a letter provided by Husband from a Ukrainian attorney. However, on redirect examination he admitted that he was not aware if the word “stake” and “control,” had any specific legal meaning under Ukrainian Law. He further testified that he had no independent knowledge of whether the “stake” that was restored was limited to intellectual property rights or if it included physical assets. (Tr. 1/17/19 pg. 209-214;217). While the Ukrainian Letter was utilized by Plaintiff’s counsel to refresh Mr. Gottlieb’s recollection, it was not accepted into evidence. Wife agrees with Mr. Gottlieb’s conclusion that Delta Capital’s “stake” or “interest” in the Z-L factory was restored in 2015. In addition, she argues that her understanding of the word “stake” includes both intellectual property, physical assets, and operational control. However, Wife strongly disagrees with the zero value Mr. Gottlieb attributes to that interest. Instead, Wife claims that Delta Capital is worth millions of dollars. Wife bases this conclusion upon the partner’s rejection of Boyko’s $22 Million Dollar offer, and the 2010 Renaissance valuation of the company. Notably, all the information relied upon by Wife regarding a potential value of the Z-L factory occurred before the government takeover of the company in 2010. Wife has offered no evidence of value relating to whatever aspect of the company was restored to Delta Capital. Even assuming Wife’s position that the entire ownership interest was restored, she has offered no evidence of what the factory was worth when this action commenced in 2015. Husband does not agree with Mr. Gottlieb’s conclusion that Delta Capital’s stake in the factory was restored. While Husband acknowledges that Mr. Gottlieb came to this conclusion based upon a letter that he provided from a Ukrainian attorney, he argues that Mr. Gottlieb’s understanding of the terminology in that letter is mistaken. Husband claims that Delta Capital’s stake or interest was never fully restored. Rather he claims that only control over the brand name was restored, but not the intellectual property, physical assets or more importantly, any decision-making authority (Tr. 1/22/19 pg. 356). In any event, Husband agrees with Mr. Gottlieb that the interest holds no value. When asked if the Z-L name, which was admittedly restored, had any value, Husband testified that he didn’t know (Tr. 1/22/19 pg. 358). While Wife repeatedly alleged that control as restored to Husband, she offered no direct evidence, no expert opinion, and no fact witnesses with personal knowledge to support her position. Rather, as discussed more fully below, she relied upon public statements made by Husband. For example, in 2015, after the Ukrainian Courts ruled in Delta’s favor, Husband made four media appearances in which he discussed the status of the ZL factory. Husband gave a Ukrainian television interview wherein he claimed that “there was no way back for Igor Boyko” that “justice had prevailed,” and that “the structure will be the same as it used to be before 2010″ (Tr. 2/27/19 pgs. 1089-92). A video of the television interview was viewed as evidence during the trial. When asked why he made these statements, Husband claimed that he was coerced by government agents who instructed him what to say in advance of his appearance. When asked if anyone “held a gun to his head” he answered “yes” (Tr. 1/24/19 638), but it is unclear if that testimony was intended to be taken literally or figuratively, especially since he was admittedly in the United States when he gave that interview (Tr. 2/27/19 pg. 1111). Husband did testify that he was literally picked up in a government truck with two armed men on a visit to the Ukraine, but that they were there to protect him. This Court does not credit Husband’s account that he was forced to say everything he said during the interview, or that he was reading from a script, although he may have been exaggerating about the extent of his legal victories. Wife credibly testified that throughout this marriage she made significant direct and indirect contributions to Husband’s various businesses. Wife maintained the marital home, cooked for the family and served as primary caretaker for the children. Husband worked many more hours than Wife outside the home leaving Wife to perform most of the parenting and homemaking duties. Wife would even take the children to work with her when there was no school as Husband was unavailable. When Husband first started his electrical business in Brooklyn, Wife went from door to door giving out flyers promoting the business, she also cleaned the office on a regular basis. As time went on, she travelled abroad with Husband, entertaining clients and customers of Trilini and Delta Capital both abroad and when they travelled to New York. She visited the ZL Factory, made suggestions as to how to improve the cleanliness and conditions for the workers there, and designed a new uniform for them to wear. b. Wife’s Business Interests. In 1990, Wife started a medical supply company known as Midwood Medical Supply which specialized in personal apparel for women suffering from breast cancer and mastectomies. She would visit her clients in their homes and alter the bras to ensure a proper fit. In 1995, Midwood lost its ability to participate in Medicaid coverage which severely hindered the businesses’ success. Shortly thereafter, Wife changed the name of the business to Anfex, Inc. Wife originally owned a fifty percent share in Anfex with the remaining 50 percent share belonging to a third party. She became the sole owner of Anfex in 1998, however she claims she transferred 30 percent interest to each of her daughters sometime in 2006-07. Her daughter I.L. is paid by Anfex, although she does not work there. Wife claims the basis for her salary is that she is the licensee for the orthopedic footwear aspect of the business. In 2012, Wife bought a second company, Mermaid Medical, a medical clinic in Brooklyn. Upon assuming ownership, she changed the name to “A Merryland Operating LLC” (“A Merryland”). Shortly thereafter, Hurricane Sandy caused substantial damage to the offices of both A Merryland and Anfex. As a result of this damage, the businesses were shut down for many months. Wife testified that although she received an SBA loan in the amount of $79,000, the money was insufficient to rebuild the businesses. Accordingly, she borrowed over $500,000 from various people and ran up her credit cards to keep these businesses running. She borrowed over $200,000 from her daughter V.L. alone. In 2013, Wife claims she transferred 9.9 percent interest in A Merryland to each of her daughters and a 9.9 percent interest to family friends who loaned money used for the reconstruction. Mr. Gottlieb credibly testified at trial that his court ordered obligation to value Wife’s businesses was severely hindered by a general lack of participation on her part. Mr. Gottlieb testified that Wife was reticent in turning over documents, and that his request for a formal interview to discuss discrepancies and gaps in the documents that were provided was initially denied. In fact, the limited participation Mr. Gottlieb received from Wife only occurred after his report was completed. After Wife realized that she didn’t agree with his evaluation, she attempted to participate after the fact in a late attempt to cure. (Tr. 1/17/19 pgs. 139-141). However, Mr. Gottlieb testified that even if he were to consider the limited information provided by Wife after the fact, it would not materially change the findings in his valuation report. After reviewing the limited information available to him, Mr. Gottlieb concluded that the books and records of Wife’s companies did not match their tax returns and were otherwise inconsistent with how the corporations operated. For example, Mr. Gottlieb concluded that Anfex was paying exorbitant and unsupportable amounts of rent that were far above customary norms. Moreover, they were not supported by documentary evidence such as a lease or cancelled checks so he reduced those sums in his evaluation (Tr. 1/15/19 pg. 66). Even the amount of Wife’s ownership interest was difficult to determine. At trial Wife alleged that she only retained a small percentage of Anfex after distributing equity to her children and debtors, however, Mr. Gottlieb found no evidence of this, and instead concluded that Wife owned 97 percent of the company, with her daughter owning only the remaining 3 percent. After analyzing the limited information available concerning Wife’s businesses and applying customary accounting principles utilized when there is lack of information, Mr. Gottlieb estimated a commencement date value of $372,000 for Wife’s alleged 90.1 percent interest in A Merryland and $390,000 for her alleged 97 percent interest in Anfex. Wife disagreed with these valuations and with the basic ownership interest that Mr. Gottlieb assigned to her for each company, so she hired her own partisan expert, Ms. Heidi Muckler, to analyze and value her businesses. Ms. Muckler was also tasked by Wife to attempt to determine Husband’s income earning capacity via a “lifestyle analysis.” Ms. Muckler, who testified in support of Wife at trial, assessed a value of zero ($0) to A. Merryland and a value of $221,000 to Anfex. When considering her trial testimony, the Court notes that despite objections from Plaintiff’s counsel, Ms. Muckler was allowed to sit alongside Defendant’s counsel during Mr. Gottlieb’s testimony. However, she was authorized to do so with a warning to counsel that the weight afforded to her testimony would be tempered by the fact that she was allowed to hear the entirety of Mr. Gottlieb’s testimony, while Mr. Gottlieb would not be afforded the same right as a neutral. Ms. Muckler took issue with Mr. Gottlieb’s approach to valuing these businesses, particularly with respect to assumptions he made regarding the square footage of each business and the typical rental fee for each space. Ms. Muckler testified that Mr. Gottlieb assumed an erroneous amount of square footage to this space and erroneously failed to account for the costs in rebuilding after Hurricane Sandy. Moreover, based upon Wife’s failure to properly document or substantiate her claims, Mr. Gottlieb wrote off a substantial amount of the corporate debt claimed by Wife. In contrast, Ms. Muckler testified that this debt severely impacted the value of Wife’s companies. Husband testified that he made direct contributions to each of Wife’s businesses. In addition to providing “loans” as startup capital, he claims that he provided “sweat equity” by acting as a contractor for the construction of business offices, and that he offered Wife business advice. There is little testimony in the record regarding indirect contributions made by Husband, as Wife was admittedly the primary caretaker of the children, and the marital home. 2. Real Property. During their marriage, the parties accumulated a considerable amount of real property, including their marital home which is located in an affluent section of Staten Island, and a vacation home located in Monticello New York. In addition to these residences, the parties collectively own numerous investment properties. As indicated above, all of the investment properties are owned by holding corporations, and the ownership of those corporations is shared between Husband and his partners. However, regardless of how the equity interests are titled, Husband’s percentage of ownership is presumed to be marital because all of the properties were obtained during the marriage. Each of these properties are discussed in detail below. 3. Leoloy Financial Group LLC At trial, Wife attempted to establish that in 2010, Husband transferred $540,000 from a Swiss bank account to acquire a 30 percent interest in a company known as “Leoloy Financial Group LLC” which bought a commercial strip mall of five or six stores in Atlanta Georgia. Husband contends that he never purchased or sold an interest in Leoloy. Rather, Husband testified that he became aware of the opportunity, and recommended that his daughter V.L. investigate to see if it would be profitable for her. An Operating Agreement related to this transaction dated December 2009 purports to be signed by V.L. as the individual making the capital investment in the project. A few days later, on or about January 10, 2010, her signature appears on a different document purporting to sell the same equity interest she obtained a few days earlier to a Canadian citizen named Eric Ronasse for the same $540,000. Husband opined that V.L. sold her interest after he advised her that there were certain implications of her purchasing property as a Russian citizen. At trial, V.L. credibly testified that she was not aware of this transaction until it was discovered in this litigation. She credibly testified that she did not sign any of the documents which were notarized by one of Husband’s business associates, Igor Dodin, Esquire. Mr. Dodin testified at this trial but claimed not to recall any details about this transaction. Wife also called Grigory Baranovsky. While Mr. Baranovsky indicated that he doesn’t personally own an interest in Leoloy, he claimed to represent his Wife, who owns a 47 percent share. Mr. Baranovsky credibly testified that he never met V.L., never saw her sign a document, and only knew Husband as a social acquaintance. He further admitted that he never had any discussions regarding the purchase or sale of an interest in Leoloy with either Husband or V.L. However, he indicated that Leoloy Financial considers the transaction between V.L. and Mr. Ronasse to be valid, and that Husband was never paid anything by the company. (Tr. 1/23/19, Pgs. 531-534). Based upon the evidence offered at trial, this Court does not credit Husband’s testimony that he was not involved in the Leoloy transaction. Rather, this Court credits V.L.’s testimony and finds that Husband likely signed his daughter’s signature on these transactional documents with the help of a complicit notary and purchased and later sold an interest in Leoloy for the sum of approximately $540,000. While these transactions, and his testimony regarding the same raise questions regarding Husband’s general credibility and character, Wife failed to show how these transactions, which occurred five years before the commencement of this action, are relevant to the financial issues in this trial. 4. Bank and Investment Accounts, Personal Property. During the course of trial, both parties identified various bank accounts, investment accounts and retirement accounts that were accumulated during the marriage. While Husband raised some issues regarding the increase in value of these accounts, they are clearly subject to a presumption of being marital property. In addition to these identified accounts, Wife spent a considerable amount of time at trial establishing that Husband had, or has, access to various “offshore” accounts with unknown values. In addition to bank accounts, both parties testified at trial to personalty that they obtained during the marriage including expensive furnishings, artwork, jewelry and watches. The distribution of these assets is discussed below. 5. Income of the Parties. After seventeen days of trial, over fifteen witnesses, two hundred fifty exhibits, and hundreds of pages of sworn testimony, this Court remains unable to clearly determine the actual income of either of the parties. This difficulty is due to the complexity of their commercial holdings and the actions each party took to obscure the reporting of their true income throughout their marriage. The trial record supports a finding that both parties have taken liberties with their tax filings and treated businesses and real estate investments as personal bank accounts rather than separate corporate entities. For Husband, moving money in and out of people’s names and signing their names to financial documents to hide and underreport his income appears to be a common business practice. Wife has shown hundreds of thousands of dollars transferred between Husband’s companies using a simple “loan repayment” reference to make it appear like there was a legitimate transfer of loaned funds. As a result, Husband’s personal bank account routinely fluctuated by hundreds of thousands of dollars. In one such example, Husband was shown a “refund” check in the amount of $83,100 from June of 2018 that he couldn’t explain (Tr. 1/23/19 pg. 503). As another example, Husband testified that he should “ask his bookkeeper” about a $50,000 check from Byrna Court which appeared to be a withdrawal of profits from that entity that was never reported (Tr. 1/23/19 pg. 509). In regard to Husband’s access to money, the parties’ daughter V.L. testified that, at her Father’s direction, she regularly transferred large sums of money in and out of off shore accounts for Husband’s personal use, reviewed fake “loan documents” designed to legitimize these transfers and created phony invoices to evade taxes. Two of these transfers were made to “Time Elements” for the purchase of two luxury watches for Husband in the amounts of $51,000 and $49,000 respectively (Ex. FFF). Husband also used his friend Igor Shikman to transfer money for him. He had Trilini pay his friend’s company (Flock Industries) for product on a phony invoice which would be paid in cash to Husband. V.L. also frequently picked up tens of thousands of dollars in cash from various people in the United States and in Moscow rather than utilizing a wire transfer which would create a paper trail for tax purposes. On a regular basis, Husband gave Wife, V.L. and others travelling abroad thousands of dollars in cash to bring with them to and from Eastern Europe. The cash would be counted carefully to ensure that the amount did not exceed $10,000., the maximum amount allowable without reporting to the United States government (Tr. 1233-34). Husband forged V.L.’s signature multiple times in connection with financial transactions and he forged Wife’s signature on the Monticello home equity loan. He set up offshore accounts in St. Maarten and in Switzerland because, as testified to by V.L., he did not want to show any profits to the IRS. V.L. credibly testified that, in 2007, at Husband’s direction, she put the entire Swiss bank account in her name using her Russian passport. Husband was concerned about having assets in his name at that time because his partner Katsnelson was “having a lot of problems with the IRS” (Tr. 1302). No account was off limits to Husband in his efforts to keep money out of his name. He even parked money in V.L.’s son’s account for a time without only to remove the entire sum at a later date with no explanation. V.L. did not even know her father utilized her son’s account. While Wife was unsuccessful in proving any specific offshore account that was subject to equitable distribution, it is obvious that Husband has access to large amounts of money which could not be specifically traced and identified at trial. To be fair, Husband was not the only one concealing and diverting income for the obvious purpose of evading taxes. Wife was involved in many similar activities. It is obvious that Wife underreported her income from Anfex and A Merryland by wrongfully withdrawing funds for her own personal use, and then claiming that they were legitimate business expenses. Mr. Gottlieb testified that Wife’s “discretionary spending” from her businesses amounted to over $350,000 a year although this exact figure is unsupported by the balance of the record, and admittedly based upon incomplete information. While this exact figure may be speculative, Wife’s improper use of her businesses is well documented. Husband persuasively challenged several credit card charges and payments from Anfex to Wife as repayment of alleged business-related expenses. He also questioned several payments Wife made between her companies and to herself and others using the same “repayment of loans” notation scheme utilized by Husband. At trial, Wife unable to substantiate many of the transfers of interests in her companies she allegedly made over the years and never reported them on her tax returns until after this action was started. She also failed to substantiate hundreds of dollars of “loans” made by her daughters and others to these companies. In fact, as found by Mr. Gottlieb, even after Wife did provide the books and records for her companies, he could not reconcile the information contained therein against the filed tax returns Wife had turned over to him previously. She also was unable to establish the propriety of several expenses and withdrawals from her business accounts. On this subject, Wife testified that any ATM withdrawals she made, or credit cards or petty cash from her business was used for the purpose of buying candles, cakes and lunches for clients and staff. This testimony was not credible particularly in light of the large amounts of money implicated. Rather, the evidence establishes that Wife used the business accounts as her own personal accounts just as Husband did in total disregard of the corporate structure and any applicable tax rules. The only difference is that Husband’s activities were of a much greater scope given the multitude of domestic and international business interests, the number of individual and corporate partners involved and the millions and dollars implicated. In short, they all engaged in the same tactics in furtherance of their common mantra: “only fools pay taxes”. Against this web of fabricated corporate records and outright lies, it is impossible for this Court to determine the “actual” income of either party. Suffice to say, while the parties maintained separate bank accounts at times throughout their marriage, there was a complicit culture of moving money around in order to underreport income generated here and abroad and to evade paying United States taxes on that income. Whether it was bringing bags of cash to and from Eastern Europe or transferring money to and from offshore accounts in St. Maarten and Switzerland, the income reported by both these parties appears to represent a mere fraction of the actual income generated by the multitude of domestic and international companies owned in whole or part by these parties. Husband conceded that at various times he earned substantially more in the past than his average $250,000 annual salary he now claims. The early 2000s were especially lucrative for him and at one point he was earning over a Million Dollars a year, but he claims that his income has steadily decreased since that time. For example, in 2014 his reported income was $227,317 which was later amended to $228,817. In 2015, Husband reported income of $266,330. After considering the entirety of the record this Court finds that Husband’s account of his current income and his claimed current and future earning capacity are not credible. Wife claims that Husband earns closer to a million dollars per year, a figure suggested by her forensic accountant, Heidi Muckler, who purported to conduct a “lifestyle analysis” of Husband on Wife’s behalf. This Court is not persuaded by Ms. Muckler’s conclusions as to Husband’s current income. Her testimony in this regard was vague and speculative (“close to a million”) and her analysis was unsupported and unconvincing. In this case, while the parties accumulated great wealth, except for their homes, business travel and a relative few personal indulgences, they did not live a flashy extravagant lifestyle. During this very long marriage, they reinvested most of their substantial profits into various other investments rather than spend it on material goods and luxuries. This may explain why, as a practical matter, a traditional lifestyle analysis was not useful here. More persuasive and reflective of Husband’s actual income potential is his Jan 4, 2019 sworn Statement of Net Worth which indicates annual earnings of $644,244. Notably, this figure is consistent with the most recently filed tax return available to this Court which indicates an adjusted gross income of $637,528 (2017; pl ex. 16). Husband conceded that his income in 2017 was $637,534 but claimed that was inflated due to the one-time sale of 37 Terrace Place. (Tr. 335:24-336;22; Ex. 9). See e.g. Blay v. Blay, 51 AD3d 1189 (3rd Dept. 2008). There is no dispute that this property was sold in 2017, and that the $375,000 proceeds were recorded on his tax return. However, contrary to Husband’s position, the sale of real estate is a business activity that Husband has consistently been engaged in since the parties purchased their first home when they immigrated to the United States. Accordingly, the Court finds that while the specific sale of 37 Terrace Place may have been a one-time event, the sale of both real property and business entities is a reoccurring source of income for Husband. Moreover, the trial record is replete with instances when Husband withdrew funds from businesses, or real estate holdings to “supplement” his income. He repeatedly did so to fund new business ventures, or to purchase property. These routine withdrawals, often identified or misidentified, as “loans” must be considered when a determination of Husband’s earning capacity is made. See Abellard v. Amie, 18 AD3d 653 (2d Dept. 2005); see also Kosovsky v. Zahl, 257 AD2d 522 (1st Dept. 1999); Kessler v. Kessler, 235 N.Y.L.J. 75 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Cty. 2006); affd. 33 AD3d 42 (2d Dept. 2006). Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence in this trial and the testimony of the parties and their experts, this Court finds that Husband is capable of earning at least $400,000 a year through his employment and business and real estate ventures. This figure includes consideration of the reoccurring sale of properties, and the withdrawal of money or “loans” from marital businesses. It is also supported by Husband’s Statement of Net Worth (Pl. Ex. V) which claims monthly expenses in excess of $30,000 a month ($360,000 a year). The standard for the imputation of income is not what one year’s tax return indicates, but rather what a person is reasonably capable of earning through his efforts. See Ramdas v. Ramdas, 176 AD3d 988 (2d Dept. 2019); see also Brendle v. Roberts-Brendle, 169 AD3d 752 (2d Dept. 2019). Wife has established that Husband is a savvy businessman and real estate mogul who is capable of earning at least $400,000 a year through his efforts. Accordingly, this Court finds that it has a basis to impute the sum of $400,000 a year to Husband for the purposes of consideration for the issues of maintenance and equitable distribution. However, the Court is aware that Husband’s actual income may vary from year to year depending on the success of his business ventures, and or the sale or purchase of additional real property. A similar analysis of Wife’s income tax returns would not be fruitful to determine her income or earning capacity. Both tax returns offered into evidence by Wife indicate considerable losses attributable to her businesses that are relevant to tax preparation, but not to a determination of maintenance. In 2016, Wife’s tax return indicates a loss of — $419,310 and in 2017 she indicated a loss of — $362,689. A portion of Wife’s earning capacity can be gleaned from her Sworn Statement of Net Worth dated November 30, 2018 (Def Ex. PPPP). According to this document, Wife earns the sum of $500.00 every two weeks ($13,000 annually) as a salary from her company Anfex, Inc. and the sum of $2,075 a month from Social Security benefits. Thus, Wife earns, or is capable of earning at least $37,900 a year from reported sources. However, this Court must also consider Wife’s unreported income. When asked to explain his valuation methods of Wife’s businesses on cross examination, Mr. Gottlieb testified that Wife uses both of her business ventures to pay personal expenses. He further opined that these personal expenses should be considered “discretionary earnings,” even if they are unreported. While acknowledging that the financial documentation provided to him was incomplete, he determined that Wife withdrew at least $358,000 from her businesses for personal expenses. Although this Court finds that Wife uses her businesses as personal accounts, and inappropriately withdraws funds from them without reporting the same, there is little support for the sum found by Mr. Gottlieb elsewhere in the record. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence in the record, this Court finds that while Wife’s base income is at least $37,900 a year, she is capable of supplementing that income by at least $60,000 a year from her businesses if she withdrew funds as a taxable salary instead of improper personal expenses. Therefore, Wife is hereby imputed a combined total income of $97,900 for consideration as a factor in this Court’s determination of equitable distribution, maintenance, and counsel fees. While this Court is unable to determine an exact income figure for either party, it is clear that both parties are capable of earning a significant amount of income from their business ventures. This Court finds that the income reported on each party’s respective tax returns is derived from the misuse of expenses and intentional underreporting of income and therefore not useful nor appropriate for determination of the issues tried before this Court. Equitable Distribution When determining the equitable distribution of marital property, the Court must consider the factors set forth in DRL §236(B)(5)(d). Upon consideration, this Court has found that many of these factors do not apply to this case, or only do so tangentially. Accordingly, some factors were afforded minimal weight, if any, by this Court. For example, there are no minor children of this marriage, there is no realistic possibility of loss of health benefits as both parties are on Medicaid, and there are no pensions or retirement benefits at issue. In regard to tax implications, no evidence was offered by either party as to the likely tax impact of any potential award granted herein. Accordingly, this Court discusses below only those factors that were most significant to this Decision. Specifically, the Court has considered the following factors: (a) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time of commencement; (b) Wife’s maintenance award (c); the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties; (d) the liquid or non-liquid character of marital property; (e) the probable future financial circumstances of each party; (f) any equitable claim to, interest in, or indirect contribution to the acquisition of marital property by the party not having title; (g) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or interest in a business, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim by the other party; and (h) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse. See Santamaria v. Santamaria, 177 AD3d 802 (2d Dept. 2019). Equitable distribution law is premised upon the theory that marriage is not only an emotional and physical union between spouses, but also an economic partnership. See Burke v. Burke, 175 AD3d 458 (2d Dept. 2019). “As such, during the life of a marriage spouses share in both its profits and losses.” Ospina-Cherner v. Cherner, 178 AD3d 1059 (2d Dept. 2019). Despite this well settled principle, Husband attempted to establish that although the parties were married close to fifty years, and managed to transform a starting net worth of one-hundred dollars into a multimillion-dollar estate, that they somehow did not form an economic partnership, or that any partnership was minimal such that equitable distribution of certain assets should be strongly tilted in his favor. This finding, which is rarely made in matrimonial actions, especially those of long duration, is certainly not supported by the record here. See e.g. Achuthan v. Achuthan, 2020 NY Slip Op 00255 (2d Dept. 2020); see also Behan v. Kornstein, 164 AD3d 1113 (1st Dept. 2018); Cf., Francis v. Francis, 286 AD2d 749 (2d Dept. 2001) [economic partnership not found where parties lived separate and apart for 37 years and wife started a new family]. Husband admits that the parties began as financial partners coming to the United States with a mere $100 between them, and relying upon one another. He further admits that they initially had joint bank accounts and contributed financially to each other’s welfare during the early years of their marriage. However, he testified that at some point in 1986 Wife withdrew money from an account without his approval to spend on “clothing and stuff” for herself and the subject children. (Tr. 1/22/19 pg. 294). As a result, Husband removed her name from all the marital accounts, and opened his own private accounts. The parties have admittedly maintained separate bank accounts since that time. However, there is no evidence in the record that Wife had any say in the initial decision to close the joint accounts or supported the idea of separate accounts. The fact that the parties ceased having joint accounts in 1986 does not result in a conclusion that they somehow severed the economic partnership that they formed when they married. This is especially true whereas here, the record establishes that they filed joint tax returns for many years (until 2011), constructed two jointly titled homes, and raised two children while jointly contributing to household expenses. See Iwanow v. Iwanow, 39 AD3d 471 (2d Dept. 2007); see also O’Brien v. O’Brien, 66 NY2d 576 (1985). The record further supports a finding that the parties used marital equity withdrawn from jointly owned real property to fund their businesses, and to buy additional real estate. The parties inversely used loans from their businesses to fund additional marital purchases. These transactions all evidence the marital partnership contemplated by the equitable distribution law. Moreover, while Husband denies that Wife contributed to his businesses, he testified at length to alleged contributions that he made to businesses titled in Wife’s name. These contributions further establish the “economic partnership” contemplated by the equitable distribution law. While Husband testified that he considers the contributions to be “loans,” his distinction is without meaning. Any money that he “loaned” to Wife was marital, and thus a portion thereof already belonged to her. In any event, any loan entered into during the marriage, by either party, would become a marital debt that would be subject to equitable distribution, not a debt owed to one spouse or the other. See Popowich v. Korman, 73 AD3d 515 (1st Dept. 2010); see also Westreich v. Westreich, 169 AD3d 972 (2d Dept. 2019). As set forth above, there is ample evidence in the record to support the presumption that everything acquired by either party during this long-term marriage is marital property regardless of how it is titled. See Nerayoff v. Rokhsar, 168 AD3d 1071 (2d Dept. 2019); see also DeLuca v. DeLuca, 97 NY2d 139 (2001). Thus, Husband’s repeated reference to the contribution of “his” funds to “Wife’s” businesses or the investment of “his” funds into “his” businesses is simply inaccurate. No separate property assets have been proven to exist in this proceeding. Husband’s reliance throughout his summation on this theory served to distract from a more thorough analysis of these complex assets. Finally, when considering issues of equitable distribution, the term “marital property” is to be construed broadly, while the concept of “separate property” is to be construed narrowly. See Price v. Price, 69 NY2d 8 (1986). “Were courts to engage in precise financial tracing, they would be paralyzed by divorcing parties seeking review of every debit and credit incurred during their marriage.” Klauer v. Abeliovich, 149 AD3d 617 (1st Dept. 2017). Thus, the specific economic decisions made by parties during the course of a long-term marriage are not subject to review, rather the court must effectuate an equitable distribution of marital assets, taking into account all relevant factors. See Mahoney-Buntzman v. Buntzman, 12 NY3d 415 (2009). When a marriage is of long duration, and both parties have equally contributed to it, the distribution of assets should be effectuated as equally as possible. See Miller v. Miller, 128 AD2d 844 (2d Dept. 1987). Factors Considered (a) Income and property of each party at the time of the marriage and at the time of commencement. As no separate property has been identified during these proceedings, the first factor considered by this Court in determining an appropriate distribution of marital assets is the relative incomes of each party. It is undisputed that when the parties were married, they were of meager means, with a starting net worth of one hundred dollars. As indicated above, despite hours of testimony and voluminous documentary evidence, this Court was unable to determine an accurate income for either party as of the time of commencement. Rather the record supports a finding that both parties have consistently hidden income, avoided taxes, and inappropriately used their businesses as personal bank accounts, rather than as corporate entities. Notwithstanding both parties’ financial misconduct, it is clear Husband earns, or is capable of earning, considerably more than Wife. Based upon the most credible information available in the trial record, this Court has imputed an annual income of $400,000 to Husband as a reflection of his established earning capacity. See Klein v. Klein, 178 AD3d 802 (2d Dept. 2019). Similarly, this Court was unable to determine an accurate income for Wife. Therefore, after considering all the evidence in the record, together with the testimony of the parties and Mr. Gottlieb, this Court imputed an income of $97,900 to Wife, reflecting both her reported sources of income, and the many personal expenses that were funneled through her companies. See Castello v. Castello, 144 AD3d 723 (2d Dept. 2016); see also Beroza v. Hendler, 71 AD3d 615 (2d Dept. 2010). The Court finds that this combined figure of $97,900 is reflective of Wife’s earning capacity from all sources. Despite the lack of candor exhibited by both parties to this Court, and to the federal and state taxation authorities, there is no doubt that Husband’s income is substantially greater than Wife’s for consideration as a factor for equitable distribution purposes. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of Wife when this Court determines each party’s equitable share of their assets. However, the weight of this factor is to some degree mitigated by a consideration of the maintenance awarded to Wife herein (See “Maintenance Award” below). (b) Maintenance Award. During the course of this proceeding Wife has received pendente lite support in the amount of $4,500 per month. In addition, Husband was responsible for the payment of many of the carrying charges related to the home where Wife resides. For the reasons set forth below, this Court has granted Wife non-durational “lifetime” maintenance in the sum of $6,500 per month or $78,000 per year. When this sum is added to Wife’s imputed income it results in a total combined income of $175,900, while reducing Husband’s income to $322,000 While this award is supported by various factors set forth herein and should be adequate to maintain Wife’s established standard of living, it is considerably less than the $12,500 a month requested by Wife. The amount and duration of this final maintenance award has been given considerable weight by this Court in determining how to equitably divide the assets identified at trial. Any perceived reduction by Wife in her maintenance request should be considered as mitigated by the distribution of assets as set forth herein. (c) Duration of the Marriage, Age and Health of the Parties. The parties have been married since 1969. Husband is 70 years old and Wife is 69 years old. Husband is in relatively good health while Wife has various health concerns as detailed herein. In accordance with their respective ages both parties are entitled to receive social security benefits, however, both are currently employed, managing their business entities. Among other health concerns, Wife suffers from lingering dental injuries casually related to an assault by Husband early in the marriage which caused considerable damage to her mouth and jaw. She also suffers from depression and anxiety at least partially related to instances of domestic violence in her marriage. In addition to health issues related to Husband, Wife also had additional medical conditions over the years which necessitated hospitalization, but those conditions have resolved. Both parties are active and working at their ages, however, there is no doubt that Wife’s health is more precarious than Husband’s. Moreover, it is relevant to the issue of equitable distribution that Wife still suffers from chronic pain and discomfort from injuries caused to her by Husband. See Havell v. Islam, 301 AD2d 339 (1st Dept. 2002). Her persistent, chronic pain, deteriorating health and consistent need for dental care causes this Court to weigh this factor in Wife’s favor, especially in relation to Wife’s desire to retain possession of the marital real property. To that point, and as Husband has no interest in occupying the same, Wife shall be granted the opportunity to attempt to retain these homes by purchasing Husband’s equitable share thereof, as discussed more fully below. (d) The Liquid or Non-Liquid Character of All Marital Property. In this case, there are both liquid and non-liquid assets available to both parties. Both parties will receive an equitable share of the bank accounts, investment accounts and the other accounts accumulated during the marriage. However, the record supports a finding that Husband has more liquid assets available to him for his future use than Wife does. While Wife was unable to establish specific values at trial, there is ample evidence in the record that Husband has access to funds located in off shore accounts that were not fully disclosed at trial. This resource, which has consistently been used by Husband to sequester assets from Wife, and arguably taxation authorities, is not available to Wife. The marital homes and the parties’ business are non-liquid assets that cannot be easily accessed to pay monthly expenses, or to pay down Wife’s considerable debt. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of Wife for equitable distribution purposes. (e) The Probable Future Financial Circumstances of the Parties (Earning Capacity). While both parties are currently employed by their businesses, Husband’s business interests are lucrative while Wife’s businesses are struggling. Moreover, even after considering Husband’s right to retire in the future, as his partners have done, he will have access to far greater passive income not dependent on his active efforts than Wife will when she retires. Thus, Husband has a much better chance of retaining his standard of living when he retires as much of his earnings are based on invested interests rather than being dependent on his active efforts. Conversely, Wife’s businesses are more dependent on her ability to continuing working on a full-time basis which may not be feasible for much longer given her advanced age and health. In addition, unlike Husband, Wife does not have access to an international community of wealthy investors, financing opportunities, and savvy business partners as is available to Husband should he fall on difficult times in the future. Finally, Wife has indicated a desire to use most, if not all, of the distributive awards she is awarded herein as credits to purchase Husband’s equitable share of the marital real property. While this would be Wife’s choice, the fact remains that much of her wealth will likely be tied up in non-income producing real property that will be subject to market changes and depreciation. Moreover, while Wife will be receiving a considerable amount of lifetime maintenance to support herself, she will also have substantial expenses associated with the real property. For these reasons, this Court finds that Wife’s future financial circumstances are far more precarious than Husband’s. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of Wife. However, this Court has given this factor less significance than others indicated herein as Wife is electing to retain her wealth in real property as opposed to selling the homes, downsizing, and utilizing the sale proceeds to support herself. (f) Any Equitable Claim or Interest to, or Direct or Indirect Contribution made, to the acquisition of Marital Property by the Party not Having Title. Based upon the way the parties structured their economic partnership, each parties’ direct and indirect contributions to the business interests titled in the other party’s name is one of the more significant factors to be considered by this Court. While these parties have been married for over 50 years, each of their business interests are titled separately. As discussed above, the parties agree that Husband owns a titled interest in the following entities that are subject to equitable distribution, and have stipulated to the value of his interests as found by Mr. Gottlieb: (1) Enterprise Electrical Contractors, Inc. ($30,000); (2) Enterprise Electrical Systems ($710,000); (3) Trilini International Ltd. ($908,000.); (4) Eurocandy, LLC ($19,000); (4) New Castle Commodities, LLC ($3,000); and (4) Transocean Capital LLC ($74,000). While parties stipulated to these values, they could not agree upon the value, if any, of Husband’s alleged interest in Delta Capital and its alleged ownership of the Z-L Factory. Likewise, while the parties agree that Wife owns an interest in two companies, A Merryland and Anfex, they disagree as to the percentage of equity owned by Wife, and the commencement date value of that equity. All of the business entities operated by Husband are titled solely in his name and the names of his business partners. The same is true of Wife’s businesses. However, each business at issue, regardless of how titled, was acquired during the marriage and is therefore marital property subject to the principles of equitable distribution. See Westbrook v. Westbrook, 164 AD3d 939 (2d Dept. 2018). Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that any separate property funds were used to establish or maintain these businesses. While Husband attempted to show that he contributed money to sustain Wife’s businesses, the money that he contributed was marital in nature as it was derived from marital income, marital property, and marital business interests. As a general principle, this Court must presume that everything acquired during this long term marriage is marital as the parties started with no pre-marital assets, and there is no evidence of inheritances, personal injury awards, or the like. Husband had the burden of establishing the contribution of premarital funds to Wife’s businesses, and he failed to do so. See Steinberg v. Steinberg, 59 AD3d 702 (2d Dept. 2009). Accordingly, this Court must establish a commencement date value for each marital business interest, and then equitably distribute that interest. See Cotton v. Roedelbronn, 170 AD3d 595 (1st Dept. 2019). In so doing, the Court is required to consider each party’s direct and indirect contributions made to the acquisition and growth of those companies. See Repetti v. Repetti, 147 AD3d 1094 (2d Dept. 2017). Wife seeks an award of at least 30 percent of the commencement date value of Husband’s companies while Husband argues that 10 percent is the highest this Court should consider awarding Wife. Similarly, Husband seeks an award of at least 30 percent of the commencement date value of Wife’s businesses, while Wife argues that no award should be granted to Husband at all. Turning first to the businesses titled solely in Husband’s name, as discussed more fully below, the parties have stipulated to the value of Husband’s business interests with the exception of his alleged ownership interests in Delta Capital and the Z-L Factory. In regard to Wife’s direct and indirect contributions, she credibly testified that she was more actively involved in Husband’s businesses early in the marriage. For example, Wife delivered advertising brochures for Enterprise Electrical and assisted in cleaning the office. In addition, Wife supported Husband by accompanying him on trips overseas and by entertaining clients and business associates. Wife admitted that her direct contributions decreased during the course of the marriage. Rather, Wife increasingly spent time taking care of the parties’ children, and in the later years she focused primarily on developing her own business interests. When testifying, Wife was admittedly confused as to which of Husband’s companies she was “directly contributing to” when she assisted him. However, regardless of whether Wife could attach a specific action to a specific business, she credibly testified that she directly and indirectly contributed to Husband’s success as a businessman. Wife’s direct and indirect efforts are discussed more specifically below in relation to the respective distribution of each marital business. In addition to his “active businesses,” Husband owns a titled interest in various passive real estate holding companies that were also acquired during this long-term marriage. As marital funds were used as startup capital for these businesses, and to acquire the real property owned by them, this Court finds that each party contributed equally to the creation of these assets for equitable distribution purposes. However, Husband credibly testified that he was primarily responsible for arranging the maintenance and upkeep of the buildings, and for collecting rent, while Wife took a more passive role. Husband argues that Wife should be awarded no more than 10 percent of the value of each holding company, while Wife argues that she should be awarded at least 50 percent. Unlike his active businesses, there is no evidence in the record to support treating these holding companies as though they were “conducting business” in a traditional sense or that they have any independent “goodwill.” See Cohen v. Cohen, 279 AD2d 599 (2d Dept. 2001); cf. Congel v. Malfitano, 141 AD3d 64 (2d Dept. 2016). Rather, as with many holding companies, the value of the company is equal to its “net assets,” to wit, the market value of the real estate that it holds. See Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 107 AD2d 139 (2d Dept. 1985); See also, McDaniel v. 162 Columbia Hgts. Hous. Corp., 25 Misc 3d 1024 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 2009); Pickard v. Pickard, 33 AD3d 202 (1st Dept. 2006). In addition to the businesses titled in Husband’s name, the parties also acquired two businesses titled in Wife’s name, A Merryland and Anfex. Unlike Husband’s business interests the parties could not stipulate as to a value or an ownership percentage for these entities. At trial, the neutral business appraiser, Mr. Gottlieb, concluded that Wife owned a 90.1 percent interest in A Merryland at a value of $372,000, and a 97 percent interest in Anfex at a value of $390,000 as of the time of commencement. In opposition, Wife offered her own valuation expert, Ms. Muckler, who found that Wife owns an undetermined interest in A Merryland at a value of zero ($0) and a 40 percent interest in Anfex at a value of $66,000. Ms. Muckler further testified that she utilized Mr. Gottlieb’s methodology for Anfex, but found errors in his application and assumptions. She offered that even if the Court were to accept the ownership percentage utilized by Mr. Gottlieb (97 percent ), that the value of Wife’s interest under her calculations would be $221,000. (Tr. 4/17/19 pg. 17). In support of his valuation of Wife’s businesses, Mr. Gottlieb credibly testified that he used customary valuation methods and statistical analysis to reach his conclusions, but that he was required to make certain assumptions. He opined that his analysis was frustrated and hindered by a general lack of participation from Wife. Accordingly, to the extent that Wife feels that Mr. Gottlieb overvalued these companies or misstated her equity share, allegations that she failed to prove at trial, any over-valuation would be primarily due to Wife’s failure to substantively comply with requests for financial documentation, or an in-person interview, until after the report was issued. Thus, any prejudice to Wife caused by alleged errors in the valuation would be caused by her own tactical refusal to cooperate and not through any shortcoming in Mr. Gottlieb’s methodology or analysis. While Wife makes much of the fact that she ultimately did turn over some documents and gave authorizations for access to her accountants, this did not serve to cure Wife’s initial lack of participation. When Mr. Gottlieb finally received this information, his report was already finished. Moreover, Mr. Gottlieb found that the limited books and records supplied by Wife could not be reconciled with her corporate and personal tax returns and thus would not serve to meaningfully change his valuation. Finally, while Wife ultimately agreed to be interviewed to address these discrepancies, she did so after the fact, and still failed to adequately explain what Mr. Gottlieb found. This Court had a similar experience when trying to understand the nature, operation, and value of Wife’s businesses at trial. When asked to explain some of her business entries or deductions, Wife was unable or unwilling to do so. She claimed complete ignorance as to many of the figures listed on the tax returns, what they represent, whether they were correct, or even who put them there. As the primary owner and sole operator of these businesses, Wife is the person in the best position to explain their activities. Her failure to do so does not give this Court a high degree of confidence in the accuracy of the information she ultimately provided to Mr. Gottlieb. Moreover, the fact that Ms. Muckler utilized Wife’s information (at least in part) for her determination of value leads this Court to similarly afford that valuation very little weight. While this Court recognizes that some of the “assumptions” relied on by Mr. Gottlieb may not have been accurate, such as the square footage of A Merryland, this Court is unable to determine the actual effect these “errors” had on his overall valuation. However, this Court can definitively state that Wife did not prove that the value of A Merryland should be calculated at zero ($0) as opined by her expert. Moreover, if Wife would have fully participated in Mr. Gottlieb’s analysis, she could have corrected any error in the square footage. In calculating the value of Wife’s businesses, Mr. Gottlieb also wrote off much of the business debt claimed by Wife because it was not documented. Given Wife’s self-serving, vague and contradictory testimony as to these loans, when they were made and the specific terms of repayment, this Court agrees that they were not supported in such a way that they could be captured properly. However, Mr. Gottlieb did allow for some adjustments for the debts claimed by Wife, even if they were unsupported by documentary evidence. To this end, Mr. Gottlieb testified that he gave Wife “the benefit of the doubt” when he could (Tr. 1/17/19, pg. 185). Ms. Muckler’s proposed values were based largely on self-serving interviews with Wife and the parties’ adult daughter V.L. regarding the parties’ spending habits. Thus, she did not base her findings on an in-depth analysis of the books and records of Anfex or A Merryland. In fact, Ms. Muckler admitted that her report was based upon information that she did not personally audit, and thus she could not certify the report’s accuracy. (Tr. 4/17/19 pg. 28). She further disclosed that her opinion excluded information regarding the operation of Wife’s businesses, in depth financial analysis, and other supporting documentation that would typically be found in her reports. Rather, she relied upon Mr. Gottlieb’s report, which she argued was deeply flawed, and then made adjustments based on the objections she had with it. Against this background, this Court finds the court appointed neutral valuation of Wife’ businesses to be far more reliable. The parties also disagree as to the percentage of equity held by Wife in her companies as of the commencement date. As for Anfex, Mr. Gottlieb found that Wife owned a 97 percent interest and valued that interest at $390,000 while Wife claims she owned a 40 percent interest which should be valued at $66,000. Ms. Muckler utilized both approaches and concluded that if Wife owned a 97 percent controlling share the value would be $221,000 while if she owned a 40 percent minority share it would be worth $66,000. In support of her expert’s valuation, Wife claims that her ownership was diluted by various equity transfers to her daughters. Specifically, Wife testified that she transferred 30 percent to her daughter V.L. and 30 percent to her daughter I.L., retaining 40 percent for herself. (Tr. 3/6/19 pg. 1255). Wife initially alleged that these transfers occurred at least ten years before the commencement of this matrimonial action, or at early as 1998. However, upon cross examination, Wife admitted that those dates did not correlate with her tax returns, which indicate that the equity transfers occurred after the commencement of this action, arguably in violation of the “Automatic Orders” set forth in 22 NYCRR §202.16(a). As established by the documentary evidence offered at trial, Wife reported that she was a 97 percent owner of Anfex on her 2015 tax return (Pl Ex. 102). It was not until Wife’s 2016 tax returns, filed a year after this action was commenced, that her interest was reportedly reduced to 40 percent (Pl Ex. 103). Despite being shown this obvious discrepancy, Wife testified that she “could not recall” when she made the transfers, in contradiction to her prior testimony that they occurred 10 years before commencement. (Tr. 4/10/19 pgs. 22-27). After considering Wife’s testimony, this Court agrees with Mr. Gottlieb that Wife’s interest must be found to be 97 percent as reported on her 2015 tax returns and on Anfex’s K-1s. Parties are generally bound to statements made in their tax returns. See Czernicki v. Lawniczak, 74 AD3d 1121 (2d Dept. 2010); see also, Mahoney-Buntzman v. Buntzman, 12 NY3d 415 (2009). Similar issues arise out of Wife’s claimed interest in A Merryland. Based upon the information he was provided, Mr. Gottlieb concluded that Wife owned a 90.1 percent interest in that company at the commencement of this action. Wife, on the other hand, claims that she only owned a 60.4 percent interest.¹ As with Anfex, Wife attempted to establish that she transferred equity to her daughters, and to a couple known as the “Lemburgs,” all of whom allegedly loaned her money to keep the business afloat. While this Court credits that Wife may have borrowed money from family and friends to keep her business afloat, there is no evidence in the record that she transferred equity prior to the commencement of this action. Rather, like Anfex, these alleged transfers are contradicted by her 2014 and 2015 tax returns which indicate that she owned 90.1 percent (Pl. Ex. 100). Wife did not report the 60.4 percent figure that she now claims until she filed her 2016 return, after the present action was commenced. Wife’s expert did not serve to support her arguments as she testified that she “didn’t care” who owned the business because she valued it at zero, and any percentage of “zero is zero.” (Tr. 4/17/19 pgs. 54-55). After considering the testimony of Wife, Mr. Gottlieb and Ms. Muckler and carefully reading their respective analyses regarding the valuation of A Merryland and Anfex, this Court finds both the ownership percentages, and respective values found by Mr. Gottlieb to be more indicative of the true commencement date value of these companies than the alternative values offered by Wife and her expert. For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that at the time this action was commenced, in or around May of 2015, Wife held a 90.1 percent ownership interest in A Merryland at a value of $372,000 and an 97 percent ownership interest in Anfex at a value of $390,000. (g) The Impossibility or Difficulty in Valuing Business Interests. As set forth above, the questionable, and arguably improper, business practices of both parties have made it impossible for this Court to definitively ascertain either their true income or the true measure of their wealth. The purported books and records of both parties are filled with vague and unsupported loan entries, loan repayments, phony invoices, and similar entries used to justify countless withdrawals and transfers of money throughout their marriage. While Wife blames Husband for her perceived difficulty in valuing his business interests, such as the Z-L factory, and Husband argues that Wife’ refused to provide information regarding Anfex and A Merryland, the fact is that both parties contributed to a lifestyle that resulted in the valuation difficultly that they now face. Much of Wife’s focus during this matrimonial proceeding, and specifically during trial, was the identification and valuation of Husband’s alleged ownership interest in the so called “Z-L Factory.” Wife argues that this asset, which she claims is worth at least $40,000,000 is the most important asset in this case. To the contrary, Husband argues that the Z-L Factory simply no longer exists as a marital asset, and has not existed since the company was taken over by the Ukrainian government in 2010. In part due to these wildly divergent positions, the issue of the Z-L factory was extremely difficult to address during discovery or to resolve at trial. Despite Wife’s best efforts, and the testimony of two forensic accountants, no one could clearly establish either the existence or value of this alleged asset. Wife’s frustration in investigating the factory was compounded by the fact that any substantive information needed to prove its existence and or value is located in the Ukraine during a period of historic political and military upheaval. While Wife would disagree, the difficulty in obtaining discovery regarding the Z-L factory cannot be blamed on Husband. During the pre-trial proceedings Wife tried, but failed to establish, that Husband willingly and contumaciously refused to comply with her discovery demands, and thus frustrated her ability to meet her burden of proof in regard to the factory. This resulted in multiple preclusion motions brought by Wife, each of which were denied by this Court. Contrary to the argument set forth in Wife’s discovery motions, virtually all the information that she offered at trial was supplied by Husband’s attorneys, including the only definitive statement as to ownership, which was drafted by a Ukrainian investigative attorney. While Wife disagrees with the contents of that letter, it remains the only representation from a Ukrainian professional on the subject. Moreover, while Wife chides Husband and Mr. Gottlieb for failing to obtain financial documentation regarding the Z-L Factory from the “Ukrainian Statistics Bureau” where she claims they exist, she did not take steps to obtain these alleged records, and to offer them at trial either. Her speculative arguments that Husband could have retrieved them but deliberately failed to do so are not persuasive given the voluminous discovery Husband turned over to Wife and Mr. Gottlieb in this case. In any event, it was Wife’s burden to establish the existence, and value of the Z-L Factory, as she is the “party seeking an interest in the business.” See Nacos v. Nacos, 168 AD3d 413 (1st Dept. 2019); see also Post v. Post, 68 AD3d 741 (2d Dept. 2009); Repetti v. Repetti, 147 AD3d 1094 (2d Dept. 2017). It was not Husband’s burden to disprove his own position that the asset no longer existed for reasons beyond his control. (h) Wasteful Dissipation of Assets by Either Party. At trial, Wife attempted to establish that Husband repeatedly and wrongfully dissipated marital assets during the marriage. To this end, Wife relies on Husband’s “failed” investment of approximately $540,000 in an entity known as the “LeoLoy Financial Group”; payments relating to a union related lawsuit filed against Enterprise Electrical; the use of income tax refunds during the marriage; and a $500,000 Home Equity Loan that Husband withdrew from the Monticello home. A wasteful dissipation occurs when a party wrongfully reduces or extinguishes marital assets without a reasonable explanation, or with the intention of depriving the other spouse of that asset. See e.g. Wilner v. Wilner, 192 AD2d 524 (2d Dept. 1993) [excessive gambling]; see also Mage v. Mage, 174 AD3d 884 (2d Dept. 2019) [intentional post commencement sale of stock]; cf. Kohl v. Kohl, 24 AD3d 219 (1st Dept. 2005). The party alleging the wasteful dissipation bears the burden of proving such waste by a preponderance of the evidence. See Marino v. Marino, 2020 NY Slip Op 02922 (2d Dept. 2020). While there is considerable discretion in what amounts to waste, a wasteful dissipation of assets generally does not occur when marital funds are utilized to pay legitimate expenses or used to fund failed investments absent evidence of wrongdoing. See Eschemuller v. Eschemuller, 167 AD3d 983 (2d Dept. 2018); see also Kohl v. Kohl, 24 AD3d 219 (1st Dept. 2005). While this Court does find that Husband invested in LeoLoy using V.L.’s name, this investment was apparently sold just days after its acquisition for the same amount that it was purchased for. Accordingly, Wife failed to prove that a loss was sustained as a result of this investment. In any event, economic decisions made during the marriage, even if unsuccessful, generally do not amount to a wasteful dissipation. See Spencer-Forrest v. Forrest, 159 AD3d 762 (2d Dept. 2018); see also Kessler v. Kessler, 118 AD3d 946 (2d Dept. 2014). Similarly, the use of marital funds to pay legal fees in connection with an action or potential action involving Enterprise Electrical cannot be found to constitute wasteful dissipation, as it was a necessary expense of a marital business. To the contrary, it may well have been wasteful for Husband to not retain lawyers to safeguard the assets of this marital company and to attempt to limit its liability. The parties’ choice to deposit joint tax refunds into an account tilted in Husband’s name does not amount to a wasteful dissipation either. It is undisputed that in the later part of their marriage all of their bank accounts were separately titled, accordingly, there was no joint account for a tax refund to be deposited into. Moreover, the parties tax preparer, Irene Kostetsky, credibly testified that she utilized the same account for many years, that both parties were aware of the procedure, and no one objected (Tr. 2/25/19 pg. 1025). In any event, there is no evidence that these funds, which were deposited years before the commencement of this action (2010 and 2013 respectively) were not utilized for marital expenses. The Court will not look back into the parties’ marriage to second guess the financial decisions that they made. See Mahoney-Buntzman v. Buntzman, 12 NY3d 415 (2009). Finally, Husband’s unilateral procurement of a $500,000 Home Equity Loan (HELOC) secured by the Monticello property by forging Wife’s signature was clearly improper and has been considered by this Court as a measure of Husband’s character. However, for the limited purpose of analyzing Wife’s wasteful dissipation claim, there is no evidence that the procurement of this HELOC resulted in a financial loss. Husband testified that he has repaid most of this loan with approximately $125,000 remaining as of the date of his testimony. Wife contends that the exact balance has not been established by documentary evidence. However, as this Court has assessed the full amount outstanding on this loan solely to Husband, there will be no economic loss to Wife. Accordingly, as neither party has established that the other wrongfully dissipated marital assets, this factor does not weigh in favor of either party herein or is otherwise not relevant to the distribution of assets. Distribution Having now considered the above factors, this Court proceeds to distribute the marital assets as indicated below. In making its determination, the Court notes that this is a marriage of very long duration, accordingly, marital assets should be distributed as equally as possible. See Kamm v. Kamm, 2020 NY Slip Op 02465 (2d Dept. 2020). However equitable distribution does not mandate equal distribution, especially in regard to business interests where one party contributed significantly more than the other. See Jones v. Jones, 2020 NY Slip Op 02463 (2d Dept. 2020); see also, Teitler v. Teitler, 156 AD2d 314 (1st Dept. 1989). However, unlike active businesses with inequal contributions, passive and or liquid assets, such as real estate or bank accounts, should be divided equally where possible. See Achuthan v. Achuthan, 117 N.Y.S.3d 667 (2d Dept. 2020). This is especially true in a marriage that has spanned 47 years, and where neither party entered the marriage with pre-marital assets. See Suydam v. Suydam, 203 AD2d 806 (3rd Dept. 1994). While these parties may have contributed to certain assets unequally, they accumulated everything that they currently own together. A. Marital Businesses Titled in Husband’s Name. 1. The Enterprise Electrical Companies At trial it was established that Husband has a 50 percent ownership interest in two related companies, Enterprise Electrical Contractors, Inc., and Enterprise Electrical Systems, Inc. Enterprise Electrical Contractors was one of the first companies created by Husband, as it was formed in late 1986 or early 1987. At its height Electrical Contractors was engaged in the rewiring of commercial and residential buildings. While Electrical Contractors is technically still in business, it has ceased active operations. The company remains in existence primarily because it holds the licenses and permits that are utilized by a related company, Enterprise Electrical Systems Inc.. Electrical Systems, which was created in 2006, is described by Husband as a smaller version of what Electrical Contractors originally was. This company is still in business although it subcontracts most of its remaining work out to outside electricians. Husband has indicated an intention to close both companies in the near future as his long-time business partner has retired. At trial Wife had a difficult time differentiating between these two entities. 1(a) Enterprise Electrical Contractors The trial record supports a finding that this business was no longer actively operating at the time this action was commenced. While it was not operational, it remains in existence and retains value as it holds certain permits utilized by Electrical Systems. The parties stipulated that Husband’s 50 percent interest in this business was worth $30,000 at or around the date of commencement of this action. As for her direct contributions, Wife credibly testified that she cleaned the offices and participated in the marketing of the business during its early years, by handing out leaflets and business cards. As the oldest of Husband’s business interests, Wife’s non-direct contributions of being the children’s’ primary caretaker and tending to the home are most significant here. After considering Wife’s credible testimony, and the factors indicated above, this Court grants Wife’s full request for a distributive award equal to 30 percent of Husband’s $30,000 interest for a total award to Wife of $9,000. 1(b) Enterprise Electrical Systems. While this business was active when this action commenced, it was subcontracting most of its work due to the retirement of Husband’s long-time business partner, Mr. Katsnelson. The parties stipulated that Husband’s 50 percent interest in this business was worth $710,000 at or around the time of commencement. Wife did not testify as to any direct contribution that she made to this business, and it is undisputed that the parties ceased communicating with one another in 2012 six years after this business was formed in 2006. However, it is clear from the trial record that Electrical Systems is a successor company to Electrical Contractors, in which Wife played a greater role. Accordingly, some of her direct contributions to the success of Electrical Contractors necessarily carried over to Electrical Systems. Wife also made indirect contributions to this Company as she served as the primary caretaker of the marital home. Notably, While Wife was also primarily responsible for raising the parties’ two children, they were both emancipated by the time Electrical Systems was formed. However, given the 47-year duration of this marriage, and the fact that Wife made direct contributions to the parent company, and indirect contributions by supporting Husband and taking care of the home, this Court grants Wife a distributive award equal to 20 percent of Husband’s $710,000 interest for a total award of $142,000. See Peritore v. Peritore, 66 AD3d 750 (2d Dept. 2009). 2. Trilini Inc. As indicated above, Trilini is a company involved in sale of confectionary supplies including “cocoa powder, cocoa butter, and different kinds of fats and ingredients.” (Tr. 1/22/19 pg. 303). Trilini was formed by Husband and his business partner Mr. Katsnelson in 1992. One of Trilini’s primary customers is the Z-L Factory which has become a major point of contention in this proceeding. Trilini has continued to sell products to the Z-L Factory even after Husband lost corporate control of that entity. The parties stipulated that Husband’s 35 percent intertest in Trilini was worth $908,000 at or around the commencement of this action. Wife credibly testified that she directly contributed to this business by entertaining clients here and abroad, and by accompanying Husband on over sea trips and meetings with clients. Wife also contributed indirectly as a supportive Wife and mother. In her own words Wife ‘did everything, he asked [her] to do” to support the business prior to 2012 when the parties stopped speaking to each other. While Husband testified that Wife did “absolutely nothing” to contribute to this business, that testimony is not credible. Based on her direct and indirect contributions to this business, Wife is awarded her full request for a distributive award equal to 30 percent of Husband’s $908,000 interest for a total award of $272,400. 3. Eurocandy. Eurocandy, which was founded in 1999 or 2000, is an asset holding company, with its primary asset being a 30 percent interest in the warehouse that Trilini Inc. utilizes to store its confectionary products. (Tr. 1/22/19 pgs. 315-317). The parties stipulated that Husband’s 33.33 percent interest in this business was worth $19,000 at or around the commencement of this action. During trial, Wife did not testify as to any direct contributions that she made to this business. As for indirect contributions, one of the parties’ children was emancipated when this business was formed, while the other was 18 years old. Accordingly, there was little direct or indirect support established at trial. However, given the 47-year duration of this marriage and the fact that Wife was primarily responsible for taking care of the marital home, this Court grants Wife 15 percent of Husband’s $19,000 interest for a total award of $2,850. 4. New Castle Commodities LLC. There is very little evidence in the record regarding the business entity known as “New Castle Commodities.” Husband testified that it was created in 2004 or 2005 and that it is the manifestation of an “idea” that he and his partners had regarding how to increase their other companies’ access to markets in the Russian Federation countries. (Tr. 1/22/19 pg. 325). Husband further testified that the company never actually conducted any real business. Despite the limited nature of this entity the parties have stipulated that Husband’s 16.67 percent interest thereof was worth $3,000 at or around the date this action was commenced. Wife did not testify as to any direct contribution made to this business. In fact, it is unclear if Wife was even aware that this Company existed. As for indirect contributions, both children were emancipated by the time this business was formed, but Wife remained the party primarily responsible for tending to the home. Accordingly, after considering the limited nature of this business entity, and the limited contributions from Wife, this Court grants Wife 10 percent of Husband’s interest as of commencement stipulated to be $3,000 for a total award of $300. 5. Transocean Capital LLC / Delta Capital S.A. / and the Zhytomyrski Lasoshchi (Z-L) Factory The alleged existence and value of the Z-L Factory, and its pass-through value to its holding companies, Delta Capital S.A. and Transocean Capital LLC, was the primary focus of both the pre-trial proceedings and much of this protracted trial. It is undisputed that the marital ownership interest in Transocean is titled in Husband’s name and thus any passthrough ownership of the Z-L Factory would also be theoretically titled in his name. There is no allegation in the record that Wife was ever a titled owner of any the above companies. Accordingly, at the onset, it is worth noting that the applicable legal standard places the burden on Wife, as the non-titled spouse, to establish both the existence of the alleged asset, and its value. See Iwahara v. Iwahara, 226 AD2d 346 (2d Dept. 1996); Alper v. Alper, 77 AD3d 694 (2d Dept. 2010). In the present case, this burden of proof applies to both the existence and value of the Z-L factory as Husband asserts that (A) he does not own the factory, and (B) that whatever limited interest that Transocean may have in the factory through Delta Capital has no value. If non-titled spouse fails to establish either the existence of an alleged marital asset, or its value, it is improper for the Court to speculate as to a possible distribution of the same. See Antoian v. Antoian, 215 AD2d 421 (2d Dept. 1995); see also Tabriztchi v. Tabriztchi, 130 AD2d 652 (2d Dept. 1987). The ownership structure of these three related companies is complicated. The entity referred to as “Transocean” owns 100 percent of a separate entity known as “Transocean Capital B.V.” which, in turn, owns 75 percent of an entity known as “Delta Capital” (Tr. 1/22/10 pgs. 346-348). Delta Capital is notable as it was the holding company that maintained an extremely lucrative ownership interest in the Z-L Factory during the parties’ marriage. Husband testified that he has never had a direct ownership interest in either Delta Capital or the Z-L factory, and rather that his indirect interest in those companies was derived through his ownership interest in Transocean. During trial, the parties stipulated that Husband’s 33.34 percent interest in Transocean was worth $74,000 at or around the time of commencement. In his Summation, Husband argues that any value attributed to Transocean necessarily includes the value of all of the equity holdings that Transocean holds, including any indirect interest that Husband may allegedly have in the Z-L Factory. While this may be technically true in a corporate structure sense, it is clear from the record that Wife entered into the stipulation regarding the value of Transocean (as a separate entity) while simultaneously arguing that the stipulated value improperly omitted the value of the Z-L Factory. In other words, Wife stipulated to the value of Transocean while arguing that Transocean was undervalued because it omitted its passthrough interest in the Z-L Factory. Accordingly, if Wife were successful in establishing both the existence, and value, of the Z-L Factory, it would arguably result in a greatly increased value of Transocean. The complicated history of the Z-L factory has been described at length above. In short, Wife contends that Husband’s ownership interest in the Z-L factory including all of its buildings, equipment, and day to day operational control was restored in 2015. Husband argues that while some limited intellectual property, such as the company name, was restored to Delta Capital, it did not include any physical assets or operational control. In an alternative theory, Mr. Gottlieb testified that even if Delta Capital’s interest in the factory was restored, that it would have no value because it the factory was encumbered by $23 Million Dollars of debt and was embroiled in various lawsuits. Mr. Gottlieb reached this conclusion based in part upon a letter that he received from a Ukrainian attorney. This attorney was retained by Husband to investigate the status of the factory’s current ownership during the discovery phase of this proceeding. Husband argues that Mr. Gottlieb misunderstood the contents of the letter, in that operational control was never restored to Delta, but agrees that Delta’s interest in the Factory has no value. Wife asks this Court to find that Husband’s ownership interest in the Z-L factory was restored and that his interest therein should be valued at $48 Million Dollars. However, other than certain media statements made by Husband wherein he implied that some aspect of control was restored, Wife offered no evidence to meet her burden of establishing either the existence of the Z-L Factory as a marital asset, or its value. While this Court does not believe Husband’s testimony that he was “forced” to participate in interviews or that he was “given the answers,” this Court agrees that Husband’s statements regarding “restoration” and “justice” can be construed several ways. In any event, this Court finds that Husband’s statements, standing alone, are insufficient to establish that that anything of actual, specific, value was restored to Delta Capital. In the same light, Husband’s admission that Trilini continues to do business with the Z-L Factory is inconclusive. Husband credibly explained that the business arrangement is lucrative for Trilini, which is why it continues to do business with the factory that was stolen from him. Despite her best efforts, Wife offered no relevant evidence to prove the existence of the factory as a marital asset as of the commencement date of this action. The only expert called by Wife on the subject, Ms. Muckler, testified she had no information as to who owned the factory, how much debt it had, or what its value may be. (Tr. 4/17/19 pg. 43). Wife called no other expert or fact witnesses to counter Husband’s claims. Wife attempted to offer Mr. Roman Katsnelson’s deposition testimony to prove that operational control had been fully restored to Delta Capital, but close examination of the transcript reveals he never actually made that claim. The sole line relied upon by Wife states “The factor — okay. It — so we — we still probably own this, but — does not — we cannot take anything.” (Def. Ex. C5 Pg. 71). This jumbled statement is unclear, incomplete, speculative, and far from conclusive as to what, if anything, was restored to Delta Capital in 2015. In fact, Mr. Katsnelson goes on to explain that he has not been to the Factory since 2010 and had no personal knowledge of what happened in 2015. Finally, many of the questions posed by Wife’s counsel were presented in the form of hypotheticals wherein it was assumed that Delta was restored to control.² This Court finds that Mr. Katsnelson’s unclear statement that “we still probably own this” is insufficient to establish the existence of a multi-million dollar asset for purposes of equitable distribution. Even if Wife was successful in proving that the physical assets of the factory, or operational control, was restored to Delta Capital in 2015, her equitable distribution claim would still fail. A party seeking the equitable distribution of an asset has the burden of establishing a value for that asset. See Seckler-Roode v. Roode, 36 AD3d 889 (2d Dept. 2007); see also Spera v. Spera, 71 AD3d 661 (2d Dept. 2010). Absent persuasive evidence of value, it is improper for the Court to speculate as to the distribution of an asset. See Gredel v. Gredel, 128 AD2d 834 (2d Dept. 1987). When dealing with actively managed assets, such as businesses, the proper valuation date is generally the date of commencement. See Cotton v. Roedelbronn, 170 AD3d 595 (1st Dept. 2019); See also Daniel v. Friedman, 22 AD3d 707 (2d Dept. 2005).In her attempt to meet this burden, Wife presented proof that the Z-L Factory was valued in 2010 at between $75-100 Million Dollars by an independent appraisal company located in Moscow by the name of “Renaissance.” Husband did not contest that this valuation had occurred. However, as the Renaissance valuation occurred some five years before this action was commenced the resulting value is too remote from the commencement date to be useful. Moreover, it is undisputed that this analysis was conducted prior to the factory being taken over by corporate raiders and nationalized by the Ukrainian Government. Clearly, the undisputed takeover of the Z-L Factory after this valuation was performed is a significant intervening event which negates the reliability and accuracy of the Renaissance value. In the alternative, Wife suggested that the Court utilize Igor Boyko’s purported offer to buy the factory for $22 Million Dollars and Husband’s counter-offer of $37 Million Dollars as evidence of value. First, these negotiations took place in 2010, and thus are similar to the Renaissance appraisal in that they are too remote from the commencement of this action to be useful. Moreover, Husband credibly testified that both he and Mr. Boyko were posturing, and that neither the initial offer or his counter-offer was realistic or credible. This is further evidenced by the fact that the offer was made by the very same individual who organized the takeover of the company when his efforts to purchase it proved unsuccessful. Finally, the parties’ adult child V.L. testified on Wife’s behalf that after making several attempts, and misrepresenting why she needed the information, she received a letter from the “Ukrainian Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food” which attributed a multi-milliondollar³ value to the Z-L Factory. (Tr. 3/7/19 pg. 1360). This dollar amount, which was specifically stricken from the record, is the proposed value that Wife utilizes in her Summation. In addition to V.L.’s testimony being stricken, the letter was not received into evidence due to a multitude of evidentiary deficiencies. Among other failures, there was no credible information offered as to the credentials of the person who allegedly wrote the letter, the due diligence and analysis performed, if any, and whether that agency has the authority to make such a representation. Moreover, the entire foreign document constituted inadmissible hearsay. See CPLR §4542. Interestingly, throughout the pre-trial proceedings, and throughout trial, Husband offered to transfer 100 percent of his interest in Transocean Capital LLC to Wife. Husband argued that this would allow Wife to continue to pursue what she perceived to be Delta Capital’s active interest in the Z-L factory. In fact, in his written Summation, Husband again indicates that if Wife wants his interest in Transocean, she can have it. Wife has repeatedly rejected the transfer of ownership to her in favor of requesting a $4 Million Dollar distributive award for what she perceives to be 30 percent of Husband’s alleged 25 percent interest in the factory. It is not clear why, after facing the herculean task of attempting to prove the existence and value of a factory that was admittedly raided and nationalized, Wife would decline the opportunity to obtain 100 percent of Husband’s equity in Transocean, Delta Capital, and ultimately the Z-L Factory itself. After thoughtful consideration of the arguments and evidence offered by both sides on this paramount aspect of the parties’ divorce, this Court finds that Wife failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Z-L factory was an actual, existing, marital asset subject to equitable distribution when this action was commenced. See Fu Kuo Hsu v. Hsuan Huang, 149 AD2d 405 (2d Dept. 1989). Moreover, even if she had successfully proven the assets’ existence, the Court finds that Wife failed to establish a reliable commencement date value. Massimi v. Massimi, 35 AD3d 400 (2d Dept. 2006). Accordingly, this Court is not in a position to acknowledge the existence of, or attribute any value to, the Z-L Factory for equitable distribution purposes. See Repetti v. Repetti, 147 AD3d 1094 (2d Dept. 2017). Thus, as this Court finds that the Z-L Factory, and Delta Capital, have no separate value apart from that reflected in the stipulated value of Transocean Capital LLC, the Court must proceed to distribute that entity. The parties have stipulated that Husband owned a 33.34 percent interest in Transocean that was worth $74,000 at or around the date of commencement. This Court must now consider what, if any, direct or indirect contributions Wife made to this business. On this subject, Wife failed to offer any testimony regarding contributions that she made to Transocean Capital LLC as a separate entity from the Z-L Factory. Regarding the factory, Wife credibly testified that she entertained clients, made suggestions to improve the quality of the workplace for factory employees, and traveled to the Ukraine with Husband to support this business. (Tr. 3/6/19 1207-1208). However, there is no evidence in the record connecting the value attributed to Transocean to the alleged value of the Z-L Factory. In fact, Mr. Gottlieb, who provided the value that the parties stipulated to, specifically attributed a zero value to the Z-L Factory when he determined Transocean’s value. Accordingly, this Court cannot reasonably impute the contributions made by Wife to the Z-L Factory, to Transocean. Moreover, as Transocean was formed in 2008, after both children were emancipated, and four years before the parties stopped communicating in 2012, Wife’s indirect contributions were minimal at best. Accordingly, this Court awards Wife 10 percent of the stipulated value for a total distributive award of $7,400. However, as Wife staunchly believes that the Z-L Factory is a marital asset with considerable value, this Court will adopt Husband’s offer to transfer 100 percent of his equity interest in Transocean to Wife in lieu of the distributive award indicated above. (See Pl. Summation pg. 47). If Wife’s allegations are correct, this transfer will effectively award her whatever ownership interest that Husband has in the Z-L Factory, passed up through the various holding companies.⁴ Accordingly, Wife shall have 60 days from the date of this Decision to indicate to Husband’s counsel, in writing, whether or not she elects to receive the $7,400 distributive award, or a transfer in kind of 100 percent of Husband’s interest in Transocean Capital LLC. B. Real Estate Holdings / Holding Companies In addition to the various asset holding companies and active businesses discussed above, the parties’ marital estate includes ownership interests in various parcels of real estate. Some of this real property is jointly titled, such as the marital home in Staten Island, and the parties’ vacation home in Monticello. However, the parties also own various parcels of real estate that are owned by holding companies titled in Husband’s name. These holding companies were valued by the court neutral evaluator, Mark Gottlieb who relied upon property valuations performed by a court neutral real estate appraiser, Mr. Dominick Neglia. As with all of the assets discussed herein, there is no dispute that each of the parcels of real property are marital, regardless of how they are titled. 1. 41 Terrace Place Corp. 41 Terrace Place Corp. was incorporated in April of 1993. This asset holding company manages an improved parcel of real estate located at 41 Terrace Place in Brooklyn New York. The property consists of a two-story office building and a parking lot. At the time of appraisal, a portion of the property was rented to the City Marshall. The rest of the building is rented as office space for Husband’s businesses, including Trilini International, Ltd. and Enterprise Electrical Systems, Inc. Both companies pay monthly rent to 41 Terrace Place Corp. There is no evidence in the record that 41 Terrace Place Corp. serves any active function other than to own a parcel of real estate and collect rent. Thus, as 41 Terrace Place is primarily a passive asset that gains value through market forces, the parties agreed to utilize a “date of trial” valuation date. See Newman v. Newman, 35 AD3d 418 (2d Dept. 2006). As of the date of trial, the parties have stipulated that Husband’s 50 percent interest in 41 Terrace Place is worth $700,000.⁵ As the parties have agreed upon a value, the Court must now equitably distribute the same. Husband argues that Wife should only be granted 10 percent of the marital interest in 41 Terrace Place. In support of this minimal percentage, Husband argues that Wife did not testify as to any direct or indirect contributions that she made to the “company.” While this may be true, a direct and indirect contribution analysis is less useful here, where the asset at issue is primarily passive in nature. Unlike the “active” businesses above, a significant portion of the value associated with this, and the other real estate holding companies addressed herein, is derived from the land and buildings, which are not necessarily dependent on either parties’ contributions. See Ferraioli v. Ferraioli, 295 AD2d 268 (1st Dept. 2002). Notably, Mr. Gottlieb came to a similar conclusion when he decided to utilize a “Asset Based Approach” in valuing the holding companies rather than a market or income based approach (See Pl. Ex. 1C). See Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 107 AD2d 139 (2d Dept. 1985); see also McDaniel v. 162 Columbia Hgts. Hous. Corp., 25 Misc 3d 1024 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 2009). In opposition to Husband, and without much of an explanation, Wife requests a 50 percent distribution of each real estate holding company identified during this proceeding. While the distribution of assets in a marriage of long duration should be as equal as possible, Wife’s proposed distribution seemingly ignores the fact that Husband was the party primarily responsible for the maintenance, rent collection, and day to day control of the marital investment properties including 41 Terrace Place. In addition, 41 Terrace Place houses Husband’s business interests, which he primarily controls. While Husband’s contributions may be less relevant on a primarily passive asset, as discussed above, they must still be considered by the Court when balancing the equities. See e.g. Greenwald v. Greenwald, 164 AD2d 706 (1st Dept. 1991). Accordingly, while acknowledging that this asset was obtained during a marriage of long duration, and is primarily passive, the Court finds that a distribution of 60 percent to Husband and 40 percent to Wife is equitable under the circumstances. This unequal distribution acknowledges Husband’s contributions to the maintenance and upkeep of 41 Terrace Place. See Lawson v. Lawson, 288 AD2d 795 (3rd Dept. 2001); see also K. v. B., 13 AD3d 12 (1st Dept. 2004). Thus, as the non-titled spouse, Wife shall be granted a distributive award in the amount of $280,000. 2. 37 Terrace Place, LLC 37 Terrace Place, LLC is a real estate holding company that was formed on June 25, 2015. Its purpose was to develop a subdivided parcel of residential real estate located at 37 Terrace Place in Brooklyn, New York. Notably, 37 Terrace Place is adjacent to 41 Terrace Place which was discussed above. The testimony and evidence offered at trial by both parties in connection to this property was incomplete, inconsistent, and confusing at best. Mr. Gottlieb’s report indicates that the building was constructed with the intention of immediately selling the same as a “two family, four-bedroom residence” upon completion. At the time of the business appraisal, the building was still under construction. In his report, Mr. Gottlieb indicates that he relied upon the valuation findings of Mr. Neglia to determine the company’s “net asset” value. Mr. Neglia found the underlying real property to be worth approximately $2,150,000 as of February 27, 2017. In accordance with Mr. Neglia’s finding, Mr. Gottlieb concluded that the holding company was worth $2,150,000, however, his stated valuation date was “as of December 31, 2015″ a little over a year earlier, and before the asset existed. (Pl. Ex. 1C). To further complicate the issue, on the first day of this trial, the parties appeared to stipulate that the value of Husband’s 50 percent share of 37 Terrace Place Inc. was $1,099,000 at the time when Mr. Neglia’s report was prepared. (Tr. 1/15/19 pg. 61). According to the real estate valuation report prepared by Mr. Neglia, the lot upon which 37 Terrace Place is situated (Lot No.36) was sub-divided from the lot upon which 41 Terrace Place is situated (Lot#35). This subdivision occurred on May 22, 2015, a week after the present action was commenced. Husband testified that he only contributed the sum of $10,000 to the construction of the structure that was built on the newly subdivided lot, however he also oversaw the contractors. (Tr. 1/23/19 pgs. 509-512). The rest of the funding for the property came from his business partner, and co-owner of the property, Mr. Katznelson. After construction was completed, the property was sold in December of 2017. Despite the value attributed to Husband’s share of the property by Mr. Gottlieb and Mr. Neglia, Husband only recovered the sum of $375,000 from the sale. (Tr. 1/22/19 pg. 336; Pl Ex. 9). There is no evidence in the record to contradict this amount, and the best evidence of value is generally what someone is willing to pay for an asset. See Matter of JB Park Place Realty, LLC v. Village of Bronxville, 50 AD3d 689 (2d Dept. 2008); see also Reckson Operating P’ship, L.P. v. Assessor(s) of Greenburgh, 289 AD2d 248 (2d Dept. 2001). In his Summation, Husband argues that this holding company, and the property that it held, should not be considered a marital asset at all as it was formed in June of 2015, approximately one month after the commencement date of this action (May 15, 2015), and disposed of over a year before the commencement of this trial. To the contrary, Wife identifies 37 Terrace Place LLC as a marital asset, claims that the value thereof was stipulated to, and seeks a distribution in the amount of $537,500, representing approximately 50 percent of the “stipulated value.”⁶ Wife’s request for a distributive award of $537,500 is unsupported by the record. The stipulation as to value relied upon by Wife is unclear, and subject to interpretation. (Tr. 1/15/19 pg. 61). Moreover, even if Mr. Gottlieb’s value were utilized, it would not relieve Wife of her burden, as the non-titled spouse, to establish that 37 Terrance Place LLC (or an aspect thereof) is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. See Weiss v. Weiss, 106 AD3d 491 (1st Dept. 2013). It is axiomatic that assets obtained during a marriage are presumed to be marital, however, assets that are obtained post commencement are generally not. See Anglin v. Anglin, 80 NY2d 553 (1992) [the commencement of a divorce action is the termination point for the further accrual of marital property.]; see also Mesholam v. Mesholam, 11 NY3d 24 (2008). Here, Wife has failed to clearly establish to what degree 37 Terrace Place LLC, or the property that it held, was a marital asset. To the contrary, the evidence offered at trial supports a finding that Husband subdivided the land, formed the holding corporation, constructed, and sold the building after the commencement date of this action. Accordingly, Husband has a good faith basis to argue that it should be considered separate property. See Badwal v. Badwal, 126 AD3d 736 (2d Dept. 2015). However, despite Wife’s failure of proof, the evidence in the record reveals two things. First, that the plot of land upon which the structure was built was subdivided from marital property, and second, that Husband utilized $10,000 of marital money as an initial investment into the property. While neither party clearly identified the source of this $10,000, the investment occurred so close to the commencement date of this action that it would be impractical to believe that it was sourced by anything other than marital funds. Likewise, the subdivision occurred just days after the commencement of this action. Accordingly, it is clear to this Court that some aspect of 37 Terrace Place was a marital asset. See Hartog v. Hartog, 85 NY2d 36 (1995) [asset created during the course of a marriage, but realized after commencement is still marital property.]; see also Marcus v. Marcus, 135 AD2d 2016 (2d Dept. 1988). c.f. Vora v. Vora, 268 AD2d 470 (2d Dept. 2000) [asset acquired after commencement is not marital because it was not "the product of a sale or exchange of marital property"]. As the trial record supports a finding that some aspect of 37 Terrace Place is a marital asset, it was incumbent upon Wife to establish a value of the same. However, the value that she utilized, which was based upon Mr. Neglia’s appraisal, is not realistic. Rather, as Husband received the sum of $375,000 from the actual sale of his ownership interest in the company/building, that amount is a more accurate. Thus, as a portion of 37 Terrace Place has been established to be marital, and the value of Husband’s equity share was $375,000, all that is left is for the Court to distribute the same. In so doing, it is clear from the record that the subdivision, incorporation, construction, and sale of 37 Terrace Place was orchestrated by Husband and his business partner, and had nothing to do with Wife, especially since the parties ceased communicating with one another in 2012. Accordingly, Husband should be entitled to a considerably larger share of the sale proceeds. For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that Husband should be entitled to 90 percent of the proceeds of the 37 Terrace Place sale, with Wife receiving 10 percent. Therefore, Wife shall be granted a distributive award in the amount of $37,500 representing a return on the subdivision of marital land, and the investment of marital funds into 37 Terrace Place. 3. Byrna Court Corp. Byrna Court Corp. is a real estate holding company that was formed in November of 1984. Husband owns a 50 percent interest in this company, with the other 50 percent being owed by Husband’s long-time business partner Mr. Katsnelson. The purpose of the company is to own and manage a portion of a multi-family residential building located at *** Prospect Park West in Brooklyn NY. While there are 21 apartments in the building, Husband and his partner are the titled owners of only seven. Husband currently resides in one of these apartments. During trial there was a considerable amount of confusion regarding the value of this property. The court neutral real estate appraiser, Mr. Neglia, testified that he had to modify his initial appraisal twice, to reflect discussions that he had with Defendant’s counsel, another unidentified attorney, and his “own legal research” regarding the applicability of the “Martin Act” to these units. See NY Gen. Bus. Law §352-eeee. Mr. Neglia also had to make an adjustment because he incorrectly calculated the properties’ maintenance fees. As a result, three neutral appraisals were offered into evidence at trial. According to these appraisals, the Byrna apartments either had a value of $3,000,000 or $1,975,000 as of March 1, 2017. Due in part to the discrepancies in Mr. Neglia’s analysis, Wife hired her own real estate appraiser, “Equity Valuation Associates” who conducted a review of the various Neglia Appraisals. Mr. Henry Salmon, who prepared the report, testified at trial in support of his findings (Tr. 4/18/19). While Husband initially contested Mr. Salmon’s findings as “partisan,” he later recognized that Mr. Neglia’s appraisals were flawed and stipulates in his written summation that the value of his 50 percent interest in Byrna should be calculated at $1,517,000. This figure reflects fifty percent of the $3,000,000 value found by Mr. Salmon (Def. Ex. EEEEE); (Pl ex. 1C). Husband argues that Wife should only be granted 10 percent of the marital interest in *** Prospect Park, or Byrna Court Corp. In support of this minimal percentage, Husband argues that Wife did not contribute “cash, loans, or labor” to the construction or maintenance of this asset. While this may be true, Byrna Corp., like 41 Terrace Place Corp. above, is primarily a passive asset, which derives its value based upon the value of its real estate holdings. Accordingly, the direct and indirect contribution analysis conducted by Husband is less persuasive here. Moreover, while Husband testified about money that he contributed to the Byrna properties, he fails to acknowledge that all of the money spent during the marriage was marital in nature, and not “his” (see legal analysis above). In opposition to Husband, Wife requests a 50 percent distribution of this asset, viewing it as a passive parcel of real property. While the distribution of assets in a marriage of long duration should be as equal as possible, Wife’s proposed distribution seemingly ignores the fact that Husband was the party primarily responsible for the maintenance, rent collection, and day to day control of the apartments located within *** Prospect Park. In fact, Husband resides within one of the apartments. Accordingly, while acknowledging that this asset was obtained during a marriage of long duration, and is primarily passive, the Court finds that a distribution of 55 percent to Husband and 45 percent to Wife is equitable under the circumstances. This unequal distribution acknowledges Husband’s contributions to the maintenance and upkeep of *** Prospect Park. See Lawson v. Lawson, 288 AD2d 795 (3rd Dept. 2001); see also K. v. B., 13 AD3d 12 (1st Dept. 2004). Therefore, Wife shall be granted a distributive award in the amount of $682,650 representing 45 percent of the marital interest in Byrna Court Corp. and its holdings. 4. Pier 69 Corp. Pier 69 Corp. was incorporated on August 3, 2000. Husband is a 50 percent titled owner with the other 50 percent being owned by Mr. Katsnelson. This corporation’s original purpose was to develop a six-story condominium located at 6911 Shore Road in Brooklyn NY. However, since the company’s formation, all the condominiums have been sold. One of the condominiums is owned by the parties’ adult daughter I.L. According to the trial record, the only asset that this holding company still owns is a parking lot, which was not sold with the condominiums, and still retains value as it rents parking spaces at a rate of $200 per month, per space. At trial neither party spent much time testifying about this corporation. Like many of the assets herein, the parties stipulated as to the value of the marital interest in Pier 69 Corp. According to the findings of Mr. Gottlieb, who relied upon an appraisal conducted by Mr. Neglia, the value of the marital interest is $85,000. As this asset is primarily passive, and either party testified as to contributions that they made, this Court finds it equitable to distribute the same equally. Accordingly, Wife, as the non-titled spouse, is hereby granted a distributive award in the amount of $42,000 representing 50 percent of the marital share of this asset. 5. The Marital Residences In addition to the various investment properties indicated above, the parties’ own two parcels of real property that they utilized as a primary residence, and a vacation home during the course of their marriage. The former marital home, which is still occupied by Wife, is located in Staten Island, NY, while the parties’ vacation home, the use of which is currently shared between the parties, is located in Monticello NY. It is undisputed that both homes are marital property and are subject to equitable distribution. The parties also agree that as passive marital assets, the homes should be valued as close to the date of trial as possible. 5(a). Former Marital Home This Court appointed Wonica Appraisers to appraise the former marital home which is located in an affluent section of Staten Island. There is no mortgage associated with this property. Mr. Wonica’s first valuation report, dated February 5, 2016, assessed a value of $1,305,000 for the property (Def. Ex. SSS). However, he later updated his appraisal on December 10, 2018 and found that the value had decreased to $1,100,000 (Def. Ex. TTT). At trial Mr. Wonica testified that this decrease in value was due to market forces. (Tr. 3/6/19 pg. 1178). Husband disagreed with both values but did not call his own expert on this subject. Rather, on cross examination, Husband attempted to show that the comparable sales relied upon by Mr. Wonica were not in the exact same neighborhood and should be disregarded. Moreover, he suggested that Mr. Wonica should have instead used “listing prices” in the same neighborhood, regardless if those properties sold. After considering Husband’s arguments, this Court agrees with Mr. Wonica that listing prices are too speculative to serve as an appropriate measure of value. Rather, this Court finds Mr. Wonica’s valuation testimony credible, and the most persuasive evidence available as to the value of the marital home. Accordingly, this Court attributes a value of $1,100,000 to the former marital home for equitable distribution purposes. Having established a value, the Court must now consider how to distribute the same. Husband argues that the valuation attributed to the property was incorrect, but also immaterial as the house should be ordered sold and the proceeds split evenly. Husband testified that that he was directly involved in the construction of the home as an electrical engineer and the titled owner of various contracting companies. Husband admits that Wife equally contributed to the marital home and suggests that she also be granted 50 percent of the sale proceeds. Wife, argues that she would like to retain sole title and exclusive use of the former marital home as she is elderly and it would be a hardship for her to relocate. In so arguing, Wife acknowledges that Husband should be entitled to a credit equal to one half of the house’s equity. Wife also testified as to the substantial contributions that she made to the house, all of which were credible. After consideration of the factors above, and the similar positions of both parties, the Court finds that each party shall be entitled to 50 percent of the equity in the former marital home, to wit, approximately $550,000 each. See Matter of Motta v. Motta, 145 AD3d 560 (1st Dept. 2016); see also Alleva v. Alleva, 112 AD3d 567 (2d Dept. 2013). However, after considering Wife’s arguments, the Court is persuaded that she should have the right to “buy out” Husband’s 50 percent share of equity in the home, and should be further authorized to utilize the distributive awards granted herein as credits towards that equity purchase. See Rubackin v. Rubackin, 107 AD3d 872 (2d Dept. 2013) Accordingly, Wife shall have a period of 60 days following the date of this Decision to advise, in writing, whether she intends to purchase Husband’s 50 percent equity in the home. In the event that she elects not to buy his interest, then the house will be placed on the market for sale with the net sale proceeds to be divided equally between the parties. 5(b). Monticello Vacation Property During the course of their marriage, the parties purchased land in Monticello New York and built a vacation home there. During the pre-trial phase of this proceeding the parties jointly retained an appraiser to value this property, Mr. Sean Reiber. However, Wife later retainer a second expert, Mr. Brian Gager because she disagreed with aspects of Mr. Reiber’s findings. The key dispute between the real estate experts is whether this property should be considered “lakefront property,” with the understanding that this designation significantly increases market value. Mr. Reiber found that the property was not lakefront and was worth approximately $725,000 (Tr. 1/24/19 pg. 596). On the other hand, Mr. Gager found that the house is “lakefront property,” and that its value was $1,178,000 (Tr. 2/25/19 pg. 984, Def. Ex. MMM). Mr. Gager went on to testify that he was shocked by Mr. Reiber’s valuation, and that he called him concerning it, as they were both from the same community and were friendly with one another. After carefully considering the expert testimony on this subject, this Court finds that the date of trial value of $1,178,000, as assessed by Brian Gager, is the more persuasive value for this property. Both experts are licensed experienced real estate brokers familiar with the Monticello region. However, in reaching a value of $725,000 Mr. Reiber admitted that he did not review the property survey nor did he conduct a title search to determine whether this property had ever been designated as lakefront. Mr. Gager, on the other hand, reviewed a property survey and identified an easement which establishes that this home may be properly marketed as lakefront. As this property is encumbered by a mortgage that was incurred during the marriage, the Court must also distribute that debt. See Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 183 AD3d 803 (2d Dept. 2020). As discussed above, Husband admitted that in 2004, he used the Monticello home as security for a $500,000 Home Equity Loan. While he claims that Wife knew about the loan, he admits that he signed her name on the loan documentation (Tr. 1/22/19 pg. 285), and that the notary jurat, which indicates that Wife was present, is incorrect (Tr. 1/23/19 pg. 443). Wife credibly testified that she knew nothing about the HELOC and that Husband did not have authority to sign her name in her absence. In 2015, after this action was commenced, the loan converted to a mortgage. Husband testified that there is approximately $128,413 still owed on this loan. Wife contends that Husband has failed to provide any documentation as to what amount remains outstanding and that the full $500,000 indebtedness remains on public record. As this Court credits that Wife was not aware of this loan, and that Husband entered into it without her permission, the repayment of 100 percent of that debt (the remaining balance) shall be Husband’s sole responsibility. As Husband will be required to pay 100 percent of the debt when the equity is distributed, thus removing the mortgage from the property, the Court may distribute the equity in the property as if the mortgage did not exist.⁷ Both parties agree that the other made substantial contributions to the construction and maintenance of the Monticello home. Husband requests that the property be sold, and the proceeds split evenly between the parties. Wife agrees to an equal distribution of equity but requests the right to buy out Husband’s 50 percent share so that she can retain the property for her exclusive use. Wife also requests that the outstanding HELOC balance be deducted from Husband’s share no matter how the asset is distributed. As indicated above, 100 percent of this debt has been assessed to Husband, thus removing the mortgage from the distribution analysis. Having established a value, the Court must now consider how to distribute the same. Both parties agree that the property should be split evenly. Accordingly, each party shall be entitled to one half of the value of the property, to wit, $589,000. For the same reasons as set forth above (see “Former Marital Home”) and as Husband has never expressed an interest in occupying the property, Wife is hereby granted the right to purchase Husband’s 50 percent share of the Monticello home. Wife shall be authorized to utilize the distributive awards granted to her herein as credits to effectuate this right. Wife shall have a period of 60 days from the date of this Decision to elect, in writing, whether she intends to purchase Husband’s 50 percent equity in the home. If she elects to do so, Husband shall be obligated to immediately pay the remaining balance of the HELOC loan to remove the mortgage from the property. In the event that Wife declines to purchase Husband’s share of the equity, then house will be placed on the market for sale with the net sale proceeds to be divided equally between the parties as set forth below. In the event that either the Monticello home, or the Staten Island home are to be sold, then either or both (as the case may be) shall be listed on the open market by the real estate appraisers who valued the property during the course of this proceeding. Accordingly, Mr. Wonica shall be retained to sell the Staten Island Home, and Mr. Gager shall be retained to sell the Monticello home. Both real estate brokers shall be paid their usual customary rate of commission. The houses shall be listed at a price recommended by the respective brokers, representing the current market value for the properties. The parties may modify the terms of this paragraph so long as they do so on mutual consent. In the event that the Monticello property is sold, then Husband shall be responsible for paying 100 percent of the HELOC at closing out of his share of the net proceeds. C. Wife’s Businesses. While the parties were able to stipulate to the value of many of the marital businesses titled in Husband’s name, they could not do the same in relation to the marital businesses titled in Wife’s name. During the course of this marriage Wife formed two businesses, A Merryland Operating, LLC. and Anfex Inc. Anfex is a medical supply company, and A. Merryland is a medical office that houses at least thirteen medical professionals. There is no dispute that these businesses are marital assets which are subject to equitable distribution. A thorough discussion of the difficulties in valuing these businesses can be found above. (See Factor F). As set forth herein, this Court has found that at the time of commencement, Wife held a 90.1 percent ownership interest in A Merryland with a value of $372,000 and a 97 percent interest in Anfex which had a value of $390,000. Having made findings as to extent of Wife’s interest in A Merryland and Anfex and the respective commencement date value of each business, this Court now considers Husband’s direct and indirect contributions to these businesses. Husband testified that he contributed monetarily to both of Wife’s businesses, by providing them with startup capital and various “loans.” However, as indicated above, and contrary to Husband’s position, as the parties were engaged in a long-term marriage any money that “he” contributed to A Merryland and Anfex was presumptively marital money, not “his” money. See Sagarin v. Sagarin, 251 AD2d 396 (2d Dept. 1998). Likewise, any loans that were made between Husband and the companies were marital loans, and to the extent that either company was required to repay those loans, the debt was owed to the marital estate, not to Husband as an individual. See Mack v. Mack, 169 AD3d 1214 (3rd Dept. 2019); see also Popowich v. Korman, 73 AD3d 515 (1st Dept. 2010). Other than the contribution of marital funds as “loans,” Husband did not credibly testify as to any direct contribution to A. Merryland. However, Husband did credibly testify that he added some “sweat equity” to Anfex as a contractor when it was created, and he tried to help Wife run the business in its early stages. Husband testified that he assisted Wife in finding clients and helped her physically build “whatever was necessary inside the medical supply office.” (Tr. 1/22/19, pgs. 375-376). However, while he may have made some contributions to Anfex, it cannot be said that Husband was a supportive spouse during this marriage. As credibly testified to by Wife, Husband’s volatile temper, physical abuse, and jealous nature can hardly be said to be supportive of Wife’s success. For these reasons, and after consideration of the factors above, Husband is granted 10 percent of the commencement date value of Wife’s interests in A Merryland ($372,000) resulting in a distributive award of $37,200 and 20 percent of the value of Anfex ($390,000) resulting in a distributive award of $78,000. D. Personalty. During the course of this trial both parties testified as to personalty that they obtained during the marriage, however all of the testimony offered was general in nature. Neither party identified specific items that they sought to be distributed together with evidence of their value. No appraisals, receipts, or other documentary evidence of value was offered. Notwithstanding these evidentiary shortcomings, both parties seek equitable distribution of the personal property that they jointly obtained. Wife seeks the right to keep all of the furnishings, artwork and other property in the marital and vacation homes without any credit being given to Husband (Tr. 3/8/19 pg.1481). Husband agrees with Wife’s proposal to keep the items, so long as he is given a distributive award equal to one half of the value. Wife credibly testified that she was primarily responsible for furnishing both the Staten Island and Monticello properties, and Husband substantially agreed with that testimony. Husband testified that he believes the combined value of these furnishings to be approximately $180,000 (Tr. 1/31/19 pgs. 742-743; Def. Ex. U). Wife testified that the value of these possessions is approximately $145,000 (Tr. 3/6/19 pg. 1219). While neither party offered any documentary evidence of value, their respective testimony is sufficient for equitable distribution purposes, especially since their estimated values are similar. See Felicello v. Felicello, 240 AD2d 625 (2d Dept. 1997); see also Fassett v. Fassett, 101 AD2d 2d 604 (3rd Dept. 1984); Nebons v. Nebons, 26 AD3d 478 (2d Dept. 2006). Moreover, as Wife was the party who purchased virtually all of these items, this Court find’s Wife estimated value to be more persuasive. Accordingly, the Court finds that the combined value of the personalty in both the Staten Island and Monticello homes to be worth $145,000. Having established a value, the Court must now equitably distribute the same. After considering the factors above, especially the duration of the marriage, and the contributions of both parties, the Court finds that each party is entitled to one half of the value of the personalty identified during trial. However, as Wife hand-picked virtually all the household furnishings and artwork, her application to retain possession of the same is hereby granted. Accordingly, Husband shall be entitled to a distributive award equal to 50 percent of the value found herein, to wit, $72,500. In addition to the household furnishings above, the parties also provided general testimony concerning certain expensive watches purchased by Husband and expensive jewelry possessed by Wife. Unlike the testimony of value above, which was similar in nature and amount, there was little to no evidence at trial sufficient to identify the parties’ jewelry, establish the means of its acquisition or establish its value, accordingly this Court is not in a position to equitably distribute the same. See LaBarre v. LaBarre, 251 AD2d 1008 (4th Dept 1998); see also Moller v. Moller, 188 AD2d 807 (3rd Dept. 1992). Accordingly, each party shall be entitled to keep all of the watches or jewelry that they currently possess. This ruling shall also apply to each parties’ personal effects. Finally, there is some testimony in the record that the parties obtained motor vehicles and at least one boat during their marriage. Husband testified that he owns a 2008 Yamaha Boat, that he believes is worth approximately $10,000, however, Wife attempted to establish that the “Kelly Blue Book” value of the same was $3,655. (Tr. 1/31/19 pg. 738). As to the parties’ automobiles, it is unclear from the record if their current vehicles are financed or leased. Accordingly, after considering the limited testimony offered at trial, together with the factors indicated above, this Court finds that each party shall be entitled to retain the motor vehicles that they currently drive. As for the boat, it shall be listed on the market for sale within 60 days of service of a signed Judgment of Divorce at its current book value and the proceeds of that sale shall be split evenly between the parties. E. Bank Accounts. During trial it was established that Husband had the following bank accounts as of the date of commencement of this action in 2015: (1) Chase account ending 9565; (2) Chase account ending 9501; (3) TD Bank account ending in 5900; (4) a Fidelity Investment account; and (5) a Fidelity Management Trust IRA. Wife has the following personal bank account: (1) TD Bank account ending 1852. At the same time that Husband opened his Fidelity IRA account, he also opened a similar IRA in Wife’s name. However, Wife liquidated her IRA in 2013 and received approximately $88,000 from that withdrawal (Tr. 3/8/19 pg. 1487). Husband seeks a distributive award equal to one half of that liquidated amount. Wife seeks 50 percent of the value of each of Husband’s accounts as of the date of trial. While “passive” assets are typically valued as of the date of trial, bank accounts are typically valued as of the date of commencement if they are utilized by the parties during the pendency of the proceeding. See Rywak v. Rywak, 100 AD2d 542 (2d Dept. 1984); See also Graziano v. Graziano, 285 AD2d 488 (2d Dept. 2001); Michaelessi v. Michaelessi, 59 AD3d 688 (2d Dept. 2009). Here, the evidence at trial supports a finding that both parties deposited and withdrew funds from their respective bank accounts during the course of the action, accordingly, date of commencement values will be utilized, unless otherwise indicated below. Husband argues that Wife should be denied any award as all the accounts titled in his name should be deemed his separate property. While it is undisputed that the accounts were all created during the marriage, Husband argues that the parties kept their finances separate and apart, and that as a result they did not form an economic partnership. As indicated above, this Court has discredited Husband’s argument and found that the parties formed a mutually beneficial economic partnership over the course of their 47-year marriage. Accordingly, both parties are entitled to an equitable share of the marital accounts which existed at the commencement of this divorce action, notwithstanding title. See Fields. v. Fields, 15 NY3d 158 (2010). According to his sworn statement of Net Worth dated July 31, 2015 (Def. Ex. U), Husband’s Fidelity Investment account had a commencement date value of approximately $675,218. Husband trades actively in this account and uses it as supplemental income to support himself. Wife argues that Husband withdrew monies from this account between January 1, 2018 and January 4, 2019 after this action was commenced in violation of the “automatic orders” contained in 22 NYCRR 202.16(a). This Court finds, however, that Husband did not wrongfully liquidate assets from this account. Rather, Husband transferred certain monies from this account into another account because he was concerned about changes in the stock market. Active trading in an investment account to protect its value does not constitute a wasteful dissipation nor a violation of the automatic orders. See e.g. Grunfeld v. Grunfeld, 255 AD2d 12 (1st Dept. 1999). In fact, the failure to protect a marital asset could be considered a wasteful dissipation. See e.g. Maggiore v. Maggiore, 91 AD3d 1096 (3rd Dept. 2012). Wife seeks 50 percent of the value of the Fidelity Investment account as of the date of commencement of trial. When this trial commenced in January of 2019 the Fidelity Investment account had an approximate balance of $1,094,645 (Pl. Ex. 36). When this action commenced the same account had an approximate balance of $675,218 (Def. Ex. U). At trial, Husband credibly testified that he has continued to deposit his post commencement income and social security payments into this account, and that he actively trades its stock holdings. Accordingly, this Court finds that the increase in value that occurred during this proceeding is primarily due to Husband’s active efforts, rather than market forces. See Ferraioli v. Ferraioli, 295 AD2d 268 (1st Dept. 2002). Therefore, the Court will utilize the date of commencement value of $675,218 for purposes of equitable distribution. Having established a value, the Court must now proceed to distribute the same. After consideration of the factors above the Court finds it equitable to distribute the same 50 percent to Husband and 50 percent to Wife. Accordingly, as the non-titled spouse, Wife is hereby granted a distributive award in the amount of $337,609. This Court reaches a similar conclusion with respect to each of the parties’ savings and checking accounts. These accounts have also been actively utilized by each of these parties for their daily needs throughout this litigation. As such, it would be inequitable to use a trial date valuation date for these assets. The approximate date of commencement values of Husband’s checking and saving accounts are as follows: (a) Chase 9596 = $103,800; Chase 9501= $52,680; and TD Bank 5900 = $22,807 (Def. Ex. U). After considering the factors above, each of these accounts shall be distributed equally between the parties. Accordingly, as the non-titled spouse, Wife is hereby granted a combined distributive award in the amount of $89,644 representing her one-half share of these three accounts. Wife’s bank accounts are more difficult to identify and value. During trial, various accounts were identified as being associated with Wife.⁸ The difficulty arose in that Wife routinely utilized her corporate accounts as personal accounts, and not all of her banking transactions were accounted for during trial (See Tr. 4/9/19). As the non-titled spouse, it was Husband’s burden to identify and establish the value of each account. However, he failed to do so, seemingly in support of his unsupportable position that each party should be entitled to keep their own accounts as separate property. The evidence offered by Wife was even less useful to this Court, as her various statements of net worth failed to identify account numbers and amounts. (Def. Ex. 0000; PPPP). The only account that was specifically identified and discussed during trial was Wife’s TD bank account ending in 1852, which Wife incorrectly identified as her “only personal account.” (Tr. 3/8/19 pg. 1467). As this account was routinely utilized during the proceeding, a date of commencement value would be most appropriate, however none has been provided. The closest to commencement value available to the Court is from December of 2016 when the account contained $4,062 (Def. Ex. RRRR). For the same reasons as set forth above, this Court finds that this account should be split evenly between the parties. Accordingly, as the non-titled spouse, Husband is hereby granted a distributive award in the amount of $2,031. E(1). Retirement Accounts In addition to the bank and investment accounts indicated above, both parties seek distribution of the others retirement accounts. Wife seeks distribution of Husband’s Fidelity Management Trust IRA account. Husband testified that this IRA had a value of $131,000 as of January 2019 (Tr. 1/31/2019; pg. 740). Husband admits in his summation that any increase in value from when this account was opened, to the date of trial was “caused by market fluctuations and not contributions or distributions” (Pl. Summ. pg. 101.) Accordingly, Husband’s IRA is most appropriately identified as a “passive asset” and valued as of the time of trial. See Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, 268 AD2d 273 (1st Dept. 2000). After considering the factors above, and specifically that this is a marriage of long duration during which this account was funded, this Court awards each party a 50 percent share of the commencement date value. Accordingly, Wife is entitled to a distribution of $65,500. However, as this account is a retirement account, and to avoid tax implications, Wife is hereby directed to open her own IRA so that her share of Husband’s IRA can be rolled over in kind. Similarly, Husband seeks a distribution of one half of Wife’s Fidelity Management Trust IRA which Wife liquidated in 2013. Wife testified that she withdrew the balance of the account because she needed the money to support her businesses. She admits that she did so without informing Husband, although she did inform his accountant (Tr. 3/8/19 pg. 1488). Wife obtained the net sum of $88,000 from the liquidation. Courts are generally constrained to divide assets that existed at the time the action was commenced. See Anglin v. Anglin, 80 NY2d 553 (1992); see also Alaimo v. Alaimo, 199 AD2d 1039 (4th Dept. 1993). Here, Wife’s fidelity IRA was liquidated during the course of the parties’ marriage, before the commencement of the present action. “Courts should not second-guess the economic decisions made during the course of a marriage but should rather equitably distribute the assets remaining once the relationship is at an end.” Westreich v. Westreich, 169 AD3d 972 (2d Dept. 2019); see also Spencer-Forrest v. Forrest, 159 AD3d 762 (2d Dept. 2018). While it is true that Wife did not inform Husband of her intentions, she did inform his accountant of the intended transaction. There is no evidence in the record to support a finding that Wife liquidated the account in anticipation of a divorce action. Moreover, the money was utilized to stabilize Wife’s businesses, of which Husband has received an equitable percentage. Accordingly, the Court finds that Husband is not entitled to a distribution of this asset, which was liquidated approximately two years before this action commenced. F. Marital Loans Like marital debts, the balance of debts owed by third parties to either one, or both spouses may be deemed marital property subject to equitable distribution. See Popowich v. Korman, 73 AD3d 515 (1st Dept. 2010). In her written summation, Wife identifies four alleged marital loans that she claims remain outstanding and payable to Husband; (a) A loan to “Flock Industries” in the amount of $100,000; (b) a loan to “YLB Management LLC” in the amount of $100,000; (c) a loan to Trilini International in the amount of $150,000; and (d) a loan to “Interboro Management” in the amount of $50,000. At the onset, any “loan” allegedly made by Husband to Trilini would at best be an investment in that company which has been identified as marital and equitably distributed herein. Moreover, the Court finds this “loan” which is mentioned in a single balance sheet (Pl. Ex. 45), is likely not a loan at all, but rather a part of the practice employed by both parties, to loan money to and from their businesses to manipulate their incomes (see above). In any event, a review of the record reveals insufficient support, such as promissory notes, loan agreements, or even dates and amounts, to support Wife’s claim for equitable distribution of any of the “loans” that she identified in her written summation.⁹ While there are passing references in the record as to “loans” made by Husband (See e.g. 2/25/19 pgs. 921-922) these references are insufficient to satisfy Wife’s burden to identify and value assets of which she seeks equitable distribution. See Greenwald v. Greenwald, 164 AD2d 706 (1st Dept. 1991). As Wife failed to identify and value these alleged loans with any specificity in the trial record, she has failed to meet her burden of proof in relation to these alleged assets. See Fu Kuo Hsu, v. Hsuan Huang, 149 AD2d 405 (2d Dept. 1989); see also Reiner v. Reiner, 100 AD2d 872 (2d Dept. 1984). G. Miscellaneous In addition to the assets detailed above, both parties have briefly mentioned various business entities, and real estate holdings during trial. In this regard, both Husband and Wife have been involved in numerous entrepreneurial ventures and real estate transactions during their 47-year marriage. Both parties have also referred to “hidden bank accounts,” and “cash holdings” that have been secreted by the other throughout the course of this marriage. In determining equitable distribution, this Court has only discussed those business entities, bank accounts, and real estate holdings that were identified and valued with sufficient specificity to be subject to equitable distribution. It is this Court’s obligation to distribute the assets that existed at the commencement of this action for divorce, and not to second guess every transaction that the parties entered into during the course of their marriage. See Kessler v. Kessler, 188 AD3d 946 (2d Dept. 2014); see also Westreich v. Westreich, 169 AD3d 972 (2d Dept. 2019). To the extent that a particular entity or account that was mentioned during trial is not discussed in this Decision, it is due to a failure of proof to properly identify and value that alleged asset. See Seckler-Roode v. Roode, 36 AD3d 889 (2d Dept. 2007); see also Barnhart v. Barnhart, 148 AD3d 1264 (3rd Dept. 2017). Accordingly, the distribution of any alleged asset not specifically discussed herein is hereby denied. Maintenance Wife seeks an award of non-durational maintenance in the amount of $12,500 per month, or approximately $150,000 per year. Wife claims that she needs this amount to allow her to maintain the lifestyle that she enjoyed during this long-term marriage, including the ability to maintain both the Staten Island residence and the Monticello vacation home, of which she seeks exclusive possession. Husband claims that Wife should not be entitled to a maintenance award at all as she is self-sufficient, gainfully employed, and will receive a considerable award of equitable distribution herein. Wife requests that any maintenance award be retroactive to the commencement of this action, however maintenance awards are only retroactive to the first time they were formally requested. See Crane v. Crane, 264 AD2d 749 (2d Dept. 1999); see also Hendry v. Pierik, 78 AD3d 784 (2d Dept. 2010). In the present case, Wife’s first request for maintenance was contained in a pendente lite motion which was filed in September of 2016. In response to this motion, on October 21, 2016, the parties stipulated to a pendente lite maintenance agreement. Pursuant to this So Ordered Stipulation Husband was obligated to pay the sum of $4,500 in direct monthly support, together with an obligation to fund various expenses for Wife’s benefit, including all expenses related to the Monticello property, and “taxes, insurance, and landscaping” fees related to the Staten Island property (Ct. Ex. 4). This pendente lite stipulation was modified in August of 2017 to increase Husband’s obligation to include all expenses related to the Staten Island residence (Ct. Ex. 6). A summary of the amounts paid by Husband under these orders was entered into evidence at trial (Pl Ex. 17). As this action was commenced prior to January 23, 2016, the Court must consider the Domestic Relations Law factors that existed at the time this action was commenced in May of 2015. Notably, the maintenance law at the time when this case was commenced did not utilize the presumptive calculations and income caps that are currently employed when calculating post-divorce maintenance. The overriding purpose of a maintenance award is to give the [receiving] spouse economic independence, and it should be awarded for a duration that would provide the recipient with enough time to become self-supporting.” Sirgant v. Sirgant, 43 AD3d 1034 (2d Dept. 2007). When determining if a party will be able to support themselves, a simple subsistence standard of living is not what the legislature contemplated. See Hartog v. Hartog, 85 NY2d 36 (1995). Rather, a party is entitled to an award of maintenance sufficient to support a semblance of the standard of living that they enjoyed during the marriage. See Golden v. Golden, 98 AD3d 647 (2d Dept. 2012). “The amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court based upon the unique facts of a case. See Lamparillo v. Lamparillo, 12 N.Y.S.3d 296 (2d Dept. 2015). When determining a maintenance award the Court is directed to review a list of enumerated factors, and indicate which factors it considered in making its award. See DRL §236(B)(6)(a)(1-20). After consideration of these statutory factors, the factors deemed most relevant to the present matter are (1) the comparative income of the parties; (2) the parties established standard of living; (3) the equitable distribution of property awarded herein; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5) the age, health, and future earning capacities of the parties; (6) the ability of the party seeking maintenance to become self-supporting; and (7) domestic violence. See Carroll v. Carroll, 125 AD3d 710 (2d Dept. 2015); See also, Brian v. Brian, 36 AD3d 847 (2d Dept. 2007). 1. The Comparative Incomes of the Parties As indicated above, this Court has found that Wife is capable of earning in the vicinity of $96,000 a year while Husband is capable of earning at least $400,000 a year. While this Court cannot specifically determine either party’s actual income, Husband is clearly the more monied spouse. The same is true for income producing assets. While both parties have assets available to them, Husband has more income producing assets available to him, including various real estate ventures. Moreover, as compared to Wife’s businesses, which are struggling, Husband’s businesses are successful and will continue to provide substantial income and distributions to him for as long as they remain operational. Clearly, Husband has access to substantial liquid assets not available to Wife. Accordingly, on balance, Husband’s current income, and ability to maintain that income, is considerably better than Wife’s as it relates to this maintenance factor. 2. The Standard of Living of the Parties. The parties had a very modest standard of living at the time of their marriage in 1969, and they were penniless when they arrived in the United States in 1978. However, over the course of this 47-year marriage, they have managed to accumulate a considerable amount of wealth due to the consistent work efforts of both parties. As detailed above, both parties have enjoyed, and become accustomed to, a luxurious lifestyle which included two mansions, luxury vehicles, expensive artwork, costly watches, jewelry, and furs among other possessions. They vacationed frequently and traveled abroad usually bringing thousands of dollars in cash with them. They also paid for the college and graduate education for their children without the need for financing. While both parties testified to what amounts to an “affluent” standard of living, neither party indicated that their lifestyle was exorbitant or excessive. In fact, the record supports a finding that a considerable amount of the money that the parties earned, was reinvested in new properties and business opportunities. The purpose of a maintenance award is to maintain a semblance of this standard of living to the extent possible. See Hartog v. Hartog, 85 NY2d 36 (1995). 3. The Equitable Distribution of Property The equitable distribution of property, as set forth above, is one of the more significant factors considered by this Court when determining an appropriate maintenance award. Indeed, the $12,500 a month requested by Wife must be considered in light of the fact that she will receive a considerable amount of money and equity from the marital estate. By virtue of this Decision, Wife is entitled to receive distributive awards which total to approximately $1,903,353 together with $1,211,500 worth of equity in the parties’ real estate holdings and personalty, and a $65,500 IRA rollover. Accordingly, Wife is receiving an aggregate equitable distribution award of approximately $3,179,853, in addition to the ability to retain both of her businesses. When Wife’s percentage of the commencement date value of her businesses are factored in, she has been attributed approximately $3,514,653 of marital assets herein. Even considering Wife’s equitable distribution award, the fact remains that Husband is in a superior financial position. Under the terms of this Decision Husband is entitled to keep the balance of his lucrative business holdings which total to a value of approximately $2,606,400, the balance of his bank, investment, and retirement accounts which total to approximately $492,753¹⁰, equity in the parties’ real estate holdings totaling approximately $1,139,000, and distributive awards from Wife’s businesses, bank accounts, and personalty which total to approximately $189,731. In total, Husband has been attributed approximately $4,427,884 worth of marital assets herein. The fact that Husband remains in a superior financial position substantiates the propriety of a considerable maintenance award, even in light of the substantial equitable distribution award granted to Wife herein. See Sykes v. Sykes, 43 Misc 3d 1220(A) (Sup. Ct. NY Cty. 2014); see also, Kohl v. Kohl, 24 AD3d 219 (1st Dept. 2005). However, as Wife has a net worth above $3.5 Million dollars, she is capable of contributing to her own expenses, and supporting her pre divorce standard of living without relying wholly upon Husband. Accordingly, this Court finds that the equitable distribution of marital assets above supports the amount of maintenance awarded to Wife herein. See Alexandar v. Alexandar, 116 AD3d 472 (1st Dept. 2014); see also Grumet v. Grumet, 37 AD3d 534 (2d Dept. 2007) [reducing the amount of lifetime maintenance awarded where the court failed to consider a large distributive award]. 4. Duration of Marriage, Age and Health of the Parties. As this is a marriage of long duration and Wife is of retirement age, she seeks an award of non-durational lifetime maintenance. Husband is also of retirement age, although he continues to be gainfully employed in a many active and passive business ventures. While neither party testified to any serious ongoing health issues, they both expressed concerned as to what affect this divorce will have on their ability to retire and to maintain their respective standard of livings. In this regard, Wife’s testified that she has a limited future earning capacity while Husband has a more stable income from passive assets (See below). Moreover, Wife’s ability to support her established standard of living is stagnant, while Husband consistently makes financial investments that increase his net worth. Accordingly, this Court finds that the duration of this marriage, and the age of the parties, supports an award of nondurational maintenance to Wife. See Summer v. Summer, 85 NY2d 1014 (1995); see also Marino v. Marino, 52 AD3d 585 (2d Dept. 2008); Keane v. Keane, 25 AD3d 729 (2d Dept. 2006). 5. Present and Future Earning Capacity/Ability to Be Self Supporting Primary amongst the factors to be considered by a Court when determining an appropriate maintenance award is the ability of the requesting spouse to become selfsupporting and economically independent. See Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 123 N.Y.S.3d 648 (2d Dept. 2020). Here, the record supports a finding that Wife’s business income and social security payments allow her to be self-supporting to some degree. However, the applicable standard requires Wife to be self-supporting at a level “roughly commensurate” to the established marital standard of living. See Summer v. Summer, 85 NY2d 1014 (1995). As indicated above, Wife will need financial assistance from Husband to maintain her established standard of living, even after considering the large equitable distribution award granted herein. In regard to the parties’ comparative future earning capacities, the record supports a finding that Husband is in a superior financial position. Wife’s businesses, while profitable, are laden with debt, and the subject of debt related litigation. Moreover, they largely require Wife’s active participation to remain profitable, and her ability to manage the same will likely decrease as she gets older. While Husband argues that he is also of advanced age and intends to retire soon, a significant portion of his income is not dependent on his daily active participation. Accordingly, this Court finds that even if Husband should retire one day, he would still have sufficient income to fund a maintenance obligation if that obligation is set at a reasonable level. 6. Reasonable Needs. Part and parcel to maintaining her standard of living is a requirement that any maintenance award be sufficient to meet Wife’s reasonable needs. See Naik v. Naik, 125 AD3d 734 (2d Dept. 2015). In her updated statement of New Worth dated November 30, 2018, (Def. Ex. PPPP), Wife indicates that her monthly expenses inclusive of vehicles, food, and recreation total approximately $7,550 per month. A similar figure is found in her initial Statement of Net Worth dated August 15, 2016 (Def. Ex. OOOO). However, at trial Wife testified that she needs $12,000 to $13,000 per month to support herself. This discrepancy is in part related to her desire to obtain possession of, and maintain, both the former marital home, and the parties’ vacation home. Wife’s Statement of Net Worth does not include many of the expenditures related to these properties as Husband paid for most of the carrying charges during the pendency of this action. As indicated above (see equitable distribution), Wife has been granted the opportunity to purchase Husband’s equity in both of these properties, however the Court finds that if Wife elects to maintain a vacation home for her exclusive use, she must contribute to its upkeep from her own considerable resources, and not be wholly dependent upon Husband. In this regard, the Court finds the maintenance awarded herein to be an adequate contribution to Wife’s reasonable needs of approximately $7,550 a month. 7. Acts That have Inhibited a Party’s Earnings Capacity (Domestic Violence). As testimony regarding incidents of severe domestic violence were repeatedly addressed by Wife during trial, this Court would be remiss in not discussing the same. Wife credibly testified that Husband was overly jealous and angry, belittled her, and on occasion became violent. Once such event resulted in Husband striking her in the jaw, breaking some of her teeth. While Husband denied some of these allegations, he admitted that physical violence had occurred “a long time ago.” While the injuries sustained by Wife may have occurred earlier in the marriage, Wife credibly testified that she still suffers lingering emotional and physical pain from the injuries. However, despite this treatment, Wife has become a successful businesswoman. While Husband was never very supportive of Wife’s career, she achieved success notwithstanding his poor treatment of her at times. There is little evidence in the record that Husband’s reprehensible actions actually inhibited Wife’s ability to earn income over the course of this marriage. While this Court cannot make specific findings as to the effect the credible instances of domestic violence had on Wife’s actual earning capacity, this Court has considered Husband’s maltreatment of Wife when determining maintenance and equitable distribution. Maintenance Award After a thoughtful consideration of all the factors indicated above, this Court awards Wife the sum of $6,500 per month, or $78,000 a year, in non-durational lifetime maintenance. While this amount is lower than the sum requested by Wife, the Court is constrained to consider the arguments of both parties as applied to the factors discussed above in determining a proper award amount, and duration. While Husband’s income, or ability to earn income, is considerably higher than Wife’s, the trial record supports a finding that Wife improperly utilizes her businesses to fund many of her personal expenses. This improper use of corporate funds both increases her earning capacity through non-taxed income and reduces her monthly expenses. The amount of maintenance awarded herein, when added to Wife’s imputed income of $97,900 results in a combined annual income of $175,900, a considerable portion thereof presumably being tax free. The Court finds this sum sufficient to support a standard of living roughly equivalent to the standard that Wife became accustomed to during the marriage when considered together with the equitable distribution award of approximately $3,179,853 granted to her herein. In addition, this amount strikes a reasonable balance between the preservation of Wife’s established standard of living and Husband’s right to retire, as many of his business partners already have. While a considerable portion of Husband’s income is passive, primarily from real estate holdings, his earning capacity will be reduced when he retires. In fact, Husband has testified that several of his businesses are no longer active, and that he plans on closing many of the others in the near future. If the Court were to grant the $12,500 monthly amount sought by Wife as non-durational maintenance, Husband would likely be unable to pay it at some point in the near future without rendering himself unable to pay his own considerable living expenses and financial obligations (Def. Ex. V). See Miller v. Miller, 24 AD3d 521 (2d Dept. 2005). This award of maintenance shall be payable as follows: The first payment of maintenance under this Decision shall be due within seven days of service of the signed Judgment of Divorce. The Pendente Lite Order shall remain in effect until that time. After the new award is in effect, it shall be payable in two semi-monthly payments of $3,250. This award is to be considered all inclusive. Accordingly, Husband shall have no obligation to pay any of the expenses related to either marital property that Wife elects to possess, other than satisfying the HELOC associated with the Monticello property, as indicated herein. This award of maintenance shall end upon the death of either party or Wife’s remarriage. See In re Riconda, 90 NY2d 733 (1997). Pursuant to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, the payment of maintenance is no longer federally tax deductible to the payor nor considered income to the payee. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §11051, 131 Stat. 2089. However, the New York State Tax Code has not changed. Under the New York State Code, maintenance payments remain deductible by the payor and income to the payee. See Racquel L.J. v. Derwin J.J., 117 N.Y.S.3d 468 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 2019). Accordingly, to the extent allowable by federal and state tax law, the maintenance payments herein shall be tax deductible to Husband, and taxable to Wife. See Girgenti v. Girgenti, 81 AD3d 886 (2d Dept. 2011). A. Retroactivity A party’s maintenance obligation commences, and is retroactive to, the date the application for relief was first made, which in this case was September of 2016. See DiLascio v. DiLascio, 170 AD3d 804 (2d Dep. 2019). When calculating retroactivity, the payor spouse is entitled to a credit for any pendente lite payments made pursuant to court order. See D’Iorio v. D’Iorio, 135 AD3d 693 (2d Dept. 2016). Credits are also appropriate for any payments made to third parties on the recipient spouse’s behalf, or for their benefit (such as carrying charges, utilities, or similar payments). See Yunis v. Yunis, 94 NY2d 787 (1999). The award of maintenance herein, to wit, $6,500 a month, is payable retroactive to the filing of Wife’s pendente lite motion in 2016. Accordingly, from September of 2016 to July of 2020 Husband owes 45 months of support at $6,500 a month for a retroactive total of $292,500. However, on October 21, 2016 the parties entered into a Pendente Lite Order that required Husband to pay $4,500 a month in direct support to Wife, along with certain expenses related to the marital home, and the parties’ Monticello vacation home. Husband’s obligations were increased in August of 2017 to include “all” of the bills for maintenance and upkeep for both homes (Ct. Ex. 6). There is no evidence in the record to indicate that Husband is in arrears for any of these required payments. In fact, any time that Husband did fall behind during this proceeding, he quickly remedied any arrears. In support of his claim for credits, Husband offered a summary of pendente lite payments that he made from the October 2016 Order forward. (Pl. Ex. 17). Pursuant to the relevant sections¹¹ of this document Husband established that he paid $117,000 in direct support to Wife up to December of 2018, and approximately $73,690 in expenses paid to third parties for Wife’s benefit. Moreover, as neither party has sought to supplement the record to include evidence of unpaid support payments after the end date of Husband’s summary (12/24/18)¹², this Court may reasonably conclude that Husband is up to date in his $4,500 monthly direct payments to Wife. These “post summary” payments amount to an additional 30-month maintenance credit of $135,000.¹³ Accordingly, in total, Husband is entitled to a credit of at least $325,690 in pendente lite support payments, which exceeds the retroactivity calculation of $292,500, resulting in no retroactive award. Notably, while these calculations result in an overpayment, Husband is not entitled to recoup any excess payments made, as such recoupment would violate public policy. See Johnson v. Chapin, 12 NY3d 461 (2009); see also Rader v. Rader, 54 AD3d 919 (2d Dept. 2008). B. Life Insurance Wife requests that this Court mandate Husband to obtain a life insurance policy in the amount of $2 Million Dollars to protect her maintenance award. Generally, a payor spouse may be required to maintain life insurance in an amount sufficient to secure an award of maintenance in the event of their death. See Mayer v. Mayer, 142 AD3d 691 (2d Dept. 2016). Any such policy should be set at an amount sufficient to achieve that purpose. See D’Iorio v. D’Iorio, 135 AD3d 693 (2d Dept. 2016). Here, Husband testified that he currently has two life insurance policies. The first has a death benefit of $56,000 and names Wife as beneficiary. The second policy, which has a death benefit of $223,441, names Husband’s cousin as beneficiary. In his Summation, Husband offers to amend the beneficiary of this second policy to Wife to satisfy any obligation he may have to provide insurance. Setting a proper life insurance policy is difficult when considering an award of nondurational maintenance, as the award cannot be reduced to a sum certain. Moreover, the ability to obtain life insurance may be difficult, or impossible, for someone of advanced age. See Hartog v. Hartog, 85 NY2d 36 (1995). Accordingly, Husband is hereby ordered to maintain his existing life insurance policies and to change the beneficiary on his second life insurance policy (Def. Ex. BBB) to name Wife as sole irrevocable beneficiary. This will provide Wife with approximately $280,000 worth of insurance coverage in the event of Husbands’ death. In addition, Husband is hereby directed to take reasonable steps to procure an additional $250,000 policy naming Wife as irrevocable beneficiary. See Kammerer v. Kammerer, 174 AD3d 874, 2d Dept. 2019, see also Cohen v. Cohen, 120 AD3d 1060 (1st Dept. 2014). However, in the event that Husband is unable to obtain the required policy due to his age, or other factors, at a reasonable cost, then he may seek modification of his requirement from a Court of competent jurisdiction. Counsel Fees During the course of this protracted divorce proceeding Wife incurred approximately $177,885 in counsel fees with her current attorney Howard File Esq. In addition to Mr. Files fees, Wife also incurred an additional sum of $89,263 with her prior counsel Raoul Felder Esq. All of the fees attributed to Mr. Felder were incurred before a request for judicial intervention (“RJI”) was filed. Mr. Felder’s outstanding fee was reduced to a charging lien when he withdrew as counsel and was replaced by Mr. File (Def. Ex. SSSS). Since commencement, Husband has voluntarily paid pendente lite counsel fees to Wife’s attorney totaling approximately $70,000. Other than the sums paid by Husband, and a $15,000 retainer, Wife’s attorney remains unpaid despite having sent at least 37 bills to Wife. In her written Summation after Trial, Wife seeks an award of counsel fees incurred in relation to this matrimonial action. Wife seeks an award of $115,909, representing the amount currently due and owing to Mr. File through his preparation of her written summation, including $23,245 in disbursements. In support of her claim, Wife argues that Husband is the more monied spouse in this action, and that he has unnecessarily complicated the proceedings such that an award of counsel fees is warranted. Wife’s counsel has submitted a post-trial Affirmation of Services dated May 10, 2019. Husband has not challenged the accuracy of Mr. File’s charges, nor raised any procedural issues regarding his billing practices. During trial both parties agreed that the matter of counsel fees would be best handled through submissions, rather than through live testimony and cross examination of counsel (SFO 4/29/19). However, both parties testified at trial regarding the issue of their respective counsel fees. In opposition, Husband argues that an award of counsel fees is not warranted in what he labels as an essentially “pointless” proceeding. Husband argues that the long delay in getting this matter to trial, and that the duration of this trial, was due primarily to Wife’s “obsession” with the ZL Factory, an alleged asset that she could not prove existed, or had value, at trial. Husband further argues that a good portion of the trial was spent on questions relating to irrelevant transactions that occurred long before the commencement of this divorce proceeding. Finally, Husband argues that he has already paid $70,000 towards Wife’s fees based primarily upon unsuccessful motions filed by Wife during the pre-trial phase of this proceeding, and that he should not be required to contribute any more. An award of reasonable counsel fees is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. The issue of counsel fees is controlled by the equities and circumstances of each particular case. See Nicodemus v. Nicodemus, 98 AD3d 605 (2d Dept. 2012); see also DRL §237(a). While DRL §237 permits consideration of many factors, paramount amongst these factors is financial need. See O’Halloran v. O’Halloran, 58 AD3d 704 (2d dept. 2009); see also Silverman v. Silverman, 304 AD2d 41 (1st Dept. 2003). “An award of an attorney’s fee will generally be warranted where there is a significant disparity in the financial circumstances of the parties”. Cohen v. Cohen, 73 AD3d 832 (2d Dept. 2010). The purpose of DRL §237 is to “redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the nonmonied spouse. See O’Shea v. O’Shea, 93 NY2d 187 (1999). Other factors to be considered include the relative merits of the parties’ positions, and if either party engaged in conduct that resulted in a delay of the proceedings or unnecessary litigation. See Vitale v. Vitale, 112 AD3d 614 (2d Dept. 2013). While all relevant factors must be considered, there is a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees should be awarded to the less monied spouse. See Marchese v. Marchese, 2020 NY Slip Op 03655 (2d Dept. 2020); see also Boltz v. Boltz, 178 AD3d 656 (2d Dept. 2019). It has been established throughout this Decision that Husband is the more monied spouse in this action, both in terms of access to liquid funds and income producing assets. Accordingly, Wife benefits from a statutory presumption that she is entitled to an award of counsel fees. Husband, in opposition, has failed to rebut this presumption. See Soltanpour v. Koch, 176 AD3d 570 (1st Dept. 2019); see also Wiedman v. Wiedman, 162 AD3d 720 (2d Dept. 2018).However, that does not end the Court’s analysis. While Husband may be in a superior financial position, this Decision has served to considerably reduce the economic gap between the parties. Wife has been awarded a significant amount of maintenance, together with an allocation of over three million dollars in marital assets. Accordingly, she is capable, and thus responsible, for the payment of at least some of the fees that she incurred in this proceeding. See Macaluso v. Macaluso, 145 AD3d 1295 (3rd Dept. 2016); see also Sykes v. Sykes, 41 Misc 3d 1061 (Sup. Ct. NY Cty. 2013); Scott M. v. Illona M. 31 Misc 3d 353 (Sup. Ct. Kings. Cty. 2011). Moreover, Husband is correct in asserting that at least some of the positions taken by Wife in this proceeding served to unnecessarily increase counsel fees. See Klestadt v. Klestadt, 120 N.Y.S. 3d 813 (2d Dept. 2020). While Wife’s initial pursuit of the Z-L factory was not frivolous, or a “fools errand” as Husband suggests, there did come a time when her ability to prove and value the factory as a marital asset subject to equitable distribution under New York law became less and less likely given the fact that any alleged proof laid irretrievably buried in the Ukraine. Wife filed numerous unsuccessful motions related to discovery, seeking information about the factory that Husband repeatedly indicated he did not possess. The only “proof” offered by Wife was secured under false pretense by their daughter V.L. from an office in the Ukraine and ultimately precluded as inadmissible hearsay. Wife’s failure to comply with the neutral business evaluator until after his analysis was completed also prolonged the trial. Wife contested Mr. Gottlieb’s report as “unsupported” by the facts then hired her own expert, Ms. Muckler, who testified at trial. However, Husband also unnecessarily prolonged this proceeding at times by spending time eliciting information irrelevant to the claims in this case. Finally, a review of the several hundred page trial record reveals that both parties were less than forthcoming about their finances frequently claiming lack of knowledge, lack of recollection or changing their testimony completely by the time redirect rolled around. This made for a rambling, confusing, contradictory record, caused the need for even more clarifying exhibits, and ultimately diminished the credibility of both parties here. After considering the arguments made by both parties regarding the issue of counsel fees, and after considering the factors discussed above, this Court finds it reasonable to award Wife the sum of $57,955 in counsel fees, representing a 50 percent contribution to the amount she requested. See Lindo v. Lindo, 2020 NY Slip Op 04154 (2d Dept. 2020); see also Susskind v. Susskind, 12 AD3d 536 (2d Dept. 2005); Chaudry v. Chaudry, 95 AD3d 1058 (2d Dept. 2012); Aloi v. Simoni, 82 AD3d 683 (2d Dept. 2011). This award complies with the statutory presumption of counsel fees that Husband failed to rebut, while still acknowledging the other relevant factors, such as the questionable positions taken by Wife in this proceeding, and the considerable awards of equitable distribution and maintenance that she received herein. See Grumet v. Grumet, 37 AD3d 534 (2d Dept. 2007); see also Chalif v. Chalif, 298 AD2d 348 (2d Dept. 2002). A. Charging Lien On or about August 10, 2016, Wife’s former attorney Raoul Felder Esq., filed a Notice of Charging Lien. This document put this Court, and the parties, on notice that Mr. Felder was making claim to the sum of $89,263.05 which would attach to any Judgment of Divorce rendered by this Court and would preclude Wife from obtaining any proceeds until the lien was satisfied in full. This Lien was entered into evidence at trial (Def. Ex. SSSS). Pursuant to Judiciary Law §475, an attorney in an action or proceeding has a statutory right to a lien against his or her client’s cause of action. This lien, known as a “charging lien,” does not provide for an immediately enforceable judgment, like a money judgment, but rather provides a security interest against an asset, i.e., a judgment or settlement in their client’s favor. See Bernard v. De Rham, 161 AD3d 686 (1st Dept. 2018). In the context of a matrimonial proceeding, a charging lien is available to the extent that an equitable distribution award creates an award for the client “greater than the value of the interests already held.” See Charnow v. Charnow, 134 AD3d 875 (2d Dept. 2015). A charging lien does not attach to an award of maintenance. See Theroux v. Theroux, 145 AD2d 625 (2d Dept. 1988). As per this Decision, Wife succeeded in obtaining considerable distributive awards from assets that were not titled in her name. Accordingly, Mr. Felder is entitled to recoup the sum of $89,263.05 payable to him “off the top” of any equitable distribution awards payable to Wife by Husband, or from the sale of real property. A redacted copy of this Decision shall be forwarded to Mr. Felder, by Wife’s current counsel Mr. Howard File Esq., so that he can be advised of his right to recovery herein. The Decision shall be redacted to only include the sections relating to equitable distribution and counsel fees. In any event, the payment or satisfaction of this charging lien is subject to any causes of action that Wife may be entitled to raise to challenge the amount of fees in the lien, or the propriety of its enforcement in relation to any specific awards herein. While it is unclear in her summation, there is some evidence in the record that Wife sought contribution from Husband in relation to these pre-suit fees. To the extent that any claim was made for contribution, that claim is hereby denied. These fees were incurred before this case appeared in Court, and were not substantiated by billing documentation, evidence, or testimony at trial. Accordingly, it would be unjust for Husband to have to contribute to the same. B. Reallocation of Expert Fees Husband seeks reallocation of the expert fees incurred in this case. Husband argues that he has been forced to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees primarily because Wife “refuses to stop chasing the ZL Factory an asset she knows [Husband] lost control of in 2010″ (summation, p. 3). Included in this sum is at least $113,000 paid to the court neutral business appraiser Mark Gottlieb. Husband further reminds this Court that in addition to Mr. Gottlieb he has paid all the experts in this case except for Ms. Muckler and Mr. Gager who were retained by Wife to contest the neutral experts. However, it is worth noting that Wife has sought for Husband to pay for these experts as well. While it is true that Husband, as the monied spouse, was directed to pay for many of the pendente lite litigation expenses, including the cost of neutral experts, his basic premise that “he” paid for the expenses is incorrect. As addressed at length throughout this Decision it has sadly become commonplace for both parties to utilize their businesses as personal bank accounts, and Husband’s expert fee obligation was treated no differently. As established at trial through documentary evidence and the testimony of Mr. Gottlieb, approximately $52,800 of Mr. Gottlieb’s fee was paid by 37 Terrance Place LLC, 41 Terrance Place Corp., Bryna Corp., and Trilini International (Tr. 1/17/19 pgs. 190-192). In light of the fact that it was not Husband who paid Mr. Gottlieb, but Husband’s businesses, the Court declines to reallocate any portion of Mr. Gottlieb’s fees to Wife. It is unknown to this Court whether Husband, or his businesses, funded the balance of the experts he was directed to compensate. However, it is immaterial to this Court’s analysis. Husband was, and remains, the more monied spouse in this action even after the equitable distribution of assets and the payment of maintenance indicated herein. Accordingly, Husband’s application for a reallocation of expert fees incurred by him during proceeding is hereby denied. See BC v. RC, 50 Misc 3d 1228(A) (Sup. Ct. Kings. Cty. 2016). Conclusion For the detailed reasons set forth above, and in accordance with the testimony of both parties, and the terms of the Preliminary Conference Order, Plaintiff Husband is hereby granted a Judgment of Divorce on the ground that the parties’ marriage has broken down irretrievably for a period of six months. See DRL §170(7). Wife’s application for a final award of non-durational maintenance is hereby granted in the amount of $6,500 a month, which shall be payable in semi-monthly installment payments of $3,250. The first payment of final maintenance under this Decision shall be due within seven days of service of the signed Judgment of Divorce. The Pendente Lite Order shall remain in effect until that time. Equitable distribution shall be effectuated as described at length herein. All distributive awards herein are to be paid within 60 days after service of the signed Judgement of Divorce unless it is explicitly stated otherwise herein. Wife’s right to purchase Husband’s share of the equity in both the Staten Island and Monticello homes shall be effectuated as detailed above. If Wife chooses not to purchase either, or both, of the properties they will be placed on the market for sale as indicated herein. When effectuating equitable distribution, both parties shall be entitled to utilize their comparative distributive awards as offsets against amounts that they owe the other party. Wife is also authorized to use the distributive awards payable to her as credits against the purchase of the equity in the Staten Island and Monticello homes. Wife’s application for an award of counsel fees is granted in the amount of $57,995. This award shall be paid directly to Wife’s counsel, Howard File Esq., within 90 days of service of a signed Judgment of Divorce. Mr. File shall serve a copy of this Decision (as limited above) upon Wife’s former counsel, Raoul Felder Esq. within 20 days of issuance. Plaintiff Husband is hereby directed to file a Judgment of Divorce in accordance with the terms of this Decision, together with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In addition, Plaintiff is hereby directed to file all necessary supporting documentation and file a Note of Issue if one has not been filed. The Judgment, and supporting documentation is to be filed within 30 days of the issuance of this Decision. In the event that Husband’s counsel fails to file within 30 days, Wife’s counsel may do so, and the cost of the same, including legal fees accrued in relation to document preparation, shall be chargeable to Husband. Both parties are hereby directed to enter into a stipulation converting this matter to the NYSCEF E-Filing system to ease the process of filing the Judgment of Divorce. This constitutes the Decision of the Court after trial. In the event that an application was made during or before trial, and not specifically addressed herein, or any motion was filed and not specifically decided, that application or motion is hereby denied. Dated: July 29, 2020