By: Edmead, P.J., Higgitt, McShan, JJ. 16-023. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. MICHAEL IGLESIA, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Alexander M. Tisch, J.), rendered March 7, 2013, affirmed. Since defendant waived prosecution by information, the accusatory instrument only had to satisfy the reasonable cause requirement of a misdemeanor complaint (see People v. Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]). So viewed, the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally valid, since it provided reasonable cause to believe that defendant was guilty of driving while ability impaired (see Vehicle and Traffic Law ? 1192[1]), the offense to which he ultimately pleaded guilty. The operation element of the offense was satisfied by allegations that defendant was observed “standing next to a white Ford Van,” that defendant had the keys to the van in his pants pocket, the lights to the van were on, and that defendant stated that he hit a pole while driving (see People v. Esposito, 33 NY3d 1016 [2019], revg 60 Misc 3d 60 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]; People v. Brown, 65 Misc 3d 126[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 51493[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1015 [2019]). The impairment element was satisfied by allegations that the arresting officer observed defendant’s “watery and bloodshot eyes, slurred speech,” unsteadiness on his feet, refusal to submit to a breath test, and his statement that he “hit [the] pole” while “making a U-turn” on the Queensboro Bridge (see People v. Cruz, 48 NY2d 419, 426-427 [1979], appeal dismissed 466 US 901 [1980]; see also People v. Fiumara, 116 AD3d 421 [2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1036 [2014]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
By: Edmead, P.J., Higgitt, McShan, JJ. 16-338. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. MARC MITCHELL, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Stephen Antignani, J.), rendered February 17, 2016, affirmed. Since defendant waived prosecution by information, the accusatory instrument only had to satisfy the reasonable cause requirement of a misdemeanor complaint (see People v. Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]). So viewed, the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally valid because it described facts of an evidentiary nature establishing reasonable cause to believe that defendant was guilty of fraudulent accosting (see Penal Law §165.30), the charge to which defendant ultimately pleaded guilty. The instrument recited that defendant was observed in Times Square standing next to a makeshift table, on which there was a black box with a slit, trying to obtain money from pedestrians by falsely representing that the funds would go to charitable organizations supporting the homeless, when in reality defendant would keep the money himself. Defendant’s intent to defraud (see Penal Law §15.00) may be inferred from his statements, conduct and the surrounding circumstances (see also People v. Gordon, 23 NY3d 643, 650 [2014]; People v. Phillips, 60 Misc 3d 126[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50906[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 940 [2018]; People v. Lewis, 56 Misc 3d 126[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50800[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 951 [2017]). The accosting element of the offense was satisfied by allegations that defendant “ask[ed] passing pedestrians to ‘Help the Homeless’” (see People v. Morrison, 58 Misc 3d 19 [App Term, 1st Dept 2017], quoting People v. Tanner, 153 Misc 2d 742, 746 [Crim Ct, NY County 1992 (Richter, J.)] [the "accosts" element of the offense "requires that the defendant take some affirmative action to make contact with the victim for the purpose of involving that individual in the scam"]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
