The following papers were read on this motion by defendants for an order, pursuant to 3211 (a) (7) and (8) and 327 (a), dismissing the complaint. Papers Numbered Notice of Motion, Affirmation, Exhibits E5-11 Affirmation In Opposition, Exhibits E14-20 Reply Affirmation E21-22 Sur-Reply E23 Reply to Sur-Reply E24 Upon the foregoing papers, it is ordered that this motion is determined as follows: Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in a construction accident that occurred on September 1, 2018, in Frederiksted, Virgin Islands. It is fundamental that a court must acquire personal jurisdiction over a defendant before it can render a judgment against that defendant (see Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 US 604 [1990]; Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US 694 [1982]). A defendant may consent to a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction (see National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 US 311 [1964]), or waive the right to object to it (see CPLR 3211 [e]; Iacovangelo v. Shepherd, 5 NY3d 184 [2005]), but when a defendant has objected to the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to prove jurisdiction (see Fischbarg v. Doucet, 9 NY3d 375 [2007]; Mejia-Haffner v. Killington, Ltd., 119 AD3d 912 [2d Dept 2014]). Under modern jurisprudence, a court may assert general all-purpose jurisdiction or specific conduct-linked jurisdiction over a particular defendant (see Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 US 117 [2014]; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 US 915 [2011]). “A court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim against that defendant, even if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different State” (Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco County, ___ US ___, 137 S Ct 1773, 1780 [2017]; see Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 US 915). “Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, depends on an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation” (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 US at 919 [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted]; Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 US 117). CPLR 301, which confers general jurisdiction in New York, authorizes a court to exercise “such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have been exercised heretofore.” In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the United States Supreme Court stated that a court is authorized to exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the corporation’s affiliations with the state “are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State” (564 US at 919, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310, 317 [1945]). In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Supreme Court limited the scope of general jurisdiction to that definition and rejected a standard that would allow the exercise of general jurisdiction in every state where a corporation is engaged in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business (571 US 117). The Supreme Court instructed that the paradigm bases for general jurisdiction over a corporation are the place of incorporation and principal place of business. In the present case, no defendant is incorporated in New York or has a principal place of business here. Plaintiff argues that defendants consented to the jurisdiction of New York courts for all purposes by registering to do business in New York. Business Corporation Law §1301 (a) provides that “[a] foreign corporation shall not do business in this state until it has been authorized to do so.” Business Corporation Law §304 (b) provides that no foreign corporation may be authorized to do business in New York unless in its application for authority, it designates the secretary of state as the agent upon whom process against the corporation may be served. Similarly, Business Corporation Law §1304 (a) (6) requires a foreign corporation, in its application for authority to do business in New York, to designate the secretary of state as its agent upon whom process against it may be served and an address to which process received by the Secretary of State is to be mailed. This court is constrained to follow the precedent established in Aybar v. Aybar, where the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that “New York’s business registration statutes do not expressly require consent to general jurisdiction as a cost of doing business in New York, nor do they expressly notify a foreign corporation that registering to do business here has such an effect” (169 AD3d 137, 147 [2d Dept 2019], lv dismissed 33 NY3d 1044 [2019]. The court continued, “it cannot be said that a corporation’s compliance with the existing business registration statutes constitutes consent to the general jurisdiction of New York courts, to be sued upon causes of action that have no relation to New York (Aybar v. Aybar, 169 AD3d at 147.” The number of New York courts rejecting general personal jurisdiction based solely on a foreign corporation’s registration to do business here continues to grow (see Kyowa Seni, Co. v. ANA Aircraft Technics, Co., 60 Misc 3d 898 [Sup Ct, NY County 2018]), under the reasoning that Daimler AG v. Bauman renders the reasoning of old cases upholding general jurisdiction on the basis of consent-by-registration outmoded and inapplicable (see Aybar v. Aybar, 169 AD3d 137). New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR 302, provides, in relevant part, that New York courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary who “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” (CPLR 302 [a] [1]) or “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state” (CPLR 302 [a] [3]). Under CPLR 302 [a] [3], “[t]he situs of the injury is the location of the original event which caused the injury, not the location where the resultant damages are subsequently felt by the plaintiff” (Herman v. Sharon Hosp., 135 AD2d 682, 683 [2d Dept 1987]; see Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 24 NY3d 370 [2014]; McGowan v. Smith, 52 NY2d 268 [1981]; Bloomgarden v. Lanza, 143 AD3d 850 [2d Dept [2016]; Vaichunas v. Tonyes, 61 AD3d 850 [2d Dept 2009]). Here, since the accident which caused the injuries occurred in the Virgin Islands, CPLR 302 (a) (3) does not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over these defendants (see Abad v. Lorenzo, 163 AD3d 903 [2d Dept 2018]; Vaichunas v. Tonyes, 61 AD3d 850). In order to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists under CPLR 302 (a) (1), the court must determine (1) whether the defendant “purposefully availed itself of ‘the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State’ by either transacting business in New York or contracting to supply goods or services in New York” (D & R Global Selections, S.L. v. Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro, 29 NY3d 292, 297 [2017], quoting Rushaid v. Pictet & Cie, 28 NY3d 316, 323 [2016]), and (2) whether the claim arose from that business transaction or from the contract to supply good or services (see D & R Global Selections, S.L. v. Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro, 29 NY3d 292; Rushaid v. Pictet & Cie, 28 NY3d 316). In order to satisfy the second prong of the jurisdictional inquiry, there must be an “articulable nexus” (McGowan v. Smith, 52 NY2d at 272) or a “substantial relationship” (Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467 [1988]) between a defendant’s New York activities and the cause of action sued upon (see D & R Global Selections, S.L. v. Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro, 29 NY3d 292; Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 20 NY3d 327 [2012]; Leuthner v. Homewood Suites by Hilton, 151 AD3d 1042 [2d Dept 2017]; Fernandez v. DaimlerChrysler, AG., 143 AD3d 765 [2d Dept 2016]). The minimal, attenuated New York contacts alleged by plaintiff in this case, even if sufficient to demonstrate that defendants purposefully availed themselves of this forum, are unrelated to plaintiff’s construction accident that occurred in the Virgin Islands (see Saratoga Harness Racing Assn. v. Moss, 20 NY2d 733 [1967]; Copp v. Ramirez, 62 AD3d 23 [1st Dept 2009]). General connections with the forum are insufficient for the purposes of specific jurisdiction. “A corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts within a state…is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity’” (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 US at 927, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US at 318). Accordingly, defendants’ motion is granted, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8), and the complaint is dismissed. This constitutes the decision and order of the court. Dated: October 23, 2020
