OPINION & ORDER On May 16, 2018, six days prior to the scheduled start date of trial, Defendant Michelle Morton pled guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud and investment advisor fraud. On July 20, 2018, after the trial of her co-defendants (from whom she had previously sought severance) had ended, Morton moved to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that it had not been knowingly and voluntarily made. The Court denied Morton’s motion, noting, among other things, that Morton — who appeared remarkably calm, collected, and poised at the plea proceeding — had clearly allocuted that she understood what she was pleading to and the potential consequences of her decision. Morton raised no issues regarding her attorneys or their legal representation of her in that July 2018 motion. In late 2018, however, two days before she was scheduled — for the second time — to be sentenced, Morton informed the Court that she desired new counsel, and on May 17, 2019, she filed a second motion to withdraw her guilty plea — the instant motion. In this second motion, Morton claims for the first time that her prior attorneys coerced her into pleading guilty despite knowing and believing that she was innocent, and that they rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. In March 2020, the Court held a four-day evidentiary hearing, during which it heard extensive testimony from Morton’s prior counsel, as well as from her pretrial services officer. Morton herself did not testify. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court found both her prior attorneys to be credible witnesses, as well as zealous advocates who had vigorously represented Morton over the course of almost two years. The Court determined that, contrary to Morton’s assertions, neither attorney had encouraged, persuaded, or coerced her to plead guilty, nor did either believe her to be innocent when she did so. Rather, the Court concluded that Morton “appear[ed] to be a skilled manipulator.” The Court nonetheless asked the parties to file additional submissions addressing Morton’s preparedness for her plea hearing. Now, after considering the parties’ multiple filings, as well as the hearing testimony, the Court concludes that Morton was not coerced into pleading guilty, that her plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and that her prior counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, Morton’s motion to withdraw her plea is, again, denied. BACKGROUND The facts of this case have been detailed in various prior opinions, see Dkts. 568, 690, and the Court therefore includes only those facts necessary to resolve the instant motion. Michelle Morton was arrested on May 11, 2016, following the filing of a sealed Complaint charging her with conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, conspiracy to commit investment adviser fraud, and investment adviser fraud. Dkts. 1, 6. On May 31, 2016, an indictment was filed against Morton and her co-defendants, charging her with the same four crimes. Dkt. 22. In early 2017, after first working with an attorney hired pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, Morton retained Gregory Morvillo, Eugene Ingoglia,1 and Savannah Stevenson, then at Morvillo LLP, to represent her. Dkt. 149. I. Morton’s Guilty Plea On May 16, 2018, six days prior to the start of trial and following extensive pre-trial and in limine motion practice, Morton entered a guilty plea to two counts in the indictment: (1) conspiracy to commit securities fraud and (2) investment advisor fraud. See Dkt. 503 (“Plea Tr.”). At the plea hearing, the Court questioned Morton about recent physical ailments that she claimed to have suffered, her general mental state, and any medication that she was taking. See id. at 4-6. Although Morton acknowledged that she had been treated for mental illness three decades ago, she affirmed that this had no effect on her mental state or in any way affected her ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. See id. at 4. In particular, Morton testified that there was “nothing” about her health condition that affected her understanding of what was happening in the proceeding. Id. at 5. Morton further testified that she had had sufficient time and opportunity to discuss her case with her counsel, and that she had “discussed with them the nature of the charges, any possible defenses [she] may have, and the rights that [she would] be giving up if [she] pled guilty.” Id. at 5-6. The Court nonetheless explained the constitutional rights that Morton was giving up by entering a guilty plea. See id. at 6-9. Morton was also asked if she was satisfied with her counsel’s representation, to which she responded that “[i]t has been excellent” and that she was “very satisfied.” Id. at 6. During the proceeding, the Court ensured that Morton understood the consequences of her guilty plea. The Court explained that the maximum term of imprisonment to which Morton could be sentenced was five years in prison for each count, meaning that the “total maximum term of imprisonment” to which she could be sentenced was ten years in prison. Id. at 11-12, 13-14. Morton testified that she understood these terms. Id. Morton also testified that she understood that any term of imprisonment may be followed by a term of supervised release for up to three years, id. at 12, 14, and that her sentence may also include certain financial penalties, id. at 13-14. Morton affirmed that she had discussed the sentencing guidelines with her attorneys and that she understood that those guidelines serve as recommendations to the Court. Id. at 15-16. The Court, nonetheless, specifically explained that it was “required to consider the recommendations of the federal sentencing guidelines” in determining Morton’s sentence, and that while it “must take into account the sentencing guidelines,” it was also “required to give the sentence that [it] believes best satisfies the purposes of the criminal law, even if it’s higher or lower than the guidelines recommendation.” Id. at 15. As to her plea agreement, Morton confirmed that she read the agreement prior to signing it, that she discussed it with her attorneys, and that she understood “all of the terms of [the] agreement” after doing so. Id. at 16. The Government subsequently summarized the main terms of the agreement, explaining that the parties had “agreed and stipulated to a guidelines range of 135 to 168 months imprisonment,” but that because the “statutorily authorized maximum sentence” for the two counts is 120 months imprisonment — i.e., “less than the minimum of the applicable guidelines range” — the maximum sentence for both counts was 120 months. Id. at 17. The Court separately ensured that Morton understood that she was giving up her right to appeal or otherwise challenge her sentence as long as she was sentenced to 120 months or less, as well as that she was giving up certain other rights of appeal. Id. at 18. As the proceeding progressed further, Morton was questioned about the specific counts against her. Morton testified that she “willingly” signed the plea agreement, and denied being offered “any inducement to plead guilty” to these counts, or being “threatened, bribed, or forced [] to sign the plea agreement or to plead guilty.” Id. at 19. Morton also confirmed that no one had made any promise to her about what her sentence would be. Id. She further confirmed that she understood that any prediction as to what her sentence would be could be wrong, and that she would not be able to withdraw her plea on the basis that her sentence is different from what she hoped for or expected. Id. The Court then asked Morton to explain, in her own words, what she did to make her “guilty of [the] crimes.” Id. at 20. In response, Morton stated that, “[i]n or about April 2015,” while she “was chief executive officer of a registered investment adviser known as Atlantic Asset Management[,]” she had “ agreed with others to purchase certain bonds for a client account at Atlantic,” knowing “there was a material conflict of interest in connection with the bonds,” and she “did not disclose [the conflict] to the client before making the purchase.” Id. Morton stated that “[t]his was wrong for [her] to do,” as it “enabled Jason Galanis,” the principal conspirator in the case, “to steal the bond proceeds through a broader fraud that [she] did not know anything about and, therefore, [her] investors lost money.” Id. The Government then summarized its proof against Morton, id. at 21-22, and her attorneys also confirmed that, from their perspective, “there [was] a sufficient factual predicate” for her guilty plea to the two counts, id. at 21. Overall, as the Court noted in its prior opinion, Morton remained “remarkably calm, collected, and poised” throughout the entirety of the plea hearing. See Aug. 17, 2018 Order, Dkt. 568, at 2. II. Morton’s First Motion to Withdraw On June 14, 2018, almost a month after the trial of her co-defendants had begun, Morton submitted an ex parte letter informing the Court that she intended to file a motion to withdraw her plea. Still having not received Morton’s motion by July 9th, the Court ordered her to submit it no later than August 3, 2018. See Dkt. 539. After being advised that Morton also refused to cooperate with the preparation of her presentence report until her anticipated motion was resolved, however, the Court ordered her to submit the motion by July 20, 2018 in order to provide sufficient time for the preparation of the report in the event that it was denied. See Dkt. 542. On July 20, 2018, over three weeks after the completion of her co-defendants’ trial, Morton moved to withdraw her guilty plea on the basis that it had not been knowingly and voluntarily made. See Dkt. 548; see also Def. First Mot., Dkt. 549, at 2 (arguing that “she had deluded herself and that entering a guilty plea was a reaction to the stresses in her life — not an honest acknowledgment of wrongdoing”). The Court denied this motion on August 17, 2018. See Aug. 17, 2018 Order. First, the Court emphasized the “peculiar timing of the events relating to Morton’s plea.” Id. at 4. As the Court recounted, “Morton entered her plea on May 16, six days before the scheduled start date of her trial,” but then later claimed that she had “had an epiphany of sorts a mere two days [after her plea].” Id. By waiting to file her withdrawal motion, the Court noted, Morton had successfully avoided going to trial with her co-defendants. See id. Second, the Court rejected Morton’s argument that her physical ailments, financial difficulties, and family troubles had resulted in a “momentary lapse into self-delusion about her guilt.” Id. at 5-6. The Court found that Morton had made clear at her plea allocution that she understood what she was pleading to and the potential consequences of her decision. Id. at 4-6. According to the Court, this “weigh[ed] heavily against withdrawal.” Id. at 5. Finally, the Court determined that the prejudice to the Government should also preclude Morton from withdrawing her plea. See id. at 7-8. Specifically, the Court stated that re-trying Morton would force the Government “to duplicate its trial preparation,” and, as would be greatly to her advantage, Morton had “had a full preview of the government’s case and trial strategy.” Id. at 7. For all of these reasons, the Court concluded that Morton had not “offered a single compelling reason to permit withdrawal of her plea.” Id. at 8. The Court scheduled Morton’s sentencing for November 30, 2018. The day of the sentencing, however, Morton informed the Court that she had a medical emergency, and could not appear before it. The Court subsequently adjourned Morton’s sentencing date to December 21, 2018. On December 19, 2018, Morton’s attorneys informed the Court that Morton no longer wanted them to represent her, and that she was considering taking action against them for legal malpractice. See Dkt. 712 (“Dec. 21, 2018 Tr.”). On December 21, 2018, the Court held a conference with Morton and her attorneys. See id. At this conference, the Court agreed to give Morton until January 11, 2019 to find new counsel to represent her at sentencing. See id. at 10.2 On January 14, 2019, Morton’s present counsel was assigned to her pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. See Dkt. 726. Shortly thereafter, Morton’s new counsel informed the Court that it planned to file a second motion to withdraw her guilty plea. III. The Instant Motion Morton filed the instant motion on May 17, 2019. Dkt. 754. The Government responded on August 8, 2019, Dkt. 794, and Morton replied on October 28, 2019, Dkt. 815.3 On November 6, 2019, the Government filed a letter requesting leave to file a sur-reply “to respond to new arguments” made by Morton in her reply brief, which the Court granted. The Government filed its sur-reply on November 27, 2019, Dkt. 830, and Morton filed her response to the sur-reply on December 11, 2019, Dkt. 832.4 A. Morton’s Claims Morton primarily argues that her former attorneys, Gregory Morvillo and Savannah Stevenson (“prior counsel”), “coerced her to plead guilty despite her innocence in this case, and then suborned her false guilty plea,” rendering her plea involuntary and therefore invalid. See Def. Mot., Dkt. 755, at 1. 1. Coercion According to Morton, “[f]rom the inception of her relationship with Mr. Morvillo and Ms. Stevenson,” she made clear that she was innocent, and “Mr. Morvillo and Ms. Stevenson repeatedly told Ms. Morton that they believed in [her] innocence and that they could prevail at trial.” Id. at 3; see also Morton Decl., Dkt. 756,
4, 16. Morton states that “Morvillo made concerted efforts on [her] behalf,” including presentations to the Government asserting Morton’s innocence, as well as a motion to dismiss the underlying indictment against her. Def. Mot. at 3; see also Morton Decl.
