MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This is at least the second civil rights action brought by pro se plaintiff Peter McCluskey against Samuel Roberts, the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (“OTDA”), and Darla P. Oto, the Principal Hearing Officer at OTDA, in which McCluskey complains about their actions in affirming a 2017 decision by the Nassau County Department of Social Services (“Nassau DSS”) that refused to take into consideration McCluskey’s unincurred dental expenses in calculating his income and his SNAP benefits (formerly known as food stamps). In a Memorandum and Order dated May 18, 2020, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss this action, holding 1) that this action was barred by res judicata, 2) that the complaint failed to allege personal involvement on the part of Roberts or a violation of McCluskey’s federal constitutional or statutory rights, and 3) that Oto enjoyed absolute judicial immunity. McCluskey now moves to alter or amend the judgment against him pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on several grounds. For the reasons set forth below, that motion is denied. BACKGROUND Although this Memorandum and Order assumes familiarity with this action and with the two prior actions which McCluskey has brought with respect to the calculation of his SNAP benefits, the Court will recap McCluskey’s litigation history for the reader’s convenience. McCluskey is an elderly resident of Nassau County, who has been receiving food stamps since 2005. Defendant Roberts is the Commissioner of the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (“OTDA”), the state agency charged with overseeing the administration of SNAP benefits. Defendant Oto is a Public Hearing Officer at OTDA in Albany. Nassau DSS is the agency responsible for determining SNAP benefit eligibility in Nassau County and Jeanne Ryan is charged with overseeing the administration of SNAP benefits at Nassau DSS. McCluskey’s SNAP benefits are reassessed or re-certified every odd-numbered year. Since 2012, McCluskey has been litigating the issue of whether anticipated medical and dental expenses which have yet to be incurred should be considered in calculating his income for benefits purposes. In 2012, before Roberts became Commissioner of OTDA, McCluskey commenced an action — McCluskey v. Commissioner of Nassau County Department of Social Services, No. 12-CV-3852 (JFB) (ETB) — against Ryan and the Commissioners of DSS and OTDA. In September 2013, Judge Bianco dismissed that action, holding, among other things, that McCluskey’s claims against the OTDA Commissioner in his official capacity were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that the claim against the OTDA Commissioner in his personal capacity failed because the complaint did not allege facts suggesting that the Commissioner was personally involved in the actions identified in support of McCluskey’s §1983 claim. See McCluskey v. Comm’r of Nassau Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 12-CV-3852 (JFB) (ETB), 2013 WL 4780954, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2013). In 2017, McCluskey commenced a second federal action: McCluskey v. Imhof, No. 17 CV-5873 (JFB) (ARL) (the “2017 Action”). That action named four defendants, including Roberts in his official capacity as Commissioner of OTDA and Oto in her official capacity as Principal Hearing Officer. That action principally contested the rejection of McCluskey’s application for an increase in his SNAP benefits based on anticipated medical and dental expenses. Among the documents McCluskey submitted in support of that application were medical bills from his cardiologist and a sworn statement from his dentist, Dr. Berger, attesting to McCluskey’s anticipated dental expenses. The actual medical expenses documented in the cardiologist’s bill were accepted by Nassau DSS and reflected in their calculation of McCluskey’s SNAP benefits. (Id.) However, Nassau DSS refused to consider the anticipated dental expenses, asserting that anticipated expenses are never included in calculating the SNAP medical deduction. (Id.) McCluskey appealed this ruling, requesting a Fair Hearing before the OTDA. On August 4, 2017, he received a Fair Hearing Decision which affirmed Nassau DSS’s ruling. That decision read, in pertinent part: Office Regulations at 18 NYCRR 387.12(c) advise that for SNAP budgeting purposes, deductions from income include that portion of allowable medical expenses…which are in excess of $35 per month and incurred. In this case, the undisputed record demonstrates that the Appellant has not yet incurred the anticipated dental expenses. Therefore, the Agencies [sic] determination as to the amount of the deductible medical expenses…is affirmed. (Compl. at 8 (emphasis in original)). In a letter dated August 8, 2017, McCluskey requested that the OTDA Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) review the Fair Hearing Decision pursuant to 18 NYCRR §358-6.6(a). (Compl. at 11.) In that letter, McCluskey argued that the Fair Hearing Decision was contrary to a provision in 7 C.F.R. §273.10(d)(4), which requires, among other things, that a State agency “calculate a household’s expenses based on the expenses the household expects to be billed for during the certification period.” McCluskey argued that 18 NYCRR §387.12(c), which permits deductions “consisting of that portion of medical expenses, excluding special diets, which are in excess of $35 per month and incurred by a household member who meets the definition of elderly (age 60 and older) or disabled,” is inconsistent with the federal regulation and the law on which the regulation is based: 7 U.S.C. §2014(e)(5)(B). In a letter dated September 11, 2017, Principal Hearing Officer Oto rejected McCluskey’s request for OAH review, stating that OAH “found no basis to establish that the Decision is incorrect.” (Id. at
13-14.) She did not address McCluskey’s arguments but maintained that the anticipated expenses could not be considered because they were “just estimates.” (Id.) On September 15, 2017, McCluskey sent a letter to OTDA Commissioner Roberts, arguing that the Fair Hearing Decision and 18 NYCRR §387.12 were both contrary to 7 U.S.C. §2014(e)(5)(B). (Compl. at 19.) In his letter, McCluskey cited to McCluskey v. Nassau Cty. Comm’r of Soc. Servs., 12-CV-3852 (JFB) (ETB), as evidence that DSS had been engaged in this same “illegal practice” since 2012 and argued that OTDA had perpetuated the illegality by affirming DSS decision based on 18 NYCRR §387.12. In early October 2017, having received no response to his letter, McCluskey commenced the 2017 Action against John Imhof, who was then Commissioner of Nassau DSS; Ryan; Roberts; and Oto. After McCluskey amended his complaint, Roberts and Oto moved to dismiss the action and that motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Lindsay. On August 27, 2018, Judge Lindsay issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”), which noted: “The arguments set forth in the 2012 lawsuit essentially mirror the allegations in the current Amended Complaint.” McCluskey v. Imhof, No. 17-CV-5873 (JFB) (ARL), 2018 WL 5077169, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2018). The R&R did not rely on res judicata but recommended dismissing the claims against Roberts on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Id. at *4-*5. Magistrate Judge Lindsay recommended dismissing the action against Oto for failure to state a §1983 cause of action, noting, “the conduct attributable to Oto does not establish that she deprived him of a federal right.” Id. at *6. Although McCluskey objected to the R&R, Judge Bianco adopted the R&R in its entirety and directed the entry of judgment against McCluskey. McCluskey v. Imhof, No. 17 CV-5873 (JFB) (ARL), 2018 WL 4521207 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2018). In October 2018, McCluskey moved to alter or amend that judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to file a supplemental pleading pursuant Rule 15(d). The latter motion sought to add allegations relating to Nassau DSS’s failure to take anticipated medical expenses into account during the 2019 recertification process. In particular, McCluskey proposed allegations faulting the DSS’s recertification form (the LDSS-4826) for requiring medical bills and failing to allow applicant’s to claim anticipated medical expenses. (Proposed Supplementary Addition to Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 62-l in No. 17-CV-5873) at 20.)1 Since McCluskey’s Rule 59(e) motion was denied, McCluskey v. Imhof, No. 17-CV 5873 (RRM) (ARL), 2019 WL 4861372, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019), the Court did not address the motion to file a supplementary complaint. This Action In April 2019, a few months before McCluskey’s Rule 59(e) motion was denied, McCluskey filed this §1983 action against Roberts and Oto. Although the caption of the complaint alleged that these defendant were being sued in their individual capacities, the ad damnum clause requested an injunction directing the defendants to “provide all assistance lost to plaintiff as a result of defendants’ actions” and “to ensure a proper determination of the medical expense deduction for food stamps to elderly applicants.” (Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 9.) The complaint in this case alleged three causes of action. The first asserted that defendants violated the Supremacy Clause by applying 18 NYCRR §387.12(c) to deny consideration of anticipated medical expenses, even though this state regulation was in violation of 7 U.S.C. §2014(e)(5)(B) and 7 C.F.R. §273.10(d)(4). The second alleged that defendants knowingly violated 7 U.S.C. §2014(e)(5)(B)(ii), 7 C.F.R. §273.10(d)(4)(III), and 7 U.S.C. §2020(e) in 2012, 2017, and 2019 by refusing to consider medical expenses until they were incurred and by mandating submission of recertification forms which did not include any provision for anticipated medical expenses. The third cause of action alleged that defendants violated their obligations under New York Social Services Law 22 by “knowingly affirming the application of 18 NYCRR §387.12(c).” Defendants moved to dismiss this action, principally arguing that this action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. Defendants also argued, among other things, that McCluskey had not alleged a viable section 1983 claim against either defendant. In a Memorandum and Order dated May 18, 2020 (the “Prior Order”), the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. First, the Court held that defendants had made out the elements of a res judicata defense as set forth in TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d 493, 499 (2d Cir. 2014), because McCluskey’s 2017 Action was adjudicated on the merits as to Roberts and Oto, the 2017 Action was brought by the exact same plaintiff, and the claims asserted in this action could have been raised in the 2017 Action. (Prior Order (Doc. No. 26) at 8.) In addressing the second element, the Court stated: Although McCluskey’s complaint in this case alleges that “the individual capacity defendants in this action are not in privity with the official capacity defendants in the 2017 [A]ction,” (Compl. at 39), the second element does not require that defendants establish that they were the same as, or in privity with, the defendants in the prior action. Rather, it requires that the plaintiffs in both actions be the same. (Id.) In discussing the third element, the Court noted that although the 2017 Action named Roberts and Oto in their official capacities and the instant action purported to name them in their individual capacities, both cases involved the same transaction or series of transactions. (Id. at 9.) The Court also dismissed the personal liability claims against Roberts and Oto for other reasons. The Court held that McCluskey’s complaint did not state a §1983 claim against Roberts because it did not allege personal involvement by the Commissioner of OTDA, much less his involvement in a violation of McCluskey’s federal constitutional or statutory rights. (Id. at 10-11.) The Court held that Oto, as an OTDA hearing officer, was absolutely immune from claims for money damages. (Id.) The Instant Motion McCluskey now moves pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to alter or amend the judgment dismissing his case. Read liberally, his 59(e) Motion to Amend Judgment and Order (the “Motion”) raises five arguments. First, McCluskey argues that res judicata does not bar his second cause of action because it relies in part on events that occurred after the 2017 Action was commenced. (Motion (Doc. No. 28-1) at 1-2.) Second, McCluskey implies that the Court overlooked his argument that res judicata does not apply to the instant case because Roberts and Oto were named in their individual capacities in this action but were named in their official capacities in the 2017 Action. (Id. at 2.) Third, quoting portions of the complaint and the report and recommendation in the 2017 Action and noting that the post-judgment motion to supplement his pleading in that action was never adjudicated, McCluskey claims he has alleged federal constitutional and statutory claims in support of his §1983 claims: namely, a due process claim and a federal statutory claim for violating the time limits set forth in 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(3) and (9). (Motion at 2-3.) Fourth, McCluskey cites to Briggs v. Bremby, 792 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2015), for the proposition that the Second Circuit does not require a showing of personal involvement on the part of Commissioners in cases such as this. (Motion at 3.) Finally, citing to Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1988), and Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963), McCluskey argues that the Court overlooked allegations that Oto engaged in a corrupt conspiracy with attorneys representing his adversaries. (Motion at 4 (citing Compl.
