The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 were read on this motion to/for REARGUMENT/RECONSIDERATION. DECISION ORDER ON MOTION Upon the foregoing documents, it is ORDERED that the motion, pursuant to CPLR 2221, of petitioner Jason Mudrick (motion sequence number 002) is denied; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly; and it is further ORDERED that counsel for respondents shall serve a copy of this order along with notice of entry on all parities within twenty (20) days. MEMORANDUM DECISION In this Article 78 proceeding, petitioner Jason Mudrick (Mudrick) moves for leave to reargue a portion of the court’s earlier decision dismissing his petition (motion sequence number 002). For the following reasons, the motion is denied. BACKGROUND FACTS On August 10, 2020, this court issued a decision denying the Article 78 petition that Mudrick had filed to challenge respondents’ decision denying his 2015 application for a handgun license (motion sequence number 001). See notice of motion, Adler affirmation, exhibit A. Mudrick then submitted this motion to reargue the court’s decision on September 2, 2020 (motion sequence number 002). All parties have submitted responsive papers, and this matter is now ready for disposition. DISCUSSION Pursuant to CPLR 2221, a motion for leave to reargue may be granted only upon a showing “‘that the court overlooked or misapprehended the facts or the law or for some reason mistakenly arrived at its earlier decision.’” William P. Pahl Equip. Corp. v. Kassis, 182 AD2d 22, 27 (1st Dept 1992), quoting Schneider v. Solowey, 141 AD2d 813 (2d Dept 1988). “Reargument is not designed to afford the unsuccessful party successive opportunities to reargue issues previously decided.” Id. at 27, citing Pro Brokerage v. Home Ins. Co., 99 AD2d 971 (1st Dept 1984). Nor does a reargument motion provide a party “‘an opportunity to advance arguments different from those tendered on the original application.’” Rubinstein v. Goldman, 225 AD2d 328, 328 (1st Dept 1996), quoting Foley v. Roche, 68 AD2d 558, 568 (1st Dept 1979). Here, Mudrick raises five points of argument in his motion, all of which the court addressed in its August 10, 2020 decision. The first section of Mudrick’s brief, entitled “the law,” argues that the court improperly cited the decisions by the Appellate Division, First Department, in Matter of Klenosky v. New York City Police Dept. (75 AD2d 793 [1st Dept 1980], affd 53 NY2d 685 [1981]) and Matter of Kaplan v. Bratton (249 AD2d 199 [1st Dept 1998]) as authority for the proposition that his gun license application was subject to a “special need” justification which several federal courts have held to be unconstitutional. See notice of motion, Adler affirmation,
7-17. However, it is plain that the court’s August 10, 2020 decision did not discuss or even mention such a “special needs” requirement. See notice of motion, Adler affirmation, exhibit A. Instead, the court cited the two First Department decisions when discussing the “proper cause” requirement that New York State law imposes as a condition to issuing Special Carry Business Licenses. Id. Mudrick produced no federal precedent indicating that that requirement is constitutionally infirm, nor could the court’s own research discovery any of the same. Therefore, the court rejects Mudrick’s first argument. The second section of Mudrick’s brief, entitled “pre-emption” [sic], asserts that “[t]he City’s attempt to encroach upon state licensing standards and legislate locally is, we submit, preempted by state law.” See notice of motion, Adler affirmation,
