DECISION AND ORDER Mayfair Resort is a 6-lot subdivision located on the shores of Lake George in the Hamlet of Bolton Landing, Warren County. All lot owners have deeded access to a common beach area, as well as deeded boat slips on a shared dock. Each of the parties to this action own lots within the subdivision — which lots are improved by single family residences — with plaintiff Paula Wun (hereinafter Wun) and her husband Joel Wun owning the lot located at 12 Mayfair Drive, plaintiff Susan Burke and her husband Con Burke (hereinafter Burke) owning the lot located at 7 Mayfair Drive, and defendant owning the lot located at 6 Mayfair Drive. All lots within the subdivision are subject to a Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions, Easements, and Assessments (hereinafter Declaration) dated May 15, 2012 and later amended on November 13, 2013. This Declaration is administered by plaintiff Mayfair Resort Homeowners Association, Inc. (hereinafter the HOA), and provides that “[e]very person who is [a] record owner [of a lot in the subdivision] shall be a member of the [HOA].” The Declaration further provides that “[m]embers right[s] to sublet individual lots shall be limited to one-year rental terms only by written lease to be provided to the Association. No daily, weekly, or monthly rentals shall be allowed.” That being said, since completing the construction of its home in late 2018/early 2019, defendant — by and through its sole owners, Glenn Kupsch (hereinafter Kupsch) and his wife, Laura Kupsch — has continually rented the home on a weekly and monthly basis. These rentals, which include the use of defendant’s golf cart as well as its deeded rights to the beach area and boat slip, have caused several issues for other lot owners. Wun has described the issues as follows: “The first time I noticed that there were individuals other than Mr. Kupsch was in February 2019. My family and I were at our home during our children’s winter break. We noticed that there were a number of people living in [d]efendant’s home, but did not recognize any of them. One Sunday during the break, there was extensive noise until at least 11 pm. Our master bath window faces the street, and our connected bedroom windows face the lake. Thsssat night, the individuals from [d]efendant’s house were driving a loud golf cart around the cul-de-sac and up and down the pathway to the lake repeatedly. The motor of the golf cart, the noise from the people and the headlights going directly into my bedroom window kept me awake for hours, which was disturbing as I had to be up by 5 am to go to work. “There were other similar incidents involving the renters. There is excessive party noise — loud voices, curse words, etc. — which extend well into the night. There is significant trash, including food, general trash and cigarette butts left on the common beach, patio and dock areas. The use of the golf cart is oftentimes reckless, with the individuals driving fast and driving over other residents’ lawns. I witnessed one accident where the golf cart flipped over completely…. This is clearly a danger to not only the occupants of the cart but others who might be on the common path. Moreover, the golf cart is being overused, as is seen by the excessive wear and tear and ruts worn into the path we all use to access the lake and our shared dock.” Wun and her husband also incurred physical damage to their boat when renters using defendant’s boat slip “docked their vessel too close…and as a result ended up banging into [it].” Burke — who is President of the HOA — stated that he and his wife have had similar issues with defendant’s renters. Specifically, they hear “consistent loud noise at night while [their children] are all settling down and trying to sleep,” see “young kids driv[ing] the [golf] cart aimlessly around the [subdivision] as if it were a racetrack,” and have dealt with “countless individuals on the lakefront and beach area, causing a crowding condition.” According to Burke, “the members of the [HOA] specifically addressed [these] issue[s] with Mr. Kupsch at the April 2019 Annual Shareholders’ meeting[, at which time] Mr. Kupsch acknowledged that he was renting his house, that it was a violation of the Declaration, and that he was going to continue to rent it. In fact, he made a motion to change the Declaration to allow the short-term rentals, which motion failed. He then made a motion to allow only his summer 2019 rentals, but that…also [failed].”1 Defendant continued renting its home throughout the summer of 2019, prompting plaintiffs to commence this action in February 2020 to permanently enjoin and restrain defendant from renting its property. Plaintiffs also seek damages for the diminished use and enjoyment of their respective properties, as well as counsel fees. Simultaneous with commencement of the action, plaintiffs moved by Order to Show Cause for a preliminary injunction restraining defendant from renting its property during the pendency of the action. Defendant appeared in opposition to this motion, arguing that the Declaration prohibits only daily, weekly, and monthly sublets of the home — not daily, weekly and monthly rentals. The Court was not persuaded by this tenuous interpretation, however, and found that — notwithstanding the Declaration’s use of the term “sublet” — it clearly states that “[n]o daily, weekly, or monthly rentals shall be allowed.” The motion was thus granted by Order dated June 3, 2020 and entered that same date, with this Order expressly providing “that [d]efendant, its agents and employees, are enjoined and restrained, during the pendency of this action, from offering the [s]ubject [p]roperty for rent for periods of less than one year.” On or about June 13, 2020, defendant entered into a lease agreement with Roger Saks relative to the subject premises, which lease had a “term…begin[ning] on 6/13/20 @ 4:00 p [sic] and end[ing] on 6/12/2021 @ 11:00 a [sic].” The term of the lease notwithstanding, Saks and his family were only present at the property from June 13, 2020 to August 24, 2020. Saks was subpoenaed by plaintiffs and appeared for a deposition on August 31, 2020, at which time he stated that in “late 2019 [he] was looking to rent property on Lake George around[] Bolton Landing[, and] found [defendant's] property on the HomeAway/Vrbo Internet platform.” He then contacted Kupsch and rented the property from June 27, 2020 to August 15, 2020. Saks further stated as follows: “A. Subsequent to that [initial contact], couple things happened. One, I asked if we could stay longer because of the COVID exodus and everybody taking up residence outside of their primary residences; so we — we chose to ask if we could stay longer. Glenn and Laura said it would be okay and at the same time offered up this one-year lease option. “Q. And when you say you asked if you could stay longer, did you have a particular time frame that you specified? “A. Yes. Originally, it was to start up to three weeks sooner, but we decided we couldn’t get away; so we started two weeks sooner. So we got in there somewhere around June 7th, and we ended up staying a little bit longer than we originally intended as well. “Q. Okay. Did you inquire about renting the property for an entire year? “A. That was Glenn’s idea. I didn’t — to be clear, we signed a one-year lease, but we weren’t intending on staying through its entirety. “Q. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Kupsch why a one-year lease was being presented to you — if you were not actually interested in renting if for a year?… “A. Yes. He thought it would be the right thing to do for his HOA”. Saks also provided plaintiffs with 70 pages of text message exchanges with Kupsch. Among these was the following exchange wherein Saks requested permission to stay beyond the originally agreed upon date of August 13, 2020: “7/16/20, 10:15 AM “Saks: Question for you — is staying another week or two an option? With my work still remote and kids school up in the air, wanted to consider options if you and Laura were not coming back until sept. “7/16/20, 6:33 PM “Saks: Hey. Making sure you saw my text earlier. Let me know your thoughts. “Kupsch: I want to make that work…just need some time. I can chat more later…. “Saks: We’re not 100 percent sure on our end but it came up for discussion and I think it’s likely an option we want to evaluate…. “7/17/20, 11:11 A.M. “Kupsch: On the additional weeks…. I have a person who reserved the week immediately after you leave. He put a deposit down in Feb, and I haven’t heard from them since. “Saks: Won’t your HOA go ballistic? “Kupsch: It wouldn’t be hard to cancel with him due to the HOA situation. Yes — ballistic one of the words. It will create a problem for me. So let me know if you definitely want to extend, and I’ll make the arrangements. We are planning our friends [sic] trip starting Sept 2nd, so you can extend till then if you wish.” Saks then extended his stay and left on August 24, 2020. Saks expressly indicated during his deposition that he took all of his personal belongings with him when he left and has no intention of returning to the property. Presently before the Court is plaintiffs’ motion by Order to Show Cause seeking to hold defendant in both civil and criminal contempt for violating the June 3, 2020 Order (see Judiciary Law §§753 [A] [3], 750 [A] [3]). “‘To sustain a finding of either civil or criminal contempt based on an alleged violation of a court order[,] it is necessary to establish that a lawful order of the court clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate was in effect[,] that the order has been disobeyed’ and that the charged party ‘had knowledge of the court’s order’” (Town of Copake v. 13 Lackawanna Props., LLC, 73 AD3d 1308, 1309 [2010], quoting Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v. Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 70 NY2d 233, 240 [1987]; see Matter of McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574, 583 [1983], amended 60 NY2d 652, [1983]). “[C]riminal contempt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt” (Town of Copake v. 13 Lackawanna Props., LLC, 73 AD3d at 1309; see Matter of People v. Hooks, 64 AD3d 1075, 1077 [2009], lv dismissed 13 NY3d 815 [2009]). Civil contempt, on the other hand, “must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and requires a showing that the rights of a party have been prejudiced” (Town of Copake v. 13 Lackawanna Props., LLC, 73 AD3d at 1309; see Judiciary Law §753 [A] [3]; McCain v. Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216, 226 [1994]; Automated Waste Disposal, Inc. v. Mid-Hudson Waste, Inc., 50 AD3d 1073, 1074 [2008]). The same act may constitute both criminal and civil contempt, but “the two types of contempt serve separate and distinct purposes” (Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v. Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 70 NY2d at 239). “A civil contempt is one where the rights of an individual have been harmed by the contemnor’s failure to obey a court order” (id.; see People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer of N.Y., 101 NY 245, 245-246 [1886]). “Any penalty imposed is designed not to punish but, rather, to compensate the injured private party or to coerce compliance with the court’s mandate or both” (Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v. Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 70 NY2d at 239; see State of New York v. Unique Ideas, 44 NY2d 345, 349 [1978]). A criminal contempt, however, “involves an offense against judicial authority and is utilized to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to compel respect for its mandates” (Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v. Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 70 NY2d at 239; see King v. Barnes, 113 NY 476, 479 [1889]). “Unlike civil contempt, the aim in a criminal contempt proceeding is solely to punish the contemnor for disobeying a court order, the penalty imposed being punitive rather than compensatory” (Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v. Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 70 NY2d at 239; see State of New York v. Unique Ideas, 44 NY2d at 349). “In keeping with a civil contempt’s distinct purpose, it must be established that the rights of a party to the litigation have been prejudiced” (Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v. Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 70 NY2d at 239-240; see Judiciary Law §753 [A]; see Matter of McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 NY2d at 582). “In a criminal contempt proceeding, no such showing is needed since the right of the private parties to the litigation is not the controlling factor” Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v. Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 70 NY2d at 240). In this regard, “[a] key distinguishing element between civil and criminal contempt is the degree of willfulness of the subject conduct” (id.). “To be found guilty of criminal contempt, the contemnor usually must be shown to have violated the order with a higher degree of willfulness than is required in a civil contempt proceeding” (id.; see Judiciary Law §750 [A] [3]; Matter of Winograd, 184 AD3d 1073, 1075 [2020]; Town of Copake v. 13 Lackawanna Props., LLC, 73 AD3d at 1309; McCain v. Dinkins, 84 NY2d at 226; Matter of McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 NY2d at 583). For example, in Town of Copake v. 13 Lackawanna Props., LLC (supra) the Appellate Division, Third Department found that defendants’ conduct constituted not only civil but also criminal contempt. There, defendants — who were engaged in the business of hauling solid waste and trash — were found to be dumping that waste and trash on a farm they owned in the Town of Copake, Columbia County. As a result, the Town commenced an action seeking to enjoin them from violating its Zoning and Solid Waste Laws. Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (hereinafter TRO) prohibiting defendants from “‘construction and/or excavation [and the] depositing [of] any materials of any type upon the premises’” (Town of Copake v. 13 Lackawanna Props., LLC, 73 AD3d at 1309). This TRO was amended twice to permit defendants to engage in limited farming activities on their property, as well as to comply with a consent decree issued in connection with a separate action commenced by the Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter the DEC). The Town moved to hold defendants in civil and criminal contempt, alleging that they proceeded with the construction of a farm stand and 10-foot high stone wall without a permit, as well as deposited fill material and wood pallets on the premises. Supreme Court granted the motion and the Third Department affirmed, stating as follows: “[T]he TRO expressed a clear and unequivocal mandate[, and] plaintiff presented the testimony of several individuals and numerous photographs demonstrating that defendants willfully and openly flouted the explicit directives of the TRO. While defendants assert that their activities came within the modifications of the TRO permitting farming and restoration of wetlands…, Supreme Court flatly rejected the testimony in this regard as lacking in veracity, and that credibility determination must be accorded deference. In any event, plaintiff demonstrated that the work was beyond the scope of that permitted by the modifications. In our view, the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants willfully violated the TRO and caused prejudice to plaintiff by frustrating plaintiff’s ability to enforce its public health and safety laws. Thus, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion…in finding civil and criminal contempt” (id. at 1309-1310 [citations omitted]). In Matter of Spinnenweber v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation (160 AD2d 1138 [1990]), on the other hand, the Third Department found that petitioner’s conduct constituted civil but not criminal contempt. There, petitioner placed fill along the shoreline of his property in an effort to combat erosion, but failed to first obtain a permit from the DEC. As a result, the DEC issued an Order imposing certain penalties and directed petitioner to submit a plan for removal of the fill. When petitioner’s plan proved unacceptable, the DEC issued a second Order delineating a plan for removal. Petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge that second Order, which challenge was denied with Supreme Court stating “clear[ly] and unequivocal[ly] that ‘[a]ll remaining fill’ must be removed” (id. at 1140). Petitioner failed to remove all the fill as directed and the DEC moved to find him in civil and criminal contempt, which motion was denied by Supreme Court based upon a finding that “petitioner [was] in ‘apparent substantial compliance’ with its [O]rder” (id. at 1139). The Third Department reversed this determination — in part — stating as follows: “Supreme Court’s [O]rder…is clear and unequivocal that ‘[a]ll remaining fill’ must be removed; there is no intimation that ‘substantial performance’ will suffice. Petitioner’s disobedience of the court’s lawful mandate defeated, impaired, impeded or prejudiced respondent’s right to have the littoral zone restored; hence, civil contempt was established and punishment is appropriate” (id. at 1140). The Third Department proceeded to find, however, that “[p]etitioner is not…guilty of criminal contempt, for there was no finding that he willfully and intentionally flouted Supreme Court’s authority” (id.). Here, the Court finds that defendant’s conduct in violating the June 3, 2020 Order constitutes both civil and criminal contempt. At the outset, all three elements necessary to sustain a finding of either civil or criminal contempt are present: (1) the June 3, 2020 Order sets forth a clear and unequivocal mandate that defendant was not to rent its home for periods of less than one year; (2) defendant disobeyed this mandate, renting its home to Saks for a period of 10 weeks from June 13, 2020 to August 24, 2020; and (3) defendant clearly had knowledge of the June 3, 2020 Order, as it feigned compliance with the requirements set forth therein by entering into a sham lease with Saks. Further, a finding of civil contempt is appropriate because defendant’s violation of the June 3, 2020 Order resulted in prejudice to plaintiffs. Specifically, Burke submitted an affidavit stating that the rental resulted in disruption to the neighborhood. Burke recalled one incident on August 2, 2020 at approximately 1:30 A.M. when he and his wife were awakened by a party Saks’s teenage son was having on the shared beach. Finally, a finding of criminal contempt is appropriate because — by entering into the sham lease — defendant “willfully and openly flouted the explicit directives” of the June 3, 2020 Order (id. at 1310). While defendant submitted the affidavit of Kupsch in opposition to the motion, such affidavit is unavailing. Kupsch states that plaintiffs’ “assertions that [he] never intended on being bound to a one year lease [are] baseless, absurd and sanctionable.” He then points to the following excerpt from Saks’ deposition testimony: “A. He said that he is — he said — said that for the purposes of the HOA, we should be in a one-year lease. “Q. Okay. So he wanted it to appear as though you were renting the property for a full year; correct?…. “A. Well, as my conversation with him, it was more than appear. We were legally entering — I — I was entering a legal contract for one year. He was at risk for me to stay there for a full year, and we had that specific conversation. I asked him: ‘If I stayed here for a year, what’s your recourse?’ And he said, ‘That’s my risk. If you want to spend New Year’s Eve there and I want to live in my house, it’s your house.’” Kupsch further states “that the average monthly rental price for a home in Warren County, on an annual lease, is approximately $1,125.00 per month, or a total of $13,500.00 PER YEAR,” citing the website “hotpads.com.” He then indicates that “[t]he agreed upon rent between Mr. Saks and [defendant] was $24,774.00[,] nearly TWICE the average rent for an annual lease.” In this regard, Kupsch asks the Court to agree that $24,774.00 is a fair price for a one-year lease of defendant’s home. The Court finds these statements to be self-serving and entirely without merit. The conversation Saks describes relative to his right to remain in the home for the term of the lease is belied by the remainder of the record. Indeed, if in fact Saks had the right to remain in the home until June 12, 2021, he certainly would not have requested permission from Kupsch to remain there for 2 weeks beyond the August 13, 2020 check-out date originally agreed upon — and perhaps more notably, Kupsch would not have responded that the extension was problematic, given that the home was rented to someone else the week after August 13, 2020. Furthermore, the average monthly rental price of a home in Warren County certainly cannot be compared with the average monthly rental price of a home like defendant’s on Lake George — with both beach access and a deeded dock — during the summer months. Indeed, having been invited by defense counsel at oral argument on October 22, 2020 to examine the website “hotpads.com” — as relied upon by Kupsch in calculating the average monthly rental payment of $1,250.00 — the Court found that the website includes rentals throughout Warren County. Among the available rentals, for example, is a 3-bedroom home on Crandall Street in the City of Glens Falls, listed for $1,350.00 per month — which cannot reasonably be compared to a home like that of defendant. Briefly, the Court finds that defendant may be held in contempt without a hearing, as the affidavits submitted present “no question of fact as to what [the contemnor] accomplished[, and] the parties dispute only whether what was done did indeed comply with the [O]rder” (Matter of Spinnenweber v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 160 AD2d at 1140). Under the circumstances, plaintiffs have succeeded in proving defendant’s civil contempt by clear and convincing evidence and its criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. Turning now to the appropriate penalties, plaintiffs request that defendant be directed to pay their costs and attorney’s fees in the amount of $6,000.00 as punishment for its civil contempt. Plaintiffs further request that defendant be fined in the amount of $1,000.00 for each of the 72 nights that it violated the June 3, 2020 Order — for a total of $72,000.00 — as punishment for its criminal contempt, with this $72,000.00 fine being paid directly to them. As set forth above, a penalty for civil contempt should be designed to compensate the injured party (see Matter of Mundell v. New York State Dept. of Transp., 185 AD3d 1470, 1471-1472 [2020]; Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v. Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 70 NY2d at 239). A penalty for criminal contempt, on the other hand, is punitive rather than compensatory and should be designed to punish the contemnor for disobeying a court order (see Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v. Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 70 NY2d at 239; State of New York v. Unique Ideas, 44 NY2d at 349). Here, the Court finds that reimbursement to plaintiffs for their counsel fees and costs in connection with the motion is an appropriate punishment for defendant’s civil contempt (see Judiciary Law §753 [A] [1]). To the extent that counsel for plaintiffs did not provide any proof relative to the $6,000.00 allegedly incurred in this regard, counsel was directed at oral argument to submit an affidavit of services — on notice to defense counsel — within fifteen (15) days. The Court then extended defense counsel a further fifteen (15) days in which to submit a response. Upon the receipt and review of these submissions, the Court will issue an Order with regard to the amount of counsel fees and costs to which plaintiffs are entitled. The appropriate punishment for defendant’s criminal contempt is a more difficult question. Judiciary Law §751 (1) provides that “punishment for [such] a contempt…may be by fine, not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment, not exceeding thirty days, in the jail of the county where the court is sitting, or both, in the discretion of the court.” Where there are multiple acts of disobedience, separate fines may be imposed for each such act (see Bd. of Town of Southampton v. R.K.B. Realty, LLC, 91 AD3d 628, 631 [2012]; People v. Metropolitan Police Conference of N.Y., 231 AD2d 445, 446 [1996]). Where, however, there are multiple manifestations of a single act of contempt, then a single fine must be imposed (see Matter of Department of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of N.Y. v. Deka Realty Corp., 208 AD2d 37, 45 [1995]). While defendant’s conduct in signing the sham lease could arguably be viewed as a single act of contempt, it likewise could be viewed as multiple acts of contempt — specifically, an act of contempt for each of the 72 nights that the home was rented to Saks. To the extent that a fine of $1,000.00 clearly would not vindicate the Court’s authority — which is the overarching purpose of criminal contempt (see Bd. of Town of Southampton v. R.K.B. Realty, LLC, 91 AD3d at 631; People v. Metropolitan Police Conference of N.Y., 231 AD2d at 446; Matter of Department of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of N.Y. v. Deka Realty Corp., 208 AD2d at 45) — the Court finds that the latter view is more appropriate in this case. That being said, a fine of $1,000.00 for each night — as suggested by plaintiffs — is excessive. Rather, the Court finds that defendant should be fined in the amount of $350.00 per night, which results in a total fine of $25,200.00 — roughly the same amount received by defendant for the 10-week rental. Pursuant to Judiciary Law §791, fines for criminal contempt must be paid into the public treasury (see Goodman v. State of New York, 31 NY2d 381, 395-396 [1972]; Kozel v. Kozel, 161 AD3d 700, 701 [2018]; Board of Educ. of Clarkstown Cent. School Dist. No. 1 v. Clarkstown Teachers’ Assn., 42 AD2d 771, 771 [1973]). To that end, plaintiffs’ request that the fine be paid directly to them is denied with defendant directed to pay the $25,200.00 fine to the Warren County Treasurer within thirty (30) days of the date of this Decision and Order. Lastly, the issue of whether defendant’s conduct constitutes a fraud upon the Court has been examined, with a fraud upon the Court involving “wilful conduct that is deceitful and obstructionistic, which injects misrepresentations and false information into the judicial process ‘so serious that it undermines…the integrity of the proceeding’” (CDR Créances S.A.S. v. Cohen, 23 NY3d 307, 318 [2014], quoting Baba-Ali v. State of New York, 19 NY3d 627, 634 [2012] [citation and quotation marks omitted]). At present, the Court is not inclined to so conclude. While defendant’s wilful conduct was deceitful and perhaps even obstructionistic, it did not inject misrepresentations into the judicial process so serious as to undermine the integrity of the proceeding. The Court is hopeful that no further inquiry on this subject will be necessary. Based upon the foregoing, plaintiffs’ motion is granted to the extent that defendant is found in both civil and criminal contempt for its conduct in violating the terms of the June 3, 2020 Order. As and for a punishment for its civil contempt, defendant shall reimburse plaintiffs for its counsel fees and costs in connection with the motion, with the amount of such reimbursement to be determined upon receipt and review of the additional submissions enumerated hereinabove. As and for a punishment for its criminal contempt, defendant is fined $350.00 per night for each of the 72 nights its home was rented, for a total fine of $25,200.00, to be paid to the Warren County Treasurer within thirty (30) days of the date of this Decision and Order. The motion is otherwise denied. Therefore, having considered NYSCEF documents 46 through 55, submitted in support of the motion; NYSCEF documents 59 through 61, submitted in opposition to the motion; and NYSCEF document 62, submitted in further support of the motion; and oral argument having been held on October 22, 2020 with John D. Wright, Esq. appearing on behalf of plaintiffs and Edward J. Herban, Esq. appearing on behalf of defendant, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion is granted to the extent that defendant is found in both civil and criminal contempt for its conduct in violating the terms of the June 3, 2020 Order; and it is further ORDERED that, as and for a punishment for its civil contempt, defendant shall reimburse plaintiffs for its counsel fees and costs in connection with the motion, with the amount of such reimbursement to be determined upon receipt and review of the additional submissions enumerated hereinabove; and it is further ORDERED that, as and for a punishment for its criminal contempt, defendant is fined $350.00 per night for each of the 72 nights its home was rented, for a total fine of $25,200.00, to be paid to the Warren County Treasurer within thirty (30) days of the date of this Decision and Order; and it is further ORDERED that the motion is otherwise denied. The above constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. The original of this Decision and Order has been e-filed by the Court. Counsel for plaintiffs is hereby directed to promptly obtain a copy of the e-filed Decision and Order for service with notice of entry upon defendant in accordance with CPLR 5513. Dated: November 4, 2020
