By Dillon, J.P.; Lasalle, Connolly, Iannacci, JJ. WILLIAM R. HARGRAVES, ETC., app, v. TYLER TOWERS OWNERS CORP., ET AL., res — (Index No. 705566/19) Wagner, Berkow & Brandt LLP, New York, NY (Ian J. Brandt of counsel), for appellant. Hagan, Coury & Associates, Brooklyn, NY (Paul Golden of counsel), for respondents. In an action, inter alia, for injunctive relief, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Chereé A. Buggs, J.), dated June 3, 2019. The order denied that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to preliminarily enjoin the defendant Tyler Towers Owners Corp. from foreclosing on, selling, transferring, or assigning the plaintiff’s shares of stock in the defendant Tyler Towers Owners Corp. during the pendency of the action. ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. The defendant Tyler Towers Owners Corp. (hereinafter the defendant) is a residential cooperative housing corporation and the owner of a multiple dwelling in Jamaica, Queens. The plaintiff is a shareholder of the defendant and the proprietary lessee of an apartment in the cooperative building, where he resided. In 2016 or 2017, the steam pipes under the apartment’s floors and the steam risers behind the apartment’s walls and ceiling began to emit steam, which caused damage to the apartment. Pursuant to a New York City Fire Department directive, the defendant undertook immediate repairs to the steam pipes and risers. In November 2017, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an agreement wherein the plaintiff agreed to vacate his apartment and provide the defendant with unrestricted access to it so that the defendant could repair the damage to the ceiling, walls, and floor. As consideration for the plaintiff’s agreement to vacate and provide access to the apartment, the defendant agreed to make certain payments to the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the defendant’s restoration work in the apartment commenced in November 2017 and continued through July 2018, when water from plumbing from the apartment directly above poured into the plaintiff’s apartment and destroyed all the wood flooring that was recently installed by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that in May 2018, the defendant ceased making payments to him pursuant to their agreement. The defendant alleged that it finished making the requisite repairs to the plaintiff’s apartment in May 2018, and that it satisfied its obligations under that agreement. In a notice to cure dated January 3, 2019, the defendant advised the plaintiff that he was in breach of the proprietary lease based on his default in tendering his monthly maintenance payments, and that he was required to cure this default by tendering the maintenance arrears on or before January 28, 2019. The notice to cure further advised that should the plaintiff fail to cure his default in the time period set forth therein, the proprietary lease for the apartment would be terminated and his shares considered forfeited and sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure auction. The plaintiff did not cure his default. In a notice of termination dated January 30, 2019, the defendant notified the plaintiff that based on his failure to cure his breach of the proprietary lease, the defendant was electing to cancel the plaintiff’s shares and terminate his tenancy, requiring him to vacate the apartment by February 19, 2019. The defendant then issued a notice of sale dated February 21, 2019, which advised the plaintiff that based on his default under the proprietary lease, the defendant would be auctioning the plaintiff’s shares on April 3, 2019. On March 29, 2019, the plaintiff commenced this action, alleging, inter alia, breach of the warranty of habitability and the proprietary lease, and seeking, among other things, declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff also moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 6301 to preliminarily enjoin the defendant from auctioning his shares. The Supreme Court denied that branch of the plaintiff’s motion based on his failure to seek injunctive relief prior to the expiration of the cure period. We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for a preliminary injunction based on the plaintiff’s failure to move for such relief during the cure period. Motions for preliminary injunctions pursuant to CPLR 6301, like motions for Yellowstone injunctions (First Natl. Stores v. Yellowstone Shopping Ctr., 21 NY2d 630), must “be made prior to the expiration of the cure period” (Goldcrest Realty Co. v. 61 Bronx Riv. Rd. Owners, Inc., 83 AD3d 129, 135; see Lombard v. Station Sq. Inn Apts. Corp., 94 AD3d 717). Here, the plaintiff waited an additional two months after the expiration of the cure period to seek such relief, without tendering any explanation for the delay. In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the plaintiff’s remaining contentions. DILLON, J.P., LASALLE, CONNOLLY and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.
By Rivera, J.P.; Roman, Miller, Wooten, JJ. THE PEOPLE, ETC., res, v. TASHAWN D. MILES, app — (Index No. 174/17) Carol Kahn, New York, NY, for appellant. William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, NY (Kirsten A. Rappleyea of counsel), for respondent. Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Edward T. McLoughlin, J.), rendered April 27, 2018, convicting him of criminal sexual act in the first degree and criminal sexual act in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed. The defendant’s contention that his plea of guilty was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Davis, 24 NY3d 1012; People v. Lopez, 71 NY2d 662). In any event, the record reflects that the defendant acknowledged that he understood the charges against him and the rights that he was forfeiting, that he had discussed the plea, and possible defenses and arguments that could be raised at trial with his attorney, that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation, that he was not under the influence of any substances that would impair his thinking, and that he was entering the plea of his own free will. Under these circumstances, we find that the defendant’s plea of guilty was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary (see People v. Valentin, 173 AD3d 1227; People v. Rodriguez-Abreu, 170 AD3d 895; People v. Anderson, 138 AD3d 876). Contrary to the defendant’s contention, he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal at the time he entered his plea of guilty (see People v. Thomas, 34 NY3d 545; People v. Mack, 168 AD3d 1100; People v. Moore, 140 AD3d 1091; People v. Corbin, 121 AD3d 803). The record reveals that the County Court adequately explained, and the defendant acknowledged that he understood, the separate and distinct nature of the waiver of the right to appeal (see People v. Corbin, 121 AD3d 805). The defendant’s valid waiver of his right to appeal precludes appellate review of his present challenge to the County Court’s adverse suppression determination (see People v. Sanders, 25 NY3d 337; People v. Kemp, 94 NY2d 831, 833-834) and his contention that the sentence imposed was excessive (see People v. Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257; People v. Lopez, 6 NY3d 248; People v. Lovick, 127 AD3d 1108). RIVERA, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and WOOTEN, JJ., concur.
