The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 007) 13, 14, 17, 18 were read on this motion to/for REARGUMENT/RECONSIDERATION. DECISION AND ORDER In this action commenced by Nereida Velasquez (“Velasquez”) to recover damages for sexual discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation, plaintiff Angela G. Tese-Milner, As Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee for Velasquez, moves, pursuant to CPLR 2221(d), to reargue her post-trial motion (motion sequence 006), which sought reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs against defendants ATCO Properties and Management, Inc. (“ATCO”) and Desmond Beglin (“Beglin”) (Docs. 14-16). Defendants oppose the motion (Doc. 18). After a review of the parties’ contentions, as well as the relevant statutes and case law, the motion is denied. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: The underlying facts of this case are set forth in detail in the decision and order of this Court filed November 10, 2020 (“the 11/10/20 order”), which denied defendants’ post-trial motion seeking, inter alia, to vacate the jury verdict rendered against them on July 29, 2019 (motion sequence 005), as well as plaintiffs motion for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs on the ground that said determination should be referred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (“the SDNY Bankruptcy Court”) (Doc. 11). Any additional relevant facts are set forth below. In denying plaintiff’s motion, this Court noted that, in her application to the SDNY Bankruptcy Court seeking to hire counsel, plaintiff represented that counsel “‘shall apply to said court ‘for allowance of compensation and reimbursement of expenses in accordance with ‘the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, [and] the Local Bankruptcy Rules and orders of the [SDNY Bankruptcy Court]“; that counsel would be paid on a contingency basis; and that plaintiff agreed that her attorney “shall apply to be compensated for any pre-petition work that it performed on the employment discrimination action” (Doc. 11 at 32). This Court also referenced several representations made by plaintiff’s counsel before the SDNY Bankruptcy Court wherein he agreed that his attorneys’ fees would be paid from the proceeds of any recovery in the captioned action and only upon approval of the SDNY Bankruptcy Court (Doc. 11 at 33). Further, in an order entered September 4, 2012, Judge Stuart M. Bernstein of the SDNY Bankruptcy Court directed, inter alia, that plaintiff would be compensated in accordance with “sections 330 and 331 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, the Local Rules, the Amended Guidelines for Fees and Disbursements for Professionals in the Southern District of New York, dated November 25, 2009, and the United States Trustee Fee Guidelines” (Doc. 11 at 33-34). Plaintiff now argues that this Court erred in denying her motion by conflating, as evidenced by its heading entitled “B. Motion by Plaintiff’s Counsel for Attorneys’ Fees” on page 32 of the decision and order, its role with that of the Bankruptcy Court (Doc. 14
