The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, (Motion 002) 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 94, 107, 108, 110, (Motion 003) 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 111, 112, 113, 115 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT — SUMMARY. DECISION ORDER ON MOTION Upon the foregoing documents, the motion of defendant Kent Security of New York, Inc. (“Kent Security”) for summary judgment (Motion Seq 001) is granted; the motion of defendants 576 Fifth Master Tenant LLC (“576 Fifth”) and Severn Realty Partners L.P. (“Severn”) for summary judgment (Motion Seq 002) is granted in part and to the extent set forth herein; and the motion of defendants Manhattan Buyers, Inc. (“Manhattan Buyers”), Arthur J. Abrams a/k/a Arthur Abramov (“Abramov”) and Albert A. Jonah (“Jonah”) (together, the “MB Defendants”) for leave to file an amended answer and for summary judgment (Motion Seq 003) is granted in part to the extent set forth herein, and denied as to the remainder, in accord with the following memorandum decision. Background Plaintiff J.B. International, LLC (“Plaintiff”) is a diamond merchant seeking to recover for property damage arising out of the theft and conversion of diamonds. At all times relevant to the present action, Plaintiff maintained offices at 576 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York (the “Building”), which is owned and operated by defendant Severn. Defendant 576 Fifth is the managing agent of the building. Plaintiff alleges that, while in the process of moving offices within the Building, one of its employees inadvertently discarded diamonds valued at over $4.5 million dollars, including one 10.11 carat, oval-shaped diamond, in the Building’s common-area trash (verified complaint 14; NYSCEF Doc No 1). Non-party Wilfred Martinez (“Martinez”), a security guard who was employed by Kent Security, was videotaped removing boxes from the common-area trash, which Plaintiff alleges contained the mislaid diamonds. Martinez then sold the 10.11 carat diamond to Manhattan Buyers, a diamond merchant that also maintains offices in the Building. Abramov is President and part owner and Jonah is an officer and part owner of Manhattan Buyers. The MB Defendants argue that, although they purchased the 10.11 carat diamond from Martinez, they were unaware that Martinez had stolen it from Plaintiff. In any event, after the MB Defendants purchased the 10.11 carat diamond, they had it re-cut, which reduced the overall size of the stone to approximately 9 carats. The MB Defendants assert that the diamond was re-cut to correct a “bowtie” flaw and increase the value of the diamond, while Plaintiff asserts that the stone did not have a bowtie flaw and the cutting reduced the overall value of the stone. On December 14, 2015, Martinez was arrested and charged with grand larceny. Plaintiff filed this action, and the present motions were commenced after issue was joined and discovery completed. Standard of Review “The proponent of a motion for summary judgment must demonstrate that there are no material issues of fact in dispute, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” (Dallas Stephenson v. Waisman, 39 AD3d 303, 306 [1st Dept 2007]). The movant’s burden is “heavy,” and “on a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” (William J. Jenack Estate Appraisers & Auctioneers, Inc. v. Rabizadeh, 22 NY3d 470, 475 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Upon proffer of evidence establishing a prima facie case by the movant, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment bears the burden of producing evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to require a trial of material questions of fact (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). “A motion for summary judgment should not be granted where the facts are in dispute, where conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, or where there are issues of credibility” (Ruiz v. Griffin, 71 AD3d 1112, 1115 [2d Dept 2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Discussion A. Motion Sequences 001 and 002 Plaintiff’s second cause of action for negligent hiring, the sole cause of action alleged against defendants Kent Security, 576 Fifth, and Severn, alleges that these defendants failed to exercise reasonable care in hiring security guards to protect the Building’s occupants. In motion sequence 001, Kent Security moves for summary judgment to dismiss both the complaint as asserted against it and 576 Fifth and Severn’s cross-claims for common law and contractual indemnity, contribution, and breach of contract. In motion sequence 002, Severn and 576 Fifth move for summary judgment to dismiss both the complaint as against them and Kent Security’s cross-claims for contractual and common law indemnity. In its unopposed motion, Kent Security argues that the cause of action for negligent hiring, which relies on the theory of respondeat superior, should be dismissed against it because the theft was a clear departure from the scope of Martinez’ employment, Kent Security neither knew nor should have known of Martinez’ propensity to steal, and should not be held responsible for Martinez’ actions. The doctrine of respondeat superior renders an employer vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee acting within the scope of his or her employment (Bowman v. State of New York, 10 AD3d 315 [1st Dept 2004]). An employer may also be held liable for an employee’s tortious act under theories of negligent hiring and negligent supervision (Gonzalez v. City of New York, 133 AD3d 65 [1st Dept 2015]). A necessary element of this cause of action is that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for the conduct that caused the injury (N.X. v. Cabrini Med. Ctr., 280 AD2d 34 [1st Dept 2001]). In support of its motion, Kent Security submits, inter alia, background checks, personnel files, and deposition testimony that show that the theft was outside the scope of Martinez’ employment and that he had no criminal history before he was hired by Kent Security. The record contains no contrary evidence that Kent Security knew or should have known of Martinez’ propensity for the conduct which caused plaintiff’s monetary injury. Taken together, this evidence is sufficient to establish Kent Security’s prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing Plaintiff’s second cause of action for negligent hiring (see Wallace v. Gomez, 296 AD2d 306 [1st Dept 2002]). Therefore, that branch of Kent Security’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint against it is granted and the complaint is hereby dismissed as against Kent Security. In their motion, 576 Fifth and Severn move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them and dismissing Kent Security’s cross-claims for contractual and common law indemnity. Kent Security opposes the motion only to the extent that the movants seek indemnification from Kent Security, and takes the position that 576 Fifth and Severn bear no liability in this action for which they need indemnification. Plaintiff does not oppose the motion. The movants contend that they contracted with Kent Security as an independent contractor to provide security related services for the Building and they cannot be held liable for the acts of an independent contractor under the circumstances of this case. “As a general rule, a principal is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor because principals ordinarily do not control the manner in which independent contractors, as opposed to employees of the principal, perform their work” (Goodwin v. Comcast Corp., 42 AD3d 322 [1st Dept, 2007]). The exceptions to this rule “fall roughly into three basic categories: where the employer is negligent in selecting, instructing or supervising the independent contractor; where the independent contractor is hired to do work which is ‘inherently dangerous’; and where the employer bears a specific, nondelegable duty” (Saini v. Tonju Assoc., 299 AD2d 244, 245 [1st Dept 2002]). In support of their motion, the movants submit a contractual agreement between 576 Fifth, Severn, and Kent Security (the “Security Contract”), the plain language of which establishes that Kent Security was an independent contractor (contract between 576 Fifth and Kent Security
