Decision and order The defendants have moved pursuant to CPLR §3212 seeking summary judgement dismissing all claims filed against Aaron Scharf individually. Further, the defendants seek to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim on the grounds it is duplicative of the breach of contract claim. The plaintiff opposes the motion. Papers were submitted by the parties and arguments held. After reviewing the arguments of all parties this court now makes the following determination. Background On October 31, 2018 the defendant Franklin Exhibit Management Group LLC [hereinafter 'Franklin'] entered into a contract with the plaintiff wherein the plaintiff agreed to transport a decommissioned aircraft from Rhode Island to Maryland for a price of $850,000. The aircraft was made into a replica of Air Force One and was intended to operate as an exhibit as part of the Children’s Democracy Project. The plaintiff commenced this lawsuit alleging the defendants have not paid any of the contract price associated with the transport of the airplane. The complaint alleges two causes of action against all defendants, for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Defendant Scharf has moved seeking to dismiss the claims against him on the grounds he cannot be personally liable for any corporate liability. Further, the defendants seek to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim on the grounds it is duplicative of the breach of contract claim. The plaintiff opposes the motions. They contend they should be permitted to engage in discovery to determine Scharf’s relationship with the corporate entity to discern if personal liability is proper. Moreover, the plaintiff asserts the unjust enrichment claim is proper since the defendants received ticket sales as a result of the transport and such enrichment are distinct from the allegations of breach of contract. Conclusions of Law Where the material facts at issue in a case are in dispute summary judgment cannot be granted (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NYS2d 557, 427 NYS2d 595 [1980]). Generally, it is for the jury, the trier of fact to determine the legal cause of any injury (Aronson v. Horace Mann-Barnard School, 224 AD2d 249, 637 NYS2d 410 [1st Dept., 1996]). However, where only one conclusion may be drawn from the facts then the question of legal cause may be decided by the trial court as a matter of law (Derdiarian v.Felix Contracting Inc., 51 NY2d 308, 434 NYS2d 166 [1980]). To succeed on a request to pierce the corporate veil the plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) the owners exercised complete dominion of the corporation in respect to the transaction attacked; and (2) that such dominion was used to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in plaintiff’s injury” (Conason v. Megan Holding LLC, 25 NY3d 1, 6 NYS3d 206 [2015]). As the Court of Appeals observed, at the pleading stage “a plaintiff must do more than merely allege that [defendant] engaged in improper acts or acted in ‘bad faith’ while representing the corporation” (East Hampton Union Free School District v. Sandpebble Builders Inc., 16 NY3d 775, 919 NYS2d 496 [2011]). Rather, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating such dominion over the corporation and that “through such domination, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form to perpetuate a wrong or injustice against the plaintiff such that a court in equity will intervene” (Oliveri Construction Corp., v. WN weaver Street LLC, 144 AD3d 765, 41 NYS3d 59 [2d Dept., 2016]). “Factors to be considered in determining whether an individual has abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate or LLC form include the failure to adhere to [corporate or] LLC formalities, inadequate capitalization, commingling of assets, and the personal use of [corporate or] LLC funds” (see, Grammas v. Lockwood Associates LLC, 95 AD3d 1073, 944 NYS2d 623 [2d Dept., 2012]). Thus, mere conclusory statements that the individual dominated the corporation are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss (AHA Sales Inc., v. Creative Bath Products Inc., 58 AD3d 6, 867 NYS2d 169 [2d Dept., 2008]). In this case the complaint states that “Scharf is the sole member of FEMG, and upon information and belief is the sole member of AF1 and 485EV, and at all times was Defendants’ sole representative and point of contact with HLI” (see, Complaint, 13). Further, the complaint states two more times that “Scharf is the sole member” of Franklin and the other corporate defendants (see, Complaint,
