By: Edmead, P.J., Higgitt, Brigantti, JJ. 16-169. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. SAMUEL COPPEDGE, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Erika M. Edwards, J.), rendered September 14, 2015, affirmed. Since defendant waived prosecution by information, the accusatory instrument only had to satisfy the reasonable cause requirement of a misdemeanor complaint (see People v. Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]). So viewed, the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally valid because it described facts of an evidentiary nature establishing reasonable cause to believe that defendant was guilty of third-degree assault (see Penal Law §120.00[1]). The “physical injury” element of the offense was satisfied by allegations that defendant “str[uck] [the victim] in the face with a closed fist, causing swelling and bruising to his lip, a scratch on his cheek, and substantial pain.” Based on these allegations, a reasonable person could infer that the victim felt “substantial pain” (Penal Law §10.00[9]; see People v. Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680 [1999]; People v. Lang, 81 AD3d 538 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 896 [2011]), a term which simply means “more than slight or trivial pain” (People v. Chiddick, 8 NY3d 445, 447 [2007]). Defendant’s intent to cause physical injury was readily inferable from his actions (see Matter of Edward H., 61 AD3d 473, 473 [2009]; Matter of Marcel F., 233 AD2d 442, 442-443 [1996]). All concur. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
By: Edmead, P.J., Higgitt, Brigantti, JJ. 16-341. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. JUAN RAMIREZ, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Lyle E. Frank, J.), rendered February 29, 2016, affirmed. Since defendant waived prosecution by information, the accusatory instrument only had to satisfy the reasonable cause requirement of a misdemeanor complaint (see People v. Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]). So viewed, the complaint charging reckless driving (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §1212) was jurisdictionally valid. The instrument recited that a police officer observed defendant, at a specified location at 4:20 a.m., drive his vehicle through two red lights while talking on a cell phone and while there were “numerous other vehicles on the road.” These allegations were sufficient for pleading purposes, since they provided reasonable cause to believe that defendant “unreasonably endanger[ed] users of the public highway” (Vehicle and Traffic Law §1212; see People v. Grogan, 260 NY 138, 144 [1932]; People v. Goldblatt, 98 AD3d 817 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 932 [2012]; People v. Medard, 63 Misc 3d 165[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50943[U][App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 934 [2019]), and provided sufficient detail to enable defendant to prepare a defense and invoke his protection against double jeopardy (see People v. Kasse, 22 NY3d 1142, 1143 [2014]). All concur. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
