MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Plaintiff, owner of the BARBIE® mark, has brought claims against entities doing business on Amazon for improper use of its marks. As Defendant Guangzhou Zhehong Network Technology Col, Ltd (“Guangzhou Zhehong”) has been served but has failed to appear, Plaintiff moves for default judgment. For the reasons that follow, that motion is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND On December 30, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint ex parte under seal against Defendants bringing claims of trademark infringement, counterfeiting, and dilution, among others, for allegedly engaging in the sale and distribution of doll clothes and accessories under the name “BARBEGIO” that closely resembles and/or utilized the trademarked qualities of Plaintiff’s products. Dkt. No. 11. Plaintiff simultaneously filed under seal an ex parte motion for attachment and temporary restraining order to prevent Defendants from transferring or withdrawing their funds from Amazon.com. Dkt. No. 22-25. Judge Broderick, sitting as Part I, granted Plaintiff’s motion that same day, ordered Plaintiff to serve the Order on Defendants,1 and ordered Defendants to show cause on at a hearing on January 15, 2021 why a permanent injunction should not be granted. Dkt. No. 18. That conference was later adjourned to January 22, 2021. Dkt. No. 15. The Court unsealed the case on January 19, 2021. Dkt. No. 4. On January 22, 2021, the Court held a show cause hearing, at which Defendants did not appear. On January 25, 2021, Defendant Guangzhou Zhehong acknowledged receipt of service. Dkt. No. 17. The Court extended the temporary restraining order for good cause until February 26, 2021, so that Plaintiff could continue to engage in settlement discussions and move for default judgment if Defendant Guangzhou Zhehong did not appear. Dkt. No. 19. Defendant Guangzhou Zhehong has not appeared to respond to the complaint, and the deadline to do so, February 16, 2021, has elapsed. Dkt. No. 17. The Clerk of Court issued a certificate of default on February 22, 2021 and Plaintiff moved this Court for default judgment. Dkt. Nos. 30-31. Plaintiff served the motion and accompanying papers on Defendant Guangzhou Zhehong. Dkt. No. 35. In its motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to permanently enjoin Defendant Guangzhou Zhehong from infringing or counterfeiting Plaintiff’s BARBIE® trademark and to grant Plaintiff at least $6,323.86 in damages. II. DISCUSSION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 sets out a two-step procedure for the entry of judgment against a party who fails to defend: the entry of a default and the entry of a default judgment. See New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005). The first step, entry of a default, simply “formalizes a judicial recognition that a defendant has, through its failure to defend the action, admitted liability to the plaintiff.” City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2011); Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.”). “The second step, entry of a default judgment, converts the defendant’s admission of liability into a final judgment that terminates the litigation and awards the plaintiff any relief to which the court decides it is entitled, to the extent permitted by Rule 54(c).” Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 128. Rule 54(c) states, “[a] default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). The district court must still determine whether the allegations in the complaint state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981). A. Liability Defendant Guangzhou Zhehong has not participated in this litigation, despite service of the Complaint, TRO, and the instant motion. The Court therefore accepts as true all well pleaded allegations in the complaint but must still determine whether those allegations establish a “legal basis” for liability. Jemine v. Dennis, 901 F. Supp. 2d 365, 373 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation — other than one relating to the amount of damages — is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.”). The Court thus examines “whether [the] plaintiff’s allegations are prima facie sufficient to demonstrate liability for the cause of action as to which they are seeking a default judgment.” Morozov v. ICOBOX Hub Inc., No. 18-cv-3421 (GBD) (SLC), 2020 WL 5665639, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-cv-3421 (GBD) (SLC), 2020 WL 5665563 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2020). The legal sufficiency of these claims is analyzed under the familiar plausibility standard enunciated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To succeed on its Lanham Act trademark infringement and trademarking counterfeiting claims, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendant, without Plaintiff’s consent, “(1) used in commerce, (2) any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark, (3)in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use, (4) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Felizardo, No. 03 CIV. 5891 (HB), 2004 WL 1375277, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2004) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §1114(1)(a)). To determine whether the final prong is met, Courts look to factors such as “the strength of plaintiff’s mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the parties’ areas of commerce, the likelihood that plaintiff will bridge the gap separating their areas of activity, actual consumer confusion, whether defendant acted in bad faith or was otherwise reprehensible in adopting the mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the relevant consumer group.” Spin Master Ltd. v. 158, 463 F. Supp. 3d 348, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing Polaroid v. Polarad Elecs. Corp, 287 F.3d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)). These elements are met. Plaintiff has demonstrated, through its Certificate of Trademark Registration, that it owns the rights to the BARBIE® mark. Dkt. No. 11
