DECISION and ORDER Currently before the Court, in this personal injury action filed by Karen Oncay and Raymond Oncay (“Plaintiffs”) against Inflasafe USA, Inc., and Great Air, Inc. (“Defendants”), is Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against Defendant Inflasafe pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). (Dkt. No. 48.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted. I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND A. Plaintiffs’ Complaint Generally, in their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Inflasafe (along with Defendant Great Air and multiple defendants who have been dismissed from this action) designed, manufactured, assembled, distributed, promoted and sold recreational airbags, one of which caused Plaintiff Karen Oncay’s injuries. (Dkt. No. 3 [Pls.' Compl.].) More specifically Plaintiffs allege that on September 24, 2016, or 2017,1 at Whiteface Mountain, Plaintiff Karen Oncay attempted a vertical freefall of approximately 30 feet into Defendant Inflasafe’s airbag, feet first, during which she suffered serious and permanent injuries consisting of a tibia and fibula fracture of her right leg requiring surgery and other medical treatment. (Id. at
53-55.) Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiffs assert the following four claims against Defendant Inflasafe: (1) Defendant Inflasafe is strictly liable to Plaintiff Karen Oncay for her injuries suffered as a result of the airbag because that airbag was not reasonably safe and/or defective; (2) Defendant Inflasafe was negligent in failing to exercise reasonable care in the design, testing, manufacture, assembly, distribution, promotion, sale, and delivery of the airbag, and by failing to include proper warnings, notice, or instructions to users and consumers about the dangers, risks, and hazards attendant in use of the airbag; (3) Defendant Inflasafe expressly or impliedly warranted that the airbag and its component parts were of merchantable quality, were fit for the purpose and use for which they were intended, and could be used for those purposes without substantial risk of injury; and (4) Defendant Inflasafe’s actions have caused Plaintiff Raymond Oncay to suffer a loss of the comfort, companionship, services, and consortium of his wife, Plaintiff Karen Oncay. (Id.) B. Relevant Procedural History On September 23, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this case in the Southern District of New York. (Dkt. No. 3.) On November 15, 2019, the case was transferred to this Court pursuant to a motion by Defendant Great Air. (Dkt. No. 27.) On May 18, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a request for entry of default against Defendant Inflasafe; and, on May 19, 2019, the Clerk of Court entered default against Defendant Inflasafe on all claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). (Dkt. Nos. 42, 44.) On June 8, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the current motion for default judgment against Defendant Inflasafe. (Dkt. No. 48.) C. Parties’ Briefing on Plaintiffs’ Motion Generally, in their motion for default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b), Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to default judgment for the following reasons: (a) Defendant Inflasafe has been properly served with the summons and Complaint but has neither answered nor moved relative to the Complaint; (b) Defendant Inflasafe is not an infant, incompetent, or a member of a military service; and (c) the Clerk of Court granted a certificate of default on May 19, 2020. (Dkt. No. 48, at 1-2, 68-69.) Plaintiffs request that, upon entry of default judgment, an inquest be conducted to determine the amount of damages resulting from Defendant Inflasafe’s actions. (Id.) As of the date of this Decision and Order, Defendant Inflasafe has neither filed an Answer to the Complaint nor filed a response to Plaintiffs’ motion. (See generally Docket Sheet.) The time in which to file a response to Plaintiffs’ motion has now passed. (Text Notice filed June 9, 2020 [indicating that any response to Plaintiffs' motion was due by June 29, 2020].) II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides a two-step process that the Court must follow before it may enter a default judgment against a defendant.” Robertson v. Doe, 05-CV 7046, 2008 WL 2519894, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008). “First, under Rule 55(a), when a party fails to ‘plead or otherwise defend…the clerk must enter the party’s default.’” Robertson, 2008 WL 2519894, at *3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55[a]). “Second, pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), the party seeking default judgment is required to present its application for entry of judgment to the court.” Id. “Notice of the application must be sent to the defaulting party so that it has an opportunity to show cause why the court should not enter a default judgment.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55[b][2]). “When an action presents more than one claim for relief…, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties…if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Pursuant to Second Circuit law, when determining whether to grant a default judgment, the Court must consider three factors: (1) whether the defendant’s default was willful; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense to the claims; and (3) the level of prejudice the non-defaulting party would suffer as a result of the denial of the motion for default judgment. Pecarksy v. Galaxiworld.com, Ltd., 249 F.3d 167, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2001); Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993). “An unexcused or unexplained failure to provide an answer to the Complaint will itself demonstrate willfulness,” as does failing to respond to both a complaint and a subsequent motion for default judgment. United States v. Silverman, 15-CV 0022, 2017 WL 745732, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2017) (citing S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738-39 [2d Cir. 1998]; Indymac Bank v. Nat’l Settlement Agency, Inc., 07-CV-6865, 2007 WL 4468652, at *1 [S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2007]). When a court considers a motion for the entry of a default judgment, it must “accept[ ] as true all of the factual allegations of the complaint….” Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). “However, the court cannot construe the damages alleged in the complaint as true.” Eng’rs Joint Welfare, Pension, Supplemental Unemployment Benefit and Training Funds v. Catone Constr. Co., Inc., 08-CV-1048, 2009 WL 4730700, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2009) (Scullin, J.) (citing Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 [2d Cir. 1999] [citations omitted]). “Rather, the court must ‘conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.’” Eng’rs Joint Welfare, Pension, Supplemental Unemployment Benefit and Training Funds, 2009 WL 4730700, at *2 (quoting Alcantara, 183 F.3d at 155 [citation omitted]). This inquiry “involves two tasks: [1] determining the proper rule for calculating damages on such a claim, and [2] assessing plaintiff’s evidence supporting the damages to be determined under this rule.” Alcantara, 183 F.3d at 155. Finally, in calculating damages, the court “need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action….” Au Bon Pain, 653 F.2d at 65 (citation omitted). Under N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(a), when requesting an entry of default judgment from the Clerk of the Court, the moving party must submit (a) the Clerk’s certificate of entry of default, (b) a statement showing the principal amount due (not to exceed the amount demanded in the Complaint and giving credit for any payments with the dates of payments), (c) a computation of the interest to the day of judgment, (d) a per diem rate of interest, (e) the costs and taxable disbursements claimed, and (f) an affidavit of the moving party or the party’s attorney. N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(a). The appended affidavit must show that (a) the party against whom judgment is sought is not an infant or incompetent person, (b) the party against whom judgment is sought is not in military service, (c) the party against whom judgment is sought has defaulted in appearance in the action, (d) service was properly effected under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, (e) the amount shown in the statement is justly due and owing and no part has been paid except as set forth in the party’s other statement, and (f) disbursements sought to be taxed have been made in the action or will necessarily be made or incurred. Id. Under N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(b), when moving for an entry of default judgment from the Court, the moving party must submit (a) the Clerk’s certificate of entry of default, (b) a proposed form of default judgment, (c) a copy of the pleading to which no response has been made, and (d) an affidavit of the moving party or its attorney setting forth the facts required by N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(a). N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(b). III. ANALYSIS After careful consideration, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against Defendant Inflasafe as to liability for the reasons stated in their motion. See, supra, Part I.C. of this Decision and Order. To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis. A. Willfulness of Defendant Inflasafe’s Default As an initial matter, the Court finds that Defendant Inflasafe’s default was willful based on its failure to either answer the Complaint or file any response to Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. Silverman, 2017 WL 745732, at *3 (citing McNulty, 137 F.3d at 738-39; Indymac Bank, 2007 WL 4468652, at *1). The Court notes that, according to the affidavit of Plaintiffs’ counsel and the affidavit of service of the Complaint, Plaintiffs served a copy of their Summons and Complaint on Defendant Inflasafe by leaving a copy of both at (and subsequently mailing a copy to) the place of business of Arsen Ambartsumyan, the president of Defendant Inflasafe.2 Plaintiffs served the in-person copies on a John Doe present at the relevant address, and, despite indications that Mr. Ambartsumyan was employed as a sales manager at the business located at that address, the John Doe refused to accept the Summons and Complaint. (Dkt. No. 40, at 4.) The mailed Summons and Complaint were sent to the same address. (Id.) Subsequently, Plaintiffs served a copy of their motion on Defendant Inflasafe at the same address, which does not appear to have been returned as undeliverable (despite the fact that a Text Notice from the Court was returned as undeliverable at approximately the same time). (Dkt. No. 52.) In any event, Plaintiffs’ counsel has sworn in an affidavit that multiple sources of information indicate that Mr. Ambartsumyan is an employee of the business located at the relevant address, and has provided a report that lists Mr. Ambartsumyan as the Sales Manager for that business. Based on the information provided, the Court finds that Defendant Inflasafe (through Mr. Ambartsumyan) was provided with notice of both the action against his company and of the pending motion for default judgment, but has failed to answer either and has not appeared to provide an explanation for the default. The Court therefore finds that the available evidence is sufficient to indicate that Defendant Inflasafe’s default is willful. B. Meritorious Defense to Plaintiffs’ Claims The Court finds that there is no indication at this time that Defendant Inflasafe would have a meritorious defense to the asserted claims for which, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts to establish liability on a motion for default judgment. C. Liability on Plaintiffs’ Claims As discussed above in Part II of this Decision and Order, the Court must accept the factual allegations in the Complaint as true when assessing whether a plaintiff has established liability for a motion for default judgment. However, that does not mean that a finding of liability is automatic. Rather, “prior to entering default judgment, a district court is ‘required to determine whether the [plaintiff's] allegations establish [the defendant's] liability as a matter of law.’” City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 [2d Cir. 2009]). As discussed above in Part I of this Decision and Order, Plaintiffs assert the following four claims against Defendant Inflasafe: (1) defective design; (2) negligence and failure to warn; (3) breach of express or implied warranty of merchantability; and (4) loss of support. (Dkt. No. 3 [Pls.' Compl.].) Although success on each of these claims may not be necessary for Plaintiffs to obtain all of the relief they seek against Defendant Inflasafe, the Court will analyze each of those claims for the purpose of thoroughness. 1. Defective Design To state a claim for defective design under New York law, the plaintiff must allege facts plausibly suggesting the following: “(1) the product as designed posed a substantial likelihood of harm; (2) it was feasible to design the product in a safer manner; and (3) the defective design was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injury.” Astoria Energy II LLC v. HH Valves Ltd., 17-CV-5724, 2019 WL 4120759, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2019); accord, Parillo v. Stryker Corp., 15-CV-0155, 2015 WL 12748006, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015) (Sannes, J.) (citing Maxwell v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 713 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 [N.D.N.Y. 2010] [Suddaby, J.]). In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the relevant airbag was not reasonably safe and/or was defective for the following relevant reasons: (a) it lacked any means of reliably quantifying or measuring the air pressure within the chambers; (b) it lacked any reliable means of stabilizing air pressure in the chambers as air was lost with each jumper; (c) it lacked the means to prevent operators from using the bag in a dangerous or unintended manner (such as using only one chamber); (d) it was designed, distributed and sold without any scientific or engineering basis for its overall size and thickness, or for the size, thickness, number, shape or configuration of its chambers; (e) it was adapted from competitors’ designs without sufficient independent research or a sufficient scientific or engineering understanding of those competitors’ designs; (f) it was designed, distributed and sold without review, input, analysis, or testing by a qualified scientist, engineer, biochemist, or gymnasium/stunt expert; (g) it was marketed and sold for purposes (i.e., ski and snowboard jumps and vertical freefalls) that were not sufficiently tested by Defendant Inflasafe to ensure safety; (h) it was marketed and sold for use in vertical freefall attractions without developing specific recommendations for use in such a context; (i) it lacked written or visual instructions for safe use; (j) it was designed and/or manufactured without proper research, evaluation, formulation, and testing of the materials and prototypes to ensure safety; and (k) its appearance as a “giant pillow” deceptively lulled the user into a false sense of security by making the airbag appear safe and disguising its inherent danger. (Dkt. No. 3, at 58 [Pls.' Compl.].) Plaintiffs additionally allege that (a) the airbag was in defective condition, (b) the design, manufacture, assembly, distribution, promotion, and sale of the airbag in a dangerous and defective condition caused Plaintiff’s injuries, (c) a feasible alternative design for the airbag exists and did exist at the time when the relevant airbag was manufactured and sold, (d) the alternative design would have rendered the airbag reasonably safe, and (e) the design of the relevant airbag is inherently dangerous and cannot be made safe for the intended purpose of recreational vertical freefalls by untrained participants. (Id. at
