By: Higgitt J.P., Brigantti, Hagler, JJ. 16-365. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. JC DUNCAN, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Bruna L. DiBiase, J.), rendered February 10, 2014, affirmed. In view of defendant’s knowing waiver of the right to prosecution by information, the sufficiency of the accusatory instrument is assessed under the standard applicable to a misdemeanor complaint (see People v. Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]). So viewed, and giving the allegations “a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading” (People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]), we find “as a matter of common sense and reasonable pleading” (People v. Davis, 13 NY3d 17, 31 [2009]), that the allegations were sufficient for pleading purposes to establish reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed the offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (see Penal Law §220.03). The instrument recited that police recovered a controlled substance in the form of “one pill of hydrocodone” from “defendant’s right pants pocket” and that the officer believed the pill was hydrocodone “based upon [his] prior experience as a police officer making drug arrests” and “the label on the pills”1 (see People v. Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064 [2015]; People v. Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 231-232 [2009]; People v. Pearson, 78 AD3d 445 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 799 [2011]). Where, as here, “the defendant has waived prosecution by information (and therefore has assented to the more lenient reasonable cause standard), these legal and factual allegations are sufficient to particularize the crime charged and protect against a constitutional double jeopardy violation” (People v. Thiam, 34 NY3d 1040, 1044 [2019, DiFiore, Ch. J., concurring]). All concur. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
1. Although the complaint states “pills” (plural) in one section and that the officer recovered “one pill” in another, this discrepancy did not affect the legal sufficiency of the complaint. A person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree when he or she knowingly and unlawfully possesses a controlled substance (see Penal Law §220.03), “irrespective of amount” (People v. Mizell, 72 NY2d 651, 655 [1988]).
