DECISION/FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER AFTER TRIAL The parties are unmarried and have one child in common, P.S. (hereinafter “P.S.” or “subject child”). On July 30, 2019, the mother, Sabrina S. (hereinafter “Mother” or “Ms. S.”) filed a support petition under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act1 (hereinafter “UIFSA”) against the father, Oscar C. (hereinafter “Father” or “Mr. C.”). In her petition, she alleged that she is entitled to Mr. C.’s contribution towards P.S.’s support because Mr. C. is P.S.’s father. She sought Mr. C.’s pro rata share of child support, medical premiums, unreimbursed medical expenses and child care. Despite attempts to settle the matter, the parties were unable to resolve the case. The matter was thus scheduled for a virtual all-day trial. On February 11, 2021, a fact-finding hearing commenced and was completed. Assistant County Attorney Kristin D’Angelo (hereinafter “Ms. D’Angelo”) handled the matter on behalf of Ms. S.; Robert Mangi, Esq. (hereinafter “Mr. Mangi”) represented Mr. C. Only two witnesses testified: Ms. S. and Mr. C. Ms. S. appeared virtually from Germany; Mr. C. appeared virtually from his attorney’s office in Nassau County. Both parties admitted documentary evidence. Ms. S.’s documents included certified translations from the German language into English. The parties agreed that with respect to Ms. S.’s testimony, the conversion rate of Euros to dollars would be 1.21, which was the conversion rate on the trial date. At the close of trial, the parties delivered their summations. The Court reserved decision. Having considered the evidence presented at trial, the parties’ arguments, and the law, the Court’s decision follows: THE EVIDENCE TESTIMONY MS. S.’S TESTIMONY Ms. S. testified that she resides in Germany with her husband, and her two daughters, P.S. and P. She told the Court that P.S. is Mr. C.’s daughter. She stated that P.S. is 9 years old and in the Fourth Grade. She told the Court that P. is her husband’s daughter and is not the subject of her petition. Ms. S. testified that prior to P.’s birth in January, 2020, she worked as a certified Accounting Manager, earning 1,660 Euros2 monthly before taxes. She told the Court that for about a year, she had been studying towards another, higher degree as a Business Economist. She stated that she is unable to continue with her Business Economist studies because she is on parenting leave with P., P.S. is currently being homeschooled, and Ms. S.’s classes are not moving forward due to COVID19. Ms. S. testified that when she goes back to work, she is unsure if she will return at the same salary level as other Accounting Managers. She explained that her employer requires her to complete job-related studies on a regular basis in order to maintain her level. She told the Court that she is hoping to catch up with those requirements while on parenting leave, but may not be able in light of COVID19′s restrictions. Ms. S. testified that she started parenting leave when P. was born and she intends to continue her leave through mid-2022. She told the Court that her family’s bills are paid through her husband’s salary of 2,500 Euros monthly, her parenting leave benefits from the German government of 242 Euros monthly, and 204 Euros monthly per child that the German government provides to her family. She explained that before she got married, she received child support from the German government, but now she receives an allowance for each child. Ms. S. testified that when she got married, the family fell into a different tax status. She told the Court that the spouse who makes less pays more money in taxes. Ms. S. testified that she spends approximately 30 Euros monthly on clothing for P.S. She told the Court that she spends approximately 5 Euros monthly on toiletries for P.S… She stated that she spends approximately 110 Euros monthly on swimming, Taekwondo, and horseback riding for P.S. She explained that those are P.S.’s extra-curricular activities and are not used in lieu of child care. Ms. S. testified that she spends approximately 13.41 Euros monthly on life insurance for P.S.. She elaborated that she buys life insurance so that if something happens to her, P.S. has money to live. She told the Court that P.S. is the sole beneficiary of that life insurance. Ms. S. testified that her mortgage payment is approximately 832.50 Euros monthly. She told the Court that food for the family costs approximately 1,200 Euros monthly. She stated that her car payments are approximately 581 Euros monthly. Ms. S. testified that her car insurance costs approximately 100 Euros monthly. She stated that she spends approximately 195 Euros monthly towards the home’s utilities. Ms. S. testified that P.S.’s cellular telephone costs approximately 5 Euros monthly. She told the Court that she puts approximately 5 Euros monthly into a savings account for P.S.. She explained that she has not done so since she went on parenting leave. She stated that she gives P.S. approximately 10 Euros monthly towards “pocket money,” which P.S. either spends on toys, or saves. Ms. S. testified that P.S. used to attend day care. She told the Court that as of March, 2019, P.S. was no longer enrolled in child care. She stated that P.S. will not need day care until mid-2022 when Ms. S. goes back to work. She told the Court that she does not know how much child care will cost at that time. Ms. S. testified that P.S.’s regular health care is provided through the German government. She explained that the German government takes money out of its citizens’ paychecks to cover health care costs. She stated that she does not know how much P.S.’s medical premiums are. Ms. S. testified that she purchases extra health care for P.S. at a cost of approximately 9.1 Euros3 monthly. She explained that the additional health care is enhanced health care that permits appointments with special doctors, private rooms in hospitals and the ability to go to Switzerland, which has the newest medical technology. Ms. S. testified that there are typically no unreimbursed medical expenses in Germany, except for the cost of prescription drugs and braces. MR. C.’S TESTIMONY Mr. C. testified that he has been residing with his mother and maternal aunt in East Meadow for approximately 20 years. He told the Court that he attained two Associate degrees, one in criminal justice and the other in computer science, from Briarcliffe College. He stated that during High School, he worked at “Nathan’s,” and as a pizza delivery person. He told the Court that he had a computer job during his Freshman year at college. Mr. C. testified that after college, he worked in the computer field, fixing computers and printers, and working as part of a “helpdesk.” He told the Court that he worked for several different companies for varied lengths of time on “project for hire” jobs. He stated that he worked with computers for approximately 15 years, earning between $15.00 and $20.00 an hour. Mr. C. testified that he used to be A+ certified in computer hardware and software. He told the Court that his certification had to be renewed every year and cost about $100.00 yearly. He stated that he had to pass a yearly test as part of his certification. Mr. C. told the Court that he left that profession because he got bored. Mr. C. testified that his certification lapsed when he left the computer field. Mr. C. testified that he left the computer field to go into the security field. He told the Court that he has been working as a “bouncer” at nightclubs, earning between $17.00 and $25.00 an hour. He stated that he has a flexible shift. He explained that he works six-hour shifts on Friday and Saturday nights from 10:00 P.M.-4:00 A.M., and one or two days during the week. Mr. C. testified that his work hours depend on the position he holds at each specific nightclub. He told the Court that he is a 1099 employee who gets paid through a cash application. Mr. C. testified that he has not worked since the Coronavirus presented a need for nightclubs to close. He told the Court that he is hoping that the worldwide pandemic will end, and nightclubs will reopen, so that he can return to work as a “bouncer.” He explained that his mother is a retired corrections officer who works in the same field. Mr. C. testified that since COVID19 caused him to be unemployed, he has received $159.00 weekly in unemployment benefits and $262.60 weekly in stimulus checks, for a total of $482.00 weekly. He told the Court that he received his first unemployment check on March 8, 2020 and his unemployment benefits will stop on March 7, 2021. Mr. C. testified that since the pandemic began, he has been looking for work, but “there is nothing out there…not in my field…security, bouncing, that kind of thing…nightclubs and bars.” He acknowledged that he did not submit proof of a diligent job search. Mr. C. conceded that he has not searched for a job in the computer field. He explained that he has not worked with computers for the last 5 years and has no interest, time or money to pursue that field anymore. He added that in order to resume his work with computers at this juncture, he would have to go back to school to familiarize himself with technological updates and he would have to re-certify himself. He told the Court that since he is still paying off his student loans, he cannot afford to pay for more schooling. Mr. C. stated that his last student loan payment was made pre-COVID19 and that prior to the pandemic, he had been making $5.00 monthly payments. Mr. C. testified that when he was working, he used to give his mother rent money in the amount of $400.00-$500.00 monthly in exchange for living in her home. He explained that he no longer has the funds to pay rent to his mother. He stated that his mother contributes to the household with money she earns through her security position and his maternal aunt “helps her out” through her salary at a factory that manufactures ziploc bags. Mr. C. testified that prior to the pandemic, he “cracked” his cellular telephone so he purchased a new Android, for which service he pays $89.00 monthly. He told the Court that he drives one of his mother’s vehicles, a 2014 Nissan Maxima. He stated that he puts gasoline into that vehicle. He explained that gasoline cost about $55.00 weekly at the time that he was traveling to the Hamptons on the weekends to do security work. Mr. C. testified that his mother pays for the car’s insurance. He told the Court that he spends about $20.00 monthly on clothes. He conceded that in January, 2020, he spent approximately $75.00 on entertainment. Mr. C. testified that when he works, he makes more money in the security field than he did working with computers. He explained that his hourly rate as a “bouncer” was higher and he earned tips. He told the Court that prior to COVID19, he earned between $400.00 and $450.00 weekly. He stated that for the past five years, the most money he has made is $14,000.00 annually. He told the Court that he owed money to the government on his 2019 income tax return. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE All of the parties’ exhibits were admitted into evidence upon consent. Ms. S. admitted her Financial Disclosure Affidavit into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 1. Ms. S. admitted her pay stub into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 2. Ms. S. admitted an Order of Filiation from the Family Court in Lorrach, Germany, under File No. 11F709/12, adjudicating Mr. C. to be P.S.’s father, into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 3. Ms. S. admitted her 2017 and 2018 income tax statements, and her 2017 and 2018 general tax assessments from Germany, into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 4. Ms. S. admitted her children’s benefits statements from the German government into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 5. Ms. S. admitted her child care documents into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 6. Ms. S. admitted her health insurance documents into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 7. Mr. C. admitted his credit card bills into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit A. Mr. C. admitted his student loan statement into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit B. Mr. C. admitted his 2018 and 2019 tax returns into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit C. Mr. C. admitted his unemployment benefits statement into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit D. Mr. C. admitted his financial disclosure affidavit into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit E. Mr. C. admitted his updated unemployment benefits statement into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit F. DISCUSSION CREDIBILITY In any trial proceeding, the finder of fact, be it judge or jury, is charged with the responsibility of not just listening and accepting the answers that witnesses offer to questions, but also weighing and considering the behavior and demeanor of those testifying. See e.g. Matter of Taylor T., 73 A.D.3d 1075, 1075 (2d Dep’t 2010) (great deference afforded trial court who is in best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence proffered); Matter of Kai B., 38 A.D.3d 882, 883 (2d Dep’t 2007) (same); In re Frank T., 215 A.D.2d 562, 563 (2d Dep’t 1995) (upholding trial court’s assessment of credibility); Matter of Thomas S., 26 A.D.3d 389, 389 (2d Dep’t 2006). In its assessment of the evidence, the Court analyzed the credibility of the witnesses. The Court had the unique opportunity to observe the eye contact, body language, and inflection of the parties’ voices, and to contemplate those physical cues along with the proof. Notably, the virtual aspect of the trial did not interfere with the Court’s ability to evaluate credibility in any way, shape, form or fashion. The Court found both parents to be candid and credible. CHILD SUPPORT Parents have an obligation to contribute to the economic well-being of their children. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(a) (McKinney’s 2021); see also Matter of H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521, 527 (2010); Thomas B. v. Lydia. D., 69 A.D.3d 24, 27-9 (1st Dep’t 2009). To that end, under the law, a non-custodial parent pays child support to a custodial parent since the custodial parent is responsible for funding a child’s daily living expenses. See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413 (McKinney’s 2021). In New York, child support obligations continue until a child turns twenty-one years old, or emancipates themselves through marriage, military service, a job that causes them to be self-supporting, or they constructively emancipate by withdrawing from parental supervision and control. See Thomas B. v. Lydia. D., 69 A.D.3d 24, 27-9 (1st Dep’t 2009); see also Bogin v. Goodrich, 265 A.D.2d 779, 781 (3d Dep’t 1999) (citing cases). The Child Support Standards Act (hereinafter “CSSA”) contains a formula for computing the basic child support calculation, based upon parental income, which is presumed to provide a “fair and reasonable sum” to meet a child’s needs within both of his or her parents’ means. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§413(1)(a) (McKinney’s 2021); see also Cassano v. Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d 649, 652 (1995); Moore v. Abban, 72 A.D.3d 970, 971 (2d Dep’t 2010). A presumption exists that the child support amount computed under the statutory guidelines is correct, but that presumption may be rebutted, and the child support obligation adjusted, upon a support magistrate’s finding that the non-custodial parent’s obligation is “unjust or inappropriate.” N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(f) (McKinney’s 2021); see also Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 653; Moore, 72 A.D.3d at 971. In its analysis regarding whether or not the non-custodial parent’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is unjust or inappropriate, a court must consider the factors enumerated in New York State Family Court Act §413(1)(f). See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413 (1)(f) (McKinney’s 2021) (setting forth statutory factors); see also Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 653; Moore, 72 A.D.3d at 971-72. Thereafter, if a court decides that the non-custodial parent’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is unjust or inappropriate, a court must issue a written order setting forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its departure from the basic child support obligation. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(g) (McKinney’s 2021); see also Moore, 72 A.D.3d at 971-72. Courts have broad discretion in fashioning a child support award. See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413 (McKinney’s 2021); see also Beach v. Beach, 158 A.D.2d 848, 848 (3d Dep’t 1990). In determining a fair and reasonable sum, a court may issue an “income-based” order or a “needsbased” order. See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413 (McKinney’s 2021). For the purposes of an “income-based” order, the CSSA definition of income is the amount reflected on, inter alia, a party’s most recently filed federal income tax return. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(b)(5)(i) (McKinney’s 2021); see also Maharaj-Ellis v. Laroche, 54 A.D.3d 677, 677 (2d Dep’t 2008). Income is also considered to be derived, to the extent applicable, from investments, workers’ compensation benefits, disability benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, social security benefits, veterans benefits, pensions and retirement benefits, fellowships and stipends, and annuity payments. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(b)(5) (ii), (iii) (McKinney’s 2021). Moreover, a support magistrate is granted wide discretion when deciding whether or not to impute income to a parent. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(b)(5)(iv)(D) (McKinney’s 2021); see also Kennedy v. Ventimiglia, 73 A.D.3d 1066, 1067 (2d Dep’t 2010); see also Maharaj-Ellis, 54 A.D.3d at 677; Simmons v. Simmons, 48 A.D.3d 691, 692 (2d Dep’t 2008); Matter of Genender v. Genender, 51 A.D.3d 669, 670 (2d Dep’t 2008); Bibicoff v. Orfanakis, 48 A.D.3d 680, 681 (2d Dep’t 2008). When imputing income to a parent, a support magistrate may base their determination on a parent’s employment history, earning capacity, or money, goods, or services provided by relatives and friends. See Gebaide v. Gebaide McGoldrick, 74 A.D.3d 966, 967 (2d Dep’t 2008); see also Maharaj-Ellis, 54 A.D.3d at 677; Genender, 51 A.D.3d at 670; Bibicoff, 48 A.D.3d at 681. Notably, where a parent’s testimony is found to be incredible, a court may impute income greater than the claimed income. See Bouie v. Joseph, 91 A.D.3d 641,642 (2d Dep’t 2013); see also Duffy v. Duffy, 84 A.D.3d 1151, 1152 (2d Dep’t 2011); Mosso v. Mosso, 84 A.D.3d 757, 759 (2d Dep’t 2011); Wesche v. Wesche, 77 A.D.3d 921, 923 (2d Dep’t 2010); Rohme v. Burns, 79 A.D.3d 756, 757 (2d Dep’t 2010). In that regard, when a support magistrate imputes income, there must be a “clear record” regarding the reasons for such imputation, the imputed income’s source, and the consequent child support calculations. Rohme, 79 A.D.3d at 757; Sena v. Sena, 61 A.D.3d 980, 981 (2d Dep’t 2009); Gravanese v. Marchese, 57 A.D.3d 992, 993 (2d Dep’t 2008). Alternatively, where there is insufficient proof of a parent’s income due to a parent’s default, a parent’s failure to comply with financial disclosure,4 or where a parent is not forthright when presenting financial evidence, the CSSA dictates that a court shall issue a “needs-based” order based upon either the child’s needs or their standard of living, whichever is greater. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(k) (McKinney’s 2021); see also Tsarova v. Tsarov, 59 A.D.3d 632, 633 (2d Dep’t 2009); Gale v. Lotito, 50 A.D.3d 903, 904 (2d Dep’t 2008); Denham v. Kaplan, 16 A.D.3d 685, 685 (2d Dep’t 2005); Grossman v. Grossman, 248 A.D.2d 536, 537 (2d Dep’t 1998). It is axiomatic that child support must be calculated based upon a party’s ability to provide support. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(a) (McKinney’s 2021); see also Siskind v. Siskind, 89 A.D.3d 832, 833-34 (2d Dep’t 2011) (“Child support is determined by the parents’ ability to provide for their child.”); Costigan v. Renner, 76 A.D.3d 1039, 1040 (2d Dep’t 2010) (child support may be calculated based upon party’s demonstrated earning potential); Spreitzer v. Spreitzer, 40 A.D.3d 840, 842 (2d Dep’t 2007) (same). In light of the evidence presented, the Court finds that Mr. C.’s ability to earn is $21.00 an hour which, according to his testimony, is the mean amount that he is able to earn as a 1099 security employee. The Court finds it appropriate to impute a 40 hour work week to Mr. C.’s hourly scale and calculates his salary to be $43,680.00 annually. Mr. C.’s weekly self-employment tax on that salary is $118.69, or $6,171.88 annually. The evidence established that when Ms. S. was working, she earned $2,008.60 monthly or $24,103.00 annually as an Accounting Manager in Germany. Her pay stub establishes that she paid $8,678.115 in German social security annually and $672.556 in German healthcare annually. Thus, the Court applies the CSSA guidelines to the parties’ abilities to provide support in calculating Mr. C.’s basic child support obligation. Since Mr. C.’s annual salary is $43,680.00 and Ms. S.’s annual salary is $24,103.00, the parties’ annual combined gross income is $67,783.20. The Court applied appropriate deductions for both parties; the Court deducted self-employment tax from Mr. C.’s annual income and German social security and German healthcare from Ms. S.’s annual income. The total amount of deductions for both parties is $15,522.54 annually. The parties’ annual combined adjusted gross income is $52,260.66. The statutory child support percentage for one child is 17 percent of the combined parental income. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(b)(3)(i) (McKinney’s 2021). 17 percent of $52,260.66 yields a $8,884.31 per year child support obligation, or a $740.35 monthly child support obligation for both parents. Based upon the income information provided, Ms. S.’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is 28 percent and Mr. C.’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is 72 percent. Since Mr. C.’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is 72 percent, his monthly child support obligation is $533.00 monthly. The Court declined to entertain Mr. C.’s argument that he should not have to pay for P.S.’s support since he is not permitted to visit with her. Mr. C. has never brought a petition alleging parental alienation. Moreover, Mr. C. has never brought a custody or visitation petition. Notwithstanding, the law permits a parent to bring a support petition against another parent where a child was conceived of their union, regardless of whether that union was a one-time encounter. See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(a) (McKinney’s 2021). The German government adjudicated Mr. C. to be P.S.’s father. Thus, he is obligated to pay child support for her. The Court finds equally unpersuasive and unsupported by law, Mr. C.’s argument that since Germany provides Ms. S. with a monthly allowance towards P.S.’s support, his child support obligation should be reduced. A child’s receipt of government benefits does not obviate, or reduce the amount of, a parent’s responsibility to provide support. See Graby v. Graby, 87 N.Y.2d 605, 611 (1996)(“[B]enefits received by children under certain government welfare programs…. are designed to supplement existing resources, and are not intended to displace the obligation of the parent to support his or her children.”); see also Wendel v. Nelson, 116 A.D.3d 1057, 1058 (2d Dep’t 2014) (mother did not waive right to child support by accepting social security benefits for child). DEVIATION FROM MARCH, 2020 to MARCH, 2021 The Court finds that for the time period between March, 2020 and March, 2021, Mr. C. is entitled to a deviation of his child support obligation and pro rata share because it would be inappropriate, based upon the worldwide Coronvirus pandemic, to require him to pay the same amount as when he was employed. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§413(1)(f)(10), §413(1)(g) (McKinney’s 2021). The worldwide COVID19 pandemic caused an unprecedented forced closure of numerous businesses, including the entertainment industry, the bar and restaurant industry, the hospitality industry and retail establishments. These businesses have been closed for varied amounts of time, under different guidelines mandated by New York State, depending on the type of business. The Court finds that such state-required shutdowns severely decreased Mr. C.’s income through no fault of his own. However, given that Mr. C. provided no proof of a diligent search, the Court has no way of knowing whether Mr. C. explored all of his employment options within the security industry. Thus, within the Court’s discretion, the Court finds that Mr. C. is only entitled to a twelvemonth deviation. The evidence established that from March, 2020 through March, 2021, Mr. C.’s income has been $482.00 weekly, or $25,064.00 annually, which is a combination of his unemployment benefits and his stimulus checks. During that time period, Ms. S. has been on parenting leave, earning 242 Euros monthly, or $292.82 United States dollars monthly. Such amount calculates to be $3,513.84 annually. Since Mr. C.’s salary for the time period between March, 2020 and March, 2021 has been $25,064.00 and Ms. S.’s salary for the time period between March, 2020 and March, 2021 has been $3,513.84, the Court finds that the parties’ combined gross income during that time has been $28,577.84. Under the circumstances, there are no deductions to be taken. Therefore, the parties’ combined adjusted gross income during that time period has been $28,577.84. The statutory child support percentage for one child is 17 percent of the combined parental income. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(b)(3)(i) (McKinney’s 2021). 17 percent of $28,577.84 yields a $4,858.23 per year child support obligation, or a $404.85 monthly child support obligation for both parents. For the time period between March, 2020 and March, 2021, Ms. S.’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is 12 percent and the Mr. C.’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is 88 percent. Since Mr. C.’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is 88 percent during that time period, his monthly child support obligation is $356.00 monthly between March, 2020 and March, 2021. HEALTH INSURANCE New York State Family Court Act §416 (hereinafter “§416″) governs health insurance coverage in support proceedings. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §416 (McKinney’s 2021). §416(c) dictates that a “legally responsibly relative” must provide private health insurance coverage for a person on whose behalf a petition is brought if such coverage is available to them. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §416(c) (McKinney’s 2021). New York Codes, Rules and Regulations defines a legally responsible relative as “any person who is legally obligated to furnish support for a child, or spouse and child.” 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §347.2. Pursuant to §416, it is a court’s duty to determine whether health insurance benefits are available to a legally responsible relative and, if so, to order coverage. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§413(6)(c)(5), 416(c), (d) (McKinney’s 2021); Chautauqua Cty. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Matteson, 126 A.D.3d 1338, 1339-340 (4th Dep’t 2015); Chemung Cty. Commr. of Social Servs. v. Beard, 101 A.D.3d 33, 35 (3d Dep’t 2012). §416(d)(2) provides that health insurance benefits are available when they are “reasonable in cost” and “reasonably accessible.” N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§416(d)(2) (McKinney’s 2021). §416 defines “reasonable in cost” as not exceeding five percent of the combined parental gross income and/or not reducing a parent’s income below the self-support reserve. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§416(d)(3) (McKinney’s 2021); see also Matteson, 126 A.D.3d at 1339-340 (4th Dep’t 2015); Beard, 101 A.D.3d at 35 (3d Dep’t 2012). Moreover, a court may not order health insurance coverage where doing so would be “unjust or inappropriate” given, inter alia, “the circumstances of the case” and “the best interests of the child.” N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§416(d)(3) (McKinney’s 2021); Beard, 101 A.D.3d at 35 (3d Dep’t 2012). §416 defines “reasonably accessible” as convenient, based upon travel time and distance, to the person for whom health insurance coverage is sought. Id. Notwithstanding, for “good cause shown,” a court may determine that health insurance coverage is not reasonably accessible. Id. Where only one parent has available health insurance coverage, a court must direct, within the parties’ support order, that parent to immediately provide those benefits to a child. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§416(e)(2)(i), 416(h) (McKinney’s 2021). A court shall pro-rate each parent’s share of the child’s health insurance premium. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(6)(c)(5)(ii) (McKinney’s 2021). Where the non-custodial parent is ordered to place the child on their health insurance, the custodial parent’s pro rata share shall be deducted from the basic child support obligation. See id. Morever, a court shall pro-rate each parent’s share of the child’s future reasonable health care expenses, not covered by insurance, in the same proportion as each parent’s income is to the combined parental income. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(6)(c)(5)(v) (McKinney’s 2021). Mr. C.’s 1099 employment does not provide health insurance. Nevertheless, any United States health insurance would likely not cover P.S. in Germany; in other words, it would not be reasonably accessible. Ms. S. testified that the German government deducts monies from her paycheck to pay for health insurance. However, she told the Court that she does not know how much P.S.’s portion of the medical premiums cost. Ms. S. testified that she purchases “better” health insurance for P.S., which covers the newest medical technology, at a rate of 9.1 Euros monthly, which is $11.01 monthly. Since there was no proof of the cost of P.S.’s regular medical premiums at trial, Mr. C. cannot be expected to pay for his pro rata share of those. However, the Court directs Mr. C. to pay his 72 percent pro rata share of P.S.’s enhanced medical insurance premiums, through the Support Collection Unit, at a rate of $7.93 monthly, from July, 2019 to February, 2020 and from April, 2021 going forward. Having found a deviation for the time period between March, 2020 and March, 2021, the Court directs Mr. C. to pay his 88 percent of P.S.’s enhanced medical insurance premiums, through the Support Collection Unit, at a rate of $9.60 monthly for that twelve month period. The Court also directs Mr. C. to pay his pro rata share of P.S.’s unreimbursed medical expenses, if any, retroactive to the petition’s filing date. Ms. S. shall provide bills plus proof of payment of such unreimbursed medical expenses to Mr. C. as a condition precedent to Mr. C.’s remittance of his pro rata share. CHILD CARE Where a custodial parent is working, and incurs child care expenses, the non-custodial parent’s obligation towards those expenses is computed by pro-rating his or her income to the combined parental income. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(6)(c)(4) (McKinney’s 2021); see also Bibicoff v. Orfanakis, 48 A.D.3d 680, 682 (2d Dep’t 2008) (affirming order granting mother’s modification petition and requiring father to pay pro rata share of child care expenses where mother began to work and child was in daycare); D’Avanzo v. Papa, 18 A.D.3d 658, 659 (2d Dep’t 2005) (modifying order and directing father to pay pro rata share of child care expenses based upon his entire income); Lewis v. Redhead, 5 A.D.3d 600, 601 (2d Dep’t 2004) (where mother was employed full-time and child care program expenses incurred, remitted to family court for calculation of father’s pro rata share of child care expenses). The Court notes that in regards to child care, the statute is mandatory, not discretionary. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(6)(c)(4) (McKinney’s 2021). In other words, all that Ms. S. had to prove is that she is employed and incurs child care costs. See id. Ms. S. filed her petition on July 30, 2019. She told the Court that as of March, 2019, P.S. has not been enrolled in child care and is not expected to return until mid-2022. Accordingly, the Court orders Mr. C. to pay his 72 percent pro rata share of child care if P.S. needs day care when Ms. S. returns to work. Ms. S. is directed to provide bills plus proof of payment of such child care to Mr. C. as a condition precedent to Mr. C.’s remittance of his pro rata share. Retroactive child care shall not be ordered since P.S. has not been enrolled during the pendency of the petition. ORDERED, that Mr. C. shall pay $533.00 monthly towards the support of the parties’ child, P.S., through the Support Collection Unit, effective July, 2019, when Ms. S. filed her UIFSA petition through February, 2020. From March, 2020 to March, 2021, Mr. C. shall pay $356.00 monthly towards P.S.’s support. From March, 2021 going forward, Mr. C. shall pay $533.00 monthly towards P.S.’s support. Mr. C.’s pro rata share shall be 72 percent and Ms. S.’s pro rata share shall be 28 percent for the time periods between July, 2019 and February, 2020 and April, 2021 going forward. During those time periods, Mr. C. shall pay $7.93 monthly towards P.S.’s enhanced health care through the Support Collection Unit. For the time period between March, 2020 and March, 2021, Mr. C. shall pay $9.60 monthly towards P.S.’s enhanced health care through the Support Collection Unit. Ms. S. shall continue to cover the subject child under her health insurance through the German government. The parties’ temporary order of support is hereby vacated. Mr. C. shall be credited for any payments he made towards the parties’ temporary order of support. This constitutes the decision, opinion and order of the Court. Check applicable box: Order mailed on [specify date(s) and to whom mailed]: Order received in court on [specify date(s) and to whom given]: Dated: February 17, 2021
