Recitation, as required by CPLR §2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion: Papers Numbered Order to show Cause/Notice of Motion and Affidavits/Affirmations annexed 1 Answering Affidavits/Affirmations 2 Reply Affidavits/Affirmations 3 Sur-Reply 4 Decision / Order Plaintiff commenced this action for breach of a credit card agreement on July 7, 2011, seeking to recover the sum of $11,283.04. Defendant did not appear or answer and on January 13, 2012 a judgment in the principal sum of $15,093.15 (the “Judgment”) was entered against defendant. Defendant now moves by order to show cause to vacate the Judgment pursuant to CPLR §§5015(a)(1) and (a)(4). CPLR §5015(a)(1) “provides for vacatur in the case of excusable default and meritorious defense” while CPLR §5015(a)(4) “provides for vacatur when jurisdiction is lacking, irrespective of reason or merit” (Brooklyn Fed. Sav. Bank v. Crosstown W. 28 LLC, 29 Misc 3d 1237(A) [Sup Ct, Kings County 2010]). “When a defendant seeking to vacate a default judgment raises a jurisdictional objection pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4), the court is required to resolve the jurisdictional question before determining whether it is appropriate to grant a discretionary vacatur of the default under CPLR §5015(a)(1)” (Moms Smile v. Bogomdniy, 53 Misc 3d 1218(A) [Sup Ct, Kings County 2016] [internal citations omitted]). As such, the Court first addresses that branch of defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR §5015(a)(4). Defendant contends that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over her because she was never served with the summons and complaint. While the affidavit of service by plaintiff’s process server, Khalid S. Ibrahim — which states that service was effected pursuant to CPLR §308(2) at 1380 Riverside Drive Apartment 8E on October 11, 2011 with a subsequent mailing to that address — “constitutes prima facie evidence of proper service” defendant has rebutted this presumption through her affidavits1 stating that she moved out of 1380 Riverside Drive Apartment 8E in 2002 and lived at 1819 Waterloo Place in the Bronx on the date service was allegedly effected (Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC v. Scaramellino, 161 AD3d 572, 572-73 [1st Dept 2018]). These conflicting claims necessitate a traverse hearing2 (Id.). In opposition, plaintiff argues that defendant waived her defense of lack of personal jurisdiction because plaintiff garnished her wages in the amount of $4,364.88 between 2012 and 2020 without objection and sent her letters informing her of the Judgment. Plaintiff relies on Calderock Joint Ventures, L.P. v. Mitiku (45 AD3d 452 [1st Dept 2007]), in which the Appellate Division, First Department found that the defendant had “waived any objection to the court’s jurisdiction over him by making payments on the deficiency judgment under the wage garnishment order for over a year before bringing this motion to vacate” (Calderock Joint Ventures, L.P. v. Mitiku, 45 AD3d 452, 453 [1st Dept 2007]). Subsequent decisions by the First Department have clarified, however, that the defendant in that case waived any jurisdictional objections because he “explicitly or implicitly participated in the action, thus acknowledging the validity of the judgment, or demonstrated a lack of good faith or delay in asserting [his] rights,” (HSBC Bank USA v. A & R Trucking Co., Inc., 66 AD3d 606, 607 [1st Dept 2009]). The defendant here does not fall into either of these categories. While it is undisputed that defendant’s wages were garnished as a result of this action, plaintiff produces no evidence to establish when this garnishment occurred or, more importantly, to rebut defendant’s credible assertion that she believed the deductions from her wages were for employment benefits such as short term disability and health insurance rather than a garnishment stemming from the Judgment (See Azen Aff. in Reply,
