L.A. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.

OPINION & ORDER The COVID-19 pandemic has undoubtedly affected the educational experience of every school-aged child in America. This case deals with a student from a particularly vulnerable subset: children with disabilities protected by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §1400, et seq. Having already issued an order enforcing the IDEA’s “stay put” provision¹ (Order & Op., ECF No. 19 (the “September 1 Order”)), the Court now disposes of the present motion to dismiss, and in doing so, resolves the remainder of this case. Defendant New York City Department of Education (“Defendant” or “DOE”)’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety is GRANTED for the reasons that follow. BACKGROUND I. Procedural Background On July 2, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed with the DOE a demand for an expedited pendency hearing and a demand for a due process hearing regarding DOE’s alleged failure to provide Plaintiff V.K. with an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) as the IDEA requires. Compl. 62, ECF No. 3. By July 27, when Plaintiffs filed their complaint with this Court, DOE had not created an IEP for V.K.’s 2020-2021 school year (“SY”). Compl. 73. The complaint alleges that DOE violated the IDEA; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §701 (“Section 504″);² Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code, 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“Section 1983″); and the New York State Education Law.³ Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction that same day, asking the Court to order the DOE “to immediately fund the cost of V.K.’s enrollment at the New York State-approved AHRC-Howard Haber Early Learning Center [('Howard Haber')]” and “ enjoin Defendant from abandoning its legal obligation to offer V.K. a free appropriate public education [('FAPE')] and leaving V.K. without an IEP…for the current 2020-2021 school year….” Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 1-2, ECF No. 4. The parties subsequently entered into a “Resolution Agreement,” signed by Plaintiffs’ attorney and DOE’s representative on July 29 and July 30, 2020, respectively. Partial Resolution Agreement at 3, ECF No. 7 Ex. D (“Resolution Agreement”). The Resolution Agreement states that DOE will pay for V.K. to undergo several independent assessments, after which the Committee on Special Education (“CSE”) will hold an IEP meeting to review the assessments and recommendations. Id. at 2. But the Resolution Agreement says nothing about V.K.’s schooling in the meantime, so Plaintiffs pressed their motion for a preliminary injunction. On September 1, 2020, having previously entered an amended version of Plaintiffs’ proposed order to show cause (ECF No. 10) and after holding a telephonic conference on whether the Court should issue a preliminary injunction (Dkt. Annotation under ECF No. 18), the Court published its decision on Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion (September 1 Order). The September 1 Order denied Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and attorneys’ fees pendente lite but enforced V.K.’s pendency placement at Howard Haber until his IEP dispute is resolved. September 1 Order, at 9. Following the Resolution Agreement and entry of the September 1 Order, six relevant items of Plaintiffs’ requested relief remain outstanding: (1) an adjudication that V.K. will remain at Howard Haber for the remainder of the 2020-2021 SY; (2) compensatory education;⁴ (3) additional services; (4) a declaratory judgment; (5) attorneys’ fees; and (6) money damages.⁵ See Compl. 17; Compl. Ex. A, at 11-12. Approximately two weeks later, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 22. That motion is presently before the Court. As a threshold issue, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack standing because they have not suffered a concrete injury, as their “primary prayer for relief is ‘prospective payment.’” Id. at 5. Defendant also argues that the complaint presents no live controversy because Defendant does not dispute V.K.’s entitlement to pendency funding. Id. at 5-6. Further, says Defendant, the Court should not hear this case because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing their complaint. Id. at 7. Finally, Defendant urges the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 8. In response, Plaintiffs argue that (1) this Court already decided, in its September 1 Order, the issue of standing, thus estopping Defendant from raising it here (Pls.’ Mot. in Opp’n 6-7, ECF No. 24); (2) Plaintiffs need not exhaust administrative remedies in this case because doing so is futile and they are alleging systemic IDEA violations which the administrative process cannot remedy (id. at 7-8); and (3) the complaint properly states a claim for relief under Section 1983 (id. at 8-10). The Court has considered both sides’ arguments and discusses them individually below. II. Factual Background V.K. is a nonverbal five-year-old child with autism. Compl.

2, 61. On March 27, 2019, the DOE’s Committee on Preschool Special Education developed an IEP for V.K., and on April 8, 2019, V.K. began attending Howard Haber in the Bronx, New York. Compl.