DECISION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION Presently before this Court is Defendant John C. Tufino’s motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §3161 et seq., and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 (Docket Nos. 54, 64, 65.) For the reasons discussed below, Tufino’s motion is denied. II. DISCUSSION Tufino argues that dismissal is required because his rights to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment have been violated. The government maintains that no such violations have occurred. A. Tufino’s Speedy Trial Act Claim The Speedy Trial Act requires the government to bring criminal defendants to trial within 70 days of their first appearance before a judicial officer or the filing of an indictment, whichever is later. See 18 U.S.C. §3161 (c)(1); see also United States v. Oberoi, 295 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). In the event the defendant is not brought to trial within the 70 prescribed days, the indictment “shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. §3162 (a)(2). On such a motion, the defendant bears the burden of proving a Speedy Trial Act violation. See 18 U.S.C. §3162 (a)(2) (providing that “[t]he defendant shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion but the Government shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with any exclusion of time under subparagraph 3161 (h)(3)”); United States v. Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 503 (2d Cir. 2006). The Speedy Trial Act excludes certain periods of delay from the Speedy Trial clock. For instance, the 70-day period is automatically tolled for the duration of any “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or the other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. §3161 (h)(1)(D). It is also, for example, tolled for delay attributable to a co-defendant and to interlocutory appeals. 18 U.S.C. §§3161 (h)(6) and (h)(1)(C). Also excludable is “any period of delay…if the judge…find[s] that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A). Under this exclusion, the court must “set[] forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons [for so finding].” Id. Again, it is the defendant’s burden to prove a Speedy Trial Act violation. Here, Tufino has failed to meet his burden. The record reflects that since the filing of the criminal complaint on March 4, 2019, and the subsequent filing of the indictment on June 9, 2020, the court has properly excluded time under the Speedy Trial Act. The docket entries reflect consistent exclusions of time, none of which Tufino specifically challenges. See Docket Nos. 2, 6, 8, 12, 14, 18, 20, 24, 30, 31, 44, 47, 50, 57, 60. Tufino’s only argument concerning the Speedy Trial Act is that he objects to the exclusions, but he offers no basis for his objection. See Motion to Dismiss, Docket No. 54-1,
