The defendant stands before the Court charged with burglary in the second degree, as defined in subdivision two of section 140.25 of the Penal Law. The defendant was arraigned on the instant indictment on June 2, 2021. Based upon the People’s representation that the defendant was arrested inside an apartment, the Court set bail in the amount of $2,500 cash or credit card, $7,500 partially secured surety bond, and $5,000 insurance company bond. The Court adjourned the matter to allow defense counsel to arrange for appropriate pre-trial services for the defendant, who anticipated being able to pay bail. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the crime of burglary in the second degree, as charged, is not a qualifying offense, and releases the defendant subject to conditions herein enumerated. CPL §510.10(4)(a) Since January 1, 2020 securing orders within New York State have been governed by a statutory scheme that differentiates between “qualifying offenses,” those offenses for which a court may issue a monetary securing order, and “non-qualifying offenses,” those offenses for which a court may issue only a non-monetary securing order.1 Originally, the statutes designated burglary in the second degree, based upon the defendant’s presence in a dwelling, a non-qualifying offense. In April 2020, however, the legislature reconsidered that decision, and since July 2, 2020, “burglary in the second degree as defined in subdivision two of section 140.25 [has been] a qualifying offense only where the defendant is charged with entering the living area of the dwelling” (CPL §510.10[4][a] [emphasis added]). The statute does not define “charged with entering the living area.” The criminal procedure law does not contain a definition of the phrase “charged with,” and none was added by the amending legislation. The Court’s primary consideration must be giving effect to the legislature’s intention. (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §92; Samiento v. World Yacht Inc., 10 NY3d 70, 77-78 [2008]). The budget bill which established this provision, however, lacks any significant legislative history, and the floor debates in the Senate and the Assembly shed no light upon the intent of this specific provision. The Court therefore looks to the use of the phrase within our law and common experience. The colloquial use of the phrase “charged with” seems analogous to “accused of” (Charge with