MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff John Smith (“Plaintiff”),1 a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act and 42 U.S.C. §1983 against EMT-P Mr. M. Yonnone (BOP Employee) (“Yonnone”), PA-C Daniel Tarallo (BOP) Employee (“Tarallo”), Dr. Diane Sommer (BOP Employee) (“Sommer,” and collectively, the “Individual Defendants”), and the United States2 for allegedly inadequate medical care he received while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institute (“FCI”) Otisville. (Doc. 2, “Compl.”).3 The Individual Defendants served a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on December 17, 2018.4 On December 27, 2018, Standing Order M10-468 was issued by Chief Judge McMahon, staying all civil cases in which the United States Attorney’s Office had appeared as counsel of record for the United States, its agencies, and/or it employees until the business day after a budget appropriation restoring Department of Justice funding was signed into law. (Doc. 25). On April 3, 2020, this case was reassigned to this Court. On April 10, 2020, as there had been no activity on the docket for more than one year, the Court issued an Order directing the parties to submit a letter concerning the status of the action. (Doc. 27). On July 29, 2020, the Court endorsed a status letter from the parties setting a briefing schedule for Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion and the Individual Defendants’ reply papers. (Doc. 34). On September 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed his opposition papers. (Docs. 37-39). On November 2, 2020, the Individual Defendants filed both their moving papers and reply memorandum of law. (Docs. 42-48). For the reasons set forth below, the Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary judgment pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 56(a) is GRANTED. BACKGROUND The facts recited herein are drawn from the Complaint and the documents annexed thereto, which include: Plaintiff’s medical records; the Individual Defendants’ Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statement (Doc. 46, “Def. 56.1 Stmt.”); the supporting Declaration of Adam Johnson, a Supervisory Attorney with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) (Doc. 45, “Johnson Decl.”), and the exhibits annexed thereto, which include, inter alia: the results of a search of Plaintiff’s administrative grievance history as of September 11, 2018 (Doc. 45-1, “Johnson Ex. 1″); Plaintiff’s response to the Individual Defendants’ Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statement (Doc. 37, “Pl. 56.1 Opp.”); and the documents annexed to Plaintiff’s memorandum of law in opposition (Doc. 39, “Pl. Opp.”), which include a progress report from the BOP.5 Plaintiff alleges that he was struck in the hand by a basketball while working at his prison job assignment as a recreation orderly; and, experiencing right wrist pain as a result, went to the FCI Otisville Health Clinic (“BOP Health Services”) on June 14, 2014. (Compl. at 5, 15, 27; Pl. Opp. at 12). Plaintiff was seen by Yonnone, who observed some swelling and “pain to palpation” of the wrist area, but otherwise noted no deformity. (Compl. at 15, 27). Yonnone gave Plaintiff a wrist brace, directed him to ice his wrist, and ordered X-ray imaging to rule out a fracture. (Id. at 27, 29). The resulting X-rays were normal except for a finding of “scapholunate interval upper limit.” (Id. at 15, 33, 45). Tarallo reviewed and co-signed the treatment note. (Id. at 31). On August 7, 2014, Tarallo examined Plaintiff at BOP Health Services regarding several health concerns, including Plaintiff’s continuing right wrist pain. (Id. at 33). Tarallo observed “a full range of motion” of the right wrist. (Id. at 35). Tarallo submitted a consultation request for Plaintiff to be examined by an orthopedic surgeon and advised Plaintiff to continue taking his prescribed pain medication, wearing a wrist brace, and limiting strenuous use of his right wrist. (Id. at 37). An MRI of Plaintiff’s right wrist was taken on September 30, 2014; the resulting report states that there was “no evidence of scapholunate ligament tear.” (Id. at 41). On October 1, 2014, Plaintiff was examined at BOP Health Services, concerning several health issues. (Id. at 43). The record of the examination notes that Plaintiff had a wrist brace that he wore inconsistently. (Id.). The examination was positive for wrist tenderness, but negative for joint swelling or crepitus. (Id. at 47). The record indicates that Sommer subsequently referred Plaintiff to a specialist, Dr. Sodha, and that on May 14, 2015, Plaintiff presented to Crystal Run Healthcare for his right wrist pain and a surgical consultation with Dr. Sodha. (Id. at 17, 51). Dr. Sodha performed X-ray imaging which showed “chronic scapholunate ligament tear” in the right wrist. (Id. at 51). Dr. Sodha and Plaintiff “discussed in detail the different options, both operative and non-operative” and decided to proceed with “carpal bone stabilization, flexor carpii [sic] radialis tendon transfer, wrist dennervation [sic].” (Id. at 17, 51). Plaintiff was seen at BOP Health Services the following day, and the medical notes indicate that Plaintiff was to be referred for surgery. (Id. at 55). Plaintiff’s surgery was performed on August 3, 2015. (Id. at 73). Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Sodha informed him that because of the purported delayed treatment of his injury, future surgeries may be required. (Id. at 5, 67, 73). Dr. Sodha’s notes indicate that Plaintiff understood “that full restoration of function of the wrist may not be possible.” (Id. at 73). Plaintiff was seen at BOP Health Services for a post-operative evaluation on August 3, 2015. (Id. at 57). He was seen again at BOP Health Services the following day on August 4, 2015. (Id. at 77, 79). On February 4, 2016, Plaintiff had a follow-up with Dr. Sodha, who noted that Plaintiff was “[d]oing well” despite “some pains with certain movements.” (Id. at 83). X-ray imaging taken that day showed widened scapholunate joint space, which appeared greater than the comparison X-ray images taken on September 24, 2015, indicating a “tear to the associated ligament.” (Id. at 87). Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Sodha again on July 7, 2016. (Id. at 89). The medical notes indicate that X-rays revealed post-traumatic degenerative joint disease in the wrist, and that Plaintiff was proceeding with a cortisone injection, although “salvage procedures” might become necessary if the pain continued. (Id. at 93). Plaintiff had another MRI performed on November 17, 2016 which revealed a tear of the scapholunate ligament. (Id. at 97). On March 9, 2017, Plaintiff and Dr. Sodha discussed the option of a midcarpal fusion and Plaintiff decided to proceed with a second surgery. (Id. at 105). Plaintiff alleges that unnamed prison officials deliberately ignored Dr. Sodha’s instruction for a second surgery and instead, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, deliberately transferred Plaintiff to another facility across the country. (Id. at 17). STANDARD OF REVIEW I. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) A Rule 12(b)(6) motion enables a court to consider dismissing a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the ple[d] factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Id. The factual allegations pled “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “When there are well-ple[d] factual allegations [in the complaint], a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, the court must “take all well-ple[d] factual allegations as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996). However, the presumption of truth does not extend to “legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of actions.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662). Therefore, a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions” to show entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. II. Motion for Summary Judgment Under Rule 56 Under Rule 56, “a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). “Although summary judgment is generally not appropriate until after some discovery has occurred in a case,…a motion for summary judgment in lieu of an answer is appropriate where the facts are undisputed and no amount of discovery would change the outcome.” Green v. Harris, 309 F. Supp. 3d 10, 12 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (internal citations omitted); see also Anderson v. Rochester-Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 337 F.3d 201, 202 (2d Cir. 2003) (procedurally proper to move for summary judgment in lieu of an answer); 5 Borough Pawn, LLC. v. Marti, 753 F. Supp. 2d 186, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (same); Cover v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, No. 05-CV-2430, 2006 WL 8441397, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2006) (same), aff’d, 357 F. App’x 336 (2d Cir. 2009). Rule 56 directs that a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,’ and is genuinely in dispute ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Liverpool v. Davis, 442 F. Supp. 3d 714, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “‘Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary’ are not material and thus cannot preclude summary judgment.” Sood v. Rampersaud, No. 12-CV-5486, 2013 WL 1681261, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2013) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). A court’s duty in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is “not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 625 F.3d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 2010)). The task is material issue spotting, not material issue determining. Therefore, “where there is an absence of sufficient proof as to one essential element of a claim, any factual disputes with respect to other elements of the claim are immaterial and cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Bellotto v. Cty. of Orange, 248 F. App’x 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 2006)). The claims simply cannot proceed in the absence of sufficient proof as to an essential element. “It is the movant’s burden to show that no genuine factual dispute exists,” Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)), and a court must “resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor.” Id. (citing Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2003)). Once the movant has met its burden, the non-movant “must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Liverpool, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 722 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). The non-movant cannot defeat a summary judgment motion by relying on “mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts.” Id. (quoting Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986)). However, “[i]f there is any evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing party on the issue on which summary judgment is sought, summary judgment is improper.” Sood, 2013 WL 1681261, at *2 (citing Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004)). Should there be no genuine issue of material fact, the movant must also establish its “entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” In re Davis New York Venture Fund Fee Litig., 805 F. App’x 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting FIH, LLC v. Found. Capital Partners LLC, 920 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2019)). Stated simply, the movant must establish that the law favors the judgment sought. Gonzalez v. Rutherford Corp., 881 F. Supp. 829, 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining “that summary judgment is appropriate only when…law supports the moving party”); Linares v. City of White Plains, 773 F. Supp. 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (summary judgment is appropriate when “the law so favors the moving party that entry of judgment…is proper”). With respect to its analysis under both Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, the Court is mindful that “[p]ro se litigants are afforded a special solicitude,” which includes reading their filings “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Mortimer v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-7186, 2018 WL 1605982, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint submitted by a pro se plaintiff, “however inartfully ple[d], must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This status, however, does not excuse a pro se litigant from making the showing required to defeat summary judgment; he or she must offer more than “bald assertions, completely unsupported by evidence” to overcome the motion. Wisdom v. Loiodice, No. 17-CV-4837, 2020 WL 4431590, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2020); see also Ross v. Koenigsmann, No. 14-CV-1321, 2017 WL 9511096, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2017) (explaining that, even for a pro se party, “mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by the record, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment”). “It is through this lens of leniency towards pro se litigants that this Court must consider a defendant’s motion for summary judgment against a pro se plaintiff.” Adams v. George, No. 18 CV-2630, 2020 WL 5504472, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2020). The multiple branches of this motion, one to dismiss the Complaint and one to grant summary judgment on the yet-to-be-pled affirmative defense of exhaustion of administrative remedies, is entirely appropriate where, as here, documents concerning events outside of the allegations in the Complaint must be considered. The affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is more properly raised on summary judgment where, as here, the Complaint does not address the issue in any meaningful fashion. Without the summary judgment branch of the motion, the exhaustion issue could not be adjudicated on this Complaint because it lacks meaningful reference thereto. See Correa v. Lynch, No. 20-CV-02875, 2021 WL 2036697, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2021). The Court will turn to the dispositive affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies first and before considering Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference. ANALYSIS I. Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) Exhaustion The Individual Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA. The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [§] 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). “[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,’ — rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (internal citation omitted). When a prisoner is in a state-run prison, courts are required to “look at the state prison procedures and the prisoner’s grievance to determine whether the prisoner has complied with those procedures.” Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2009). However, when a prisoner is in a federal prison — as is the case here — the BOP’s grievance process must be followed. See Johnpoll v. Thornburgh, 898 F.2d 849, 850 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The Bureau of Prisons has established administrative remedy procedures by which a federal inmate may seek formal review of a complaint which relates to any aspect of his imprisonment…. A federal prisoner…is not generally exempt from exhausting federal administrative remedies.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); see also Johnson v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that a federal inmate “had to comply with the BOP’s…administrative grievance system for prisoner complaints”). Here, Plaintiff — “[a]n inmate in BOP custody” — was required to “exhaust a four-step administrative process,” which Gottesfeld v. Anderson details: First, the inmate must present his or her complaint to a staff member on a BP-8 form. If the issue is not resolved, the inmate must then submit an Administrative Remedy Request — on a BP-9 form — to the Warden within 20 calendar days of the incident that triggered the complaint. Where the inmate is not satisfied with the Warden’s response, the inmate must submit an appeal to BOP’s Regional Director on a BP-10 form, and must do so within 20 calendar days of the Warden’s response. Where the inmate is not satisfied with the Regional Director’s response, the inmate must file a Central Office Administrative Remedy Appeal on a BP-11 form with the BOP’s General Counsel, and must do so within 30 calendar days of the Regional Director’s response. No. 18-CV-10836, 2020 WL 1082590, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2020). There are three circumstances, however, in which a BOP inmate’s failure to exhaust this four-step process is excusable because relief is deemed “unavailable”: First, an administrative remedy may be unavailable when ‘it operates as a simple dead end — with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.’ Second, ‘an administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use.’ In other words, ‘some mechanism exists to provide relief, but no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it.’ Third, an administrative remedy may be unavailable ‘when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.’ Williams, 829 F.3d at 123-24 (quoting Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1860 (2016)). Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that he grieved or appealed the subject claim (id. at 14, 21), specifying the denial of “Administrative Claim # TRT-NER-2017-04313″ and referring the Court to an exhibit annexed to the Complaint (id.). The exhibit referenced is a letter from the BOP, dated October 27, 2017, advising Plaintiff that his claim for personal injury under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) was denied. (Id. at 25). In other words, Plaintiff’s referenced exhibit is not applicable to the Bivens claims that are the subject of this motion; the administrative prerequisites for FTCA claims are different from the claims at issue on this motion. See Accolla v. United States Gov’t, 668 F. Supp. 2d 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (distinguishing Form SF-95, which is required for FTCA claims, and the BP-9, which is required for Bivens claims). Plaintiff, in his opposition, does not argue that his administrative claim exhausted his administrative remedies for his Bivens claims against the Individual Defendants. (See Pl. Opp. at 6-7). Rather, concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies for his Bivens claims, Plaintiff admits that he submitted two grievances concerning medical care and that neither grievance was pursued beyond the first step of the administrative grievance system. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. 7; Pl. 56.1 Opp. at 3, 7 (“Plaintiff agrees…that neither medical grievance went beyond the first step (BP 9)”). Plaintiff argues that although he failed to exhaust administrative remedies, such a remedy was unavailable to him because the filing deadline had expired by the time he first became aware of the allegedly inadequate medical care at issue. (Pl. Opp. at 6-7). Inmates are permitted to pursue otherwise untimely grievances if there is “a valid reason for delay.” 28 C.F.R. §542.15(a). Instead of filing a grievance and exhausting his remedies after he became aware of the allegedly inadequate medical care, Plaintiff unilaterally determined that the time to file had passed and thus elected to forego the grievance process altogether. Plaintiff’s decision not to utilize the four-step process available to him “is insufficient to negate the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.” Mena v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-0028, 2014 WL 2968513, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2014) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Simply put, futility is not established by an inmate’s subjective belief that his administrative complaint might be denied. Id.; see also Indelicato v. Suarez, 207 F. Supp. 2d 216, 220 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (The “alleged ineffectiveness of the administrative remedies that are available, however, does not absolve a prisoner of his obligation to exhaust such remedies when Congress has specifically mandated that he do so.”). Plaintiff argues further that certain differences between the administrative process described in the Code of Federal Regulations and the FCI Otisville orientation materials that Plaintiff received upon his arrival at the facility were so confusing that they caused the process to be incapable of use. (Def. 56.1 Stmt.
2-6; Pl. 56.1 Opp. at 1-2,
