DECISION and ORDER Currently before the Court, in this civil rights action filed by Disability Rights New York (“Plaintiff”) against the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Service (“DOCCS”) and Acting Commissioner of DOCCS Anthony J. Annucci (“Defendants”), is Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to provide access and copies of certain documents requested pursuant to Plaintiff’s authority as the designated protection and advocacy (“P&A”) system for New York. (Dkt. No. 7.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part (i.e., with regard to Incarcerated Individual B) and denied in part (i.e., with regard to Incarcerated Individual A). I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND A. Plaintiff’s Complaint Generally, in its Complaint, Plaintiff asserts three claims: (1) a claim that Defendants’ refusal to timely provide complete and unredacted records at Plaintiff’s request violates the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (“DD Act”); (2) a claim that Defendants’ refusal to promptly provide records at Plaintiff’s request violates the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986 (“PAIMI Act”); and (3) a claim that the New York state laws that allow for redaction of certain records produced to Plaintiff are preempted by the DD and PAIMI Acts. (Dkt. No. 1 [Pl.'s Compl.].) Generally, Plaintiff’s claims arise from Defendants’ inadequate response to records requests that Plaintiff has made, pursuant to its authority as the P&A system for New York, for Incarcerated Individual A and Incarcerated Individual B, between approximately February 13, 2020, and December 3, 2020. (Id.) More specifically, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges as follows: (a) as to Incarcerated Individual A, Plaintiff’s representative physically inspected the relevant records at the correctional facility where Incarcerated Individual A is housed and tabbed which records they wanted Defendants to copy, but Defendants not only did not produce those copies in a timely manner under the Acts, but also improperly withheld certain pages as exempt under state law and redacted portions of those records that they did copy and provide; and (b) as to Incarcerated Individual B, Plaintiff requested physical access to (and copies of) the relevant records, but Defendants stated that those records would not be available because Incarcerated Individual B’s death was subject to a pending investigation by the New York State Commission of Correction (“SCOC”), and later told Plaintiff that a request for records related to that investigation could be submitted directly to SCOC. (Id.) B. Relevant Procedural History This case is the latest iteration of an ongoing disagreement between Plaintiff and Defendants about the provision of records related to individuals with mental or developmental disabilities incarcerated in DOCCS facilities. See Disability Rights New York v. New York State Dep’t of Corrs. and Cmty. Supervision, 18-CV-0980 (GTS/CFH). On December 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed its Complaint in this action. (Dkt. No. 1.) On December 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed the current motion for preliminary injunction, seeking an order forcing Defendants to provide complete and unredacted records pursuant to Plaintiff’s requests and in compliance with the relevant P&A Acts. (Dkt. No. 7.) On February 5, 2021, Defendants filed their opposition. (Dkt. No. 18.) Finally, on February 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed its reply. (Dkt. No. 19.) C. Summary of Parties’ Briefing on Plaintiff’s Motion 1. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law Generally, in its motion, Plaintiff makes three arguments. (Dkt. No. 7, Attach. 3, at 8-14 [Pl.'s Mem. of Law].) First, Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to unredacted records under the P&A Acts, which preempt state law. (Id. at 10-13.) More specifically, Plaintiff argues that (a) its request was pursuant to the P&A Acts and thus preempts any state Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”) or privacy laws, (b) its requests are not impacted by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) because the P&A Acts permit access to information that is otherwise protected by HIPAA and, in any event, Plaintiff obtained the requisite HIPAA release forms where required, (c) regarding information that Defendants redacted from the records of Incarcerated Individual A, there was no privacy or confidentiality reason for Defendants to redact copies of those records because Defendants had already permitted Plaintiff to physically inspect the unredacted version of those records, and (d) because Defendants are required to disclose any draft reports from investigatory agencies and information or records used or reviewed when preparing investigatory reports, the fact that an investigation was still ongoing into the death of Incarcerated Individual B was not grounds to deny access to relevant records that were available. (Id.) Second, Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to access to the requested records within a specific timeline under the P&A Acts (within three business days of when the written request is received under the DD Act, and “promptly” under the PAIMI Act, which Plaintiff asserts has been interpreted to mean within five business days), yet Defendants have not been complying with the required timeline. (Id. at 13-14.) Plaintiff acknowledges that the COVID-19 pandemic may have played a role in the delays, but that the delays are still unacceptable even considering that circumstance and, in any event, its requests pre-date when New York State began its shutdown in response to the pandemic and, had Defendants followed the proper timeline, those requests could have been resolved before the pandemic became an factor. (Id.) Third, Plaintiff argues it is entitled to a preliminary injunction. (Id. at 15-18.) More specifically, Plaintiff argues that (a) it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims because it has shown that it has been denied timely access to the records requested pursuant to its authority as a P&A system, (b) it has suffered, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm because the lack of access prevents it from carrying out its statutory mandate to protect New Yorkers with mental and developmental disabilities, (c) the balance of hardships favors Plaintiff because its inability to pursue timely investigations and provide competent legal representation due to Defendants’ refusal to provide records as required puts its clients in danger of further abuse or neglect, while Defendants face no hardship in simply complying with the law and allowing federally permissible investigations, and (d) the public interest will be served by granting a preliminary injunction because the public has an interest in ensuring that individuals with disabilities are protected from abuse or neglect. (Id.) 2. Defendants’ Opposition Memorandum of Law Generally, in their opposition memorandum of law, Defendants make four arguments. (Dkt. No. 18, at 3-16 [Defs.' Opp'n Mem. of Law].) First, Defendants argue that the Court must apply a stricter standard than usual when assessing whether Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction because Plaintiff is seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction in that such an injunction would grant essentially all the relief they seek and such action could not later be undone by a judgment in Defendants’ favor. (Id. at 3.) Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to show either a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claims involving the records of Incarcerated Individual A or a strong showing of irreparable harm with regard to those claims. (Id. at 4-9.) More specifically, Defendants argue that (a) Plaintiff has not provided any proof from someone with first-hand knowledge regarding its efforts to obtain the records of Incarcerated Individual A, (b) the records that Plaintiff now claims were improperly redacted were not the same ones that it physically inspected at Five Points Correctional Facility (“Five Points”), but rather were in response to a request for separate and unrelated records from Sullivan Correctional Facility (“Sullivan”), and Plaintiff has not provided copies of the relevant request for access or authorizations related to the records from Five Points, (c) there is no strong showing of irreparable harm because, even if the copies of records provided to Plaintiff were redacted, Plaintiff had physically reviewed unredacted versions of those records and thus the failure here was not one of “access” to records (as required by the governing statutes and regulations) but rather a failure to deliver unredacted copies of records that Plaintiff had already accessed, and (d) the fact that Plaintiff waited nearly a year after receiving Incarcerated Individual A’s request for legal assistance before making a request of Defendants undermines Plaintiff’s argument that it urgently needs the records of Individual A. (Id.) Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to show either a clear and substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claims involving the records of Incarcerated Individual B or a strong showing of irreparable harm with regard to those claims. (Id. at 9-15.) More specifically, Defendants argue that (a) Plaintiff never requested physical access to these records, but rather demanded an estimate for the cost of producing copies of certain of the records (which had not yet been inspected or selected for copying by Plaintiff), and (b) Plaintiff has failed to show that it had probable cause for believing that Incarcerated Individual B had been subjected to abuse or neglect in that it provided no evidence showing the details (e.g., the dates, sources, form, or substance) of the vague “complaints” that it received regarding Incarcerated Individual B’s treatment (thus precluding judicial review of this purported probable cause determination). (Id.) Fourth, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims concerning production of the records of Incarcerated Inmate A are now moot because (a) Plaintiff was given (and availed itself of) unrestricted access to these records on March 11, 2020, and was offered such access again on October 1, 2020 (and thus there has been no denial of access), and (b) although Plaintiff did not provide the proper authorizations from Incarcerated Inmate A in its December 2020 application, Plaintiff has since provided those authorizations and Defendants have sent the initially withheld records to Plaintiff. (Id. at 15-16.) 3. Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum of Law Generally, in its reply memorandum of law, Plaintiff makes four arguments. (Dkt. No. 19, at 2-9 [Pl.'s Reply Mem. of Law].) First, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ belated provision of copies of the initially withheld records of Incarcerated Individual A does not resolve the parties’ dispute regarding those records because the copies were still unlawfully redacted. (Id. at 2-3.) Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ asserted reasons for denying access to Incarcerated Individual A’s records for 11 months are not supported by the record. (Id. at 3-5.) More specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendants inaccurately attempt to confuse a record request from Five Points with a record request from Sullivan: the only request at issue in this action (with regard to the records of Incarcerated Individual A) is related to the records obtained at Five Points. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ current argument that they did not initially produce 83 pages of records because Plaintiff lacked the required authorizations is undermined by the fact that (a) the reason Defendants originally gave (in their rewritten response to Plaintiff’s request) for withholding or redacting those pages was that those pages were exempt from release under state laws, and (b) in any event, the record supports the fact that Defendants have had the required releases since March of 2020 (which is why Defendants originally granted Plaintiff physical access to the records, and then sent Plaintiff copies of 569 pages of tabbed records). (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the fact that it had physical access to the unredacted records before copying does not fulfill Defendants’ obligations under the P&A Acts and does not suggest the absence of irreparable harm, because Plaintiff may select both a physical inspection and copies of records, and Defendants do not have the right to choose what forms of access Plaintiff is entitled to. (Id.) Third, Plaintiff argues that it has shown a clear and substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claims involving the records of Incarcerated Individual B. (Id. at 7-9.) More specifically, Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to access the records of Incarcerated Individual B regardless of whether there is a pending SCOC investigation into the death of that individual. (Id.) Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are incorrect that a physical inspection of records by Plaintiff is a prerequisite to its right to receive copies of those records where, as here, the records have been adequately described to avoid the need for a search by the records custodian. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ argument that they denied access to these records on the ground that Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of probable cause is without merit because (a) the argument is undermined by the fact that, at the time of denial, Defendants based the denial only on the pending SCOC investigation, and (b) in any event, federal law makes the P&A system the final arbiter of whether probable cause exists, and Plaintiff is not required to provide specific information about the complaints it received or the evidence it considered. (Id.) Fourth, Plaintiff argues that it has suffered irreparable harm because the denial of unredacted copies of the records at issue prevents it from fulfilling its constitutional mandate to investigate allegations of abuse or neglect of individuals with mental illness or developmental disability. (Id.) II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD A. Legal Standards Governing Motions for Preliminary Injunction “‘The purpose of a preliminary injunction is…to preserve the relative positions of the parties.’” N. Am. Soccer League, LLC. v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 883 F.3d 32, 37-38 (2d Cir. 2018) (“N. Am. Soccer”) (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 [1981]). “A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy’…; it is never awarded as of right….” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008) (internal citations omitted). Generally, in the Second Circuit, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish the following three elements: (1) that there is either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits and a balance of equities tipping in the party’s favor or (b) a sufficiently serious question as to the merits of the case to make it a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the party’s favor; (2) that the party will likely experience irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is not issued; and (3) that the public interest would not be disserved by the relief. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (reciting standard limited to first part of second above-stated element and using word “equities” without the word “decidedly”); accord, Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736-37 (2015); see also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 825 (2d Cir. 2015) (reciting standard including second part of second above-stated element and using words “hardships” and “decidedly”); Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that “our venerable standard for assessing a movant’s probability of success on the merits remains valid [after the Supreme Court's decision in Winter]“). With regard to the first part of the first element, a “likelihood of success” requires a demonstration of a “better than fifty percent” probability of success. Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985), disapproved on other grounds, O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, n.2 (1987). “A balance of equities tipping in favor of the party requesting a preliminary injunction” means a balance of the hardships against the benefits. See, e.g., Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp.2d 478, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (characterizing the balancing “hardship imposed on one party” and “benefit to the other” as a “balanc[ing] [of] the equities”); Jones v. Nat’l Conference of Bar Examiners, 801 F. Supp. 2d 270, 291 (D. Vt. 2011) (considering the harm to plaintiff and any “countervailing benefit” to plaintiff in balancing the equities); Smithkline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 99-CV-9214, 1999 WL 34981557, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1999) (considering the harm to defendant and the “benefit” to consumers in balancing the equities); Arthur v. Assoc. Musicians of Greater New York, 278 F. Supp. 400, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (characterizing “balancing the equities” as “requiring plaintiffs to show that the benefit to them if an injunction issues will outweigh the harm to other parties”); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 F. Supp. 794, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y.1967) (explaining that, in order to “balance the equities,” the court “will consider the hardship to the plaintiff…, the benefit to [the] plaintiff…, and the relative hardship to which a defendant will be subjected”) [internal quotation marks omitted].1 With regard to the second part of the first element, “[a] sufficiently serious question as to the merits of the case to make it a fair ground for litigation” means a question that is so “substantial, difficult and doubtful” as to require “a more deliberate investigation.” Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953); accord, Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (2d Cir. 1970).2 “A balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting a preliminary injunction” means that, as compared to the hardship suffered by other party if the preliminary injunction is granted, the hardship suffered by the moving party if the preliminary injunction is denied will be so much greater that it may be characterized as a “real hardship,” such as being “driven out of business…before a trial could be held.” Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc. v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc., 601 F.2d 48, 58 (2d Cir. 1979); Int’l Bus. Mach. v. Johnson, 629 F. Supp.2d 321, 333-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Semmes Motors, Inc., 429 F.2d at 1205 (concluding that the balance of hardships tipped decidedly in favor of the movant where it had demonstrated that, without an injunctive order, it would have been forced out of business as a Ford distributor).3 With regard to the second element, “irreparable harm” is “certain and imminent harm for which a monetary award does not adequately compensate.” Wisdom Import Sales Co. v. Labatt Brewing Co., 339 F.3d 101, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). Irreparable harm exists “where, but for the grant of equitable relief, there is a substantial chance that upon final resolution of the action the parties cannot be returned to the positions they previously occupied.” Brenntag Int’l Chem., Inc. v. Bank of India, 175 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1999). With regard to the third element, the “public interest” is defined as “[t]he general welfare of the public that warrants recognition and protection,” and/or “[s]omething in which the public as a whole has a stake[,] esp[ecially], an interest that justifies governmental regulation.” Public Interest, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). The Second Circuit recognizes three limited exceptions to the above-stated general standard. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 598 F.3d at 35, n.4. First, where the moving party seeks to stay government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme, the district court should not apply the less rigorous “serious questions” standard but should grant the injunction only if the moving party establishes, along with irreparable injury, a likelihood that he will succeed on the merits of his claim. Id. (citing Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128, 131 [2d Cir. 1995]); see also Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2014) (“A plaintiff cannot rely on the ‘fair-ground-for-litigation’ alternative to challenge governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is because “governmental policies implemented through legislation or regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes are entitled to a higher degree of deference and should not be enjoined lightly.” Able, 44 F.3d at 131. Second, a heightened standard — requiring both a “clear or substantial” likelihood of success and a “strong” showing of irreparable harm” — is required when the requested injunction (1) would provide the movant with all the relief that is sought and (2) could not be undone by a judgment favorable to non-movant on the merits at trial. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 598 F.3d at 35, n.4 (citing Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 90 [2d Cir. 2006]); New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d Cir. 2015) (“When either condition is met, the movant must show [both] a ‘clear’ or ‘substantial’ likelihood of success on the merits…and make a ‘strong showing” of irreparable harm’….”) (emphasis added). Third, the above-described heightened standard may also be required when the preliminary injunction is “mandatory” in that it would “alter the status quo by commanding some positive act,” as opposed to being “prohibitory” by seeking only to maintain the status quo. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 598 F.3d at 35, n.4 (citing Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm’t, 60 F.3d 27, 34 [2d Cir. 1995]).4 B. Legal Standards Governing Access to Records by a P&A System Under the DD Act, a P&A system has the authority to, among other things, “investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with developmental disabilities if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe the incidents occurred,” and “have access to all records of (i) any individual with a developmental disability who is a client of the system if such individual, or the legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative of such individual, has authorized the system to have such access,” and “(ii) any individual with a developmental disability, in a situation in which…a complaint has been received by the system about the individual with regard to the status or treatment of the individual or, as a result of monitoring or other activities, there is probable cause to believe that such individual has been subject to abuse or neglect.” 42 U.S.C. §15043(a)(2).5 The P&A system is permitted “access” to the records of such individuals (and any other records that are relevant to conducting an investigation), “not later than 3 business days after the system makes a written request for the records involved,” or, in the case of the death of an individual with a developmental disability, “not later than 24 hours after the system makes such a [written] request.” 42 U.S.C. §15043(a)(2)(J)(i); 45 C.F.R. §1326.25(c). The P&A system is permitted to inspect and copy information and records, subject to a reasonable charge offsetting the duplicating costs, and “[i]f a party other than the P&A system performs the photocopying or other reproduction of records, it shall provide the photocopies or reproductions to the P&A system within the time frames specified [above]….” 45 C.F.R. §1326.25(d). Finally, HIPAA “permits the disclosure of protected health information (PHI) without the authorization of the individual to a P&A system to the extent such disclosure is required by law and the disclosure complies with the requirements of that law.” 45 C.F.R. §1326.25(e).6 Under the PAIMI Act, a P&A system has the authority to, among other things, “investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with mental illness if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe the incidents occurred,” “have access to facilities in the State providing care or treatment, and “have access to all records of (A) any individual who is a client of the system if such individual, or the legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative of such individual, has authorized the system to have such access,” or “(B) any individual (including an individual who has died or whose whereabouts are unknown)…with respect to whom a complaint has been received by the system or with respect to whom as a result of monitoring or other activities (either of which result from a complaint or other evidence) there is probable cause to believe that such individual has been subject to abuse or neglect.” 42 U.S.C. §10805(a).7 The P&A system “shall be permitted to inspect and copy records, subject to a reasonable charge to offset duplicating costs,” and access to records under the PAIMI Act “shall be extended promptly” to the P&A. 42 C.F.R. §51.41(a), (e). Additionally, “[i]f a P&A system’s access to facilities, programs, residents or records…is delayed or denied, the P&A system shall be provided promptly with a written statement of reasons.” 42 C.F.R. §51.43.8 III. ANALYSIS After carefully considering whether Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to provide it with full access to the records requested by Plaintiff, the Court answers this question in the affirmative as to Incarcerated Individual B, but in the negative as to Incarcerated Individual A, for the relevant reasons stated in the parties’ memoranda of law. To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis. As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s motion should be analyzed under the stricter standard of “clear or substantial” likelihood of success and “strong” showing or irreparable harm given the nature and extent of relief that Plaintiff seeks. As discussed above in Part I.A. of this Decision and Order, Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to provide it with complete, unredacted copies of all records requested for Incarcerated Individual A and Incarcerated Individual B. (Dkt. No. 1 [Pl.'s Compl.].) Were this Court to grant Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction and order Defendants to provide Plaintiff with the requested records, that injunction would alter the status quo that currently exists between the parties in that Plaintiff would now have documents to which Defendants appear to assert that Plaintiff is not entitled. As a result, the Court will apply the stricter standard when assessing Plaintiff’s entitlement to a preliminary injunction. A. Clear or Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits First, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of at least one of its claims, specifically its claims that Defendants’ actions regarding the requests for records related to Incarcerated Individual A and Incarcerated Individual B violated the DD and PAIMI Acts. As an initial matter, although these acts contain identical obligations and requirements in many respects, they do contain some differences, so it is important to clarify which act applies to which of the relevant individuals. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Incarcerated Individual A is an individual with a developmental disability, and Incarcerated Individual B is an individual with a mental illness. (Dkt. No. 1, at
