The following papers numbered 1 to 3 were read and considered on the Petitioner’s Order to Show Cause Order to Show Cause and Affidavits Annexed 1 Filed Papers 2-3 DECISION AND ORDER Procedural History Petitioner commenced the above entitled holdover proceeding on October 9, 2020. Following an appearance on the Court’s calendar on October 27, 2020 the matter was adjourned in accordance with the Administrative and Executive Orders in effect at that time. On December 3, 2020, Petitioner filed an Order to Show Cause seeking the court order the Respondents to post escrow, pay ongoing use and occupancy and issue a judgment and warrant. The matter was scheduled for January 27, 2021 and Respondent Yokeley Pelegrin appeared. Ms. Pelegrin represented that she lost her job due to the COVID-19 pandemic and needed time to vacate the apartment. The Court, on consent of the parties, granted a judgment and warrant stayed until March 31, 2021 and rendering the Order to Show Cause moot. A COVID-19 Declaration of Hardship (hereinafter “Hardship Declaration”), dated February 27, 2021 allegedly signed by Jimmy Hammonds was filed with the court on March 3, 2021. Petitioner now moves to strike the Declaration of Hardship on the grounds that Mr. Hammonds vacated the premises and his signature was forged. Petitioner also moved for an Order finding that the Hardship Declaration does not serve to effectuate a stay of the proceeding as the Respondent Pelegrin was not a “tenant” under the COVID-19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020 (“CEEFPA”). Respondents did not submit opposition. CEEFPA On June 30, 2020, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo signed the Tenant Safe Harbor Act (“TSHA”) which precluded a court from issuing “a warrant of eviction or a judgment of possession against a residential tenant or other lawful occupant that has suffered a financial hardship during the COVID-19 covered period for the non-payment of rent that accrues or becomes due during the COVID-19 covered period. (L 2020, ch. 127 §2). This legislation permitted a tenant to raise financial hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic as a defense to a summary proceeding. (See, L 2020 ch.127, §§1, 2). Executive Order 202.66 modified and extended TSHA by creating a new defense in holdover eviction proceedings “to the extent necessary to prevent, for any residential tenant suffering financial hardship the COVID-19 state disaster emergency declared by Executive Order 202, the execution or enforcement of such judgment or warrant, including those cases where a judgment or warrant of eviction for a residential property was granted prior to March 7, 2020, through January 1, 2021.” Executive Order No. 202.66 [9 NYCRR 8.202.66]; see, Executive Order 202.71 [9 NYCRR 8.202.71]; Executive Order No. 202.78 [9 NYCRR 8.202.78]. Thereafter, on December 28, 2020, the Legislature, noting “unprecedented circumstances” passed the COVID-19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020 (“CEEFPA”) which permits a tenant or lawful occupant to file a “Hardship Declaration” under penalties of perjury. See, L 2020 ch. 381 Part A §13). The legislature’s intent was “to avoid as many evictions and foreclosures as possible for people experiencing a financial hardship during the COVID-19 pandemic or who cannot move due to an increased risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19″. CEEFPA §3. To address this issue, CEEPFA permits residential tenants suffering from financial or health related hardships to submit, under penalty of perjury, a “Hardship Declaration” which operates to stay pending eviction proceedings and the execution of warrants through August 31, 2021. Filing of a Hardship Declaration creates a presumption that the tenant experienced a financial hardship that would support a defense under the TSHA or any other executive order and any relevant statute, local law or administrative procedure automatically stays the proceedings until August 31, 2021. See, L 2020 ch. 381, Part A §§4, 8; CEEFPA Part A, §6. In interpreting a statute, the court must attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 208 [1976]. The clearest indicator of the legislative intent is the text itself. Matter of New York County Lawyers’ Assn. v. Bloomberg, 19 N.Y.3d 712, 721 [2012]. If the language is “clear and ambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning.” State of New York v. Patricia II 6 N.Y.3d 160,162 [2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]. Unless the “plain intent and purpose of a statute would otherwise be defeated” the “literal language of a statute” is controlling. Bright Homes v. Wright, 8 N.Y.2d 157, 161-162 [1960]. If the law is unambiguous, the Court may also review the legislative history. Matter of Auerbach v. Board of Educ. Of City School Dist. of City of NY, 86 N.Y.2d 198, 204 [1995]. The Legislature defined the term “tenant” within the CEEFPA as “a residential tenant, lawful occupant of a dwelling unit, or any other person responsible for paying rent, use and occupancy, or any other financial obligation under a residential lease or tenancy agreement but does not include a residential tenant or lawful occupant with a seasonal use lease where such tenant has a primary residence to which to return to.” CEEFPA §1(3). Discussion Petitioner failed to offer any support for the allegation that Mr. Hammonds vacated the premises. As Petitioner’s contentions are bare and conclusory, the first branch of the Petitioner’s motion is denied. Petitioner argued that the Respondent Pelegrin is a licensee and thus not entitled to protection under CEEFPA. Petitioner’s basis is that Ms. Pelegrin acknowledged she did not pay rent. Petitioner did not annex any evidence in support. The Court disagrees. Contrary to the Petitioner’s interpretation, the definition of a tenant includes a residential tenant, a lawful occupant or anyone responsible for paying rent. CEEFPA Part A §1 [3], (emphasis added). The term “lawful occupant” is bounded on both sides by commas and before the word “or”. “The placement of a comma before the disjunctive ‘or’ in a statute that lists several alternatives indicates an intent to discriminate between the various parts of the sentence.” 97 N.Y. Jur. Statutes 120(2); see, Van Patten v. La Porta 148 A.D.2d 858, 860 [3rd Dept 1989]. If the Legislature intended to exclude licensees, they would have specifically done so. The Court finds, Ms. Pelegrin was a “lawful occupant”. Turning then to that branch of the Petitioner’s motion which sought to strike the Declaration of Hardship, same is also denied. A party may move to strike a pleading under CPLR §3024 on the grounds that the pleading is “so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a response…” (CPLR §3024[a]) or if the pleading is “scandalous or prejudicial…” CPLR §3024 [b]. A motion for this relief must be served within twenty days after service of the pleading sought to be challenged. CPLR §3024[c]. At the outset, Petitioner provides no grounds on which the court may conclude that a Hardship Declaration is a “pleading” pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. Pleadings are defined in the CPLR, generally, as a claim and a response to a claim. CPLR §3011, CPLR §402. A pleading may also consist of a complaint, answer, cross claim, interpleader, third party complaint and reply. No other “pleadings” are permitted unless authorized by the court1. Even assuming the Hardship Declaration is a pleading, Petitioner has not alleged grounds to strike under CPLR §3024[a], [b] and has not moved for the relief within twenty days. CPLR §3024 [c]. This branch of the motion is denied. While a motion to dismiss is the proper method of testing the legal sufficiency of a defense, the branch of the Petitioner’s motion which sought to dismiss the defense contained in the Hardship Declaration pursuant to CPLR §3211 is denied. The Court is not persuaded by the Petitioner’s argument that the Court should use its inherent power to disregard the CEEFPA legislation and “[d]o all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of [it's] jurisdiction.” Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445, 448 [2d Dept., 1985]. The New York State Constitution authorizes the Legislature to regulate practice and procedure in the courts. NY Const. Art. VI, Sec. 30. Matters which deal with the inherent nature of judicial functions are not subject to control by the legislature. See, Riglander v. Star Co. 98 App. Div. 101 [1st Dept., 1904]. Generally, “legislative enactments relating to procedure can have no valid operation if they have the effect of depriving the courts of their constitutional or inherent powers, as by…interfering with the discretionary powers of the court in the course of judicial administration…” Jones v. Allen, 185 Misc. 2d 443, 446 [2d Dept., 2000] citing 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §124, pp. 401-402. The CEEFPA legislation does not interfere with the court’s discretionary powers. First, the Hardship Declaration imposes an automatic but certainly not a permanent stay of the proceedings as the legislation is scheduled to expire on August 31, 2021. In addition, the legislative intent of CEEFPA was “to avoid as many evictions and foreclosures as possible” for those affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The purpose of the legislation was to provide greater protections to tenants than was provided under TSHA. Neither the Court’s inherent authority nor the administration of justice are served by disregarding the CEEFPA legislation. COVID-19 was and continues to be a global pandemic that has tremendously impacted the state of New York. This is especially when, in the present matter, both Respondents represented they, like millions of Americans, suffered a hardship2 because of the pandemic. CEEFPA may restrict the Court’s ability to authorize the enforcement of residential evictions, but the purpose of this restriction is to avoid evictions for those impacted by the pandemic. The legislative intent states: “COVID-19 presents a historic threat to public health. Hundreds of thousands of residents are facing eviction or foreclosure due to necessary disease control measures that closed businesses and schools and triggered mass unemployment across the state. The pandemic has further interrupted court operations, the availability of counsel, the ability for parties to pay for counsel, and the ability to safely commute and enter a courtroom, settlement conference and the like. Stabilizing the housing situation for tenants, landlords, and homeowners is to the mutual benefit of all New Yorkers and will help the state address the pandemic, protect public health, and set the stage for recovery.” CEEFPA §3. The filing of the Hardship Declaration is the mechanism for the automatic stay until August 31, 2021. Accordingly, the warrant may be executed on or after September 1, 2021. The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. Dated: July 21, 2021
