OPINION On May 27, 2021, Defendant General Electric (“GE”) notified Plaintiff that they had inadvertently produced two copies of a document that were subject to the attorney-client privilege and demanded the return of the documents pursuant to the clawback provision of the Court’s Protective Order (ECF No. 156.) (ECF No. 282-7, Ex. 5.). On June 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant motion arguing that the documents are not privileged and, if there is any privilege, it has been waived. After reviewing the disputed documents in camera, the Court concludes that they are within the attorney-client privilege and that the disclosures were inadvertent and do not constitute a waiver of any privilege. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel is DENIED. NATURE OF THE DOCUMENTS At issue are the handwritten notes by Mr. Yaron Hefetz1 (“Hefetz”), the sole named inventor of U.S. Patent No. 9,295,439 (“the ’439 patent”). (ECF No. 282 at p. 2.) Specifically, the redactions appear in two separate copies of the same set of selectively produced undated notebook pages, such that the three separate redactions at-issue appear twice (GE_SDM_00135814-15, GE_SDM_00135823, GE_SDM_00135830-31, and GE_SDM_00135839).2 Id. The two sets of notebook pages were part of a limited production of 15 documents. Id. Defendant alleges that Hefetz created the handwritten notes in connection with his attendance at a January 19-21, 2014 Intellectual Property “Bootcamp” hosted by GE in Israel. (ECF No. 292 at p. 2.) The Defendant’s IP counsel, Lucas Divine (“Divine”), and non-attorney Gil Kovalaski (“Kovalski”), organized the bootcamp, which was only attended by GE employees and consultants. Id. The bootcamp included several sessions during which attendees discussed new invention ideas and ideas to improve upon or resolve challenges in existing projects. Id. According to the Defendant, Hefetz took notes reflecting some of his own ideas, including drawings and calculations. Id. During the bootcamp, a Patent Evaluation Board meeting was held to discuss existing GE inventions and patentability, patent filing issues, and strategies. Id. This meeting was attended by Hefetz, Divine, and Kovalski. Id. Specifically, Hefetz made the notes on pages GE_SDM_00135814-15 and GE_SDM_00135830-31 during this meeting. Id. The notes redacted from those pages memorialize communications in which Hefetz requested legal advice from Divine and Divine provided legal advice regarding patent filings and patentability issues, including prior art monitoring. Id. Additionally, a note on pages GE_SDM_00135823 and GE_SDM_00135839 memorializes Hefetz’s request for legal advice from Divine regarding a patent filing. Id. DISCUSSION I. Attorney-Client Privilege To properly resolve the issues presented, it is first necessary to determine which of the documents or communications in question are in fact within the attorney-client privilege. Fed. R. Evid. 501. The attorney-client privilege protects communications between client and counsel made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice that were intended to be and in fact kept confidential. In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 418-419 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996). As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Upjohn Co. v. United States, the privilege encourages full and frank communications between a client and counsel, which in turn promotes an understanding of and compliance with the law and the administration of justice. 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). The privilege is narrowly construed, however, because it renders relevant information undiscoverable. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d at 418. The privilege applies to a company’s communications with its in-house lawyers. In light of the two hats often worn by in-house lawyers, communications between a corporation’s employees and its in-house counsel subject to the attorney-client privilege must be scrutinized carefully to determine whether the predominant purpose of the communication was to convey business advice and information or, alternatively, to obtain or provide legal advice. If the former, the communication is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d at 418, 420; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1036-37 (2d Cir. 1984). When determining the predominant purpose of a communication between a company’s employees and its in-house lawyers, a court must assess the communication “dynamically and in light of the advice being sought or rendered, as well as the relationship between advice that can be rendered only by consulting legal authorities and advice that can be given by a non-lawyer.” In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d at 420-421. The determination “also may be informed by the overall needs and objectives that animate the client’s request for advice.” Id. at 421. Importantly, the fact that a lawyer may highlight collateral non-legal risks and costs relating to “expense, politics, insurance, commerce, morals and appearances” or report “what other persons are doing or thinking about the matter” in the course of rendering legal advice does not compromise the privilege so long as the predominant purpose of the communication was to render legal advice. Id. at 420. Additionally, if the primary purpose of the communication was to receive legal advice or services, inclusion of scientific or technical information will not displace the privilege. See Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Eutectic Corporation v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 41 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-60 (D. Mass. 1950.) Importantly, if a document is relevant and privileged, the party asserting privilege has the burden of demonstrating it is privileged. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing von Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987)). In this case, Defendant asserts that the documents are privileged because Hefetz’ handwritten notes reflect requests for legal advice from GE Counsel Divine, and Divine’s responses, regarding the patentability of inventions and related patent filing issues, including prior art monitoring. (ECF No. 292 at p. 2.) Plaintiff contends that the notes are not privileged because they are commercial in nature, cannot prove that the notes reflect legal advice, and there is no evidence that Divine attended or organized the bootcamp. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that even if the documents contained or reflected privileged communications between Divine and Hefetz, Defendant has waived the privilege by failing to provide a privilege log or declaration to otherwise substantiate the privilege claims. (ECF No. 282 at p. 8.) First, Plaintiff argues that the notes are commercial in nature and do not refer to any requests for legal advice or indicate any attorney involvement. (ECF No. 282 at p. 5.) To support this theory, Plaintiff cites to In re Cty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007) and Veolia Water Solutions v. Siemens, 63 F. Supp. 3d 558. 569 (E.D.N.C. 2014) — neither of which assesses whether the advice was “commercial in nature.” Second, Plaintiff argues that the Defendant cannot prove that the notes reflect legal advice and do not provide evidence of Divine’s involvement with the bootcamp. This argument is without merit because Defendant provided Declarations from Hefetz and Divine that attest to the privileged nature of the communications as memorialized in Hefetz’s handwritten notes. (Hefetz Decl.
16-17, 20-24; Divine Decl.
