Before the Court is a motion by the pro se Defendant to vacate a judgment that was entered and docketed in 2019. In an undated letter received by the Court on June 7, 2021, Defendant requests that the judgment be vacated because he “could not take off from work.” Thereafter, the Defendant filed a document denoted as an “order to show cause” seeking then same relief as set forth in the undated letter. For the reasons explained in this Memorandum and Order, the Defendant’s motion is denied. I. Background. a. Facts. This matter involves four summonses issued to the Defendant on two separate occasions. On the first occasion, April 11, 2016, the Defendant was summonsed for a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law (“VTL”) §1202(c), (entitled “stopping, standing or parking prohibited in specified places”). On the second occasion, June 11, 2018, the Defendant was summonsed for a violation of VTL §§1202(c), 401(1)(a) (entitled “registration of motor vehicles; fees; renewals”), and 306(b) (entitled “enforcement”). As relevant to the subject default judgment, by letter dated November 29, 2018, the Defendant was notified that all of the summonses were returnable (i.e. due) in Court in excess of thirty days.1 Because of his failure to address the summonses, the Defendant was placed on notice that a default plea of guilty would be entered pursuant to the provisions of VTL §1806-a on or after January 11, 2019. Evidently, the Defendant did not respond to the notice, and on January 15, 2019, a default judgment in the amount of $1,000 was signed by this Court (Giannattasio, V.J.). That judgment was entered in the Office of the Nassau County Clerk on January 17, 2019. Notwithstanding that the judgment was entered, the Defendant failed to address or satisfy that judgment. And, in fact, the Defendant was sent letters on March 3, 2020, March 13, 2020, August 18, 2020, and September 23, 2020 regarding the summonses and the fines owed. Then, on February 17, 2021, the Defendant was sent a letter describing the Village’s COVID-19 amnesty, which suspended late fees on fines owed during the pandemic period. However, the COVID-19 amnesty did not apply to judgments, a fact that was raised with the Defendant. In any event, the Defendant did appear in Court on two occasions following his receipt of the amnesty letter, and sought to have the judgment vacated. At those times, the Court informed the Defendant that the request must be raised by motion, leading to this motion practice. The Defendant submitted his letter application for vacatur of the judgment to the Court, and the People submitted opposition on July 6, 2021. Following submission of his letter application, the Defendant filed a document denoted as an order to show cause. The Court did not sign such order, but rather treated the document as a notice of motion, and set a briefing schedule by letter dated July 8, 2021 and which was sent to all parties. The People opposed the motion by affirmation dated July 22, 2021. II. Discussion. a. Procedure. Under Uniform Justice Court Act §1001, “[m]otion practice in the court, including time provisions for the making and decision of motions…and practice relating to motions before, during and after trial, shall be governed by the CPLR, except as this act otherwise provides. Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to prevent the court, if the parties consent, from entertaining any matter, which might be raised by formal motion, without a formal motion or at a time prior to the time when the formal motion would be heard.” (See also Uniform Justice Court Act §2102 (“The CPLR and other provisions of law relating to practice and procedure in the supreme court, notwithstanding reference by name or classification therein to any other court, shall apply in this court as far as the same can be made applicable and are not in conflict with this act.”)). Here, there was no mutual consent to any informal motion practice. Upon receipt of the Defendant’s second filing (the “order to show cause”), the Court notified the parties that the document would be treated as a notice of motion. As noted elsewhere, the Court permitted the People two weeks to oppose the motion, and opposition was timely filed. b. Merits of the Motion. As an initial matter, the Court has jurisdiction under the Uniform Justice Court Act to “render any judgment that the supreme court might render in a like case.” (Uniform Justice Court Act §1401). The ability to “render any judgment” includes the ability to enter judgments on default. (Uniform District Court Act §1402). Thus, as a threshold matter, the Court finds that the entry of a default judgment against the Defendant fell within the scope of the Court’s authority as established by law. (see also Vehicle and Traffic Law §1806-a). Generally, a party seeking to vacate a judgment must move under CPLR 5015 and establish one of five specified grounds in order for a court to vacate the judgment. Although not specified in the Defendant’s letter application, relevant here is CPLR 5015(a)(1). Under that statute, vacatur is warranted if the movant demonstrates an “excusable default, if such motion is made within one year after service of a copy of the judgment or order with written notice of its entry upon the moving party, or, if the moving party has entered the judgment or order, within one year after such entry.” Two legal issues are before the Court: first, the timeliness of the motion and second, the reasonableness of the excuse offered by the Defendant. The Court finds that the motion is timely, but that the excuse offered by the Defendant is not reasonable under New York law. 1. Timeliness of the Motion. CPLR 5015(a)(1) requires that a motion to vacate a default judgment must be made within one year of its service, with written notice of its entry, upon the judgment debtor. The People’s oppose the Defendant’s as untimely, inasmuch as the Defendant was served with notice of his default. The Defendant’s receipt of the notice is evidenced by a certified mail card signed by the Defendant. However, it is unclear whether the default judgment, with written notice of its entry, was ever served upon the Defendant. Accordingly, on this record, the Court declines to deny the Defendant’s motion as untimely. 2. The Reasonableness of the Defendant’s Excuse for the Default. It has long been the law that a party seeking to vacate a default “is required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his or her default and a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion.” (Delvalle v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 117 AD3d 893, 893 [2d Dept 2014]). Whether a proffered excuse is reasonable is a question that falls squarely “within the sound discretion” of the Court. (Turko v. Daffy’s, Inc., 111 AD3d 615, 616 [2d Dept 2013]). Here, the Defendant demonstrated neither a reasonable excuse nor a potentially meritorious defense to the summonses. Start with the Defendant’s proffered reason for defaulting: not being able to take time off from work. That excuse is unavailing under these facts and circumstances. Among other things, the Defendant was provided with multiple notices of appearance dates and he had numerous opportunities to request an adjournment or rescheduling of the appearances to accommodate his work schedule. Indeed, despite his scheduling issues, the Defendant never requested that the appearances — which were scheduled over a span of years — be adjourned to a time that was more convenient to his work schedule. Even so, the Court notes that appearances are scheduled on both evenings and mornings, thereby providing the Defendant with opportunities to appear during non-working hours. In short, the Court does not find the Defendant’s excuse for failing to appear reasonable under the facts and circumstances. (See Garcia v. Shaw, 118 AD3d 943 [2014] [the court "did not improvidently exercise its discretion in refusing to accept the plaintiff's explanation for failing to oppose the defendant's motion."]). No other excuse for his default is offered by the Defendant. Accordingly, in light of the failure to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default, the Court need not evaluate any potential defenses to the summonses. (see Herrera v. MTA Bus Co., 100 AD3d 962, 963 [2d Dept 2012]). Even so, the Court notes that the Defendant’s affidavit in support of the motion to vacate does not demonstrate any potentially meritorious defense. “The affidavit submitted from [the movant] must make sufficient factual allegations; it must do more than merely make conclusory allegations or vague assertion[s].” (Peacock v. Kalikow, 239 AD2d 188, 190 [1st Dept 1997] [internal quotations omitted]). If anything, the Defendant’s affidavit highlights his culpability, particularly with respect to the vehicle inspection charge where the Defendant concedes that the registration was in need of “correction.” Therefore the Defendant’s motion does not satisfy the second prong of the analysis under CPLR 5015(a)(1), thereby warranting dismissal of the motion. III. Conclusion. It is ordered that the Defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment entered with the Nassau County Clerk on January 17, 2019 is hereby denied with prejudice. This constitutes the Order of the Court. Any matters not specifically addressed herein are denied. Dated: August 3, 2021
