In 2017, plaintiff, Regal Jewelry & Gift Shop LLC (“Regal”), agreed to sell an emerald-and-diamond jewelry suite and a diamond chain to defendant, Lloyd Klein, and his then girlfriend, Jocelyn Wildenstein, for $268,000. After receiving the jewelry, Klein and Wildenstein pawned it for a loan. Regal was paid for the jewelry through four checks, drawn on an account belonging to “JW51AE, LLC,” that bounced when Regal attempted to cash them. Regal brought this action against Klein for his role in the jewelry purchase, seeking damages in breach of contract, fraud, and conversion. Klein moved to dismiss and simultaneously served a series of discovery requests. (See NYSCEF Nos. 14-21.) This court denied the motion to dismiss in November 2019. (See NYSCEF No. 26.) Regal did not then respond to Klein’s discovery requests. Instead, it moved for summary judgment. In opposing summary judgment, Klein argued that Regal’s motion was premature given his outstanding discovery requests. This court agreed. In particular, this court held that a outstanding set of interrogatories served by Klein on Regal regarding the ownership of the jewelry were material to Klein’s claims and thus needed to be responded to before the motion could be determined. (See Regal Jewelry and Gift Shop LLC v. Klein, 2020 NY Slip Op 51055[U], at *2 [Sup Ct, NY County Sept. 14, 2020].) The court therefore stayed the determination of Regal’s motion pending a response to those interrogatories and limited additional briefing.1 (See id. at *2-*3.) Klein then brought the current motion for reargument, contending that this court’s interim order on the summary-judgment motion had overlooked other unresponded-to discovery requests that also sought material information. (See NYSCEF No. 62.) While this motion was pending,2 a the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision on questions related to this matter. Wildenstein had filed for bankruptcy. One of the obligations that she acknowledged in the bankruptcy proceeding was a $268,000 debt to Regal. Regal moved in the bankruptcy proceeding to prevent Wildenstein from having that debt discharged in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court granted the motion, holding among other things that Wildenstein had obtained the jewelry from Regal under false pretenses. (See Matter of Wildenstein, 2021 WL 1132289, at *6-7 [Bankr SDNY Mar. 24, 2021, Michael E. Wiles, J.].3) Upon becoming aware of the bankruptcy court decision, this court sought letter briefing from the parties on whether and how the decision should affect the court’s consideration of the pending reargument motion. The parties have filed briefs on this issue as requested. The motion for leave to reargue is granted. On reargument, this court concludes that Regal must respond to some — but not all — of Klein’s other discovery requests, beyond those addressed by this court’s prior interim order on Regal’s summary-judgment motion. DISCUSSION This court agrees with Klein that this court’s interim order overlooked additional discovery demands made by Klein of Regal for information and documents that potentially bear on Regal’s summary-judgment motion. Leave to reargue that order therefore is warranted. On reargument, the question before this court is what discovery Regal should have to provide in response to these additional demands. That question is discussed below. Whether the Bankruptcy Court’s Order is Entitled to Preclusive Effect in this Action This court considers first the effect (if any) of the related bankruptcy-court order, so as to determine the scope of the arguments and defenses that Klein may raise in opposition to Regal’s summary-judgment motion. Regal argues that Klein and Wildenstein “were in privity for estoppel purposes” and that “Klein’s counsel appeared in the bankruptcy proceeding,” such that Klein now “is precluded from contesting any of the Bankruptcy Court’s findings” here; therefore, Regal contends, “the findings of the Bankruptcy Court should lead to the grant of summary judgment in [Regal's] favor, particularly as to the fraud cause of action.” (NYSCEF No. 73 at 2.) This court is not persuaded. The preclusive effect of an order issued by the bankruptcy court is governed by federal law. (See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 US 880, 891 [2008]; Mutual Benefits Offshore Fund, Ltd. v. Zeltser, 172 AD3d 648, 650 n 2 [1st Dept 2019], citing Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Allianz Risk Transfer AG, 31 NY3d 64, 69 [2018] [plurality op].) Regal’s arguments here rely on issue preclusion. This doctrine bars (i) “successive litigation” of (ii) “an issue of fact or law” that was (iii) “actually litigated and resolved” in (iv) “a valid court determination” that was (v) “essential to the prior judgment.” (Taylor, 553 US at 892 [internal quotation marks omitted].) Issue preclusion, though, generally binds only one who was a party to the prior action, because the party against whom preclusion is sought must, as a matter of due process, have had “a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims and issues settled” in that prior action. (Id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 US 793, 797-798 & n 4 [1996].) In Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court described six limited exceptions to this rule against nonparty preclusion.4 (See 553 US at 893-895.) This court concludes that none of these categories of exceptions applies in this action. Regal relies primarily on a principle coming within the second of the six Taylor exceptions. Under this exception, nonparty preclusion “may be justified based on a variety of pre-existing substantive legal relationships between the person to be bound and a party to the judgment” — sometimes loosely grouped together under the title of “privity” — such as “preceding and succeeding owners of property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and assignor.” (Id. at 894 & n 8 [internal quotation marks omitted].) Regal asserts, without citation or analysis, that Klein and Wildenstein “were in privity for estoppel purposes.” (NYSCEF No. 73 at 2.) But Regal has not identified any prior substantive legal relationship between Klein and Wildenstein that would permit nonparty preclusion of Klein. At most, Regal has alleged in this action that they were joint tortfeasors. But that alone is not sufficient. (See Sacerdote v. Cammack Larhette Advisors, LLC, 939 F3d 498, 507-510 [2d Cir 2019]5; TMTV, Corp. v. Mass Prods., Inc., 645 F3d 464, 473 [1st Cir 2011]; Boehm v. Svehla, 2017 WL 4326308, at *5 [WD Wis Sept. 27, 2017].) It is also not material for preclusion purposes that “Klein’s counsel appeared in the bankruptcy proceeding,” as Regal would have it. (NYSCEF No. 73 at 2.) The record reflects instead that that Klein appeared as a witness at the hearing — represented by separate counsel from Wildenstein. (See NYSCEF No. 73 at 4 [letter from Klein's counsel to bankruptcy judge].) This is a far cry from satisfying Taylor’s fourth exception, in which nonparty preclusion is permissible if the nonparty had “assum[ed] control over the litigation in which” the prior judgment “was rendered.” (Taylor, 553 US at 895 [alteration in original].) Klein is thus not precluded in this action from contesting issues resolved by the bankruptcy court in its March 2021 order in Wildenstein’s bankruptcy proceeding. Whether Regal Must Provide Additional Discovery to Klein That the bankruptcy court’s order is not entitled to preclusive effect here does not resolve the question of what (if any) additional discovery Regal must provide to Klein, beyond those items directed in this court’s September 2020 decision. This court concludes that Regal must respond to some, but only some, of the discovery requests left unresolved by that decision. One set of requests that Regal must now respond to pertains to ownership of the emerald suite. Regal contends that Klein converted the suite by obtaining possession of the suite without paying for it (or, more precisely, paying for it with bad checks). To succeed on this claim, Regal will have to establish that it had a valid possessory right to the suite through exercising “ownership, possession or control of the property in the first place.” (Soviero v. Carroll Group Intl., Inc., 27 AD3d 276, 277 [1st Dept 2006]); and that Klein exercised “dominion over the property or interference with it, in derogation of plaintiff’s rights” (Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 NY3d 43, 50 [2006]). The issue of who owned the emerald suite, or, at a minimum, who had legitimate control over the suite with the right to sell it, is thus plainly material to Regal’s claims. The managing member of Regal (Jack Zebede) asserted in support of its summary-judgment motion that he purchased the suite wholesale from an entity called Adar Enterprises, Inc. for $200,000. (See NYSCEF No. 56 at 12.) But Zebede also sent text messages to Wildenstein in which he described a man named Harry Adjmi as the “principal owner of the Emerald suite.” (NYSCEF No. 50 at 41.) And Zebede has conceded, at a minimum, that Adjmi “advanced monies on my behalf for the purchase [of] the jewelry,” and that because Klein and Wildenstein failed to pay for their purchase, Zebede still owes Adjmi “the monies advanced on my behalf.” (NYSCEF No. 56 at
