OPINION & ORDER Plaintiff Ron Meyer (“Plaintiff” or “Meyer”) brings this action for fraud, breach of warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and rescission against Defendants Susan Seidel (“Seidel”), Susan Seidel Inc. (“Seidel Inc.,” and together with “Seidel,” the “Seidel Defendants”), Jaime Frankfurt (“Frankfurt”), and Does 1 through 5 (the “Unnamed Defendants,” and, together with the Seidel Defendants and Frankfurt, “Defendants”). Before me are the motions to dismiss filed by Frankfurt, (Doc. 44), and the Seidel Defendants, (Doc. 47), as well as the motion to quash a subpoena filed by non-party Julian Weissman (“Weissman”), (Doc. 58). Because Plaintiff’s causes of action are time-barred, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Although Plaintiff requests an opportunity to amend his complaint, because I find that any effort to amend would be futile, Plaintiff’s request is DENIED, and the complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Given that this Opinion & Order dismisses this case with prejudice, Weissman’s motion to quash is DENIED as moot. I. Factual Background1 Plaintiff is a resident of Los Angeles, California. (Compl. 1.)2 Seidel is a New York resident who is an art dealer who transacts substantial business in California. (Id. 2.) Seidel wholly owns and controls the entity Seidel Inc. (Id.) Frankfurt3 is also an art dealer, (id.), who I find has been a New York resident at least during the entirety of this litigation. The identities of the unnamed Defendants are unknown to Plaintiff, but each Defendant played a role in the events central to this litigation. (Id. 3.) On or around March 1, 2001, Frankfurt recommended Seidel to Plaintiff, representing that Seidel was a reliable and expert art dealer who was looking to sell a painting (the “Painting”) made by famous artist Mark Rothko (“Rothko”). (Id. 4.) Plaintiff was under the impression that a different art dealer owned the Painting and consigned it to Seidel for sale. (Id.) Seidel offered to sell the Painting to Plaintiff. (Id. 5.) When she did, Seidel made several misrepresentations to Plaintiff, including that the Painting was: Made by Rothko, when it was in fact a forgery; To be included in the Catalogue Raisonné of Rothko’s works, indicating that it was considered a genuine work of Rothko; Signed by Rothko; and Acquired directly from Rothko by the seller’s family. (Id. 6.) On or around March 1, 2001, Plaintiff, acting in reliance on Seidel’s representations, agreed to purchase the Painting for $900,000, plus a 5 percent commission of $45,000. (Id. 8.) Seidel sent an invoice to Plaintiff that included at least some of the misrepresentations listed above, and promised delivery of the Painting. (Id.) Sometime during March 2001, Seidel delivered the Painting to Plaintiff in Los Angeles, where he received it and paid Seidel $945,000. (Id. 9.) The Painting has remained in Plaintiff’s Los Angeles home since then. (Id.) In January 2019, Plaintiff learned that the Painting was (1) a forgery; (2) never included in Rothko’s Catalogue Raisonné; (3) never owned by, signed by, seen by, or acquired from Rothko or his family; and (4) essentially worthless. (Id. 11.) If the misrepresentations that Seidel told Plaintiff were true, the Painting would currently be worth at least $10 million today. (Id. 13.) II. Procedural History On October 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, alleging four causes of action: (1) fraud, alleged against all Defendants; (2) breach of warranty, alleged against the Seidel Defendants and the unnamed Defendants; (3) negligent misrepresentation against all Defendants; and (4) rescission, alleged against the Seidel Defendants and the unnamed Defendants. (Compl.) On November 14, 2019, the Seidel Defendants filed a notice of removal on grounds of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1.) On November 15, 2019, this case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. (Doc. 5.) On May 5, 2020, District Court Judge Dolly M. Gee ordered that this case be transferred to the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), (Doc. 38), which was effectuated the following day, (Doc. 39), and the case was assigned to me, (Doc. 40). On July 14, 2020, Frankfurt, (Docs. 44-46), and the Seidel Defendants, (Docs. 47-49), filed separate motions to dismiss, each accompanied with a memorandum of law, a declaration, and exhibits. Plaintiff filed separate responses to each motion to dismiss on September 15, 2020. (Docs. 50-51.) On October 1, 2020, both Frankfurt, (Doc. 54), and the Seidel Defendants, (Doc. 55), filed their reply memorandum of law. On May 21, 2021, Weissman filed a letter motion to quash a subpoena issued by Seidel. (Doc. 58.) The Seidel Defendants filed a letter response on May 25, 2021, (Doc. 59), and Weissman filed a second letter in support of his motion a day later, (Doc. 60). On July 14, 2021, I directed the parties to submit a filing detailing the parties’ respective positions on Frankfurt’s citizenship at the time the lawsuit was filed, his current citizenship, his citizenship at all times between the filing of the lawsuit and today, and the date Frankfurt moved from California to New York, if at all. (Doc. 61.) Frankfurt submitted a responsive filing on July 19, 2021, indicating his position and those of the other parties. (Doc. 62.) III. Legal Standards A. Rule 12(b)(6) To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard demands “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Plausibility…depends on a host of considerations: the full factual picture presented by the complaint, the particular cause of action and its elements, and the existence of alternative explanations so obvious that they render plaintiff’s inferences unreasonable.” L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 430 (2d Cir. 2011). In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2007). A complaint need not make “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. A complaint is “deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Int’l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995)). “Rule 12(b)(6) provides the most appropriate legal basis for a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.” La Russo v. St. George’s Univ. Sch. of Med, 936 F. Supp. 2d 288, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). “A court accordingly may dismiss a claim on statute-of-limitations grounds at the pleadings stage if the complaint clearly shows the claim is out of time.” Whiteside v. Hover-Davis, Inc., 995 F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). B. Rule 9(b) Allegations of fraud “are subject to a heightened pleading standard” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b), and must be pled “with particularity.” Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Accordingly, such allegations must “(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.” Id. at 197-198 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In addition, the plaintiff must allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent.” Id. at 198 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). IV. Discussion A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction This case was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1
5, 7.) In order to establish diversity jurisdiction, the matter in controversy must exceed the sum of $75,000 and there must be complete diversity among the parties. 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1). When subject-matter jurisdiction is predicated on diversity jurisdiction, “complete diversity of all parties is an absolute, bright-line prerequisite to federal subject matter jurisdiction.” Pa. Pub. Sch. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 772 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2019). It is “wellsettled doctrine that a court must satisfy itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction and may at any time in the course of litigation consider whether such jurisdiction exists.” Mitskovski v. Buffalo & Fort Erie Pub. Bridge Auth., 435 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, the parties agree that Plaintiff is a California resident and that the Seidel Defendants are New York residents. However, the pleadings left some ambiguity concerning Frankfurt’s citizenship — an important issue because, if Frankfurt were a California citizen, that would destroy complete diversity and thus I would not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this litigation. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged that Frankfurt “was and is a resident of California.” (Compl. 2.) In subsequent briefing to the Central District of California, where this case was first removed, Plaintiff stated that Frankfurt “at all relevant times” was “a California resident,” and acknowledged that the Seidel Defendants removed the case “apparently based on the assertion that Frankfurt, although a citizen of California at the time of all the events in issue, had subsequently moved to New York.” (Doc. 33, at 3, 5.) Plaintiff’s filings did not make clear Plaintiff’s position on Frankfurt’s citizenship either at the time he brought this lawsuit or today. Defendants, on the other hand, argued that “Frankfurt is a New York citizen” and has been “since 2012,” predating the time of this lawsuit. (Doc. 1
