Recitation, as required by Civil Procedure Law and Rules (CPLR) §2219(a), of the papers considered on the review of these Motions for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Papers submitted for each above listed case and corresponding Index number: Numbered1: 1. CV-723175-16/KI Plaintiff NYS Acupuncture, P.C., a/a/o Patrick Howard Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Annexed Exhibits BCYXMB Defendant’s Cross-Motion and Annexed Exhibits 3ETAHL 2. CV-723178-16/KI Plaintiff NYS Acupuncture, P.C., a/a/o Miguel Quinn Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Annexed Exhibits VEZUPK Defendant’s Cross-Motion and Annexed Exhibits 9L2X9X 3. CV-723183-16/KI Plaintiff Elmont Rehab, P.T., P.C., a/a/o Karen Cutler Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Annexed Exhibits SMQGV7 Defendant’s Cross-Motion and Annexed Exhibits X9J24W 4. CV-723185-16/KI Plaintiff NYS Acupuncture, P.C., a/a/o Karen Cutler Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Annexed Exhibits HLHQKX Defendant’s Cross-Motion and Annexed Exhibits HLCISL 5. CV-723177-16/KI Plaintiff Elmont Rehab, P.T., P.C., a/a/o Miguel Quinn Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Annexed Exhibits EG9PNE Defendant’s Cross-Motion and Annexed Exhibits JMEEDJ 6. CV-723180-16/KI Plaintiff Uzma Nasir Physician, P.C., a/a/o Miguel Quinn Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Annexed Exhibits S9SATO Defendant’s Cross-Motion and Annexed Exhibits 4MT2ST 7. CV-707439-17/KI Plaintiff Solution Bridge, Inc., a/a/o Jennifer Schaum Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Annexed Exhibits L1TAWA Defendant’s Cross-Motion and Annexed Exhibits 3C3RI6 8. CV-704429-18/KI Plaintiff Metro Pain Specialist, P.C., a/a/o Eileen Kilbane Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Annexed Exhibits SV5FHT Defendant’s Cross-Motion and Annexed Exhibits GCMFWC 9. CV-706460-19/KI Plaintiff Gentlecare Ambulatory Anesthesia Services; Lyonel F. Paul, M.D., a/a/o Maglorie Bueno Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Annexed Exhibits P59UM6 Defendant’s Cross-Motion and Annexed Exhibits FSJMGT 10. CV-707274-19/KI Plaintiff Right Aid Medical Supply Corp., a/a/o Enrique Alexander Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Annexed Exhibits TB0A9I Defendant’s Cross-Motion and Annexed Exhibits LQADFZ ADDITIONAL CASES 2. NYS Acupuncture, P.C., a/a/o Miguel Quinn; CV-723178-16/KI, 3. Elmont Rehab, P.T., P.C., a/a/o Karen Cutler; CV-723183-16/KI, 4. NYS Acupuncture, P.C., a/a/o Karen Cutler; CV-723185-16/KI, 5. Elmont Rehab, P.T., P.C., a/a/o Miguel Quinn; CV-723177-16/KI, 6. Uzma Nasir Physician, P.C., a/a/o Miguel Quinn; CV-723180-16/KI, 7. Solution Bridge, Inc., a/a/o Jennifer Schaum; CV-707439-17/KI, 8. Metro Pain Specialist, P.C., a/a/o Eileen Kilbane; CV-704429-18/KI, 9. Gentlecare Ambulatory Anesthesia Services, Lyonel F. Paul, M.D. a/a/o Maglorie Bueno; CV-706460-19/KI, 10. Right Aid Medical Supply Corp., a/a/o Enrique Alexander, CV-707274-19/KI DECISION/ORDER Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision and Order on these motions is as follows: The New York State Insurance Fund (NYSIF/the Fund/Defendant), appearing by its attorney in these breach of contract no-fault proceedings, moves this Court pursuant to CPLR §§2221 and 5015(a) for an Order (a) vacating each default judgment entered against the Defendant in each of the above referenced matters; (b) dismissing each Complaint because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; (c) dismissing each Complaint because Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (d) imposing sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel pursuant to CPLR §8303 and 22 NYCRR §130-1.1(c) for commencing frivolous actions; and (e) for any further relief that seems just, proper and equitable to the Court. Plaintiffs, appearing by their attorney, oppose Defendant’s motions to dismiss the complaints, claiming that this Court does have subject matter jurisdiction over Defendant. Plaintiffs also oppose vacatur of the default judgements on the grounds that Defendant failed to raise a reasonable excuse for defaulting, and they further oppose Defendant’s motions on the grounds that they are fatally defective pursuant to CPLR §2214(c) because Defendant failed to serve the motion with exhibits referenced in the attorney’s affirmations. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that their filings of the summons, complaints and motions for summary judgment were made in good faith and that this Court should not impose sanctions. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motions to Vacate the Default Judgment and to Dismiss each of the above-captioned ten (10) actions are GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in case any of the Plaintiffs decide to seek relief in the Court of Claims. Defendant’s application for sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel is DENIED. Finally, Plaintiffs’ and their counsel are enjoined from commencing any future similar actions or proceedings seeking relief from this Defendant in Kings County Civil Court without a determination from the Appellate Term, that it is appropriate for Plaintiffs to do so.2 Procedural History for Index Nos. CV-723175-16/KI; CV-723178-16/KI; CV-723183-16/KI; CV-723185-16/KI #1 — Plaintiff NYS Acupuncture, P.C., (CV-723175-16/KI) Plaintiff claims that Assignor Patrick Howard was allegedly involved in a motor vehicle accident on or about February 1, 2011, that Defendant was timely notified of Assignor Howard’s accident and injuries and was subsequently assigned a claim number by Defendant.3 On or about June 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Summons and Complaint with the Kings County Civil Court seeking judgment against Defendant for breach of contract based on its alleged failure to either timely pay or deny payment for services rendered to Assignor Howard, as well as statutory interest and attorney’s fees, and served it on Defendant on or about July 6, 2016.4 On or about October 3, 2016, Defendant served and filed its answer which listed affirmative defenses, including but not limited to that the Civil Court “lacked subject matter jurisdiction to the extent that plaintiff is seeking monetary relief against the STATE INSURANCE FUND, a New York State agency [and that] [r]elief must be sought in the Court of Claims.”5 On or about October 11, 2016, Kings County Chief Clerk entered a default judgment against Defendant.6 #2 — Plaintiff NYS Acupuncture, P.C., (CV-723178-16/KI) Plaintiff claims that Assignor Miguel Quinn was allegedly in a motor vehicle accident occurring on or about February 12, 2012, that Defendant was timely notified of Quinn’s accident and injuries and was subsequently assigned a claim number by Defendant.7 On or about June 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Summons and Complaint with the Kings County Civil Court seeking judgment against Defendant for breach of contract based on its alleged failure to either timely pay or deny payment for services rendered to Assignor Quinn, as well as statutory interest and attorney’s fees, and served it on Defendant on or about July 6, 2016.8 On or about October 3, 2016, Defendant served and filed its answer which listed affirmative defenses, including but not limited to that Plaintiff failed to properly serve Defendant, and the Civil Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as the relief sought against NYSIF, a state agency, must be sought in the Court of Claims.9 On or about October 11, 2016 a default judgment was entered against the Defendant.10 #3 — Plaintiff Elmont Rehab, P.T., P.C. (CV-723183-16/KI) Plaintiff claims that Assignor Karen Cutler was allegedly in a motor vehicle accident occurring on or about January 26, 2011, that Defendant was timely notified of Cutler’s accident and injuries and was subsequently assigned a claim number by Defendant.11 On or about June 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Summons and Complaint with the Kings County Civil Court seeking judgment against Defendant for breach of contract based on its alleged failure to either timely pay or deny payment for services rendered to Assignor Cutler, as well as statutory interest and attorney’s fees, and served it on Defendant on or about July 6, 2016.12 In its Answer, Defendant listed affirmative defenses, including but not limited to that Plaintiff failed to properly serve the Defendant and that the Civil Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as the relief sought against NYSIF, a state agency, must be sought in the Court of Claims.13 On or about October 11, 2016 a default judgment was entered against the Defendant.14 #4 — Plaintiff NYS Acupuncture, P.C., (CV-723185-16/KI) Plaintiff claims that Assignor Karen Cutler was allegedly in a motor vehicle accident occurring on or about January 26, 2011, that Defendant was timely notified of Cutler’s accident and injuries and was subsequently assigned a claim number by Defendant.15 On or about June 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Summons and Complaint with the Kings County Civil Court seeking judgment against Defendant for breach of contract based on its alleged failure to either timely pay or deny payment for services rendered to Assignor Cutler, as well as statutory interest and attorney’s fees, and served it on Defendant on or about July 6, 2016.16 On or about October 3, 2016, Defendant served and filed its answer which listed affirmative defenses, including but not limited to improper service of the summons and complaint in violation of CPLR §307, and that the Civil Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Defendant was a state agency and, as such, monetary relief had to be pursued in the Court of Claims.17 On or about October 11, 2016, a default judgment was entered against the Defendant.18 On or about March 15, 2019, the Plaintiffs on the four cases summarized above filed and served motions seeking summary judgment pursuant to CPLR §§3211(c) or 3212(a) and dismissal of Defendant’s affirmative defenses pursuant to CPLR §3211(b). Defendant subsequently filed notices of cross-motion in each case for summary judgment seeking an order granting its cross-motions for summary judgment and dismissing the cases on multiple grounds, including but not limited to that the Civil Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant also sought sanctions on Plaintiffs’ counsel, pursuant to CPLR §8303 and 22 NYCRR §130-1.1(c) for commencing frivolous actions. After a series of adjournments, on January 5, 2021, these four cases (index numbers CV-723175-16, CV-723178-16, CV-723183-16 and CV-723185-16) were called and argued from the Parts 40 and 41 Special 1 calendars in Kings County Civil Court. The same counsel represented Plaintiffs NYS Acupuncture, P.C. and Elmont Rehab, P.T., P.C. and Defendant had the same counsel in all four cases. This Court denied Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment. This Court further stated that it was inclined to grant Defendant’s cross-motion to dismiss the actions on the grounds that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that it would be drafting its Decision and Order on the summary judgment and sanctions issues. On or about January 25, 2021, via email to chambers, Plaintiffs’ counsel suggested instead that one of the four cases be decided on the merits instead of being dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the remaining three cases be stayed pending an appeal to and a decision from the Appellate Term. Defendant’s counsel objected to that, reiterating that the cases had to be dismissed because this Court did not have jurisdiction. Further, Defendant again urged that the Court impose sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel for continuing to commence actions against Defendant in the Civil Court despite Plaintiffs’ counsel’s knowledge of prior decisions holding consistently that only the Court of Claims had jurisdiction of the type of cases being litigated before this Court. While drafting its Decision and Order, this Court found that the New York State Unified Court System Universal Case Management System (UCMS) listed all four cases as having had default judgments entered in favor of the Plaintiffs on October 11, 2016. As a result, on April 6, 2021, during a status conference on the four cases, this Court informed counsel that in the course of its review of UCMS and the Unified Court System public online case-tracking e-Courts information service, it not only found that the four instant cases had default judgments filed, but this Court had found additional no-fault insurance cases filed against Defendant by Plaintiffs’ counsel. This Court further informed counsel that it was still drafting a Decision and Order dismissing the four cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, this Court directed Defendant’s counsel to review its records to identify any other no-fault insurance cases filed by Plaintiffs’ counsel in Kings County Civil Court that resulted in default judgments issued against it. The Court established a motion and conference schedule for both sides to file the appropriate motions. In addition, this Court urged counsel to review all their cases that had been filed in Kings County Civil Court involving this Defendant where default judgments had not been filed and to seek possible resolutions on those cases for review and approval by this Court. On April 19, 2021, Defendant’s counsel, after apparently identifying six additional no-fault cases in which default judgments had been issued against it stemming from filings in Kings County Civil by Plaintiffs’ counsel, filed Motions to Dismiss in the ten (10) instant captioned matters pursuant to the motion schedule maintaining that the Civil Court does not have jurisdiction to hear said matters and moved this Court to vacate the default judgments, dismiss the summons and complaint and to impose sanctions on Plaintiffs’ Counsel. On or about April 22, 2021, Plaintiffs’ Counsel opposed said Motions to Dismiss asserting that Defendant’s motions were defective and its defects prejudicial to Plaintiffs given Defendant’s failure to annex all the exhibits it referenced in its motion, which Plaintiffs assert is a fatal defect warranting denial of Defendant’s motion. Plaintiffs also assert that Defendant lacks a reasonable excuse to support vacating the default judgements entered against it and the Court should not vacate the same. Plaintiffs’ counsel did not seek to revive the Motions for Summary Judgment in these submissions for the first four cases heard by this Court, Index Numbers CV-723175-16, CV-723178-16, CV-723183-16 and CV-723185-16. The six additional cases identified by Defendant’s counsel and subsequently the subject of the moving and opposing papers filed by the parties on or about April 19, 2021 and April 22, 2021, respectively, and addressed in this Decision and Order, along with the first four captioned in this Decision and Order,19 are summarized procedurally below: Procedural History regarding Index Nos. CV-723177-16/KI; CV-723180-16/KI; CV-707439-17/KI; CV-704429-18/KI; CV-706460-19/KI; CV-707274-19/KI #5 — Plaintiff Elmont Rehab, P.T., P.C. (CV-723177-16/KI) Plaintiff claims that Assignor Miguel Quinn was allegedly in a motor vehicle accident occurring on or about February 12, 2011, that Defendant was timely notified of Quinn’s accident and injuries and was subsequently assigned a claim number by Defendant.20 On or about June 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Summons and Complaint with the Kings County Civil Court seeking judgment against Defendant for breach of contract based on its alleged failure to either timely pay or deny payment for services rendered to Assignor Quinn, as well as statutory interest and attorney’s fees.21 Defendant answered the complaint posing affirmative defenses,22 but on October 11, 2016 a default judgment was entered against the Defendant.23 #6 — Plaintiff Uzma Nasir Physician, P.C. (CV-723180-16/KI) Plaintiff claims that Assignor Miguel Quinn was allegedly in a motor vehicle accident occurring on or about February 1, 2011, that Defendant was timely notified of Quinn’s accident and injuries and was subsequently assigned a claim number by Defendant.24 As a result of Defendant’s alleged failure to either timely pay or deny payment for services rendered to Assignor Quinn, Plaintiff filed a Summons and Complaint in Kings Civil Court on or about July 6, 2016,25 seeking payment, statutory interest and attorney’s fees from Defendant.26 On October 11, 2016 a default judgement was entered against Defendant.27 #7 — Plaintiff Solution Bridge, Inc. (CV-707439-17/KI) Plaintiff claims that Assignor Jennifer Schaum was allegedly in a motor vehicle accident occurring on or about January 7, 2012, that Defendant was timely notified of Schaum’s accident and injuries and was subsequently assigned a claim number by Defendant.28 On or about March 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Summons and Complaint with the Kings County Civil Court seeking judgment against Defendant for breach of contract based on its alleged failure to either timely pay or deny payment for services rendered to Assignor Schaum, as well as statutory interest and attorney’s fees.29 In its Answer, Defendant listed affirmative defenses.30 On or about September 8, 2017, Plaintiff rejected Defendant’s Answer as untimely.31 On or about September 8, 2017 a default judgement was entered against Defendant.32 The April 19, 2021 Affidavit of Rosanne Nichols, an Associate Attorney for the Defendant, listed affirmative defenses, including that Plaintiff failed to properly serve the Defendant and filed its action in the wrong court, service against the Defendant was improper, and that since Defendant is a state agency, relief could only be sought in the New York State Court of Claims and thus the Civil Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.33 #8 — Plaintiff Metro Pain Specialist, P.C. (CV-704429-18/KI) Plaintiff claims that Assignor Eileen Kilbane was allegedly in a motor vehicle accident occurring on or about July 7, 2016, that Defendant was timely notified of Kilbane’s accident and injuries and was subsequently assigned a claim number by Defendant.34 On or about January 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Summons and Complaint with the Kings County Civil Court seeking judgment against Defendant for breach of contract based on its alleged failure to either timely pay or deny payment for services rendered to Assignor Kilbane, as well as statutory interest and attorney’s fees.35 On or about November 14, 2018 a default judgment was entered against Defendant.36 The April 19, 2021 Affidavit of Rosanne Nichols, an Associate Attorney for the Defendant, listed affirmative defenses, including that Plaintiff failed to properly serve the Defendant, and that since Defendant is a state agency, relief could only be sought in the New York State Court of Claims and thus the Civil Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.37 #9 — Plaintiff Gentlecare Ambulatory Anesthesia Services; Lyonel F. Paul, MD (CV-706460-19/KI) Plaintiff claims that Assignor Maglorie Bueno was allegedly in a motor vehicle accident occurring on or about September 11, 2012, that Defendant was timely notified of Bueno’s accident and injuries and was subsequently assigned a claim number by Defendant.38 On or about February 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Summons and Complaint in the Kings County Civil Court seeking judgment against Defendant for breach of contract based on its alleged failure to either timely pay or deny payment for services rendered to Assignor Bueno, as well as statutory interest and attorney’s fees.39 On or about April 13, 2019, Defendant listed affirmative defenses, including but not limited to that Plaintiff filed its action in the wrong court since Defendant, a state agency, could only be sued in the New York State Court of Claims and thus the Civil Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.40 On or about May 29, 2019 Plaintiff rejected Defendant’s Answer as untimely.41 On or about June 26, 2019 a default judgment was entered against Defendant.42 #10 — Plaintiff Right Aid Medical Supply Corp. (CV-707274-19/KI) Plaintiff claims that Assignor Enrique Alexander was allegedly in a motor vehicle accident occurring on or about January 19, 2016, that Defendant was timely notified of Alexander’s accident and injuries and was subsequently assigned a claim number by Defendant.43 On or about February 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Summons and Complaint in the Kings County Civil Court seeking judgment against Defendant for breach of contract based on its alleged failure to either timely pay or deny payment for services rendered to Assignor Alexander, as well as statutory interest and attorney’s fees.44 In its Answer, Defendant listed affirmative defenses, including that service against the Defendant was improper and Plaintiff filed its action in the wrong court, i.e., since Defendant is a state agency, relief could only be sought in the New York State Court of Claims and thus the Civil Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.45 On or about June 26, 2019 a default judgment was entered against Defendant. Issues Presented: The threshold and dispositive issue is whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiffs’ actions against this Defendant. A secondary issue is whether Defendant’s request for sanctions against the Plaintiffs and/or their counsel should be granted. Positions of the Parties: The Defendant moves this Court to vacate the default judgements entered against it and to dismiss the attendant breach of contract matters against the Defendant because the Civil Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to render the judgments. The Defendant points to Nash v. Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J., 22 NY3d 220, 229 (2013) to support the axiom that “a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction is void, and that the defect may be raised at any time and may not be waived.”46 Defendant cites additional cases supporting its argument that a court cannot assert jurisdiction over a matter in which it does not have subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Defendant’s Affirmation under Index number CV-723175-16, paragraphs 19, 21 (citing, e.g., Gager v. White, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 488 [1981] ["Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, which limits the power of a particular court rather than the judicial jurisdiction of the State en gros, a defect in basis jurisdiction is waivable."]; Morrison v. Budget Rent a Car Sys., 230 A.D.3d 253, 258, 260 [2d Dept 1997] ["If, however, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the parties may not confer it on the court…and it may not be conferred by laches or estoppel…. More importantly in the case before us, we recognize that that when a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction it may not acquire it by waiver."]). Defendant claims that it is a state agency47 and that, as such, Article VI, Section 9 of the New York State Constitution, Court of Claims Act Section 9 proscribes that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine actions for money damages against it and accordingly the Civil Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matters. See, e.g., Defendant’s Affirmation dated April 19, 2021, Index number CV-723175-16, at paragraphs 21, 25 (citing, e.g., D’Angelo v. State Ins. Fund,48 A.D.3d 400 [2nd Dept 2008]; Comm’rs of the State Ins. Fund v. Photocircuits Corp., [20 A.D.3d at 176]).48 Plaintiffs’ counter with CPLR §2214(c) to stress to this Court that Defendant’s motions are fatally defective and should not be considered. Plaintiffs’ counsel confirms that Defendant failed to serve all of the exhibits referenced in Defendant’s affidavits and said failure was prohibitive and prejudicial to the Plaintiffs’ ability to properly defend the motions. Plaintiffs further cite numerous sections of the CPLR, the NYCRR, the No-Fault Insurance Law and Regulations as well as cases to support their proposition that a Defendant’s failure to raise a reasonable excuse for defaulting is reason enough to deny vacatur of the same. Plaintiffs point to Defendant’s untimely filing of its answers to support their position that the Court deny Defendant’s motion.49 Finally, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant’s failure to raise improper service as a defense50 is a waiver of its defense of personal jurisdiction51 and vacatur of the default judgment must be denied.52 Plaintiffs also urge the Court to deny vacatur of the default judgments because Defendant’s assertion that it is a state agency is an inadequate defense to Plaintiffs’ position that Defendant is still fully subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.53 In support of its argument, Plaintiffs’ cite Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v. Low, 3 N.Y.2d 590 (1958), Carney v. Newburgh Park, 84 A.D.2d 599 (3d Dept 1981), State Ins. Fund v. State, 212 A.D.2d 98 (4th Dept 1995), Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Comm’rs of State Ins. Fund, 289 A.D.2d 807 (3rd Dept 2001); Matter of Central N.Y. Workers’ Compensation Bar Assn v. State of N.Y. Workers’ Compensation Bd., 16 A.D.3d 1066 (3d Dept 2005), Matter of Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. New York State Ins. Fund, 47 A.D.3d 633 (2d Dept 2008) and Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. New York State Ins. Fund, 85 A.D.3d 1686 (4th Dept 2011).54 Defendant seeks sanctions against Plaintiffs and their counsel as well as costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, alleging that Plaintiffs, by their counsel, have engaged in frivolous conduct by continuing to file actions against it that are completely without merit in the law and which cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and that doing so is a “continued and deliberate waste of judicial resources.”55 Defendant cited three cases to support its motion for sanctions and/or the awarding of costs and legal fees.56 Plaintiffs’ counsel maintains that he acted in good faith and that the Court must consider such good-faith to modify existing case law through “common law jurisprudence.”57 Plaintiffs rely on cases holding that unpersuasive legal arguments do not rise to the level of frivolity to require the imposition of sanctions.58 Discussion: The Issues of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Vacatur of the Default Judgments The New York State Constitution Article VI, Section 9, Court of Claims Act Section 9 states in relevant part, “The Court [of Claims] shall have jurisdiction:…2. To hear and determine a claim of any person, corporation…against the state for the appropriation of any real or personal property…, for the breach of contract, express or implied….” While it is uncontroverted that New York State statutory and case law prove that Defendant NYSIF is a State agency within the Department of Labor,59 the federal courts have likewise reached that conclusion. See Lipofsky v. The State Insurance Fund, 86 F.3d 15 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 971 (1996). In Lipofsky, the plaintiff claimant unsuccessfully challenged the federal district court’s finding that NYSIF was a state agency and thus was entitled to immunity from suit in federal court under the U.S. Const. amend. XI.60 The status of NYSIF as a state agency is only being mentioned briefly as it is the predicate to the dispositive question of subject matter jurisdiction, the answer to which is that New York courts have consistently held that claims for money damages against NYSIF, whether based on an alleged breach of contract or couched as an action for a declaratory judgment, if the remedy sought is financial recovery, must be litigated in the Court of Claims. See, e.g., GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 94 A.D.3d at 700-01 (claim denominated as one for a declaratory judgment was really for money damages and thus belonged in the Court of Claims); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 65 A.D.3d 945, 946 (1st Dept 2009) (claim disguised as one for declaratory relief was actually for money damages and thus belonged in the Court of Claims); D’Angelo v. State Ins. Fund, 48 A.D.3d at 402 (Supreme Court erred in granting Plaintiffs’ crossmotion to add breach of contract claim to recover damages as such a claim must be litigated against the Fund in the Court of Claims); Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. M. Mathews & Sons Co., 131 A.D.2d 301 (counter-claim for actual and punitive damages for wrongful policy cancellation could only be heard in the Court of Claims); Miraglia v. State Ins. Fund, 32 Misc.2d at 473-474 (Article 78 proceeding to compel payment could only be heard in the Court of Claims); Ultimate Care Chiropractic, P.C. v. State Ins. Fund, Civ. Ct., Kings County, Index No. 716668/2016 (Dec. 10, 2018, Gerstein, J.) (Civil Court lacked jurisdiction over State Insurance Fund in no-fault benefit action).61 Attempts to recover money damages from the Fund in courts other than the Court of Claims have resulted in dismissals. See, e.g., GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 94 A.D.3d at 700 (claim for money damages against State Insurance Fund in State Supreme Court rather than Court of Claims mandated dismissal). Accordingly, since this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims at issue, the Court does not have the power to impose the money judgment relief sought by Plaintiffs. Further, while a claimant may subsequently seek to file the action in the Court of Claims,62 that is not an automatic fallback option.63 Plaintiffs also urge the Court to deny vacatur of the default judgment citing to Defendant’s failure to establish a meritorious defense that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these matters.64 To support its argument, Plaintiffs’ attorney relies on Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v. Low, 3 N.Y.2d 590 (1958); Carney v. Newburgh Park, 84 A.D.2d 599 (3d Dept 1981); State Ins. Fund v. State, 212 A.D.2d 98; Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Comm’rs of State Ins. Fund, 289 A.D.2d 807; Matter of Central N.Y. Workers’ Compensation Bar Assn v. State of N.Y. Workers’ Compensation Bd., 16 A.D.3d 1066; Matter of Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. New York State Ins. Fund, 47 A.D.3d 633 (2d Dept 2008) and Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. New York State Ins. Fund, 85 A.D.3d 1686). The Plaintiffs’ reliance on these cases to support their suing this Defendant in this court for money damages is misplaced, factually and/or legally. The primary issue in Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v. Low, 3 N.Y.2d 590 (1958) was a question of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Low involved a state trooper who died after the state car he was riding in collided with a private passenger car and whose widow received Workers’ Compensation benefits via a policy issued to the State by the State Insurance Fund. Id. at 593. After Mr. Low, the operator of the other car, successfully sued New York State, not the State Insurance Fund, in the Court of Claims, alleging negligence by the operator of the state car, the Fund, which had not been a party in Low’s suit but was the statutory assignee of the deceased trooper for Workers’ Compensation purposes, subsequently sued Low for negligence in State Supreme Court. Id. at 593-594. The Supreme Court agreed with Low that the matter was res judicata and that the Fund was collaterally estopped from pursuing its action, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of the Supreme Court’s decision, noting that while the Fund was a state agency, for purposes of litigation, it was a separate entity and as it was not a party in Mr. Low’s prior suit and thus had no opportunity to litigate the matter, neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applied. Id. at 595-96. Accordingly, this case does not support Plaintiffs’ position that their cases can, in fact, be adjudicated in Civil Court. While Low does say that for purposes of applying res judicata and collateral estoppel in litigation, the Fund can be treated as a separate entity from the State, it does not say that the Court of Claims Act does not apply to the Fund. At most, the Low case shows that the legislature may enact a specific statute, e.g., the Workers’ Compensation Law Section 81, to allow the Fund to sue or be sued in courts other than the Court of Claims. Id. at 594. A subsequent Court of Appeals case to Low not cited by Plaintiffs’ counsel provides further clarification about circumstances upon which a particular court may have jurisdiction is Koerner v. State, 62 N.Y.3d 442 (1984). Koerner concerned whether a Plaintiff must, when seeking monetary damages pursuant to New York’s Human Rights Law, pursue the action only in the Court of Claims. Id. at 444. In Koerner, an employee terminated from Pilgrim State Psychiatric Hospital Plaintiff filed suit in Supreme Court. Id. at 444-45. The Defendants, including among others, Pilgrim State Psychiatric as well as the State itself, moved successfully to dismiss the complaint on multiple grounds, including that the court was without subject matter jurisdiction. See 62 N.Y.2d at 445, 448. The Court of Appeals reversed, opining that while “[f]or the most part, the State’s waiver of immunity as to actions for money damages is limited to actions commenced in the Court of Claims”, the Legislature, in statutory language permitting the State Division of Human Rights to award damages administratively without recourse to the Court of Claims, “must be deemed to have waived both the State’s immunity to suit and the requirement that it be sued in the Court of Claims.” See 62 N.Y.2d at 448-49. Koerner confirms that, barring specific legislation to the contrary, e.g. Workers’ Compensation Law §81 or the Human Rights Law, money-damage actions against New York State and its agencies lay in the Court of Claims. Low is also referenced in Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. M. Mathews & Sons Co., 131 A.D.2d 301 (1st Dept 1987), where the Fund instituted an action in Supreme Court pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law §93 to recover unpaid premiums on a cancelled insurance policy and respondent had counter-claimed for actual and punitive damages. Id. at 301. When the Fund moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the grounds that the Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that Court rejected the argument, citing Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v. Low. Id. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the counter-claim on the grounds that as the Fund was a State agency, it was cloaked with sovereign immunities, one of which was that it could not be sued for money damages in courts other than the Court of Claims. Id. (also citing Methodist Hosp. of Brooklyn v. State Ins. Fund, 64 N.Y.2d 365, 375 [1985] [holding that a counterclaim against the Fund for actual and punitive damages for wrongful policy cancellation can be heard only in the Court of Claims). Akin to Koerner, the Appellate Division in Mathews interpreted Low as allowing the Fund to consider itself a separate entity from the State itself for the purposes of instituting litigation (and thus unbound from the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata by judgments rendered only against the State), but that status did not strip the Fund of its immunity as a State agency, including the requirement that it be sued for money damages in the Court of Claims absent any statute to the contrary. See 131 A.D.2d at 301-02. Plaintiffs also rely on Carney v. Newburgh Park, 84 A.D.2d 599 to support their claim that Civil Court has jurisdiction over their cases. However, the Court's reading of M. Mathews and Carney proves that in the absence of legislation to the contrary, claims against the Fund for money damages must be heard in the Court of Claims. Carney involved an arbitration hearing before the Workers' Compensation Board which the Fund lost. The Fund then appealed the arbitration decision to the Appellate Division. Id. at 600. Plaintiffs argue that the Fund is deemed like any other litigant and is not afforded special treatment that an instrumentality of the state would enjoy to divest the Court of Claims of jurisdiction over this issue.65 Carney is another reminder that Workers' Compensation proceedings are statutorily bound to arbitration, unlike automotive insurance claims. Because Carney involved the Fund as the actual insurer for these Workers' Compensation policies (as well as many others in New York, where the Fund actually competes on the market for business), the Fund occupies a different position than it does in auto insurance No-Fault proceedings. Plaintiffs also rely on State Ins. Fund v. State, 212 A.D.2d 98, as a basis for his filings in this Court. But, like Carney, the facts and applicable law in State Ins. Fund v. State were different from the Plaintiffs' no-fault auto insurance cases, and do not establish grounds for this Court to have jurisdiction herein. State Ins. Fund v. State involved a trucking company employee who was injured by a garbage truck owned and operated by New York State. Id. at 99. As the insurance carrier for the company's Workers' Compensation policy, the Fund paid benefits on the employee's behalf. Id. The Fund then sought reimbursement from New York State, which had self-insured its garbage truck. Id. at 99-100. When the State's authorized no-fault adjuster, Continental Loss Adjusting Services Inc., denied the Fund the full amount sought, the Fund filed for mandatory arbitration against the State under Workers' Compensation Law §29 and Insurance Law §5105. Id. at 100. After the arbitrator held the Fund failed to show that the State was the proper party to the arbitration, the Fund filed a petition in State Supreme Court pursuant to CPLR §7511 seeking to vacate the arbitrator's decision. Id. at 100. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, agreeing with the State that the latter could only be sued in the Court of Claims. Id. The Fourth Department reversed the Supreme Court, holding that Insurance Law §5105 stated that the sole remedy to recover on this type of claim was to submit it to mandatory arbitration. Id. at 100-101. The Appellate Court noted that as the State had chosen to self-insure its own vehicles, for the purpose of auto accident claims involving the State, it stood in the same position as any other insurer under the No-Fault Law, making it subject to mandatory arbitration. Id. at 101-102. Thus, State Ins. Fund v. State does not mean that any or all no-fault insurance cases can be litigated against the Fund or the State outside the Court of Claims, but is permissible under certain facts and applicable laws such as when a no-fault claim arises from an accident with a state-owned, operated and self-insured vehicle. Id. at 100-102. Plaintiffs' reliance on Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Comm'rs of State Ins. Fund, 289 A.D.2d 807 is similarly misplaced. This Court finds that this case does not support the proposition that filings against the NYSIF for money judgments can lie in the Civil Court. The Royal case involved an appeal from an underlying Court of Claims decision and the issue of Court of Claims jurisdiction was not addressed by the Third Department in its decision here. Id. at 807. Plaintiffs' reliance on Matter of Central N.Y. Workers' Compensation Bar Assn v. State of N.Y. Workers' Compensation Bd., 16 A.D.3d 1066 in support of their position that this Court has jurisdiction on Plaintiffs' claims against the Fund is likewise unavailing. In Matter of Central N.Y. Workers' Compensation Bar Assn, the Fund was not a party to the action. Rather, the Defendant in this Article 78 filing, which pursuant to CPLR §7804, is required to be brought in the State Supreme Court, was the Workers' Compensation Board ("WCB"), which was accused of showing favoritism toward Fund attorneys by allowing them to have wireless internet access during WCB proceedings. Id. at 1066-67. Aside from the statutory requirement that an Article 78 proceeding must be filed in Supreme Court, thus implicitly undercutting the relevance of this case to the issue of this Court's jurisdiction, no issue of Court of Claims was explicitly raised in Matter of Central N.Y. Workers' Compensation Bar Assn. The Third Department noted that in the context of its dealings with the WCB, the Fund "is merely one of the insurers appearing in proceedings" and to provide one litigant, the Fund, with internet access while denying it to the Fund's adversaries was arbitrary and capricious and could not stand. Id. Further, it was implicit that the relief sought was equitable, not monetary, further distinguishing this case from counsel's list of cases. Id. at 1067. Plaintiffs' reliance on Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. New York State Ins. Fund, 85 A.D.3d 1686 does not address this Court's ability to exercise of jurisdiction over these cases. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. centered on whether the Fund was required to pay-out on a Workers' Compensation insurance policy issued by the Fund in its capacity as a competitive, private insurer (see 85 A.D. 3d at 1686-1687). That Merchants Mut. applied Workers' Compensation Law to a case in which the Fund had contracted to provide insurance distinguished the case from the instant Plaintiffs' No-Fault actions. See M. Mathews, 131 A.D.2d at 301-302; Carney, 84 A.D.2d at 600. Accordingly, the issue of whether the Supreme Court had subject matter jurisdiction was not raised here. Matter of Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. New York State Ins. Fund, 47 A.D.3d 633 (2d Dept 2008), also relied on by Plaintiffs, involved Insurance Law §5105. In this case, the Fund, after paying Workers' Compensation to and on behalf of an individual who was injured while employed by a company insured by the Fund, won an arbitration hearing pursuant to the statute, and then the Plaintiff moved, via an Article 75 proceeding, to vacate the award. See 47 A.D.3d at 633. This case further supports that the statute controls the venue since arbitration was required by statute, the Fund was the claimant as opposed to the Defendant, and the case involved Workers' Compensation. CPLR §7502 permits the Supreme Court to hear Plaintiff's Article 75 to vacate the award since it was not a monetary award. Progressive cannot be stretched to permit a basis for this Court's jurisdiction in Plaintiffs' current cases. Further, the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and can be raised at any time,66 which this Defendant has done repeatedly. This Court finds that Kings County Civil Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims seeking money judgment against the Fund. Accordingly, as a judgment or order issued without subject matter jurisdiction is void, and that defect may be raised be raised at any time and may not be waived, this Court is vacating all of the default judgments issued in favor of Plaintiffs in the cases captioned in this Decision and Order. See, e.g., Editorial Photocopier Archives v. Granger Collection, 61 N.Y.2d 517, 523 (1984). As the Civil Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the above-captioned ten (10) actions, this Court is compelled to dismiss the actions, but without prejudice in case any of the Plaintiffs decide to seek relief in the Court of Claims. The Issue of Sanctions With respect to Defendant's request for sanctions, the Court observes patterns in Plaintiffs' counsel's conduct that are troubling. First, in Compass Med., P.C. v. New York State Ins. Fund, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7010 (Civ. Ct., Kings County, Sept. 30, 2020), Judge Roper noted that Plaintiff's counsel, namely Oleg Rybak of the Rybak firm, received a decision in December 2018 wherein another Civil Court judge had held that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction over the State Insurance Fund.67 In Compass Med., P.C. v. State Ins. Fund, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7010, the Plaintiff commenced an action against Defendant State Insurance Fund, alleging Defendant's failure to pay first party No-Fault benefits for medical services Plaintiff rendered to its assigned eligible injured party. There, the Summons and Complaint were filed in 2015 and answered more than four months later. In 2018, the Plaintiff then filed for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR §3211(c) or §3212(a) and dismissal of Defendant's affirmative defenses pursuant to CPLR §3211(b). Defendant then filed its cross-motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case against a state agency and that jurisdiction rested in the Court of Claims. During oral argument held in 2019, Defendant argued, inter alia, that the jurisdictional argument had previously been decided in Defendant's favor in Ultimate Care Chiropractic, P.C. v. State Ins. Fund, Civ. Ct., Kings County Index No. CV-716668-16, December 10, 2018 by Hon. Michael Gerstein, a case also brought by Plaintiff's counsel. The Defendant also brought to Judge Roper's attention twenty other first party No-fault actions that Plaintiff's counsel filed in 2019, after the decision in Ultimate Care Chiropractic, P.C. v. State Ins. Fund. In Compass Med., P.C. v. State Ins. Fund, the Court noted that Plaintiff's counsel, "with full knowledge and admittedly conced[ed] that [the] Court of Claims is the court of competent jurisdiction…”, counsel continued to seek relief in Civil Court. While Judge Roper did not find that Plaintiff was collaterally estopped from bringing the action since the Plaintiff and the specific facts of said case were different from Ultimate Care, the Court agreed that jurisdiction lay in the Court of Claims.68 That Court rejected Plaintiff’s claim that the Civil Court should retain jurisdiction because the matter would be time-barred if brought in the Court of Claims. Judge Roper reasoned that “[t]his Court’s jurisdiction is not a fail-safe, not a fallback and not a court of contingent jurisdiction.”69 This Court’s review of UCMS on April 6, 2021 indicates that the Rybak Firm is listed as counsel for Plaintiffs on at least 118 matters in the Kings Civil Court against this Defendant, reflecting filings between the beginning of 2008 and the end of 2020. Even if Plaintiffs attempted to argue that Compass Med and Ultimate Care cases are distinguishable from the instant cases because there are different facts and different Plaintiffs, such assertions are without merit since it is irrefutable that the Defendant is a state agency and as a state agency, the Court of Claims is the proper court to hear their claims. When actions are brought where there is incontrovertible proof that undercut their filing in the first place,70 much less cases where there existed conclusive defenses to the asserted claims,71 courts have the discretion, on their own initiative or upon a party’s motion, to impose sanctions on a party for commencing a frivolous proceeding. See 22 NYCRR §130-1.1;72 see also Ram v. Torto, 111 A.D.3d 814 (2nd Dept 2013), lv. dismissed, 22 N.Y.3d 860 (2014) (court upheld Defendant’s motions for attorney’s fees as well as injunctive relief prohibiting self-represented Plaintiff from filing further actions related to the case without court approval and also imposed, on its own initiative, a fine for frivolous conduct); Flushing Expo, Inc. v. New World Mall, LLC, 116 A.D.3d 826 (2d Dept 2014) (defendant’s motions for sanctions and attorney’s fees granted); cf. CPLR §8303(a) (where a personal injury action is commenced or continued and is found by the court to be, at any point in the proceedings, frivolous, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees up to $10,000). In Ram, the Appellate Division noted that the self-represented Plaintiff commenced various proceedings relating to the same matter, all of which had been dismissed by lower courts, which were subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Division.73 The Ram Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7) because the Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, for injunctive relief, and for an award of costs pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1.1.74 The Appellate Division upheld the lower court’s dismissal of the complaint and further found that the lower court “acted providently in enjoining the Plaintiff ‘from commencing any action or proceeding seeking relief from [Defendants] or from…anyone else, in any form or fashion, related to or arising from the [underlying money judgment] without prior permission from this court or from the Appellate Division, Second Department.’”75 The Appellate Division also upheld the lower court’s award of costs pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1.1.76 in the amount of $6,000 for attorney’s fees, payable by the Plaintiff.77 The Appellate Division in Ram also held that the Plaintiff’s appeal was frivolous as it had no legal merit and was not supported by any reasonable argument, and ordered him to pay $2,500 to the court clerk to be forwarded in turn to the State Department of Taxation and Finance.78 See also Greene v. Rachlin, 154 A.D.3d 818 (2d Dept 2017) (attorney’s fees awarded as sanction against Plaintiff for its frivolous conduct in commencing action that was without merit in law and could not be supported by a reasonable argument for extension or modification of existing law); Mosab Constr. Corp. v. Prospect Park Yeshiva, Inc., 124 A.D.3d at 733 (attorney’s fees of $500 awarded as sanction against Plaintiff for its frivolous conduct in commencing time-barred lawsuit); Flushing Expo, Inc. v. New World Mall, LLC, 116 A.D.3d at 827-28 (sanction and attorney’s fee warranted where Plaintiff and counsel filed new action after Plaintiff’s previous action, with same counsel, had been dismissed, and new action had no merit in law nor any reasonable argument). Similarly, sanctions may be considered where a party continues to file actions despite knowing that it has no basis for doing so.79 When the Plaintiffs appealed in all of the Omni cases listed in footnote 79, which included not only the 34 cases decided on December 21, 2018, but a few more decided the same day, the Appellate Term affirmed each dismissal and, on the Appellate Term’s own motion, directed the parties to show cause as to whether the Court should impose sanctions and costs against Plaintiffs’ counsel. See, e.g., Natural Therapy Acupuncture, P.C. v. Omni Indem. Co., 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6469, 62 Misc. 3d 136(A); see also Mosab Constr. Corp. v. Prospect Park Yeshiva, Inc., 124 A.D.3d at 733 (sanctions and attorney’s fees against Plaintiff warranted where Defendant not only showed debt claims were time-barred by a wide margin and Plaintiff, when asked for proof of debt, failed to provide it but rather discussed Defendant’s defenses). In the Appellate Term’s Omni Indemnity decisions, all of which were issued on December 21, 2018, the Court held that sanctions could be considered because Plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct appeared not only to meet the definition of frivolous conduct as stated in 22 NYCRR §130-1.1, but that “[s]ince 2013, Plaintiff and/or other providers represented by Plaintiffs’ counsel have been before this court more than 20 times in similar actions wherein these providers, while represented by Plaintiffs’ counsel, have made the same or essentially the same arguments which Plaintiff raises in the instant appeal.” See, e.g., Natural Therapy Acupuncture, P.C. v. Omni Indem. Co., 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6469, 62 Misc. 3d 136(A) (citations omitted); see also Greene v. Rachlin, 154 A.D.3d at 819) (Plaintiffs’ continued pursuit on appeal of the same claims that were previously found meritless and barren of any reasonable argument as well as the advancing of other meritless arguments warranted an additional consideration as to whether the appeal was frivolous and could result in additional sanctions); Flushing Expo, Inc. v. New World Mall, LLC, 116 A.D.3d at 827-28 (judicial record of a prior case involving the Plaintiff and a related party constituted documentary evidence that warranted summary dismissal as well as sanctions and attorney’s fees). The Appellate Term further stated that “Plaintiff’s counsel continues to advance essentially the same arguments notwithstanding the fact that Defendant’s appellate brief expressly notes that this court has previously considered and rejected the arguments put forth by Plaintiff’s counsel…”. See, e.g., Natural Therapy Acupuncture, P.C. v. Omni Indem. Co., 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6469, 62 Misc. 3d 136(A) (citations omitted). The Court is also troubled by Plaintiffs’ counsel’s insistence that it has proceeded in “good faith and with the support of binding authority on the matter as discussed above”80, i.e., whether the Civil Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, it appears to this Court that Plaintiffs’ citations to cases in support of jurisdiction are replete with either misunderstood and/or incomplete recitations of pertinent facts (e.g., Carney v. Newburgh Park [specific workers compensation legislation requires NYSIF to appear at arbitration hearings in matters in which NYSIF is actually providing the policy and acting as a competitor in the market]; Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Comm’rs of State Ins. Fund [underlying case actually was litigated in the Court of Claims]. Accordingly, this Court is stressed to give the Plaintiffs and their counsel the benefit of the doubt that they have cited “binding authority” in favor of subject matter jurisdiction over the Defendant in the instant cases. Last, this Court has been further tested about Plaintiffs’ counsel’s “good faith” due to the latter’s interpretation of the last series of communications with this Court that it would not be issuing this Decision and Order as stipulations of discontinuances on all of the cases would render the issues resolved (for now, or until the cycle repeated with more no-fault filings against Defendant in Civil Court). It is a close call whether this Court should impose monetary sanctions and/or costs and attorneys’ fees upon Plaintiffs’ counsel. Conclusion: Defendant established that the New York Constitution’s Court of Claims Act requires this Court to summarily dismiss the Plaintiffs’ complaints against this Defendant state agency.81 The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ arguments, including the cases it cited that are immaterial to the issue presented and seek to unjustifiably expand this Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate actions seeking money judgments against the Fund. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the ten (10) captioned matters above, wherein jurisdiction lies only with the Court of Claims, as the Plaintiffs are attempting to collect money damages from a State agency. The Defendant’s motions to dismiss are therefore granted in part and denied in part. Granted to the extent that all actions are dismissed and denied to the extent that neither monetary sanctions nor costs and attorney fees will not be issued against Plaintiffs or their counsel although this Court has the discretion to so issue given the facts and circumstances herein. However, Plaintiffs’ counsel, namely the Rybak Firm as well as Oleg Rybak, Esq. and the Plaintiffs are enjoined from commencing any action or proceeding seeking relief in the form of a money judgment from this Defendant, in any Civil Court, without prior approval from this Court or the Appellate Term. To do so otherwise, could warrant monetary sanctions, as well as costs and attorney fees. This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. Dated: June 24, 2021
