I. Papers The following papers were read on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on its claim: Papers Numbered Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Affirmation in Support dated January 24, 2020 (“Motion”) and file stamped by the court on February 7, 2020. 1 Plaintiff’s Notice of Cross-Motion and Affirmation in Support dated August 19, 2020 (“Cross-Motion”) and electronically filed with the court on August 24, 2020. 2 Defendant’s Affirmation in Opposition dated February 10, 2021 (“Opposition to Cross-Motion”) and electronically filed with the court on February 12, 2021. 3 II. Background In a summons and complaint filed July 25, 2019, Plaintiff sued Defendant insurance company to recover $1,893.00 in unpaid first party No-Fault benefits for medical prescriptions provided to Plaintiff’s assignor Styles, plus attorneys’ fees and statutory interest (see Motion, Aff. of Kang, Ex. A). Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint (CPLR 3212[b]) on the ground that Plaintiff lacked standing (CPLR 3211[a][3]) and failed to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211[a][7]). Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on its claim against Defendant. III. Discussion The Mandatory Personal Injury Protection Endorsement is required in all automobile insurance contracts (11 NYCRR §65-1.1[a]) which provides that “[i]n the event of an accident, written notice setting forth details sufficient to identify the eligible injured person, along with reasonably obtainable information regarding the time, place and circumstances of the accident, shall be given by, or on behalf of, each eligible injured person, to the [insurance] Company, or any of the [insurance] Company’s authorized agents, as soon as reasonably practicable, but in no event more than 30 days after the date of the accident, unless the eligible injured person submits written proof providing clear and reasonable justification for the failure to comply with such time limitation” (see 11 NYCRR §65-1.1[d]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v. Country-Wide Ins. Co., 17 NY3d 586, 589-90 [2011]). Thus, as here, Plaintiff assignor Styles was required to provide notice of the accident to Defendant within thirty (30) days of the accident (Hosp. for Joint Diseases v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 N.Y.3d 312, 317, 879 N.E.2d 1291, 1293 (2007), see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v. Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498, 505 [2015]; Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d 556, 562-63 [2008]). The notice of accident requirement is a condition precedent to a No-Fault insurer’s liability (New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v. Country-Wide Ins. Co., 17 NY3d at 590). As to the matter before this Court, in an affidavit sworn January 28, 2020, Mena-Sibrian, Defendant’s No-Fault Litigation/Arbitration Supervisor, attested that Defendant first received notice of Styles’ accident in a correspondence from MVAIC dated January 17, 2019 and postmarked February 5, 2019, which was more than thirty (30) days after Styles’ accident on October 9, 2018 (see Motion, Kang Aff., Ex. C). Mena-Sibrian claimed to have personal knowledge of the file based on her responsibility for the claim and “review of the file which was kept in the ordinary course of business by [Defendant]” (Motion, Kang Aff., Ex. C at 1). Since review of records kept in the ordinary course of business does not confer upon the affiant personal knowledge, Mena-Sibrian’s statement that Defendant first received notice of Plaintiff’s accident in the January 17, 2019 correspondence postmarked February 5, 2019 (see Motion, Kang Aff., Ex. F) is hearsay (Alleviation Med. Servs., P.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 191 AD3d 934, 935 [2d Dept 2021]). Because Mena-Sibrian did not identify the correspondence postmarked February 5, 2019 annexed as Exhibit F, she failed to authenticate it to render it admissible evidence (see Antoine v. Kalandrishvili, 150 AD3d 941, 942 [2d Dept 2017]; Hefter v. Elderserve Health, Inc., 134 AD3d 673, 675 [2d Dept 2015]). Likewise, Mena-Sibrian’s account that Defendant “contacted MCVIAC [sic] via the telephone, and a MVIA [sic] representative notified [Defendant] that MVIAC received the initial notification of the loss on November 20, 2018″ (Motion, Kang Aff., Ex. C at 3) was vague and clearly not based on Mena-Sibrian’s personal knowledge, so also failed to demonstrate the untimeliness of Plaintiff’s notice of the accident to MVAIC (see Nuzzi v. Gallagher, 60 AD3d 653, 654 [2d Dept 2009]). CPLR 3212 provides that “a motion for summary judgment shall be supported by affidavit, by a copy of the pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions” (CPLR 3212[b]). “Mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient” (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). “A defendant moving for summary judgment [seeking an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint] has the initial burden of coming forward with admissible evidence, such as affidavits by persons having knowledge of the facts, reciting the material facts and showing that the cause of action has no merit” (GTF Mktg. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d 965, 967 [1985]; Anghel v. Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C., 190 AD3d 906, 907 [2d Dept 2021], see Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d 824, 833 [2014]). A motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if, upon all the papers and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any party” (CPLR 3212[b]; Zuckerman v. City of New York, at 562, see GTF Mktg. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d at 968). Here, Defendant failed to establish its prima facie case with admissible evidence. Since Defendant failed to meet its burden of demonstrating entitlement to summary judgment, this Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment without consideration of Plaintiff’s opposition (Luigi v. Avis Cab Co., Inc., 96 AD3d 809, 810 [2d Dept 2012]; Alexander v. Gordon, 95 AD3d 1245, 1246 [2d Dept 2012]). Regarding the Cross-Motion, it was Plaintiff’s burden to show it submitted the statutory claim forms indicating the fact and amount of the loss sustained and “that payment of no-fault benefits [was] overdue” (NYU-Hospital for Joint Diseases v. Esurance Ins. Co., 84 AD3d 1190, 1191 [2d Dept 2011]; Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v. ELRAC Inc., 12 Misc 3d 119, 120 [App Term 2d Dept 2006]). Plaintiff presented an affidavit dated March 27, 2020, in which Munson, Plaintiff’s biller, attested that, based on her review of Plaintiff’s records maintained in the ordinary course of business, Plaintiff submitted proof of claim to Defendant within 45 days of providing prescriptions to Styles (see Cross-Motion, Aff. of Jillian M. Enright, Ex. 2 at 1). Munson’s affidavit suffered from the same infirmity as the affidavit of Mena-Sibrian, in that the review of records did not imbue an affiant with personal knowledge, so Munson’s assertion regarding Plaintiff’s timely submission of claim was also hearsay (Alleviation Med. Servs., P.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 191 AD3d at 935). In addition, it is noted that the fact that Plaintiff submitted proof of claim to Defendant within 45 days of providing prescriptions to Styles (even if it was established by admissible evidence, while it did not here), does not provide that Styles had notified the insurance company within 30 days of the alleged car accident as required. Although an insurer’s denial of claim form may establish the insurer’s receipt of a medical service provider’s claim and untimely denial of that claim, (see Lopes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 127[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51279[U] *2 [App Term 2d Dept 2009]), Defendant’s denial of claim form dated May 7, 2019, which acknowledged receipt of Plaintiff’s claim on April 25, 2019, demonstrated that Defendant denied Plaintiff’s claim twelve (12) days after receiving it (see Motion, Kang Aff. Ex. E). Since Plaintiff failed to meet its initial burden of demonstrating entitlement to summary judgment on its claim against Defendant, this Court denies Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion without consideration of Defendant’s opposition (U.S. Bank N.A. v. Atia, 178 AD3d 747, 749 [2d Dept 2019]; Zalewski v. MH Residential 1, LLC, 163 AD3d 900, 901 [2d Dept 2018]). IV. Order Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint is denied, and it is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for summary judgment on its claim against Defendant is denied. This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court. Dated: September 15, 2021
