DECISION AND ORDER AFTER HEARING PROCEDURAL HISTORY On August 20, 2019, the Petitioner Mother ALICIA N. (hereinafter referred to as “the Mother” and “Ms. N”) filed a petition seeking to modify the parties’ existing order for custody and visitation of the subject child AKEEM H., JR. (DOB XXXX2018) (hereinafter referred to as “the subject child”). The prior order dated November 28, 2018 granted the parents joint legal custody of the subject child with residential custody to the Mother, and a parenting schedule for the Father AKEEM H. (hereinafter referred to as “the Father” and “Mr. H.”). The Father was granted weekend overnight and holiday visitation. There were additional petitions filed by the Father and the Mother during the pendency of this case, but those petitions were withdrawn and dismissed with prejudice as moot, upon consent, on June 1, 2021. The Mother in her modification petition requests that the existing order of visitation be modified by the court, terminating all visitation between the Father and the subject child and permitting her to relocate “out of state” to a confidential address. She later changed her position and sought supervised visitation for the Father. The parties initially appeared on September 4, 2019. The Father appeared pro se and the Mother appeared with private counsel David Schnall, Esq. Counsel Schnall was later relieved, on November 14, 2019 and replaced with court appointed counsel Rayaaz N. Khan, Esq. The Father was appointed counsel Hilary Nat, Esq. The parties executed a Stipulation of Reference, along with their attorneys, for this Referee to hear and make determinations concerning this matter. At the conclusion of arguments by counsel, the court suspended the Father’s unsupervised visitation with the subject child based upon the Mother’s allegations that the Father was hospitalized earlier that year for mental health issues and an attempted suicide. The Father denied the suicide attempt, but reluctantly admitted he was admitted into a psychiatric/mental health hospital. Thereafter, the court issued an order requiring supervised visitation through an agency between the Father and the subject child. That remained the parenting time arrangement throughout the duration of this matter pending before the court. In January 2020, due to the seriousness of the allegations made by the Mother, the court ordered that a forensic evaluation be conducted to assist the court, upon the motion of Counsel Khan on behalf of the Mother. Dr. Stephen Billick was appointed to conduct the forensic evaluation in June 2020. His report was not completed until January 2021, due to the Covid-19 global pandemic. Unfortunately, the pandemic dramatically limited and even ceased court operations, thereby drastically delaying this case. Visitation could only be virtual as no in-person visitation was being conducted. The Father missed significant in-person time with his son as a result. The parties were unable to reach a resolution, fact finding commenced June 1, 2021 and continued June 4, 2021, June 7, 2021 and concluded on June 8, 2021. The Court determined that it was not necessary to conduct an In-Camera Lincoln hearing of the subject child Akeem, Jr., who is currently three (3) years old. Since the child was just over one years old when the matter began in 2019, the Court used its discretion and did not appoint an attorney for the child. The Court will substitute judgment for this young child in determining what is in his best interest. FINDINGS OF FACT During the fact finding hearing the Father and the Mother testified. There were no other witnesses. Counsel Khan entered photographs as evidence in support of the Mother’s application to relocate. No other documentary, or physical evidence was submitted to the court for consideration by either party. Neither counsel called the forensic evaluator, Dr. Billick, as a witness, nor moved to offer his written evaluation into evidence. The court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of all the witnesses, to hear their testimony, and to assess their credibility. The following findings of fact are made based on the material, credible, and relevant testimony and evidence presented during the fact-finding hearing. Testimony of the Mother Alicia N. Ms. N. testified first at fact finding. During counsel Khan’s direct examination, the Mother testified that in April 2019 the father exhibited bizarre behavior when he came to her home unannounced and told her to get in his car with the subject child who was not yet one years old. She testified she got into his vehicle and he drove off with her holding the baby on her lap in the front seat. That during the drive, the Father was ranting about people being “cursed”, he then proceeded to take the Mother’s cell phone and threw it out the car window because “people were listening and watching them”. The Mother testified that they drove for about an hour then stopped and went to his home for several hours (returning home at 4:00am) and she was fearful. She stated that she did not try to escape or get help during the entire situation out of fear. She testified that she believed the father was hospitalized “a few days later”. On cross examination by the father’s attorney, Ms. N. testified that during the incident she had the baby with her at the Father’s request. She never tried to leave, nor sought help from anyone. She did not make a police report because she didn’t want the father arrested. She testified that she nor the baby were harmed nor was the father violent during the incident. Upon cross examination, the Mother admitted that the father has never hurt her nor the baby during a visit. The Mother testified of incidents in which the father would follow her after court and cry stating that he was “not crazy”. The Father would send threatening text messages and make calls from random phone numbers and insult her with jokes and statements that he was going to make sure she “suffers and stays in the shelter”. During Ms. N.’s direct examination, she made numerous statements that she believed the father suffers from schizophrenia and was hospitalized for a suicide attempt in April or May 2019. She stated that the father admitted to her that he was hearing and seeing things and she believed he wasn’t taking his medication. According to Ms. N., Mr. H. told her that the medication was “not working” and made him “feel funny”. This behavior, she testified, was the reason she was seeking the father’s visitation to be changed to supervised visitation only. Regarding the frequency of visitation, the Mother testified that the Father was not regularly visiting between May 2019 through 2020. It is worth noting that 2020 was the heart of the covid 19 global pandemic. She testified that the Father wasn’t seeking video calls or any visitation until the court modified the order to allow for community supervised visitation, with a social worker. The Mother was questioned on direct examination about her request to relocate the subject child to Florida. The Mother is currently residing in a shelter with her family, after their apartment was severely damaged and deemed unsafe from a fire in November 2020. Photographs of the damage from the fire was submitted by the Mother, as evidence to the court. She testified her home was rendered uninhabitable and her family had to move to the shelter system. The Mother testified she lives in a three-bedroom apartment in the shelter with six other people: her two children (the subject child and his half-brother Justin age 13), her niece, her sister Victoria (age 20), brother Stephon (age 26) and her mother. The whole family plans to relocate together. However, if not permitted to relocate, Ms. N. testified that some of the family would move to Florida and the rest will stay in New York with her. She further testified that if relocation is denied she will have to remain living in the shelter system. Her reasons for moving were for “more space; a quieter area and more family to help”. She testified that she had not yet looked at any homes in Florida but found a realtor and was waiting for court permission to leave with the child. She is saving money to buy a car and to fix her credit in anticipation of relocating. Upon cross examination by the Father’s counsel, Ms. Nat, the Mother testified she was unsure of her income but on redirect examination by her attorney, estimated it at $600-$800 per week. She worked for Uber and Lyft as a driver. She admitted she made no efforts to secure a better paying job in New York and planned to do the same job in Florida. The Mother testified she needs food, money, and shelter for her and her children to remain in New York, as the Father of the subject child was not paying child support. When asked whether her decision to relocate was discussed with the Father, on direct examination, she testified that originally the father agreed that she could relocate, and she would bring the baby a few weeks a year to see him. The Father then changed his mind and told her to stay in New York and “suffer”. She planned that the father could have video calls and telephone calls with the child if permitted to relocate. She offered that she would personally transport the child to New York to see the Father for a week at least three times per year, but the visits must be supervised. She offered herself and a professional as possible supervisors but had no plan. The court found the other statements (testimony) made by the Mother to be of minimal to no probative value in determining whether a relocation was in the best interest of the child. Testimony of the Father Akeem H. The Father testified on direct examination by his attorney Ms. Nat, that since 2018 he was ordered overnight visitation three weekends per month with the subject child. He stated that he did not have the visits “sometimes”. When questioned regarding diagnosis and treatment of any mental health issues, the Father testified that he has bipolar schizophrenia and was diagnosed when he was in high school and before he met the mother. The Father describes his mental health issues as having “mood swings”. The Father admitted two hospitalizations, one in June 2019 for three weeks, due to “shortness of breath because of poor eating habits” and then again in January or February 2020 because his “Mother believed he was praising the Lord”. The Father could not recollect how long he remained in the psychiatric hospital. The Father testified that he takes medication in the morning and at night, however he refused to disclose the names of the medications to the court when asked. The Father stated that he sees a therapist every month. Regarding to the incident where the Mother alleges the Father took her and the baby for a terrifying drive and threw the mother’s phone out the window in April 2019, the Father testified he doesn’t remember the incident as described by the Mother. He remembered picking up the mother and the subject child and taking them to get something to eat and then went together to his home. Ms. Nat questioned the father about his supervised visitation. The Father testified that during the supervised visitation he took his son out to eat and he made the child show his body parts to ensure he was ok. The Father testified that he has uncles, aunts, his father and his grandmother to supervise the visitation as opposed to a stranger or an agency, but the mother refuses all of them. He stated he does not want to prevent the Mother from moving to Florida, but the visitation proposed by the Mother “is unrealistic” so he can’t consent to her relocating the subject child. He believes the child will miss school with the Mother’s proposed visitation and that visitation in the summer is only possible if his family supervises and the Mother refuses that. The Father’s virtual testimony was cut short on June 7, 2021 as the battery on his phone died and he was not able to be reached. The matter was thereafter adjourned to the following day. The Father failed to appear on June 8, 2021 after his attorney and the court made numerous attempts to reach him and the paternal grandmother by telephone to no avail. The Father was deemed to have defaulted, and Ms. Nat was granted leave to file a motion to re-calendar the case, if the Father’s absence was excusable. MODIFICATION LEGAL ANALYSIS In Cook v. Cook, the Appellate Division Second Department held that, “A party seeking the modification of an existing court-ordered child custody (or visitation) arrangement has the burden of demonstrating that circumstances have changed since the initial determination such that modification is necessary to ensure the children’s best interests.” 142 A.D.3d 530, 533(2d Dept 2016); See also Bullard v. Clark, 154 A.D.3d 846 (2d Dept 2017); Bondarev v. Bondarev, 152 A.D.3d 482 (2d Dept 2017); Musachio v. Musachio, 137 A.D.3d 881, 882–883 (2d Dept 2016); Matter of Klotz v. O’Connor, 124 A.D.3d 662, 662–663 (2d Dept 2015). Additionally, the court has also held that in determining whether a prior order of custody (or visitation) should be modified, the “paramount issue before the court is whether, under the totality of the circumstances”, a modification of custody (or visitation) “is in the best interests of the child[ren]“. See Honeywell v. Honeywell, 39 A.D.3d 857, 858 (2d Dept 2007); Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89 (1982); Klat v. Klat, 176 A.D.2d 922 (2d Dept 1991); Matter of Robert T.F. v. Rosemary F., 148 A.D.2d 449 (2d Dept 1989). An existing visitation arrangement may be modified upon a showing that there has been a “subsequent change of circumstances and modification is required.” See Ross v. Morrison, 98 A.D.3d 515 (2d Dept 2012). See also Reilly v. Hager-Reilly, 166 A.D.3d 825 (2d Dept 2018) (The Appellate Court held that because of the mother’s mental illness, unsupervised visitation was detrimental to the child) “The best interests of the child generally lie in being nurtured and guided by both parents, and ‘for the noncustodial parent to develop a meaningful, nurturing relationship with [his or] her child, visitation must be frequent and regular. Absent extraordinary circumstances, where visitation would be detrimental to the child’s well-being, a noncustodial parent has a right to reasonable visitation privileges’” See Ross v. Morrison Supra at 517. See also Matter of Zwillman v. Kull, 90 A.D.3d 774, 775 (2d Dept 2011); Pollack v. Pollack, 56 A.D.3d 637, 638 (2d Dept 2008), quoting Twersky v. Twersky, 103 A.D.2d 775-776 (2d Dept 1984). RELOCATION LEGAL ANALYSIS Relocation cases must be looked at on a case-by-case basis. There is no exact rule for when relocation should be granted or denied by the Court. Instead, the Courts have adopted the legal standard for relocation determinations as set forth in the New York Court of Appeals decision Matter of Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727 (1996). In Tropea, the Court held that “each relocation request must be considered on its own merits with due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances and with predominant emphasis being placed on what outcome is likely to serve the best interests of the child.” Id. at 739. In the Matter of Feury v. Feury, 168 A.D.3d 729 (2d Dept 2019) the court held that “In deciding a custodial parent’s petition for permission to relocate, the court’s primary focus is the best interests of the child.” See Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171 (1982); Matter of Monroe v. Monroe, 164 A.D.3d 675 (2d Dept 2018). In Matter of Tayson v. Degraft-Johnson, 157 A.D.3d 703, 704 (2nd Dept 2018), the court held that “the parent seeking to relocate bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed move would be in the child’s best interests. See also Bjornson v. Bjornson, 38 A.D.3d 816-817 (2d Dept 2007). “In determining whether relocation is appropriate, the court must consider numerous factors, including the child’s relationship with each parent, the effect of the move on contact with the noncustodial parent, the potential economic, emotional, and educational enhancement to the lives of the custodial parent and the child due to the move, and each parent’s motives for seeking or opposing the move”. See Matter of Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d at 740-741(1996); See also Francis-Miller v. Miller, 111 A.D.3d 632 (2d Dept 2013); Follini v. Currie, 176 A.D.3d 1203 (2d Dept 2019) (Court denied relocation as no economic necessity on the part of the mother and not in the child’s best interest). In Tayson, the court determined that although permitting relocation might provide some economic benefits to the children, it did not “justify the reduction in the mother’s visitation or uprooting the child”. See Supra at 704. The Tropea Court also noted that while the respective rights of the custodial and noncustodial parents are unquestionably significant factors that must be considered, it is the rights and needs of the children that must be accorded the greatest weight.” Supra; See also Matter of Alaire K.G. v. Anthony P.G, 86 A.D.3d at 219 (1st Dept 2011); Matter of Melissa Marie G v. John Christopher W., 73 A.D.3d at 658 (1st Dept 2010); McBryde v. Bodden, 91 A.D.3d 781 (2d Dept 2012); Retamozzo v. Retamozzo, 91 A.D.3d 957 (2d Dept 2012). The Tropea court mentioned several other important factors to be considered by the court in a relocation matter: “the good faith of the parents in requesting or opposing the move, the child’s respective attachments to the custodial and noncustodial parents, the possibility of devising a visitation schedule that will enable the noncustodial parent to maintain a meaningful parent-child relationship, the quality of the life-style that the child would have if the proposed move were permitted or denied; the negative impact if any from continued and exacerbated hostility between the custodial and noncustodial parents; and the effect that the move may have on any extended family relationships.” Supra at 740. See Ritz v. Ritz, 36 A.D.3d 437 (1st Dept 2007) where the court denied the relocation of the children to Israel with their mother, holding that “there is no indication…that any benefits from the contemplated move would outweigh the importance of preserving the children’s relationship with their father.” Courts have used an economic analysis to help determine a basis for relocation. See Miller v. Pipia, 297 A.D.2d at 366 (2d Dept 2002), where the child was permitted to relocate to Florida with his mother. In that case, the court held in part that “economic necessity may present a particularly persuasive ground for permitting the proposed move”. See also Aziz v. Aziz, 8 A.D.3d 596 (2d Dept 2004) where the court held that “if a proposed relocation will provide economic, emotional, and educational benefits for the child, the custodial parent’s request for permission to relocate should be granted.” See Bruno v. Bruno, 47 A.D.3d 606 (2d Dept 2008); Tsui v. Tsui, 99 A.D.3d 793 (2d Dept 2012) (Court permitted relocation where the mother demonstrated that she could not meet the family’s living expenses in New York; that she wasn’t receiving child support payments, and that, if she were permitted to relocate, she would receive, from her parents, financial assistance and childcare assistance). Relocation has been denied in cases where the effect on the noncustodial parent and child relationship is severely detrimental. See Streid v. Streid, 46 A.D.3d 1155 (3d Dept 2007), where the court held that “a parent’s decision to reside in a distant locale is a very important factor among the constellation of factors to be considered in arriving at a best interest determination, particularly where there is evidence that it would detrimentally affect the other parent’s relationship with the children.” Id. at 1156. In Streid, the Court denied the mother’s application to relocate to Georgia with the child. See also Friedman v. Rome, 46 A.D.3d 682 (2d Dept 2007) (The Appellate Division held that “in considering the relevant factors, [the Family Court] properly determined that relocation was not in the children’s best interests”). The Court has also held that a parent may not be deprived of his or her right to reasonable and meaningful access to the children “unless exceptional circumstances have been presented to the court. The term ‘exceptional circumstances’ or ‘exceptional reasons’ is invariably associated with a situation where either the exercise of such right is inimical to the welfare of the children or the parent has in some manner forfeited his or her right to such access”. See Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d at 574 (2d Dept 1979). (Court denied the Mother’s request to relocate to Florida).Where the purported benefits of the proposed relocation do not justify the drastic reduction in visitation with the other parent, which would occur, the court has held that the proposed relocation is not in the best interests of the child. See Rubio v. Rubio, 71 A.D.3d 862 (2d Dept 2010); Martino v. Ramos, 64 A.D.3d 657 (2d Dept 2009); Feury v. Feury, 168 A.D.3d 729 (2d Dept 2019); Matter of Browner v. Kenward, 213 A.D.2d 400 (2d Dept 1995); See also Coniglio v. Coniglio, 170 A.D.2d 477, 478 (2d Dept 1991) (Appellate Court held that a parent will not be permitted to relocate to a “distant domicile which would effectively deprive the non-custodial parent of regular access to his or her children absent a showing of exceptional circumstances”.) In the end of each case requesting relocation, after carefully analyzing the relevant factors, it is ultimately “For the court to determine based on all the proof, whether it has been established by a preponderance of the evidence that a proposed relocation would serve the child’s best interests.” Tropea, Supra at 741. In the present matter, the most critical considerations are “Petitioner’s reason for and need for the move; the impact of the move on the children’s relationship with her father;…and the absence of any showing that the children’s life would be enhanced by the move. See Monroe v. Monroe, 164 A.D.3d 675 (2d Dept 2018). The Appellate Court has held that “Factors to be considered in determining the child’s best interests include the quality of the home environment and the parental guidance the custodial parent provides for the child, the ability of each parent to provide for the child’s emotional and intellectual development, the financial status and ability of each parent to provide for the child, the relative fitness of the respective parents, and the effect an award of custody to one parent might have on the child’s relationship with the other parent”. See Dante v. Dante, 170 A.D.3d 829 (2d Dept 2019); See also Matter of Elliott v. Felder, 69 A.D.3d 623 (2d Dept 2010); Matter of Lyons v. Sepe, 163A.D.3d 567 (2d Dept 2018). In contrast where the relocating parent has failed to show that relocation of the child is in the child’s best interest, the Court has denied such relocation. See Salichs v. James, 268 A.D.2d 168 (1st Dept 2000). (Court held that the Mother relocating to Puerto Rico with the child was not in the child’s best interest. Though the mother was the primary economic provider for the child she was unable to show that in remaining in New York, she would be unable to continue to provide adequately for her child and family. The Court found that “the most critical considerations are plaintiff’s reason for and need for the move, the impact of the move on the child’s relationship with the father, the difficulty of maintaining the central role he has played in her life, and the absence of any showing that the child’s life would be enhanced by the move.” Id.; See also Mascola v. Mascola, 251 A.D.2d 414, 415 (2d Dept 1998). The Court has also denied relocation, where a parent fails to establish an overall educational, economic or emotional benefit to the child sufficient to outweigh the detrimental impact on the quality of the child’s relationship with their other parent and other extended family that would necessarily result from a move to another state. See Salena S. v. Ahmad G. 152 A.D.3d 162 (1st Dept 2017); Matter of Lyons v. Sepe, 163 A.D.3d 567, 569 (2d Dept 2018) (Relocation was denied where the court held that although the mother in that matter “proved that the child’s life would be enhanced economically, the mother failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child’s life would also be enhanced emotionally and educationally by the move.”). DECISION This case involves not only a request to modify an existing order of visitation but also a request by the Mother to relocate the subject child to the state of Florida. The court had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor and body language of the parties as they testified virtually. The court found the testimony of the Mother, though viewed in a light most favorable to her, to be self-serving though generally credible. Any uncorroborated statements or opinions the mother testified regarding, was given no weight by the court. The court found the Father’s testimony to be completely self-serving, and minimally credible at times, including minimizing the severity of his mental health issues. The Father’s testimony exhibited a true love for his child, a desire to be involved in his life, and a genuine concern that if the Mother relocated to Florida, he would not be able to see his child. He testified that he felt that the Mother’s offer for visits was “unrealistic” and she was not willing to have anyone except an agency or her personally supervise the visits. The Mother exhibited a genuine love for her son as well, and a desire to make a “better” life for him. She however, had no plan in place, only a desire to move to Florida with her family members, and sadly an unrealistic way to facilitate visitation between the child and the Father. It is worth noting that the Mother failed to provide any evidence of the Father’s alleged attempts to commit suicide and alleged hospitalization for that. She also stated in her petition that the Father was physically abusive toward her and the child yet denied violence or physical incidents with her or the child in her testimony and offered no proof to the contrary. The only incidents she describes was some verbal incidents and the Father allegedly throwing her cell phone out the window of the moving car. The court found the allegations of physical violence to be without merit and non-credible based on her own statements to the contrary. The Mother and Father were represented by counsel and had ample opportunity to submit evidence and additional witnesses to support their claims, however minimal to none was offered. Ms. Nat remained mute as her client defaulted in the middle of his testimony. The Mother called no additional witnesses, nor presented any other evidence except pictures of her old apartment destroyed in a fire. Neither the Mother’s nor the Father’s counsel called any mental health professional as witnesses including the Forensic Evaluator Dr. Billick. During the Mother’s direct examination, she made numerous statements that she believed the father suffers from schizophrenia and was hospitalized for a suicide attempt in April or May 2019. No documentary evidence, witnesses, nor non-hearsay evidence was produced to support these statements. The Father did admit he is diagnosed with bipolar schizophrenia but refused to disclose the medications he is taking and spoke of hospitalizations for health issues not mental health issues. The court finds the Father’s testimony regarding his mental health was evasive and non-credible. Since the Father failed to return to court to continue his testimony the court was forced to proceed on what witnesses, testimony, and evidence was presented to the court. The court credits the Mother in showing that the father’s mental health issues create a change of circumstances since the issuance of the 2018 order and require that the order be modified to grant only supervised visitation for the Father. Regarding the Mother’s application to relocate with the subject child to Florida, the court is viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Petitioner Mother, must deny her application. Applying the best interest principles from Tropea to this case, the court finds that the Mother has failed to meet her burden of proof in showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it would be in the best interest of the subject child to be relocated to Florida which would severely sever the child’s relationship with the Father. The Mother with the assistance of her family has solely provided financially for the subject child and ensured that he has appropriate food, clothing, housing, and ensures that all his needs are being met. The Mother says the Father never provides for the child, yet she also never filed for child support. The Mother works as a driver for Uber/Lyft. She offered no evidence or testimony that she found better or comparable employment already in Florida. The Mother had not even assessed an area within Florida that she wanted to live. She had no plan for a relocation other than the desire to go. No testimony was offered regarding an assessment of possible schools for the child in the state of Florida, doctors and other medical providers for the child, nor the type of home she was looking for, the cost, and even who would be paying for it. The Mother testified if she must stay in New York, she will be forced to stay in a shelter. The court finds that statement self- serving and meant to play on the sympathy of the court. It is worth noting that the apartment that was destroyed in a fire was not a shelter. The Mother along with her mother and several adult siblings lived together and upon information and belief likely paid rent for that apartment (though no evidence was proffered regarding that apartment except it was destroyed by fire). The court finds that the number of adults living in the home and who would be moving to Florida (and even remaining in New York), could be employed and provide financially to the household. This contribution would allow for the family to find a more suitable home than the shelter system for the subject child in New York and not rely on that as the main reason to move to Florida. The Mother never testified to any efforts to find new or better housing or employment in New York. Instead, she is acquiescing in staying in the shelter system if forced to stay in New York with the child. She testified she wanted to enroll in school in Florida to better herself, but there are schools right here in New York which she denied looking into. The Mother offered no credible testimony or evidence that if she was forced to remain in New York with the child, it would render her unable to take care of or provide for her son. The Father has an attachment to his child despite his mental illness issues. He wants to visit his child and expressed concern that if the Mother moved away, her plan for visits was not sufficient for him to be in his son’s life. The Mother testified that the Father consented to her moving then changed his mind. The court finds that statement credible and in fact justified on the part of the Father, as the relocation would drastically and negatively impact the relationship between the Father and his son. The Father acknowledges his visits should be supervised. The parties need to work together to find a supervisor they both agree with, particularly a mutual friend or family member of the Father or even the Mother, who can reliably supervise. Permanent agency supervised visits may be cost prohibitive for the Father. Additionally, other than the testimony of the parties there was no additional evidence submitted to the court in furtherance of the Mother’s contention or to corroborate her statement that the move to Florida would be “better” for the child. To this court, no “exceptional circumstances” have been presented nor proven to the court to warrant severely severing the Father child relationship. The Father suffers from a mental illness, the severity of it was not proven by the Mother and was minimized by the Father. This does not mean he should be deprived of a regular, meaningful and viable supervised visitation schedule with his son. His mental illness does not mean he forfeits his rights to access his son, the son’s schools, doctors and medical providers, nor attend milestone events in the child’s life and extracurricular activities. Based on the testimony before the court, I find that there is nothing in this record to warrant the substantial interference with the Father’s rights to have meaningful access to his child. Though the Mother has some personal reasons to relocate, like a genuine desire to make a better life for herself and her children with the help of her family, as well as her inadmissible opinion that Florida would provide a “better” life for her children than New York. However, there was no evidence submitted to support that assertion. These reasons do not outweigh the Father’s right to have regular meaningful access to his child. Though the court understands the Mother’s desire to leave New York and better herself financially, there was no evidence or testimony of efforts she made to secure similar employment in New York or evidence to show a promotion or an increased salary in Florida. There was also no evidence of efforts made to find suitable and appropriate housing within New York or even nearby to New York. Based upon the totality of the circumstances and upon consideration of all the relevant factors, the Court finds that it would be in the best interest of the subject child to remain in the State of New York and grant an order of supervised visitation to the Father. The Mother’s petition under docket V-XXXXXX-18/19D and V-XXXXXX-18/19C is denied and dismissed with prejudice as it relates to the application to relocate the subject child. The Mother failed to meet her burden of proof in demonstrating that the relocation of the subject child to Florida is in the child’s best interest. The relief requested to modify the 2018 Order of Visitation is granted as stated below. The following shall be the Order of the Court: It is HEREBY ORDERED THAT: The Mother’s application to relocate the child to the State of Florida is denied and dismissed for the detailed reasons stated prior. The Order of Custody and Visitation dated November 28, 2018 remains in full force and effect except as modified herein: The Father shall have supervised visitation with the subject child using an agreed upon supervisor (family member or friend) or at a low to no cost agency (the parties and their counsel will work together to find one). The Father shall provide a list of all possible personal supervisors he is proposing to assist with day visits if not using an agency. The Mother shall also put forth possible friends or family members who can supervise the visitation. The Mother shall make a good faith effort to review everyone on the Father’s list and be able to fully articulate a good reason for excluding that person as a supervisor. The Father shall do the same regarding those on the Mother’s list. Should there be a cost for an agency, the Father shall cover the cost for those agency visits. In-person visitation between the Father and the subject child shall occur at least once weekly. The Father shall have web-based video conference calls with the subject child through either “Google Duo” or “What’s App” or other agreed upon free webbased video conferencing application. These calls shall occur at least twice per week on agreed upon days and times (to be determined with the assistance of counsel if necessary) Parties shall exchange a contact number for that purpose. The Parties may modify this order upon mutual electronic consent (via text messaging or email) PURSUANT TO SECTION 11130F THE FAMILY COURT ACT, AN APPEAL FROM THIS ORDER MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THE ORDER BY APPELLANT IN COURT, 35 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAILING OF THE ORDER TO APPELLANT BY THE CLERK OF COURT, OR 30 DAYS AFTER SERVICE BY A PARTYOR THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD UPON THE APPELLANT, WHICHEVER IS EARLIEST. SO ORDERED Check applicable box: Order mailed on [specify date(s) and to whom mailed] Order received in court on [specify date(s) and to whom given]: Dated: August 25, 2021
