MEMORANDUM ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff Advanced Analytics, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “AAI”) has filed objections to the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Pitman, dated September 4, 2019 (docket entry no. 340 (the “Report”)), which recommends that the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. and The Yield Book, Inc. (“Defendants”) be granted; to the Opinion and Order of Judge Pitman, also dated September 4, 2019 (docket entry no. 339 (the “Rule 56(h) Ord.”)), which denied Plaintiff’s related motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(h); and to the Opinion and Order of Magistrate Judge Cave, dated June 9, 2020 (docket entry no. 438 (the “Reconsideration Ord.”)), which denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of two of Judge Cave’s non-dispositive orders in the above-captioned action. The Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1332. The Court has reviewed thoroughly the parties’ submissions on the objections as well as the papers filed in connection with the underlying motions and, for the following reasons, overrules each of Plaintiff’s objections and adopts the Report in its entirety. BACKGROUND The factual background of this case has been discussed in prior orders of the Court; the parties’ familiarity with them is assumed. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants misappropriated number sequences developed by Plaintiff’s principal, Dr. Xiaolu Wang (the “ACE Sequences”), during Defendants’ testing of those sequences, which were then incorporated into a software product (“the Yield Book”) or used to create new sequences of numbers for use in the Yield Book. On May 7, 2004, Plaintiff filed its Complaint (docket entry no. 1) asserting claims for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and constructive trust. On July 1, 2004, Defendants filed an Answer and counterclaim (docket entry no. 11) asserting their entitlement to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, in the event they prevailed in this action, under the terms of the parties’ January 7, 1997, non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”). On February 15, 2008, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On August 5, 2009, Judge Pitman issued a report and recommendation (docket entry no. 112 (the “2009 Report”)) recommending that judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants breached the NDA, to the extent that claim arose from Defendants’ admission that their sequence developer, Teytel, had used outputs from Defendants’ testing of the ACE Sequences (but not the sequences themselves) to compare the accuracy of outputs from sequences allegedly developed by Teytel, but only to the extent of a nominal damages award of one dollar, based on a conclusion that Plaintiff had failed to proffer evidence of damages flowing from Teytel’s “research (i.e. non-investment)” misuse of the ACE outputs. The 2009 Report recommended that judgment be entered in favor of Defendants in all other respects, including to the extent that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim asserted that Teytel used or targeted the ACE Sequences themselves (rather than merely the outputs of Defendants’ testing of those sequences) in developing his own sequences on behalf of Defendants. See Advanced Analytics, Inc. v. Citigroup Glob. Markets, Inc., No. 04-CV-3531-LTS-HBP, 2009 WL 7133660, at *7-25 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2009), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, 04-CV-3531-LTS-HBP, 2010 WL 4780772 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2010). The 2009 Report also recommended that the Court enter judgment in favor of Defendants on their counterclaim for an award of fees and costs, given that Defendants had “prevailed with regard to the central relief sought” for purposes of the NDA. Id. at *24. In a Memorandum Order dated November 22, 2010 (docket entry no. 124 (the “2010 Order”)), the Court adopted the 2009 Report in several respects and entered judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. Advanced Analytics, 2010 WL 4780772, at *3.1 However, the Court declined to adopt the 2009 Report’s recommendations “regarding the character of Teytel’s use of the output and the significance of that use as to the appropriate measure of damages,” id. at *2, and therefore granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, to the extent it claimed that Teytel’s use of the ACE test results was in violation of the parties’ NDA, as to liability only, leaving open the question of the appropriate measure of damages. As to the remainder of Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim — regarding Plaintiff’s allegations that Teytel used or targeted the ACE Sequences in developing his own — the Court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, explaining that, on the then-existing record, evidence of references to ACE in a notebook maintained by Teytel (the “Teytel Notebook”) and the expert evidence proffered by Plaintiff “would be sufficient to support a reasonable jury’s determination in Plaintiff’s favor on this aspect of the breach of contract claim.” Id. The Court also noted, however, that “apparently relevant discovery (in the form of Defendants’ development and testing records) requested by Plaintiff and ordered produced by the Magistrate Judge has not yet been produced,” rendering summary judgment inappropriate. Id. Similarly, the Court concluded as to Plaintiffs’ timely2 misappropriation claims that summary judgment in favor of Defendants was “premature as well as unwarranted on the current record because there [was] a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants’ sequences were derived from the ACE sequence,” and because “the outstanding testing and development discovery may be relevant to whether Plaintiff can frame a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants’ disclosed practices were a front for actual use of the ACE sequence in generating Yield Book outputs.” Id. at *3. Having so concluded, the Court also declined to adopt, as “premature,” the 2009 Report’s recommendation that the Court grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim for attorneys’ fees under the parties’ NDA because “genuine issues of material fact preclude[d] the resolution at this stage of most of the parties’ dispute concerning breach of the NDA.” Id. at *4. On or about March 7, 2011, Defendants produced the testing and development files discussed in the 2010 Order. (Report at 18; Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, dated April 5, 2013 (“Def’t 56.1 Stmt.”) 67.) Defendants subsequently produced evidence from their retained expert, Dr. Nathaniel Polish, who analyzed the testing and development files and opined that they reflect, consistent with Teytel’s Notebook and testimony, Teytel’s independent development of Defendants’ sequences, and that there was not “any data or code in the Sequence Development and Testing Files to suggest that Dr. Teytel relied upon, targeted or had access to the ACE Numbers or any product of the ACE Numbers,” while he was developing Defendants’ sequences. (Second Expert Report of Dr. Nathaniel Polish, dated June 18, 2012 (Exhibit 35 to the Declaration of Nathaniel E. Jedrey dated April 5, 2013) (“Second Polish Report”) at 15; Report at 29-30.) Plaintiff did not timely produce any contrary expert opinion evidence analyzing the testing and development files produced by Defendants on March 7, 2011. (Report at 29-30; Def’t 56.1 Stmt. 79.) Against that backdrop, Defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s remaining claims3; Plaintiff separately moved for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(h), based on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants submitted affidavits in support of summary judgment in bad faith. On September 4, 2019, Judge Pitman issued an Opinion and Order denying Plaintiff’s Rule 56(h) motion, as well as the Report, recommending that the Court grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety. On June 9, 2020, Judge Cave — who was assigned the pretrial management of this action after Judge Pitman’s retirement in 2019 — issued an Opinion and Order resolving Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration as to Judge Cave’s resolution of two ancillary disputes between the parties. Plaintiff has filed objections to all three decisions. DISCUSSION When reviewing a report and recommendation, the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C) (Westlaw through P.L. 117-41). The Court must make a de novo determination to the extent that a party makes specific objections to a magistrate judge’s findings. Soley v. Wasserman, 823 F. Supp. 2d 221, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1997)). “However, when a party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the court reviews the report and recommendation strictly for clear error.” Piligian v. Icahn Sch. of Med. at Mount Sinai, 490 F. Supp. 3d 707, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive order, the Court must review the objections and “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A). A decision is clearly erroneous where “the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Gualandi v. Adams, 385 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). An order is “contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” Gym Door Repairs, Inc. v. Young Equip. Sales, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 3d 484, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citation omitted). This standard of review is “highly deferential”; magistrate judges “are afforded broad discretion in resolving nondispositive disputes and reversal is appropriate only if their discretion is abused.” Thai Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 924 F. Supp. 2d 508, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report The Court turns first to Plaintiff’s objections to the Report, which recommends that the Court grant Defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s remaining claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of contract. (Docket entry no. 390 (“Report Objs.”).) As set forth in greater detail in the Report, Judge Pitman concluded — in light of Defendants’ production of their testing and development records and unrebutted expert testimony analyzing those records and comparing Defendants’ sequences to the ACE Sequences — that Plaintiff has failed to introduce evidence that Defendants’ sequences were similar to or derived from Plaintiff’s sequences. Advanced Analytics, 2019 WL 9466011, at *8-10. The Report also rejected Plaintiff’s argument that summary judgment should be denied because of Plaintiff’s allegations of discovery misconduct — including that Defendants “fabricated” certain of the sequences they produced in discovery, “modified” their testing and development records before producing them, and withheld the true “production” sequences used by the Yield Book. Id. at *11-14. The Report further concluded that, on the current record, “the three ambiguous references to ACE in Teytel’s notebook…[are] not sufficient evidence of misappropriation” to defeat Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, id. at *14, and rejected Plaintiff’s new theory that Defendants’ development of portfolio hedging abilities around the same time as Defendants conducted the ACE testing raised a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Defendants’ sequences were derived from the ACE Sequences. Id. at *14-15. The Report therefore recommended entry of judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s remaining misappropriation and breach of contract claims. The first fourteen pages of Plaintiff’s objections, which purport to detail the means by which Defendants stole and used the ACE Sequences, rely almost exclusively on Plaintiff’s counsel’s interpretation of raw computer code produced by Defendants in discovery, unsupported by lay or expert witness testimony concerning the meaning of that code. Plaintiff’s counsel’s unsupported conclusions about Defendants’ code are insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of fact. Paone v. Microsoft Corp., 881 F. Supp. 2d 386, 415 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Unsubstantiated attorney argument regarding the meaning of technical evidence is no substitute for competent, substantiated expert testimony.” (citation omitted)); Demarco v. Ouellette, No. 04-CV-0440-RJH, 2005 WL 2170557, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2005) (quoting Lavine v. Town of Lake Luzerne, 296 A.D.2d 793, 794 (3d Dep’t 2002)) (“non-expert attorney’s opinion has ‘no probative value’”).4 Counsel’s interpretation of Defendants’ “theft code” and “use code” therefore does not provide a basis for rejection of the Report. Next, Plaintiff objects to Judge Pitman’s “finding of no discovery abuse by Defendants.” (Report Objs. at 18-20, 24-25.) Magistrate judges are afforded “broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes,” In re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litig., 336 F.R.D. 400, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citation omitted), however, and Plaintiff’s claims of discovery misconduct by Defendants largely recycle arguments which have already been presented to, and rejected by, this Court. See, e.g., Advanced Analytics, Inc. v. Citigroup Glob. Markets, Inc., No. 04-CV-3531-LTS-HBP, 2013 WL 489061, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013) (“For substantially the reasons stated by Judge Pitman at the September 5, 2012, hearing, and in light of the evidence proffered by Defendants that Plaintiff has everything it needs to compare Defendants’ sequences, analyze the code that Defendants use to generate their sequences to determine whether this process could have been derived from Defendants’ alleged exposure to the Plaintiff’s product and determine whether the Plaintiff’s product played any role in the development of Defendants’ sequences, the Court does not find any basis for overturning Judge Pitman’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s application for additional production of Defendants’ code.”); (Rule 56(h) Ord. at 2 (“All of the discovery issues concerning plaintiff’s theory that defendants were withholding evidence have been previously litigated.”).) Finally, Plaintiff notes that the Court’s 2010 Order concluded that the “Teytel notebook and the expert evidence proffered by Plaintiff in this connection…would be sufficient to support a reasonable jury’s determination in Plaintiff’s favor” on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants breached the NDA by using Plaintiff’s confidential information to develop the Teytel sequences, Advanced Analytics, 2010 WL 4780772, at *2, and on Plaintiff’s remaining misappropriation claims. Id. at *3 (“The recommended grant of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor is, accordingly, premature as well as unwarranted on the current record[.]“) (emphasis added). (See Report Objs. at 15-18, 21-24.) However, the Court reached that conclusion on a different record which did not include the development and testing records reflecting Teytel’s development of Defendants’ sequences, or Defendants’ unrebutted expert testimony that those records confirm that Teytel developed his sequences in accordance with the methodology described in the Teytel Notebook, and not through reliance upon, targeting, or accessing the ACE Sequences. (See Report at 18, 27, 29-30; see also Second Polish Report §II(A) (opining, based on his review of the sequence development and testing files produced by Defendants after the Court’s 2010 Order, that “Defendants developed their 200 path mixed-seed sequence in accordance with the methodology described by Dr. Mikhail Teytel in his notebook,” and that nothing in those files “suggest[s] that Dr. Teytel relied upon, targeted or had access to the ACE Numbers while he was developing the 200 path mixed-seed sequence”); Def’t 56.1 Stmt.
