The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 004) 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, and 126 were read on this motion for DISCOVERY. DECISION ORDER ON MOTION Upon the foregoing documents, plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery is granted, in accord with the following memorandum decision. Background In this class action proceeding, A’Seelah Diamond and Ruth Britt, on behalf of themselves and a class of those similarly situated (“Plaintiffs”), are residents of housing owned by defendant New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”). They seek to recover damages incurred by NYCHA’s alleged failure to provide adequate heat and hot water to all NYCHA residents for the duration of the 2017-2018 heating season, a period that ran from October 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018. On April 12, 2018, Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a summons and complaint which asserts a damages claim for breach of the warranty of habitability on behalf of themselves and other similarly-situated NYCHA residents (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1). An amended complaint that asserts a second claim for breach of the warranty of habitability, seeking injunctive relief, was filed on June 12, 2018 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 40). Plaintiffs moved to certify the class on May 21, 2018 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 41), and Defendants then moved to dismiss the amended complaint (NYSCEF Doc. No. 75). On February 7, 2019, the justice of this court who previously presided over this action (Hon. Carol R. Edmead) issued an order that denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint (see, NYSCEF Doc No. 103). That order was reversed by order of the Appellate Division, First Department, dated January 21, 2020, which reinstated the plaintiffs’ claims, certified the “damages class,” and remanded the case back to this court, where it was reassigned to the undersigned (NYSCEF Doc. No. 112). In the instant motion, Plaintiffs move pursuant to CPLR 3214 to compel defendants NYCHA and Oyeshola Olatoye, in her official capacity as Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer of NYCHA (together, “Defendants”) to respond to Document Request No. 18 of Plaintiffs’ First Set of Document Requests, which was served upon Defendants on March 12, 2020, and demands “[d]ocuments sufficient to identify each individual that resided in a NYCHA residence during the 2017-2018 heating season and each such resident’s contact information, including their address, telephone number, and email address” (Affirmation in Support [NYSCEF Doc. No. 122] 10). Following a series of “meet & confers” between counsel for the parties, Plaintiffs agreed to narrow the request to only the names and contact information of NYCHA tenants of record during the 2017-2018 heating season (the “tenant of record information”) (id.). Plaintiffs argue that the tenant of record information is discoverable and necessary for counsel to communicate with class members in order to adequately represent their interests (id. 19), and specifically, in order to provide the class notice and opt-out information; to apportion and distribute any monetary damages; to communicate with potential class members about the length and severity of any relevant heat and hot water outages, about any money expended by potential class members to alleviate the outage conditions, and about other matters relevant to the class representation (see, id. 17). Defendants concede that the tenant of record information is relevant, but contend that the request is premature and the information should not be disclosed to Plaintiffs until a court-approved notice is given to potential class members; until the identity and number of class members who “opt-out” is determined; and until there is a judicial resolution of a contemplated dispositive motion concerning common class-wide liability issues (Affirmation in Opposition [NYSCEF Doc. No. 124] 12). Discussion CPLR 3101(a) provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” “New York strongly encourages open and full disclosure as a matter of policy” (MSCI Inc. v. Jacob, 120 AD3d 1072, 1075 [1st Dept 2014]), and the words “material and necessary” are to be interpreted liberally and require disclosure of material related to the dispute that may help in preparing for trial (Allen v. Crowell Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403 [1968]; Roman Catholic Church of the Good Shepherd v. Tempco Sys., 202 AD2d 257 [lst Dept 1994]; Johnson v. Natl. R.R. Passenger Corp, 83 AD2d 916 [1st Dept 1981]). Pursuant to CPLR §3124, “[i]f a person fails to respond to or comply with any request, notice, interrogatory, demand, question or order under this article…the party seeking disclosure may move to compel compliance or a response.” On a motion brought pursuant to CPLR §3124, the burden is on the party seeking the disclosure to establish a basis for the production sought (see, Crazytown Furniture, Inc. v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 150 AD2d 420 [2d Dept 1989]; accord, e.g., Rodriguez v. Goodman, 2015 WL 4554460 [Sup Ct NY County 2015]). “[T]he party challenging disclosure bears the burden of establishing that the information sought is immune from disclosure” (Ambac Assurance Corp. v. DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc., 92 AD3d 451, 452 [1st Dept 2012]). A party is not required to respond to discovery demands that are “palpably improper in that they sought, inter alia, irrelevant information, or were overbroad and burdensome” (Montalvo v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 102 AD3d 842, 843 [2d Dept 2013]). It is indisputable that the names and contact information of class members is relevant information that is necessary to the prosecution of this action. As Plaintiffs correctly assert, the information is required to facilitate mailing of the class notice and necessary for class counsel to communicate with class members. Accordingly, the dispute regarding disclosure of tenant of record information is largely one of timing, i.e., whether the information is disclosed now or later in the litigation. Defendants’ argument that the disclosure of the tenant of record information is premature because it must be “coupled” with a motion for approval of the class notice is unpersuasive. Although issues involving the disclosure of contact information for class members may most commonly arise in conjunction with a motion made pursuant to CPLR 904 to approve a class notice, there is no statutory or other legal requirement that these events must happen contemporaneously. On the contrary, withholding the tenant of record information would effectively bar Plaintiffs’ counsel from contacting potential class members prior to approval of a class notice — a circumstance which would prejudice Plaintiffs and is not called for by the CPLR or any other legal authority. Defendants’ contention that disclosure of the tenant of record information “must await determination of the merits of the common class liability issues” (Affirmation in Opposition [NYSCEF Doc. No. 124] 9) is similarly unpersuasive. As Plaintiffs correctly note, discovery was deliberately not bifurcated in this case precisely because Defendants urged that issues of liability not be bifurcated from issues of damages (see, Affirmation in Reply [NYSCEF Doc. No. 126] 8). To the extent that Defendants rely on Murray v. Allied-Signal, Inc. (177 AD2d 984 [4th Dept 1991)]) and Pludeman v. Northern Leasing Sys., Inc. (2013 WL 5442254 [Sup Ct NY County, Sept. 23, 2013]) to preclude disclosure of the tenant of record information, those cases are inapposite (and, in any event, are not binding on this court). They are inapposite because they address circumstances where the defendant in a class action sought to compel discovery from absent class members. Plaintiffs do not seek to compel discovery from absent class members, they seek discovery from Defendants. The holdings of Murray and Pludeman do not stand for the proposition that class counsel should be prohibited from communicating with members of the class in furtherance of the litigation. Finally, the court is unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that the demand for tenant of record information is overbroad and unduly burdensome “at this stage of the proceeding” (Affirmation in Opposition [NYSCEF Doc 124]
