MEMORANDUM & ORDER Plaintiff Mark Feuer (“Plaintiff”) brings claims against defendants Stoler of Westbury, Inc., Westbury Toyota, Inc., Stoler Westbury Realty, LLC, Leonard Stoler, Barry Stoler, and David Leibowitz (collectively, “Defendants”) under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), the New York Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), and other causes of action under New York common law. Defendants seek to compel arbitration and stay this action pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. (ECF No. 19.) During a pre-motion conference regarding Defendants’ motion request, the Court informed the parties that their pre-motion letters would be construed as briefs. (ECF No. 22.) The Court afforded the parties the opportunity to supplement their positions, and both have done so. (ECF Nos. 23, 24, 25.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and stays this action. I. BACKGROUND For purposes of the instant motion, the specific details of Plaintiff’s claims are not relevant. Consequently, the Court sets forth only the factual background necessary to determine whether arbitration should be compelled. When Plaintiff began his employment as General Manager of Westbury Toyota, he signed an arbitration agreement, dated November 25, 2011 (the “Agreement”). (ECF No. 24-1.) The Agreement addressed any legal claims that might arise over the course of his employment and provided: Employee [i.e., Plaintiff] agrees that all claims involving legally protected rights directly or indirectly related to Employee’s recruitment, employment, or termination of employment by Westbury Toyota shall be settled by the Westbury Toyota internal grievance procedure, described below, and if unsuccessful, by the impartial binding arbitration, and that these are the sole, exclusive, final, and binding means for final resolution of such claims. This Agreement includes, but is not limited to, claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Americans With Disabilities Act, and Family and Medical Leave Act, any claim under any federal, state, or local law, regulation or ordinance regarding employment.1 (Id.) The Agreement also contained a choice-of-law provision, which stated that “all causes and controversies arising hereunder” shall be “interpreted, applied and enforced” by New York law. (Id.) Additionally, it provided that “Employee[] also agrees that the obligation to arbitrate any dispute is fully enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, and the judgment upon the arbitration award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction over such claims.” (Id.) The entire basis of the parties’ dispute in the instant motion is whether these provisions compel arbitration. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him by cutting his pay and unlawfully terminating him based on his medical conditions. (ECF No. 1.) He brings claims for discrimination and retaliation under the ADA; interference and retaliation under the FMLA; discrimination, retaliation, and aiding and abetting under the NYSHRL; breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel under New York law; and a violation of the NYLL. (Id.) II. DISCUSSION A. Applicable Law The parties first dispute whether the Court should apply federal or state law to their dispute regarding arbitrability. Defendants argue that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies because the Agreement states “the obligation to arbitrate any dispute is fully enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.” (ECF No. 24-1.) Plaintiff, however, contends that the Court should apply New York law because of the Agreement’s choice-of-law provision, which states that “all causes and controversies arising hereunder” shall be “interpreted, applied and enforced” by New York law. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that the Court should apply New York law, specifically CPLR §7515, which he says bars the arbitration of employment discrimination claims like the ones in his complaint. (ECF No. 21.) CPLR §7515 provides that “[e]xcept where inconsistent with federal law, no written contract, entered into on or after the effective date of this section shall contain” a prohibited mandatory arbitration clause. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §7515(i). A prohibited mandatory arbitration clause is any clause that “requires…that the parties submit to mandatory arbitration to resolve any allegation or claim of discrimination.” Id. §7515(a). This statute additionally provides that “[e]xcept where inconsistent with federal law, the provisions of such [a] prohibited clause…shall be null and void.” Id. §7515(b)(iii). Several district courts in this circuit have squarely rejected Plaintiff’s argument regarding the application of CPLR §7515 based on a New York choice of law provision in an arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Lee v. Engel Burman Grande Care at Jericho, LLC, No. 20-CV-3093, 2021 WL 3725986, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2021) (“[T]o the extent that Section 7515 does not itself carve out agreements that are subject to the FAA, Section 7515 ‘is displaced by the FAA.’”); Rollag v. Cowen Inc., No. 20-CV-5138, 2021 WL 807210, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2021) (“Parties cannot contract their way out of the FAA’s displacement of state-law prohibitions on the arbitration of particular types of claims. Simply put, NY CPLR §7515 is displaced by the FAA in any ‘arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.’”); White v. WeWork Companies, Inc., No. 20-CV-1800, 2020 WL 3099969, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2020), motion to certify appeal denied sub nom., 2020 WL 4383506 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2020) (“Since CPLR §7515 is displaced by the FAA, Whyte may not rely on it to defeat WeWork’s motion to compel arbitration. WeWork’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED, and the pending action is stayed pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §3.”). The Court does so here as well. B. Standard Under the FAA The FAA provides that “[a] written provision in…a contract…to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract…shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. §2. “[U]pon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” Id. §4. The statute “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1987). The Second Circuit has instructed that: In order to determine whether all or part of the instant action should be sent to arbitration, the Court must conduct the following inquiries: [F]irst, it must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; second, it must determine the scope of that agreement; third, if federal statutory claims are asserted, it must consider whether Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and fourth, if the court concludes that some, but not all, of the claims in the case are arbitrable, it must then decide whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration. JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Oldroyd v. Elmira Sav. Bank, FSB, 134 F.3d 72, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1998)). C. Application Applying the Second Circuit’s test to the instant situation, the Court finds that arbitration is warranted, as set forth below. 1. Agreement to Arbitrate First, the Agreement is clear that the parties agreed to arbitrate. “Whether or not the parties have agreed to arbitrate is a question of state contract law.” Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2012). New York law provides that “a party seeking arbitration need only prove the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence.” Couch v. AT&T Servs., Inc., No. 13-CV-2004, 2014 WL 7424093, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2014). Here, in signing the Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate any claim that fell within its scope. Indeed, he does not deny signing it, and he only argues that it is unenforceable under New York law.2 Accordingly, the Court finds that the parties agreed to arbitrate. In Plaintiff’s supplemental letter, he argues that “[t]he agreement only applies to Westbury Toyota, Inc. and does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Stoler of Westbury, Inc., Stoler of Westbury Realty, LLC, Leonard Stoler, Barry Stoler, and David Leibowitz” because these defendants, “aside from Westbury Toyota, Inc. are not parties to the agreement, nor covered by the terms of the agreement.” (ECF No. 23 at 2.) In his complaint, though, Plaintiff alleges that the corporate entity defendants all “operate under the same corporate umbrella and ownership.” (ECF No. 1 at 14.) In addition, he describes the individual defendants as holding corporate offices. (Id. at
