MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Petitioner Elmer Alexander Lopez, pro se, moves to vacate his conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255. Following his indictment, Lopez pled guilty to one count of racketeering on March 26, 2018 and was subsequently sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment on December 18, 2018. Lopez filed the instant petition on January 6, 2020, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to appeal his sentence after being asked to do so. (Petition at 5 (ECF No. 1255).) Lopez asks the Court for “an evidentiary hearing…regarding this matter,” and, alternatively, asks the Court to grant him his “right to appeal [his] conviction and sentence” without a hearing. (Id. at 13.) For the reasons set forth below, Lopez’s petition is denied in its entirety without an evidentiary hearing. I. BACKGROUND Lopez was arrested on October 18, 2016 and charged in a criminal complaint. (See Complaint at 1-2, 5 4 (ECF. No. 1).) Lopez was alleged to be a member of the violent gang known as La Mara Salvatrucha (“MS-13″), and specifically a member of an MS-13 “clique” known as Centrales Locos Salvatruchas (“CLS”). (See id at 5 4.) Lopez was initially charged with attempted murder in aid of racketeering and discharging a firearm in connection with that attempted murder. (See id. at 1-2.) He was subsequently charged with additional crimes in a series of superseding indictments. (See ECF Nos. 32, 50, 129, 384.) On March 26, 2018, Lopez pled guilty to a single count of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(c), as set forth in the Fourth Superseding Indictment. (ECF No. 384.) Pursuant to a plea agreement with the government, Lopez pled guilty to participation in two particular racketeering acts — namely, (1) the June 3, 2016 murder of Jose Pena, and (2) the attempted murder of an individual believed to be a rival gang member. (See Plea Transcript (ECF No. 1581-1).) Lopez’s plea agreement with the government contained a provision in which he agreed to waive the right to appeal any sentence “at or below 405 months’ imprisonment,” as well as the right to bring any petition under Section 2255. (See Plea Agreement at 4 (Dkt. No. 1581-2).) Furthermore, at the plea proceeding, the Court advised Lopez that he was waiving his “right to appeal [his] sentence itself to the extent [he had] not waived [his] right to appeal [his] plea sentence in [his] plea agreement with the government.” (See Plea Tr. at 17, 19).) On December 18, 2018, the Court sentenced Lopez to 300 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. (See Judgment (ECF No. 810); Sentencing Transcript at 24 (ECF No. 1581-3).) The advisory range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines was 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment, as agreed upon by the parties in the plea agreement. (Sentencing Tr. at 6-7.) The Court explained in detail how it arrived at the sentencing of 300 months’ imprisonment after balancing all of the factors under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). (See id. at 23-31.) At the conclusion of the sentencing, the Court also specifically advised Lopez of his right to appeal an unlawful sentence “to the extent [he had] not waived [the] right to appeal in a plea agreement with the government.” (Id. at 32-33.) On January 6, 2020, Lopez filed the instant petition for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255. Lopez alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to appeal his sentence after he was asked to do so. (Pet. at 5.) Specifically, Lopez filed a pro se petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 on January 6, 2020, in which he alleges that he “requested that [his] attorney file an appeal on [his] behalf” at his sentencing hearing, but that he was told he could not appeal. (Id.) He claims that, after the Court advised him of his right to appeal at his sentencing hearing, his attorney “promised to ‘look into it’” and that his lawyer only promised to do so “in what now appears to be a tactic to get [Lopez] to quit[] at the time.” (Id.) According to Lopez, he has not received any contact from his attorney regarding his appeal, nor has his family been able to reach him. (Id.) Lopez also claims that he “discovered through a jailhouse lawyer” that his lawyer has not filed an appeal in this case. (Id) In response to Lopez’s Section 2255 petition, the government filed a letter on August 14, 2020, asking this Court to direct Lopez’s attorneys to file declarations as to the underlying facts and seeking disclosure of any relevant information to resolving the Petition. (ECF No. 1457.) The Court entered such an order on September 14, 2020. (ECF No. 1477.) Lopez’s lawyers flatly deny his claims. A sworn declaration was submitted by Joshua L. Dratel, Lopez’s court-appointed learned counsel,1 in which he stated that he expressly raised with Lopez the issue of whether Lopez wished to appeal his sentence. (See Dratel Declaration, dated October 14, 2020, at 5 (ECF No. 1581-4).) Dratel recounts that he and Lopez spoke in a small room after his sentence was imposed, along with co-counsel Florian Miedel and an interpreter. (Id. at 4.) Specifically, Dratel states that “because [they] had an interpreter available, and the rules provide only a 14-day period to file a Notice of Appeal, [he] pointed out to Mr. Lopez that he had the right to appeal his sentence.” (Id. at 5.) Dratel “asked him whether he understood that he had received a sentence well below the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,” which made it “highly unlikely, if not impossible, to win an appeal of the sentence,” and noted the 14-day filing deadline for filing a Notice of Appeal. (Id) After Lopez “confirmed that he understood” those facts, Dratel specifically “asked [Lopez] if he agreed that he did not want [his attorneys] to appeal his sentence.” (Id) According to Dratel, Lopez “agreed [they] should not appeal his sentence.” (Id.) Florian Miedel,2 who served as Lopez’s court-appointed capital counsel, also completed a sworn declaration corroborating Dratel’s version of events and specifically “recall[ed] Mr. Lopez agreeing that there was no basis for appeal and confirming that [they] would not appeal his sentence.” (See Miedel Declaration, dated November 17, 2020, at 5 (ECF No. 1581-5).)3 The government filed a memorandum in opposition to the Section 2255 petition on December 22, 2020 along with the sworn declarations of Dratel and Miedel. (ECF No. 1581.) Lopez did not file a reply. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255(a), an incarcerated defendant “may move the court which imposed [his or her] sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence” either because: (1) it “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States;” (2) the court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant; or (3) “the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. §2255(a); see also Litwok v. United States, No. 14-CV-4341 (JFB), 2016 WL 6892814, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2016). Defendants typically have one year from the date of judgment to file a Section 2255(a) petition, subject to few exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. §2255(f)(1)-(4). Where a petitioner files a Section 2255 petition pro se, the Court construes the petitioner’s claims liberally. See United States v. Harrison, 48 F. Supp. 3d 381, 384 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating pro se petitions are construed liberally to “raise the strongest arguments that they suggest” (quoting Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001)); Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting a pro se complaint is to be “liberally construed in [the defendant's] favor”); accord Kajtazi v. United States, No. 17-cv-9301 (ALC), 2018 WL 3962932, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2018). A petitioner challenging his conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel “[bears] the burden of proving his claim.” Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2001). With respect to the issue of an evidentiary hearing, Section 2255 states that “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall…grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto.” 28 U.S.C. §2255(b). Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings also provides that “[i]f it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion.” Rules Governing §2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, Rule 4(b), 28 U.S.C. §2255. On this issue, the Second Circuit has made clear that, “[t]o warrant a hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant need establish only that he has a ‘plausible’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, not that ‘he will necessarily succeed on the claim.’” Puglisi v. United States, 586 F.3d 209, 213 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Armienti v. United States, 234 F.3d 820, 823 (2d Cir. 2000)). The Second Circuit has set forth detailed guidance on how a district court should determine whether a hearing is necessary. See id. at 213-15. In particular, the Court explained that “when the judge that tried the underlying proceedings also presides over the Section 2255 motion, a less-than full-fledged evidentiary hearing may permissibly dispose of claims where the credibility assessment would inevitably be adverse to the petitioner.” Id. at 214; see also Chang, 250 F.3d at 86 (“It was…within the district court’s discretion to choose a middle road [i.e., denying the Section 2255 motion based upon the detailed affidavit from trial counsel] that avoided the delay, the needless expenditure of judicial resources, the burden on trial counsel and the government, and perhaps the encouragement of other prisoners to make similar baseless claims that would have resulted from a full testimonial hearing. The district court reasonably decided that the testimony of Chang and his trial counsel would add little or nothing to the written submissions.”). III. DISCUSSION Lopez asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment because his attorneys failed to file an appeal on his behalf, despite the fact that he asked them to do so. (Pet. at 5.) His attorneys dispute that factual allegation, and maintain that they specifically discussed the possibility of an appeal with Lopez and that he agreed not to appeal his sentence based on the unlikelihood of success. (See Dratel Decl. at
