DECISION AND ORDER INTRODUCTION Pro se Plaintiff Glenn J. Federico brings this employment discrimination action against his former employer, Defendant Federal Express (“FedEx”), alleging that FedEx discriminated on the basis of age when it terminated him, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and failed to provide reasonable accommodations, in violation of the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”). ECF Nos. 1, 15. FedEx now moves for summary judgment on all claims. ECF No. 35. Federico opposes the motion, ECF Nos. 37, 38, and FedEx has filed its reply. ECF No. 39. For the reasons that follow, FedEx’s motion is GRANTED. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. See Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005). However, the non-moving party “may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” F.D.I.C. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). BACKGROUND In 1997, Federico began working at a FedEx location in Rochester, initially as a “Part-Time Casual Handler.” ECF No. 35-1 1. In 2001, Federico was promoted to the position of “Permanent Part-Time Material Handler,” which he held until his termination in March 2016. ECF No. 35-2 at 18-19. As a general matter, Federico’s position required him to load and offload packages and containers from one vehicle to another — whether that be tractor-trailers, airplanes, or delivery trucks. See id. at 19-20, 119. Federico testified that this was a physically demanding job that involved lifting heavy packages and materials. Id. at 20-21. Federico needed to be able to lift and maneuver 75 pounds. Id. at 23, 119. During his tenure, Federico was granted four “Medical Leaves of Absence.” ECF No. 35-1 10. Under FedEx’s policies at the time, an employee could take up to 365 days of medical leave before his employment would be terminated. Id. 20. FedEx would hold the employee’s position for the first 90 days of medical leave, after which it “may be necessary to replace or eliminate [the] position based upon operational necessity.” ECF No. 35-2 at 63, 132. After the first 90 days, the employee could receive “preferential treatment for lateral or lower level positions for which he was qualified to perform with or without reasonable accommodation.” ECF No. 35-1 20. In either case, the employee could not return to work without a release from a treating physician. Id.
20, 21. Although an employee could return to work in a limited capacity if permitted by his treating physician, any such work was limited to 90 days and would also count towards the maximum medical leave. Id.
