DECISION AND ORDER INTRODUCTION This case involves a dispute between an individual, Robert Searle (“Plaintiff”), the father of two children enrolled in school at Red Creek Central School District (the “District”), and the District and Brian Corey, individually and in his capacity as the District’s Superintendent (the “Superintendent”) (collectively, the “Defendants”). In this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, Plaintiff alleges (1) a First Amendment retaliation claim, and (2) a Fourteenth Amendment selective enforcement claim. See ECF No. 1. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to state a claim, that Plaintiff failed to establish Monell liability against the District, and that the Superintendent is entitled to qualified immunity. In the alternative, Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that there is no question of material fact and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ECF No. 6. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED. BACKGROUND1 At the time of the relevant events, Plaintiff was a resident of Wayne County in New York. ECF No. 1 4. Plaintiff’s two sons were students enrolled in and attending school at the District. Id. 9. On January 14, 2020, Defendants’ legal counsel, at Defendants’ behest, sent a notice to Plaintiff directing that he not contact any faculty or staff of the District, or come on school grounds, without written permission of the Superintendent (the Court will refer to the notice as the “January 14 Directive”). Id. 8. According to Plaintiff, Defendants issued the January 14 Directive in response to lawful communications he previously sent to Defendants, wherein he was critical of Defendants, its faculty or staff. Id. 9. Plaintiff further states that such communications were sent properly and for the purpose of obtaining information over the treatment and academic progress of his two sons. Id. The January 14 Directive stated the following: Superintendent Corey has forwarded to [counsel] email exchanges going back to August 2019 that [Plaintiff has] had with various District administrators and employees. Those emails are replete with abusive and inappropriate dialog and requests to terminate individuals with whom [Plaintiff] disagree[s]. [Plaintiff's] emails have become increasingly strident, to the point of being harassing. Accordingly, for the remainder of [the 2019-2020] school year [Plaintiff is] not to contact District staff or faculty directly. District employees have been advised not to respond to any communications from [Plaintiff]. If [Plaintiff] need[s] to communicate with the District [Plaintiff is] to do so in writing to the Superintendent, without copying other staff members in. Given the escalating nature of [Plaintiff's] harassing emails [Plaintiff is] also not to come on to school grounds unless [Plaintiff has] first obtained written permission from Superintendent Corey. ECF No. 6-2 at 46. It is Plaintiff’s position that the January 14 Directive was sent “for the purpose of inhibiting and punishing [him] from and for his constitutionally protected right of free speech under the first and fourteenth amendments,” ECF No. 1 10, and was “taken without rational basis and was done maliciously and in bad faith solely to treat [him] differently from other similarly situated parents and guardians of students at the [District].” Id. 11. As a result, Plaintiff asserts he has been “inhibited from and punished for exercising his constitutionally protected right of free speech and has been hampered in his ability to properly provide care and benefit for his sons and to prevent or redress improper treatment” at the District. Id. 12. Further, Plaintiff asserts that he has been “unreasonably hampered in or denied access to other activities at the District including attendance at sporting events, extracurricular activities, teacher meetings and conferences” as well as use of the community center. Id. 13. Plaintiff alleges that these harms are continuing. Id. 14. LEGAL STANDARD As an initial matter, the Court would ordinarily need to determine whether to treat Defendants’ motion as one for summary judgment, since Defendants rely on materials outside of the complaint. See Kopen v. Coughlin, 922 F.2d 152, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1991) (Generally, “Rule 12(b)(6) gives district courts two options when matters outside the pleadings are presented…the court may exclude the additional material and decide the motion on the complaint alone or it may convert the motion to one for summary judgment.”). Federal courts have discretion in determining whether to convert a motion into one for summary judgment. See Carione v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 2d 186, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). In this case, however, the Court finds that it is unnecessary to convert the motion to dismiss, as the Court may properly consider Defendants’ additional documents in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint is deemed to include “any statements or documents incorporated into it by reference.” Paulemon v. Tobin, 30 F.3d 307, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the complaint as presented by the plaintiff, taking no account of its basis in evidence, a court adjudication of such a motion may review only a narrow universe of materials. Generally, [a court does] not look beyond facts stated on the face of the complaint, documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” (modified)). A document is incorporated in the complaint if the complaint expressly refers to it, see id., and is considered integral “where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002). Here, Plaintiff specifically references the January 14 Directive in his Complaint. ECF No. 1 8. That email clearly satisfies this standard. The Complaint not only expressly references it, but the focus of this case is the intention behind it, and result of the directives provided therein. See, e.g., Thibault v. Spino, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6-7 (D. Conn. 2019) (considering, inter alia, a Facebook post that was the focus of the underlying free speech claim in rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss). As such, the Court will consider the January 14 Directive in evaluating Defendants’ motion to dismiss. In addition to the January 14 Directive, the Complaint specifically references communications sent to Defendants by Plaintiff “which were critical of Defendants, its faculty or staff and which were sent…for the legitimate purpose of obtaining information…over the treatment and academic progress of [Plaintiff's] two sons” who were enrolled in the District. ECF No. 1 9. Because the basis of the assertions of Plaintiff are that those communications resulted in the January 14 Directive — which Plaintiff alleges violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights — it is clear that those communications were “documents that [Plaintiff] either possessed or knew about and upon which [he] relied in bringing the suit.”2 Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). As such, the Court will also consider the communications leading up to the January 14 Directive in evaluating Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Finally, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may consider matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Goel, 820 F.3d at 559. The Second Circuit has indicated that press coverage which contains information, may be considered without regard to the truth of their contents. See Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir. 2008). Therefore, the Court will also consider Plaintiff’s January 22, 2020 published article in the Lakeshore News regarding the District. ECF No. 6-2 at 48. The article will not be considered for the truth of the contents therein, but rather, for the fact that such communication was written by Plaintiff. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter…’to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts sufficient to allow the Court to draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2005). At the same time, the Court is not required to credit “[l]egal conclusions, deductions, or opinions couched as factual allegations…[with] a presumption of truthfulness.” In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The “touchstone for a well-pleaded complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedures 8(a) and 12(b)(6) is plausibility.” In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560-61). To meet this plausibility standard, the factual allegations must permit the Court “to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. DISCUSSION Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that (1) the Complaint fails to state a First Amendment claim because Defendants’ actions did not chill his speech and were not motivated by Plaintiff’s First Amendment interests; (2) the Complaint fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim because Plaintiff fails to show that how he was treated differently from other parents similarly situated; (3) the Superintendent is entitled to qualified immunity on the claims for monetary damages;3 and (4) the claims against the District do not adequately plead Monell liability. I. First Amendment Retaliation Claim Defendants argue that the retaliation claim fails because Plaintiff was excluded from campus and from communicating with District faculty and staff for a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason — namely, the District’s right to control access to its premises and secure safety. ECF No. 6-4 at 18-23. Further, Defendants claim that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the January 14 Directive had a chilling effect on his speech. Id. As discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege a First Amendment claim and Defendants’ motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED. The elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim are dependent on the “factual context” of the case. See Williams v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2008). In order to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) he has an interest protected by the First Amendment; (2) defendants’ actions were motivated or substantially caused by his exercise of that right; and (3) defendants’ actions effectively chilled the exercise of his First Amendment right.” Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001). In the first place, it is not clear that Plaintiff has a First Amendment interest in unrestricted communication to District teachers and staff. The public does not have a constitutional right to force the government to listen to their views. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984). “Because government entities such as [a school district] do not have to listen to parents’ views, it is not a constitutional violation to require that parents, if they wish to be heard, communicate only with particular staff members or do so only at a specified time and place. And because the government is under no constitutional obligation to respond to such views, there is no violation where a government entity such as [a school district] ignores (or threatens to ignore) communications from outside the specified channels.” L.F. v. Lake Wash. Sch. Dist. #414, 947 F.3d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 2020). Plaintiff fails to meaningfully develop the legal basis for his contrary position. See ECF No. 8-6 at 4-5; United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (“It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.”). Assuming that he does have such a First Amendment interest, Plaintiff must establish that the Defendants’ January 14 Directive was motivated or substantially caused by the exercise of that First Amendment right. Plaintiff’s Complaint provides that the January 14 Directive was based on previous lawful communications sent to Defendants from Plaintiff. ECF No. 1 9. Indeed, the January 14 Directive explicitly references email exchanges between Plaintiff and various District employees and states that those emails were viewed as abusive, inappropriate, and harassing. See ECF No. 6-2 at 46. As such, the District advised that Plaintiff was not to contact staff or faculty for the remainder of the school year. Id. Because the January 14 Directive explicitly references Plaintiff’s prior communications as the conduct forming the basis for the restrictions, the Court finds that, for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges the Defendants’ conduct in imposing communication restrictions were motivated by the exercise of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right, to the extent he has such a right.4 Lastly, Plaintiff must establish that Defendants’ action had a chilling effect on the exercise of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right. “[W]here a private citizen claims First Amendment retaliation by a public official, the citizen is required to show that his or her speech was actually chilled; otherwise the citizen would, in most instances, be unable to demonstrate any concrete harm.” Avgerinos v. Palmyra-Macedon Central Sch. Dist., 690 F. Supp. 2d 115, 132 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (emphasis added) (citing Curley, 268 F.3d at 73) (additional citation omitted). In order to meet this requirement, Plaintiff must prove that the retaliatory conduct deprived him of his First Amendment right by either (1) silencing him or (2) having some “actual, non-speculative chilling effect on his speech.” Williams, 535 F.3d at 78. Thus, “[w]here a party can show no change in his behavior, he has quite plainly shown no chilling of his First Amendment right to free speech.” Curley, 268 F.3d at 73. Specifically, “[t]he Supreme Court has held that ‘allegations of a subjective “chill” are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.’” See id. (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972)). Plaintiff alleges, without elaboration, that he has been inhibited from exercising his right to free speech. See ECF No. 1
