OPINION & ORDER Felix Sater filed a motion to stay this action pending an ongoing arbitration. Magistrate Judge Parker denied that non-dispositive motion in an Opinion and Order dated December 6, 2019. Sater filed objections and the parties have since submitted supplemental briefing on the issue. For the reasons that follow, the Court adopts Judge Parker’s Opinion and Order and overrules Sater’s objections. I. Background The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts of this case, which are summarized in Judge Parker’s opinion. Op. & Order (“Op.”) at 3-13, Dkt. No. 144; see also Dkt. No. 244. According to Plaintiffs City of Almaty, Kazakhstan, and BTA Bank, JSC, Defendant Felix Sater in 2011 assisted the transfer of funds stolen from Plaintiffs into various U.S. investments. Op. at 6. Plaintiffs allege that in 2015, Litco, a company founded and solely owned by Sater, offered to assist Plaintiffs to recover their stolen funds. Id. at 8. Plaintiffs’ private investigative firm, Arcanum, negotiated the terms of Litco’s assistance on Plaintiffs’ behalf with Robert Wolf, Litco’s counsel. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiffs and Litco’s arrangement was memorialized in a Confidential Assistance Agreement (“CAA”). Id.; see also Sater Aff., Ex. A (“CAA”), Dkt. No. 78. Relevant here, the CAA contains a broad release provision by Plaintiffs against Litco and related entities and persons for all claims “for any acts or omissions related to or arising from this Agreement, the Releasees’ previous, current or future contractual obligations and any other matter between the Parties.” CAA 10. The CAA also contains an arbitration provision that requires “[a]ny dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach” be “settled by final and binding arbitration” by the American Arbitration Association in New York, New York. Id. 14. Acting under the CAA, Litco referred Sater to Arcanum to act as a witness in Plaintiffs’ efforts to recover their stolen funds, which Plaintiffs are pursuing in an action that is also pending before the Court. Op. at 10-11; City of Almaty, Kazakhstan v. Ablyazov, No. 15-cv 5345 (AJN) (S.D.N.Y.). In a 2018 deposition for that action, Sater stated that he owned Litco. Op. at 11. Plaintiffs claim that this is the first time they learned of Sater’s ownership, shortly After which they terminated their agreement with Litco. Id. In October 2018, Litco commenced an arbitration against Plaintiffs for payments due under the CAA as well as, in its Third Claim, for a declaratory judgment that the CAA’s release provision protects Sater in the present action and, in its Fourth Claim, for attorneys’ fees and costs for defending Sater in this action. Id.; see also Sater Decl., Ex. B at 19-20. Plaintiffs filed this action against Sater and other Defendants in March 2019. Dkt. No. 1. Litco is not a party in this case, nor is Sater a party to the arbitration. On August 19, 2019, Sater filed a motion to stay this action pending the arbitration. Motion, Dkt. No. 77. The Honorable Katharine H. Parker, U.S. Magistrate Judge, acting on general pretrial authority from the Court, held oral argument and considered the parties’ initial and supplemental briefing. Op. at 2. On December 6, 2019, Judge Parker issued an Opinion and Order denying Sater’s motion. Op. at 1- 2. Sater filed objections to Judge Parker’s Opinion and Order, Objections, Dkt. No. 147, and Plaintiffs filed a response, Pls. Resp., Dkt. No. 151. On November 11, 2019, Sater and other Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to allege fraud among other claims. Dkt. Nos. 105, 107. The Court on November 30, 2020, granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion, declining to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for unjust enrichment, money had and received, and conversion. Dkt. No. 244 at 8-14. On March 18, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental letter that attached a recent partial award of the arbitration panel that concluded the panel had jurisdiction to arbitrate Litco’s Third and Fourth Claims regarding Sater. Pls. Suppl. Letter, Attach. 1 (“Partial Award”), Dkt. No. 287. Plaintiffs argue that the partial award validated Judge Parker’s conclusion because it clarified that Sater was not a party to the arbitration. Pls. Suppl. Letter at 1-3. Sater filed a response, arguing that the award undermined Judge Parker’s reasoning. Sater Suppl. Resp., Dkt. No. 290. Plaintiffs filed a reply, Pls. Suppl. Reply, Dkt. No. 291, and Sater a response to that reply, Sater Sur-Reply, Dkt. No. 292. While Sater’s objections to Judge Parker’s Opinion and Order have been pending, the parties have engaged in extensive discovery. E.g., Dkt. Nos. 301, 285, 223. Fact discovery is scheduled to be completed by January 31, 2022. Dkt. No. 309. II. Legal standards A motion to stay litigation pending arbitration is a non-dispositive motion. PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel, Inc., 597 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2010); Marcus v. Collins, No. 16CV4221GBDBCM, 2016 WL 8201629, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2016).1 When a magistrate judge enters a non dispositive order and a party objects, a district court “shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A). A finding is “clearly erroneous” if “on the entire evidence, the district court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). A finding is “contrary to law” if it “fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Barbini v. First Niagara Bank, N.A., 331 F.R.D. 454, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgs. Tr. v. UBS Real Estate Sec. Inc., No. 12-CV-7322, 2013 WL 6840282, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013)). Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a written arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. §2. Further, under Section 3 of the FAA, if any suit is brought in federal court “upon any issue referable to arbitration” the district court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” Id. §3. “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract, and courts must enforce arbitration contracts according to their terms.” Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019). Specifically, whether the parties here agreed to arbitrate is a matter of New York state law. Bell v. Cendant Corp., 293 F.3d 563, 566 (2d Cir. 2002). In considering a motion to stay pending arbitration, a court must determine “(1) whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate; (2) if so, the scope of that agreement; (3) if federal statutory claims are asserted, whether Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and (4) if some, but not all, claims are subject to arbitration, whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration.” Porcelli v. JetSmarter, Inc., No. 19 CIV. 2537 (PAE), 2019 WL 2371896, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2019) (citing Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 2008)). As the moving party, Sater carries the burden of proving that an agreement to arbitrate exists by the preponderance of the evidence. Fleming v. J. Crew, No. 16 cv-2663 (GHW), 2016 WL 6208570, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2016). In assessing the relevant facts, “the court applies a standard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003)). If satisfied, Section 3 requires a stay, though the Court may impose “stays on a claim-by-claim basis.” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 361 F. Supp. 2d 237, 265-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Independent of the FAA, “district courts have ‘inherent power’ to grant stays in certain circumstances,” including when issues at stake in the case may be decided in a pending arbitration. Sierra Rutile Ltd. v. Katz, 937 F.2d 743, 750 (2d Cir. 1991). In exercising its discretion, a court considers, among other factors, the interests of plaintiffs and the prejudice that may result from delay, the interests of defendants, the interests of the courts, the interests of non parties, and the public interest. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Laver, No. 18 CIV. 2920 (AT), 2019 WL 2325609, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2019) (collecting cases); see also Louis Berger Grp., Inc. v. State Bank of India, 802 F. Supp. 2d 482, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (considering judicial economy and the risk of inconsistent decisions). III. Discussion In denying Sater’s motion, Judge Parker first concluded that Sater, a nonsignatory to the CAA, could not compel Plaintiffs to arbitrate his claims pursuant to the CAA arbitration provision. In doing so, Judge Parker rejected Sater’s theories that he could invoke the arbitration provision (a) as an officer of signatory Litco, Op. at 20-25; (b) as an intended third-party beneficiary of the CAA, id. at 25-28, or (c) by equitably estopping Plaintiffs from avoiding arbitration, id. at 29-33. Second, Judge Parker declined to exercise any inherent powers to stay the case, concluding that “the arbitration will not resolve Sater’s affirmative defense of waiver and release” and that a stay would significantly delay proceedings for Plaintiffs and the other Defendants. Id. at 34-36. Sater raises three primary objections, each of which, he argues, demonstrate clear error. First, Sater contends that although he is not identified in the CAA, he is nevertheless an intended third-party beneficiary who may enforce the arbitration provision. Objections at 11-14. Second, he argues that the facts of this case and the arbitration are sufficiently intertwined, and his relationship to Plaintiffs sufficiently close, as to estop Plaintiffs from avoiding arbitration. Id. at 14-19. And third, Sater argues that the risk of inconsistent results between this case and the arbitration requires the Court to impose a discretionary stay. Id. at 20-21. Additionally, Sater argues that throughout her opinion, Judge Parker erroneously assumed that the arbitration provision “is limited to claims between the parties.” Id. at 19. In their supplemental letter, Plaintiffs argue that the partial award issued by the arbitration panel after Judge Parker’s opinion further vindicates her conclusion, as the panel stated that its finding of jurisdiction over Litco’s Third and Fourth Claims is “consistent with [Judge Parker's] finding that” only signatories of the CAA, and not Sater, may enforce the arbitration provision. Pls. Suppl. Letter at 3 (quoting Partial Award 24); see also Partial Award 22 (stating that the panel’s finding of jurisdiction “is not in conflict with the decision of [Judge Parker]“). Sater argues that the panel’s partial award proves that Judge Parker failed to appreciate the risk of inconsistent decisions because in deciding Litco’s Third and Fourth Claims, the panel could reach a different outcome as to the validity or scope of the CAA’s release provision. Sater Suppl. Resp. at 3; see Partial Award
