MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, an Oklahoma-based company that manufactures pressure vessels used in the gas compression industry, alleges that it used the services of Southwestern Payroll Service, Inc. (“Southwestern Payroll”) to pay its employees’ payroll and the associated federal and state taxes. See Dkt. No. 1, Compl., at 8. Among other things, Plaintiff claims that it directed Southwestern Payroll to withdraw funds from Plaintiff’s account, equal to the amounts owing for federal and state payroll taxes, and to deposit such funds in an account that Southwestern Payroll maintained until the funds would be used to pay those taxes. See id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges that, upon information and belief, Southwestern Payroll transferred funds from its account to a tax account at Defendant Pioneer Bank (hereinafter collectively referred to with Defendant Pioneer Bancorp, Inc. as “Defendants”). See id. at 10. Plaintiff further contends that, in August or September 2019, Defendants, acting through John Does 1 through 101, removed funds from Southwestern Payroll’s tax account, including $336,126.26 that allegedly accounted for Plaintiff’s payroll tax trust funds, and retained those funds for Defendants’ own use and benefit instead of remitting them to the appropriate taxing authorities. See id. Plaintiff commenced this action on August 31, 2020, alleging the following causes of action: (1) conversion, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) gross negligence, and (4) accounting. See id. at
12-23. Plaintiff seeks to recover $336,126.26 “plus penalties and interest already assessed and which may be assessed, interest, costs, attorney’s fees[, and] punitive damages[.]” See id. at Wherefore Clause. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. No. 7. Plaintiff opposes the motion and requests, in its response, that the Court grant it leave to amend its complaint. See Dkt. No. 13-1, Pl’s Memorandum in Opposition, at 17. II. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff’s first cause of action for conversion “New York law defines conversion as ‘the unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods belonging to another to the exclusion of the owner’s rights.’” Ultra Dairy LLC v. Kondrat, 514 F. Supp. 3d 452, 459 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400, 403-04 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hous. Auth., 87 N.Y.2d 36, 637 N.Y.S.2d 342, 660 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (1995))). “To prove that claim out, a plaintiff must allege: ‘(1) the property subject to conversion is a specific identifiable thing; (2) plaintiff had ownership, possession or control over the property before its conversion; and (3) defendant exercised an unauthorized dominion over the [property], to the alteration of its condition or to the exclusion of the plaintiff’s rights.’” Id. (quoting Moses v. Martin, 360 F. Supp. 2d 533, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). “‘Money deposited in a general account at a bank does not remain the property of the depositor. Upon deposit…the money deposited becomes the property of the depositary bank; the property of the depositor is the indebtedness of the bank to it….’” In re HSBC Bank, USA, N.A., 1 F. Supp. 3d 34, 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Law Offices of K.C. Okoli, P.C. v. BNB Bank, N.A., 481 F. App’x 622, 627 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying New York law) (citations and quotation marks omitted)). “As a general matter, a strong presumption exists under New York law that a deposit account is a general account and not a special purpose account.” In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 439 B.R. 811, 824 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Swan [Brewery Co. Ltd. v. United States Trust Co. of N.Y.], 832 F. Supp. [714,] 718-19 [(S.D.N.Y. 1993)] (collecting cases)). “‘It is well settled that an action will lie for the conversion of money where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.’” Tevdorachvili v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 632, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Chemical Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 124, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1st Dep’t 1990), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 803, 568 N.Y.S.2d 15[, 569 N.E.2d 874] (1991)); see Krys v. Sugrue (In re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig.), Nos. 07-md-1902 (JSR); 08-cv-3065 (JSR); 08-cv-3086 (JSR); 08-cv-7416 (JSR); 08-cv-8267 (JSR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33642, *121 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010) (stating that “[f]unds in a segregated account are sufficiently identifiable to be the subject of conversion” (citations omitted)). “By its terms, this principle does not apply to the bank-depositor relationship, because funds deposited with a bank do not constitute a specific and identifiable fund.” Tevdorachvili, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 643; see also Kirschner v. Bennett, 648 F. Supp. 2d 525, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that “the fact that funds are deposited for a specific purpose is not conclusive as to whether the funds were sufficiently specific and identifiable to support a claim for conversion” (citation omitted)). “Whether an account is general or specific depends upon the mutual intent of the parties.” Swan Brewery Co. Ltd. v. United States Trust Co. of N.Y., 832 F. Supp. 714, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (collecting cases). Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim for conversion fails because deposits in a general account cannot be converted as a matter of law, and Plaintiff has not pled any facts to rebut the “strong presumption” that the Southwestern General Deposit Account — the account in which Southwestern Payroll maintained Plaintiff’s funds — is a general deposit account. See Dkt. No. 7-1, Defs’ Memorandum in Support, at 11-16. Plaintiff responds that it has properly pled that it permitted Southwestern Payroll to deposit “tax payments (trust funds)” into a special purpose account that Southwestern Payroll held with Defendants. See Dkt. No. 13-1 at 11-12 (citing Dkt. No. 1 at
