OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Wanda Wilson, an African American woman who worked for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMorgan”) for over twenty years, alleges that JPMorgan wrongfully discriminated against her in violation of state and local law. More specifically, Wilson brings hostile work environment, race discrimination, and retaliation claims pursuant to the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §290 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code §8-101 et seq. In an earlier Opinion and Order, the Court dismissed Wilson’s claims with leave to file an amended complaint. See Wilson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 20-CV-4558 (JMF), 2021 WL 918770 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2021) (ECF No. 72). Thereafter, Wilson filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). ECF No. 77 (“SAC”).1 JPMorgan now moves, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss Wilson’s amended claims. See ECF No. 79. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. BACKGROUND The relevant background is set forth in the Court’s prior Opinion and Order, familiarity with which is assumed, and will not be repeated here. See 2021 WL 918770, at *1-3. Instead, the Court will merely summarize the relevant differences between the earlier Complaint and the operative SAC. Before doing so, however, the Court must address two preliminary matters. First, JPMorgan contends that the Court should disregard certain allegations in the SAC because they “directly contradict” the facts pleaded in Wilson’s earlier complaints. ECF No. 80 (“Def.’s Mem.”), at 12; see also id. at 8-10, 11-14. A court may disregard factual allegations in an amended complaint where the plaintiff “blatantly changes” her story in a way that “directly contradicts” her earlier pleadings. Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, No. 08-CV-400 (NRB), 2008 WL 4386764, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Colliton v. Cravath, Swain & Moore LLP, 356 F. App’x 535 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order); see also, e.g., Wallace v. NYC Dep’t of Corr., No. 95-CV-4404 (SJ), 1996 WL 586797, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996) (disregarding the assertion in an amended complaint that an action was taken pursuant to an official policy because the original complaint contended that the action was an aberration from that policy). “[T]he more usual and benevolent option,” however, “is to accept the superseded pleadings but allow the factfinder to consider the earlier pleadings as admissions in due course.” Baines v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-9545 (JMF), 2015 WL 3555758, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2015) (quoting Barris v. Hamilton, No. 96 CV-9541 (DAB), 1999 WL 311813, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1999)); see also Kermanshah v. Kermanshah, 580 F. Supp. 2d 247, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that courts typically disregard subsequent pleadings only where they are “blatant” or “directly contradictory” as opposed to merely “inconsistent” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 2002 Lawrence R. Buchalter Alaska Tr. v. Philadelphia Fin. Life Assur. Co., 96 F. Supp. 3d 182, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[C]ourts in the Second Circuit will consider prior pleadings” only “[i]n rare circumstances” where “the plaintiff directly contradicts the facts set forth in his original complaint.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the latter, “more benevolent option” is warranted because the discrepancies between the SAC and Wilson’s earlier pleadings are not the sort of “blatant” contradictions that have caused other courts to disregard allegations in amended pleadings. Kermanshah, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 266. JPMorgan argues that Wilson now “relies upon wholly new allegations of explicit, ‘overt’ race-based conduct.” Def.’s Mem. at 12; see also id. at 8-10; ECF No. 82 (“Def.’s Reply”), at 1-6. But Wilson’s FAC did not deny that she experienced overt race-based conduct during her employment at JPMorgan; in fact, it made repeated reference to “racism” at JPMorgan. See, e.g., FAC 76 (reproducing email to upper management in which Wilson referenced “[r]acism at its best” at JPMorgan); id. 79 (same, stating “[m]odern day racism is in full effect at JPMorgan”).2 At bottom, the SAC merely adds allegations of specific instances of overt race-based conduct. See, e.g., SAC
36-37, 46-48, 50, 60-64. Such changes, “when taken as a whole,” can “be described as clarifying [and], at most, as inconsistent.” 2002 Lawrence R. Buchalter Alaska Tr., 96 F. Supp. 3d at 207 (cleaned up). Thus, the Court will treat the SAC as the sole operative pleading for present purposes, without prejudice to JPMorgan arguing “in due course” that the earlier pleadings should be treated “as admissions.” Baines, 2015 WL 3555758, at *1 (quoting Barris, 1999 WL 311813, at *2). Second, JPMorgan argues that, in amending her complaint, Wilson “went well beyond the latitude afforded by the Court” in its prior Opinion and Order. Def.’s Mem. 2; see also id. at 8-10. The Court disagrees. In granting leave to amend, the Court did not bar Wilson from alleging facts related to overt racial discrimination or harassment. See Wilson, 2021 WL 918770, at *8. Nor did it limit Wilson to elaborating on specific incidents already included in her FAC. See id. Instead, the Court granted leave to amend because it “conclude[d] that Wilson [might] be able to allege sufficient additional facts to remedy at least some of the defects in her claims (e.g., by adding more of the particulars to the allegations in Paragraphs 24 and 78).” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Court’s permission to file an amended complaint was not quite as limiting as JPMorgan suggests. More to the point, by adding more specific allegations of race-based conduct, see, e.g., SAC
