MEMORANDUM AND ORDER INTRODUCTION Plaintiff The Prudential Insurance Company of America (“Prudential”) brought this interpleader action against Defendants Amanda DiMuzio (“Amanda”), Faith DiMuzio (“Faith,” and with Amanda, the “Claimants”), and A.G.D. and J.A.D., both minors (the “Children”), requesting the Court determine who is entitled to the death benefit of a life insurance policy Prudential issued to Decedent John A. DiMuzio (“Decedent”). Presently before the Court is Amanda’s motion for summary judgment and Faith’s cross-motion for summary judgment, each brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons stated below, both motions are denied without prejudice to pursuing their application in state court. The Court dismisses the action, as either the domestic relations exception to subject-matter jurisdiction applies, or, assuming arguendo that the Court has jurisdiction, the domestic relations abstention doctrine calls for further litigation to proceed in state court. BACKGROUND The following facts, taken from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements, are undisputed unless otherwise noted. (See Def. Amanda’s Statement of Undisputed Facts [DE 46-1] (“Amanda 56.1″); Def. Faith Counter-Statement Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 [DE 47-3] (“Faith 56.1″); Def. Amanda Counter-Statement Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 [DE 47-10] (“Amanda Counter 56.1″)). After ten years of marriage, Decedent and Faith entered into a Separation Agreement containing several provisions for the benefit of their Children: e.g., child support, college expenses, and life insurance. (Amanda 56.1 3; see Separation Agreement arts. IX, XII, XV1 (“Sep. Agmt.”), Ex. A [DE 46-4] to Declaration of Christopher P. Gerace (“Gerace Decl.”) [DE 46-3]). The Child Support provision required Decedent to pay Faith a sum certain twice-a-month to cover, inter alia and as relevant here, payment for the Children’s “extra-curricular activities.” (Sep. Agmt. art. IX). The College Expenses provision requires Decedent to pay a portion of “the college expense of the [C]hildren,” including “tuition, books, fees, lodging, and reasonable travel.” (Id. art. XII). The Separation Agreement’s Life Insurance provision required Decedent to obtain life insurance with “an aggregate death benefit of at least Nine Hundred Thousand ($900,000.00) Dollars…with the Children designated as irrevocable beneficiar[ies] and [Faith] designated as trustee for the benefit of the [C]hildren.” (Id. art. XV). The provision further states, The [Decedent] may annually reduce the policy benefits to an amount equal to that for which he remains obligated for child and spousal support pursuant to the agreement. (Id.). Through his employer, Decedent obtained group life insurance coverage with Prudential. (Faith 56.1 11). Unfortunately, neither a copy of the group policy nor any of its terms have been provided to the Court. Likewise, nothing in the record addresses (i) when Decedent first obtained coverage, (ii) whether the group policy death benefit equaled or exceeded $900,000.00, (iii) whether the group policy death benefit was ever reduced and, if so, by how much, (iv) whether Decedent named the Children irrevocable beneficiaries or Faith as trustee for the benefit of the Children to the policy, nor (v) if Prudential required a beneficiary’s consent to change the terms in or beneficiaries of the group policy. Decedent officially divorced Faith on June 3, 2015, (see Amanda 56.1 9), and the Judgment of Divorce incorporated their Separation Agreement’s terms by reference, (Faith 56.1
9-10). Decedent married Amanda later that year. On August 20, 2018, Decedent applied to convert his group life insurance policy into an individual life insurance policy. (Decedent’s Application for Conversion of Group Life Insurance (“Life Ins. Conversion App.”), Ex. B at 7-12 [DE 46-5] to Gerace Decl.). The Claimants dispute the issue of whether Decedent sought Faith’s consent or court permission before applying for the policy conversion. (Amanda Counter 56.1
