DECISION AND ORDER I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff sues to recover damages for personal injuries sustained August 6, 2015, when he struck the back of his head and neck on an overhead plywood board as he ascended a basement staircase on premises owned by defendant EGK Realty, LLC, while he was working on a project to repair a gas leak. Defendant Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., was the general contractor for the project and subcontracted work to plaintiff’s nonparty employer. Defendant EGK Realty moves for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims for negligence and violation of New York Labor Law §200. C.P.L.R. §3212(b) and (e). Plaintiff cross-moves for summary judgment on both defendants’ liability for violation of Labor Law §§240(1) and 241(6). Consolidated Edison moves for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims for violation of Labor Law §§240(1) and 241(6). Although plaintiff cross-moved against Consolidated Edison before it served its motion, the court may disregard plaintiff’s mislabelling his otherwise timely motion for summary judgment a “cross-motion” as a mere irregularity that did not prejudice defendants. C.P.L.R. §2001; JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. White, 182 A.D.3d 469, 471 (1st Dep’t 2020). Neither defendant opposes the court’s consideration of the cross-motion as a motion for summary judgment against both defendants. EGK Realty separately moves for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law §§240(1) and 241(6) claims and any crossclaims, but provides no justification for the second motion for summary judgment. Landis v. 383 Realty Corp., 175 A.D.3d 1207, 1207 (1st Dep’t 2019); Maggio v. 24 W. 57 APF, LLC, 134 A.D.3d 621, 625 (1st Dep’t 2015); Amill v. Lawrence Ruben Co., Inc., 117 A.D.3d 433, 433 (1st Dep’t 2014); Ferolito v. Vultaggio, 99 A.D.3d 19, 29 (1st Dep’t 2012). Although EGK Realty claims that “law office failure” under C.P.L.R. §2005 excuses EGK Realty’s delay in moving for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s additional claims and any cross-claims, that provision applies only to motions pursuant to C.P.L.R. §3012(d) or §5015(a), not to motions pursuant to C.P.L.R. §3212. Moreover, the infirmity in this motion is not that it is late, but that it is a successive motion for summary judgment by EGK Realty. Even were law office failure a cognizable justification, EGK Realty fails to explain what its attorney’s “law office failure” was or how that failure prevented EGK Realty from initially moving for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law §§240(1) and 241(6) claims and any cross-claims along with his §200 and negligence claims. In fact, EGK Realty admits that it intentionally omitted its defenses against the §§240(1) and 241(6) claims from its first motion for summary judgment without further explanation. Therefore the court denies EGK Realty’s second motion for summary judgment. II. EGK REALTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE AND LABOR LAW §200 CLAIMS Labor Law §200 codifies an owner’s duty to maintain construction site safety. Rizzuto v. L.A. Wegner Contr. Co., 91 N.Y.2d 343, 352 (1998); Comes v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876, 877-78 (1993). Pursuant to principles of liability for ordinary negligence and under Labor Law §200, EGK Realty owed plaintiff a duty to provide him a safe work environment. If a dangerous condition arising from plaintiff’s work caused his injury, EGK Realty may be liable for negligently permitting that condition and violating Labor Law §200, if the owner supervised or exercised control over the activity that caused plaintiff’s injury. Rizzuto v. L.A. Wegner Contr. Co., 91 N.Y.2d at 352; Comes v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d at 877; Maggio v. 24 W. 57 APF, LLC, 134 A.D.3d at 626; Cappabianca v. Skanska USA Bldg. Inc., 99 A.D.3d 139, 144 (1st Dep’t 2012). See Ocampo v. Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc., 123 A.D.3d 456, 457 (1st Dep’t 2014); Francis v. Plaza Constr. Corp., 121 A.D.3d 427, 428 (1st Dep’t 2014). If a dangerous condition on the work site caused plaintiff’s injury, liability depends on EGK Realty’s creation or actual or constructive notice of the condition. Armental v. 401 Park Ave. S. Assocs., LLC, 182 A.D.3d 405, 407 (1st Dep’t 2020); DeMercurio v. 605 W. 42nd Owner LLC, 172 A.D.3d 467, 467 (1st Dep’t 2019); Prevost v. One City Block LLC, 155 A.D.3d 531, 534 (1st Dep’t 2017); Maggio v. 24 W. 57 APF, LLC, 134 A.D.3d at 626. Plaintiff’s injuries arose from a dangerous condition on the premises: a plywood board affixed overhead and projecting into a stairwell. EGK Realty insists it is entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s negligence and Labor Law §200 claims because plaintiff has not established EGK Realty’s negligence. To succeed on its motion for summary judgment, however, EGK Realty bears the burden to establish prima facie that the work site was not dangerous. Although EGK Realty emphasizes that the plywood board was open and obvious, the dangerous condition’s visibility obviates only EGK Realty’s duty to warn of the danger, not its duty to maintain safe premises. Matos v. Azure Holdings II, L.P., 181 A.D.3d 406, 407 (1st Dep’t 2020); Farrugia v. 1440 Broadway Assoc., 163 A.D.3d 452, 454-55 (1st Dep’t 2018); Derix v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 162 A.D.3d 522, 522 (1st Dep’t 2018); Polini v. Schindler El. Corp., 146 A.D.3d 536, 536 (1st Dep’t 2017). No evidence establishes that EGK Realty maintained reasonably safe premises. EGK Realty also insists that it lacked notice of the plywood board, but its owner Edmond Kolndreu testified at his deposition that he personally installed the board. Aff. of Matthew J. Shock Ex. G, at 37. Moreover, in opposition, plaintiff demonstrates the danger that the plywood board posed through his deposition testimony and the opinion of his construction engineer, Scott Silberman. Because EGK Realty admits it created the condition that caused plaintiff’s injury and fails to show that the condition was safe, and plaintiff demonstrates that the condition was in fact unsafe, the court denies EGK Realty summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s negligence and Labor Law §200 claims. C.P.L.R. §3212(b). Based on the absence of any evidence that EGK Realty was not negligent by installing and maintaining the dangerous board projecting down into the stairwell, no factual issue precludes summary judgment on EGK Realty’s liability to plaintiff for negligence and violation of Labor Law §200. Although plaintiff did not move for summary judgment on these claims, the court may search the record and grant summary judgment in his favor because both claims are the subject of EGK Realty’s motion for summary judgment. C.P.L.R. §3212(b); Otto v. Otto, 192 A.D.3d 517, 518 (1st Dep’t 2021). See Dunham v. Hilco Constr. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 425, 429-30 (1996). Therefore the court grants plaintiff summary judgment on EGK Realty’s liability for negligence and violation of Labor Law §200. C.P.L.R. §3212(b) and (e). III. LABOR LAW §240(1) Labor Law §240(1) requires that all building owners and general contractors: in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed. The statute imposes absolute liability on the owner and general contractor of a construction site if they fail to provide adequate protection against an elevation-related risk, and that failure is the proximate cause of plaintiff worker’s injury. Nicometi v. Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC, 25 N.Y.3d 90, 97 (2015); Rivas v. Nestle Realty Holding Corp., 188 A.D.3d 430, 431 (1st Dep’t 2020); Landi v. SDS William St., LLC, 146 A.D.3d 33, 37 (1st Dep’t 2016). Plaintiff claims that defendants are liable under Labor Law §240(1) because they failed to provide him an adequate safety device: a safely constructed stairway to travel to and from the basement while performing work covered by the statute. He maintains that, although defendants provided the stairway, three dangerous defects rendered it inadequate as a safety device. (1) The stairway step that plaintiff stepped up to when he struck the board was excessively high in comparison to the surrounding steps. (2) The plywood board with sharp edges that EGK Realty installed projected down into the stairwell, impeding ascent and descent. (3) The stairway lacked handrails for plaintiff to use to arrest his fall. Defendants insist that plaintiff’s tasks classify as routine maintenance not protected by Labor Law §240(1) and that the stairway, as a normal appurtenance of the building, functioned as a passageway unrelated to plaintiff’s work. Defendants further maintain that plaintiff’s injuries did not arise from an elevation-related risk against which an adequate safety device would have protected. A. Covered Activities Under Labor Law §240(1) Labor Law §240(1) does “not cover workers engaged in routine maintenance. The determination of whether a worker was engaged in a covered activity is not made at the moment of injury, but in the context of the entire project.” Gaston v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 190 A.D.3d 551, 551 (1st Dep’t 2021). Defendants insist that plaintiff performed only “routine maintenance,” but this label trivializes plaintiff’s assignment. Plaintiff testified at his deposition that his work required him to locate the source of a gas leak and repair gas service to two buildings. Over the course of four days, he performed excavations throughout the street, inspected the underlying gas lines, disassembled and constructed gas meters, conducted pressure tests, and reviewed the meters and gas service to the buildings. No evidence contradicts this description. Thus plaintiff’s work did not only involve “replacing components that require replacement in the course of normal wear and tear.” Esposito v. New York City Indus. Dev. Agency, 1 N.Y.3d 526, 528 (2003). See Banner v. Rockland Home for the Aged Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 129 A.D.3d 641, 642 (1st Dep’t 2015); Picaro v. New York Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp., 97 A.D.3d 511, 512 (1st Dep’t 2012); Santiago v. Fred-Doug 117, L.L.C., 68 A.D.3d 555, 555, 556 (1st Dep’t 2009). The entire project included alterations and repairs to the street, gas lines, and gas meters within EGK Realty’s premises. Therefore plaintiff’s tasks were covered activities under Labor Law §240(1). B. Stairways as a Safety Device Plaintiff claims the stairway qualifies as a safety device because it provided the sole means of access to the gas meter located in the building’s basement. Defendants insist the stairway did not function as a safety device because it was not the only entrance to the basement, and plaintiff performed no work on the stairway. Defendants further claim the stairway served as a passageway, as opposed to a safety device, because it was a normal appurtenance of the building. A stairway may qualify as a safety device when it provides the sole means of access to a designated work area. Rivas v. Nestle Realty Holding Corp., 188 A.D.3d at 431; Conlon v. Carnegie Hall Soc’y, Inc., 159 A.D.3d 655, 655 (1st Dep’t 2018); Gory v. Neighborhood Partnership Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 113 A.D.3d 550, 550-51 (1st Dep’t 2014); Ramirez v. Shoats, 78 A.D.3d 515, 517 (1st Dep’t 2010). Although defendants maintain there were two entrances to plaintiff’s work site in the basement, an entrance other than the stairway that plaintiff used does not diminish the stairway’s function as a safety device when defendants provided him access only to the stairway. No evidence shows he was even aware of a second entrance, let alone provided access to this entrance, which according to defendants would have required plaintiff to enter a tenant’s apartment. The fact that plaintiff performed no work on the stairway also does not remove it from a protected part of the work site. Hoyos v. NY-1095 Ave. of the Ams., LLC, 156 A.D.3d 491, 494 (1st Dep’t 2017); Alarcon v. UCAN White Plains Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 100 A.D.3d 431, 432 (1st Dep’t 2012). Therefore the stairway qualifies as a safety device under Labor Law §240(1). C. Elevation-Related Risk To constitute a violation of §240(1), the condition that caused plaintiff’s injury must fit within the “special hazards” contemplated by the statute. Nicometi v. Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC, 25 N.Y.3d at 97; Nieves v. Five Boro A.C. & Refrig. Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 914, 916 (1999); Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 501 (1993). The “special hazards” to which §240(1) applies “do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity. Rather, the ‘special hazards’ referred to are limited to such specific gravity-related accidents as falling from a height….” Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co., 81 N.Y.2d at 501. See Nicometi v. Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC, 25 N.Y.3d at 97; Brown v. New York-Presbyt. HealthCare Sys., Inc., 123 A.D.3d 612, 612 (1st Dep’t 2014). Thus an injury covered by Labor Law §240(1) must flow directly not only “from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person,” but also from a harm against which an adequate “scaffold, hoist, stay, ladder or other protective device” would have shielded the injured worker. Salazar v. Novalex Contr. Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 134, 139 (2011). See Runner v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 N.Y.3d 599, 604 (2009); Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d at 501. If the evidence meets these companion requirements, a “defendant’s failure to provide workers with adequate protection from reasonably preventable, gravity-related accidents will result in liability.” Wilinski v. 334 E. 92nd Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 1, 7 (2011); Hoyos v. NY-1095 Ave. of the Americas, LLC, 156 A.D.3d at 495; Ortega v. City of New York, 95 A.D.3d 125, 128 (1st Dep’t 2012). Liability under Labor Law §240(1): does not depend upon the precise characterization of the device employed or upon whether the injury resulted from a fall…. Rather, the single decisive question is whether plaintiff’s injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential. Runner v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 N.Y.3d at 603. See Hill v. City of New York, 140 A.D.3d 568, 569 (2016). Plaintiff, relying on Gory v. Neighborhood Partnership Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 113 A.D.3d at 551, insists that falling on a stairway without handrails automatically implicates liability under §240(1). Gory v. Neighborhood Partnership Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 113 A.D.3d at 550-51, held that: the fact that the stairway on which plaintiff was working when he was injured was originally constructed as a permanent structure does not remove it from the reach of Labor Law §240 (1). Not only had the stairway provided the sole means of access to the floors of the building during the demolition phase, but, in addition, it was an elevated surface on which plaintiff was required to work to complete his task of breaking up the marble pieces covering each step. The surrounding walls had been demolished, and the staircase had no guard rails. Thus, “plaintiff’s injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.” (quoting Runner v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 N.Y.3d at 603). In contrast to plaintiff here, the plaintiff in Gory did not simply fall on a stairway; he was injured because the stairway collapsed underneath him. Gory v. Neighborhood Partnership Housing Development Fund Co., Inc., Index No. 303856/2007, 2013 WL 8118506, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. 2013). Thus the defendants in Gory were liable because they exposed the plaintiff to an elevation-related risk not only by requiring him to work on the stairway, but also by failing to provide him an adequate safety device to protect against a stairway at risk of collapse, whose “surrounding walls had been demolished,” and which lacked guard rails, during a “demolition process.” Gory v. Neighborhood Partnership Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 113 A.D.3d at 551. To determine liability, “the relevant and proper inquiry is whether the hazard plaintiff encountered…was a separate hazard wholly unrelated to the hazard which brought about [the] need [for a safety device] in the first instance.” Nicometi v. Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC, 25 N.Y.3d at 98 (quotations omitted). See Serrano v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York Inc., 146 A.D.3d 405, 406 (1st Dep’t 2017); Andrade v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 51 A.D.3d 517, 517 (1st Dep’t 2008). Here, Consolidated Edison demonstrates that neither of plaintiff’s alleged injuries was caused by an elevation-related risk: (1) his neck fracture was caused by striking the plywood board, and (2) the herniated disc in his cervical spine was caused by his impact with the ground. Although plaintiff’s ascension up the staircase involved an elevation, his injuries were not a direct consequence of an elevation differential; he would have sustained the same injuries in a level passageway. Plaintiff maintains that the excessively high step that he stepped up to before he struck the board created an elevation differential, but concedes that the board caused him to lose his balance and fall. He does not claim that he lost his balance in pulling himself up onto the step. His affidavit further attests that the lack of a handrail as well as the board caused him to lose his balance, but he never attests that he attempted to grab anything to arrest his fall or that he actually fell down the steps so that he needed a handrail to arrest his fall. Rather, plaintiff testified that he fell forward, onto his hands and knees, on the same step that he ascended before striking the board. Thus his collision with the board does not fall within the ambit of Labor Law §240(1). Nor does he demonstrate that the absence of a handrail was the proximate cause of either the fracture or the herniation in his cervical spine. Nicometi v. Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC, 25 N.Y.3d at 97; Rivas v. Nestle Realty Holding Corp., 188 A.D.3d at 431; Landi v. SDS William St., LLC, 146 A.D.3d at 37. The stairway may have functioned as a safety device for plaintiff’s required travel between different levels, but the risk of injury associated with ascending a staircase is wholly unrelated to the risk of injury that the board projecting down into the staircase posed. Nicometi v. Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC, 25 N.Y.3d at 99; Melber v. 6333 Main St., Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 759, 763 (1998). See Serrano v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York Inc., 146 A.D.3d at 406. Similarly, a handrail is “simply not designed to avert the hazard plaintiff encountered” here: to have prevented his impact when falling forward onto the step he was ascending. Nicometi v. Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC, 25 N.Y.3d at 99; Melber v. 6333 Main St., Inc., 91 N.Y.2d at 763. Significantly, the authenticated photographs depicting the top step of the section of the basement staircase on which plaintiff fell led into an outside, open, concrete yard, where another set of stairs led up to the street. Thus a handrail along the three steps that plaintiff ascended before he fell would not have provided him the means to arrest his fall, because the handrail would not have extended beyond the staircase into the level area. Finally, while the excessively high step, the board, and the absence of a handrail all were unsafe conditions, neither of plaintiff’s injuries flowed “directly from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person.” Salazar v. Novalex Contr. Corp., 18 N.Y.3d at 139; Wilinski v. 334 E. 92nd Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 18 N.Y.3d at 10; Runner v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 N.Y.3d at 604. Plaintiff fell because he rose too quickly and struck his neck against the overhanging board. Unlike a worker who falls down the stairs because a defective condition causes him to lose his balance, plaintiff’s injury occurred from his upward force. For all these reasons, the circumstances of plaintiff’s injuries do not afford him protection under Labor Law §240(1). Therefore the court grants Consolidated Edison summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claim under Labor Law §240(1) against Consolidated Edison and denies plaintiff summary judgment on that claim against both defendants. C.P.L.R. §3212(b). Since plaintiff also moves for summary judgment on his Labor Law §240(1) claim, against EGK Realty, but, for the reasons explained above, fails to sustain a viable claim, the court searches the record and grants EGK Realty summary judgment dismissing that claim against EGK Realty. Id.; Canning v. Barneys N.Y., 289 A.D.2d 32, 35 (1st Dep’t 2001). See Edwards v. Aponte, 181 A.D.3d 484, 485 (1st Dep’t 2020); Esate of Mirjani v. DeVito, 135 A.D.3d 616, 618 (1st Dep’t 2016). IV. LABOR LAW §241(6) Labor Law §241 provides in part that: All contractors and owners…, when constructing or demolishing buildings or doing any excavating in connection therewith, shall comply with the following requirements: …. 6. All areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being performed shall be so constructed, shored, equipped, guarded, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to the persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places. The commissioner may make rules to carry into effect the provisions of this subdivision, and the owners and contractors…shall comply therewith. Labor Law §241(6) thus imposes a non-delegable duty on owners and general contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection for workers and to comply with specific safety regulations promulgated under the statute. St. Louis v. Town of N. Elba, 16 N.Y.3d 411, 413 (2011); Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d 338, 361 n.8 (2006); Comes v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d at 878; Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d at 502-503. Consolidated Edison moves for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claim under Labor Law §241(6) based on 12 N.Y.C.R.R. §§23-1.7, 23-1.8, 23-1.15, 23-1.16, 23-1.17, 23-1.21, 23-1.22, and 23-5, all alleged in plaintiff’s bill of particulars. Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal of his Labor Law §241(6) claim based on each of these regulations except 12 N.Y.C.R.R. §23-1.7(e)(1) and limits his claim to defendants’ violation of §23-1.7(e)(1). Therefore the court considers all the other claimed violations abandoned and grants both Consolidated Edison and EGK Realty summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claim under Labor Law §241(6) to the extent that the claim is based on any regulation other than 12 N.Y.C.R.R. §23-1.7(e)(1). Norris v. Innovative Health Sysy, Inc., 184 A.D.3d 471, 471 (1st Dep’t 2020); Leveron v. Prana Growth Fund I L.P., 449, 450-51 (1st Dep’t 2020); Henry v. Carr, 161 A.D.3d 424, 425 (1st Dep’t 2018); Ng v. NYU Langone Med. Ctr., 157 A.D.3d 549, 550 (1st Dep’t 2018). A. Covered Activities Under Labor Law §241(6) Plaintiff’s assigned tasks, as explained above, included the construction of gas meters and excavations along the road, both of which are specified activities under Labor Law §241. Therefore plaintiff’s work was covered by Labor Law §241(6). B. Sharp Projections Under 12 N.Y.C.R.R. §23-1.7(e)(1) Consolidated Edison nonetheless contends that 12 N.Y.C.R.R. §23-1.7(e)(1) does not apply to plaintiff’s injury because it did not result from a tripping hazard. Section 23-1.7 provides: (e) Tripping and other hazards. (1) Passageways. All passageways shall be kept free from accumulations of dirt and debris and from any other obstructions or conditions which could cause tripping. Sharp projections which could cut or puncture any person shall be removed or covered. Contrary to Consolidated Edison’s contention, neither the title nor the plain meaning of 12 N.Y.C.R.R. §23-1.7(e)(1) requires a tripping hazard to implicate liability under Labor Law §241(6). Kerins v. Vassar Coll., 293 A.D.2d 514, 515 (2d Dep’t 2002). While §23-1.7(e)(1)’s first sentence identifies tripping hazards as one type of hazard, the second sentence separately addresses “sharp projections.” Section 23-1.7(e)’s title likewise distinguishes tripping hazards “and other hazards.” The hazards encompassed in §23-1.7(e)(1) are independent of each other. No canon of statutory or regulatory construction supports Consolidated Edison’s interpretation of the regulation. Nor does Consolidated Edison cite any authority that limits §23-1.7(e)(1) to tripping hazards or that prohibits the plywood board from being considered a projection under the regulation. Consolidated Edison further contends, however, that the board was not a projection because it was a permanent part of the premises that Kolndreu installed by screwing it into the vertical sides of the stairwell’s wooden doorjambs. Kolndreu’s very testimony demonstrates that the board was not integrated into the stairwell so as to render the board’s removal impossible or even difficult. In fact, before plaintiff’s injury, Kolndreu removed two of three similar plywood boards that covered the doorway into the stairwell and then removed the remaining board after plaintiff’s injury. Finally, Consolidated Edison contends that the edges of the projecting board were blunt, not sharp, based on the opinion of Consolidated Edison’s engineer, Martin Bruno, after inspecting the premises and finding the board’s condition the same as depicted in photographs authenticated as depicting the board’s condition August 6, 2015. In contrast, however, plaintiff’s engineer Silberman, after his inspection of the premises and a similar comparative review of the authenticated photographs, concludes that the board’s edges were sharp. Plaintiff also attests that the board’s edges lacerated his neck. Even defendants’ inadmissible medical evidence indicates that plaintiff complained of neck pain, numbness, and tingling from striking the board, consistent with having struck a sharp projection. See Kaufman v. Capital One Bank (USA) N.A., 188 A.D.3d 461, 462 (1st Dep’t 2020). Although the court may not consider the engineers’ opinions on the applicable law or whether it was violated, Morris v. Pavarini Constr., 9 N.Y.3d 47, 51 (2007); Buchholz v. Trump 767 Fifth, 5 N.Y.3d 1, 7 (2005); Lopez v. Chan, 102 A.D.3d 625, 626 (1st Dep’t 2013); McCoy v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 53 A.D.3d 457, 459 (1st Dep’t 2008), their conflicting opinions raise a factual issue whether defendants violated the regulation by allowing plaintiff to use a stairway with a sharp projection. Feiner & Lavy, P.C. v. Zohar, 195 A.D.3d 411, 413 (1st Dep’t 2021); Shatsky v. Highpoint Assocs. V, LLC, 170 A.D.3d 497, 498 (1st Dep’t 2019); Gyamfi v. Citywide Mobile Response Corp., 146 A.D.3d 612, 612 (1st Dep’t 2017); Hernandez v. 21 Realty Co., 113 A.D.3d 503, 503 (1st Dep’t 2014). Therefore the court denies both plaintiff and Consolidated Edison, as well as EGK Realty, summary judgment on plaintiff’s Labor Law §241(6) claim. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, the court grants the motion by defendant Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law §240(1) claim and his Labor Law §241(6) claim, except based on violation of 12 N.Y.C.R.R. §23-1.7(e)(1), and grants defendant EGK Realty, LLC, summary judgment dismissing the same claims. C.P.L.R. §3212(b) and (e). The court also grants plaintiff summary judgment on EGK Realty’s liability for negligence and violation of Labor Law §200. The court otherwise denies the parties’ motions. C.P.L.R. §3212(b). Dated: October 27, 2021
