Recitation, as required by CPLR §2219 (a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion. Papers Numbered Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed 1 Affirmation/Affidavits in Opposition 2 Replying Affidavits 5 Filed Papers 3-4 DECISION AND ORDER Petitioner commenced the above-entitled holdover proceeding predicated upon a notice of termination which alleged that Respondents were holding over after the expiration of their license. Respondents appeared in court on the return date on May 13, 2021 and filed a hardship declaration alleging both a financial and a health hardship. Petitioner filed an Order to Show Cause on or about July 29, 2021 seeking (1) to amend the petition to allege a nuisance (2) striking the Respondents hardship declaration (3) permitting the action to proceed in the normal course (4) authorizing discovery and (5) indemnifying Petitioner from any and all claims stemming from the Respondents alleged unlawful and dangerous occupation of the premises. By Decision and Order dated September 7, 2021, the court denied the Order to Show Cause. Petitioner now moves to reargue. The Supreme Court in Chrysafis v. Marks, 594 US __ 2021 found that the hardship declarations violated petitioner’s due process rights. Accordingly, until the passage of the amended COVID-19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020 (“CEEFPA”) legislation, on September 2, 2021, the Court’s determination that the basis to challenge the hardship was moot was accurate. However, in that the decision was signed after the effective date of CEEFPA, this branch of the motion which sought leave to reargue is granted. CEEFPA, as amended, provides an avenue for Petitioner’s to challenge a hardship declaration. In the present motion, Petitioner alleged (1) Respondents are not entitled to protection as they are not tenants or lawful occupants and (2) Respondents presence in the unit poses a substantial safety hazard to others. ANALYSIS Petitioner requested the court strike the hardship declaration and permit the above-entitled matter to proceed in the normal course. This relief is sought, in part, upon Petitioner’s argument that the Respondents are neither tenants nor lawful occupants as those terms are defined in CEEFPA. Petitioner contends that the hardship declaration is explicitly reserved for a “tenant, lawful occupant or any other financial obligation under a residential lease or tenancy agreement.” Act, Part C, Subpart A §1. Petitioner argues that Respondents, like the respondents in Bibow v. Bibow, are licensees who do not have a financial obligation under a lease or tenancy agreement. Bibow v. Bibow, 72 Misc.3d 1212(A) (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2021). Petitioner further alleged that there is no landlord-tenant relationship if the premises occupied does not have a valid certificate of occupancy. See, Fazio v. Kelly, 2003 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 1202, 11-12 (Civ. Ct. Richmond County, 2003). Thus, Petitioner concludes as the unit is illegal and contrary to the Certificate of Occupancy, Respondents may not be deemed lawful occupants. A tenant is defined as “a residential tenant, lawful occupant of a dwelling unit, or any other person responsible for paying rent, use and occupancy, or any other financial obligation under a residential lease or tenancy agreement, but does not include a residential tenant or lawful occupant with a seasonal use lease where such tenant has a primary residence to which to return to.” Act, Part C, Subpart A §1(3). In interpreting a statute, the court must attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. DaimlerChrysler Corp v. Spitzer, 7 N.Y.3d 653 (2006); Yatauro v. Mangano, 17 N.Y.3d 420 (2011); Nostrom v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 15 N.Y.3d 502 (2010). The clearest indicator of the legislative intent is the text itself. Matter of New York County Lawyers’ Assn. v. Bloomberg, 19 N.Y.3d 712, 721 [2012]. If the language is “clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning.” State of New York v. Patricia II, 6 N.Y.3d 160, 162 [2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]. Unless the “plain intent and purpose of a statute would otherwise be defeated” the “literal language of a statute” is controlling. Bright Homes v. Wright, 8 N.Y.2d 157, 161-162 [1960]. If the law is ambiguous, the Court may also review the legislative history. Matter of Auerbach v. Board of Educ. Of City School Dist. Of City of NY, 86 N.Y.2d 198, 204 [1995]. Contrary to Petitioner’s interpretation, the definition of a tenant under CEEFPA is not limited to a residential tenant or lawful occupant. It also includes anyone responsible for paying rent or use and occupancy. CEEFPA Part C, Subpart A §1 (3). The court in Omega Melville LC, while referring to licensees specified certain people who were not intended to be granted CEEFPA protections. This, according to the court, included those individuals who have no responsibility to pay rent such as family members, home health service providers, post foreclosure holdovers and squatters. The Court finds that Petitioner’s reliance on Bibow v. Bibow1 and Omega Melville LC for the proposition that all licensees are excluded from protection is misplaced. The clear legislative intent was to “avoid as many evictions as possible for people experiencing a financial hardship.” The purpose of the legislation was to provide greater protections to tenants than was provided under the Tenant Safe Harbor Act. The legislation must be interpreted by the Court to carry out this end. See, Tzfil Realty Corp v. Mazrekaj, 72 Misc.3d 748 (Civ. Ct. Kings Co. 2021). Further support of this intent of an expansive reading can be found in the September 2, 2021 amendments to CEEFPA which changed the word “tenant” to “respondent” in Sections 4 and 6 addressing hardship declarations. See, Ocean Bay Rad LLC v. Tolliver, 2021 N.Y. Slip. Op. 21287 at *2 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Oct. 19, 2021). The Court is not of the opinion that all licensees are excluded but interprets the legislation to include a broader class. Here, the petition expressly sought to recover use and occupancy from Respondents. There is no dispute that they were under an obligation to pay same. Accordingly, as individuals responsible for payment of use and occupancy are included in the definition of a tenant, and as Respondents were under an obligation to pay same, there is no basis to challenge the hardship declaration on these grounds. The Court then turns to Petitioner’s remaining argument, that the Respondents were causing a substantial safety hazard. Petitioner alleged that the City of Yonkers Department of Housing and Buildings deemed the unit uninhabitable. A condemnation order was allegedly issued on October 14, 20212 as the premises were deemed “unfit for human habitation.” It appears, based on correspondence submitted to the court that the Respondents have vacated the premises thereby rendering this argument moot. It is undisputed the Respondents are no longer in possession of the subject premises, having vacated on or about November 16, 2021. As possession is no longer an issue, and as the landlord-tenant part of this court is already overburdened, the court, in its discretion and in the interest of judicial economy, transfers the matter to the civil court calendar for a hearing and determination on any alleged past due use and occupancy. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, that effective immediately, the above-entitled matter will be transferred from the Landlord-Tenant part of the Yonkers City Court to the Civil part of the Yonkers City Court, to hear and determine all proceedings in or related to this matter; and it is further ORDERED, the notice of petition and petition will be deemed the summons and complaint; and it is further ORDERED, that the Civil Court Clerk will assign a new civil index number for the above matter; and it is further ORDERED, civil court clerk will schedule the matter for a hearing and notify the parties. Dated and Entered: November 22, 2021
