DECISION AND ORDER INTRODUCTION Pro se Plaintiff Carrie M. Leo brought this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) against (1) the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”); (2) Basil Seggos, the Commissioner of the DEC; (3) the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”); (4) Sonny Perdue, Secretary of the USDA; (5) Joe Therrien, Director of the Special Licenses Unit at the DEC; (6) William Powell, Lieutenant at the DEC; and (7) Andrea D’Ambrosio, Animal Care Inspector at the USDA. ECF No. 1. In her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff sues the DEC, Powell, Kevin Thomas, Therrien, the USDA, and D’Ambrosio.1 ECF No. 42. Presently before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss the original complaint, ECF Nos. 13, 35, and Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint, ECF Nos. 39, 42. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED and Plaintiff’s motion to amend is DENIED. BACKGROUND I. Procedural Background Plaintiff filed the original complaint on December 4, 2020. ECF No. 1. The Court screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915 and ordered that the complaint proceed to service. ECF No. 5. The Court noted that Plaintiff’s original complaint only sought equitable relief. It acknowledged that “Leo has not clearly articulated how the facts, as alleged, align with the legal theories she has cited. Perhaps anticipating this, Leo mentions that she intends to amend the Complaint, perhaps to clarify her claims or add parties named in the Complaint but not listed as defendants.” Id. at 6. But the Court declined, at that juncture to “endeavor to parse the claims and excise them, without the benefit of further briefing.” Id. State Defendants were served, and in March 2021, they filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 13. After several extensions of time, Plaintiff opposed the motion in July 2021. ECF No. 33. Federal Defendants were served after multiple service issues and, in August 2021, they filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 35. Plaintiff opposed Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss in September 2021. ECF No. 38. The same day, Plaintiff indicated her intent to amend the original complaint, but did not actually identify any proposed amendments. ECF No. 39. Plaintiff filed a motion to amend — with proposed amendments — on October 27, 2021. ECF No. 42. The proposed First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) contains more organized legal claims but omits much of the recitation of the facts contained in the original complaint. It also seems to add claims for monetary relief to the original complaint’s request for equitable relief. Federal Defendants oppose the motion to amend, ECF No. 44, while State Defendants “defer to the discretion of the Court and reserve their rights to move to dismiss the Amended Complaint after it has been served,” ECF No. 45. In her reply, filed on December 15, 2021, Plaintiff rehashes many of the facts contained in the original complaint that were omitted from the FAC. ECF No. 50. II. Factual Background Because of the confusing procedural history and posture of this case — and the omission of most of the facts from the FAC — the Court will address the pending motions based on the facts contained in all of Plaintiff’s submissions. Plaintiff’s allegations arise from, what she says, are years of Defendants’ abusive and conspiratorial conduct, which targeted Plaintiff’s “wildlife center” in Walworth, New York, and led to the theft of her wild animals, the revocation of her wildlife licenses, and the wildlife center’s ultimate demise. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that starting on November 7, 2015, DEC officials visited her wildlife center upon receiving a complaint from a neighbor that Plaintiff was harboring wild animals. ECF No. 1 at 4. Although Plaintiff was licensed by the DEC and USDA, officials returned on May 10, 2016 for an “inspection,” and seized “a pack of six adult coyotes” she possessed pursuant to a DEC license. Id. at 5. In July 2016, the DEC cited Plaintiff with eleven citations, mostly for possession of coyotes. Id. The charges were resolved with a plea to two civil violations for keeping opossums in cages in the winter and for submitting an annual license log late — violations that Plaintiff contends are normally ignored by the authorities. Id. Sometime in 2017, Defendant Powell and DEC Officer Thomas (who was not named in the original complaint but was later named in the FAC), made Plaintiff “take the entire center down.” Id. In April 2017, Plaintiff boarded three animals with a colleague — who is later identified in the complaint as Tyler Thomas, but who is not included as a Defendant. Without Plaintiff’s permission, “staff members of the DEC and USDA” assisted the colleague in taking the animals out of New York State and exporting them to Texas. Id. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant D’Ambrosio encouraged the colleague “to take as many animals as possible from [the] center with the intent not to return them.” Id. at 7. Defendant Powell manipulated authorities to threaten financial retribution and collaborated with the colleague who stole the animals. Plaintiff has been attempting to regain possession of the stolen animals since then. She claims she was granted a preliminary injunction in September 2018 but does not identify the court that issued it or the defendants who were enjoined. Plaintiff does allege that, in response to the injunction she learned that the animals were either stolen or deceased. Id. Plaintiff claims that, despite her repeated and frequent efforts, the DEC and USDA have been withholding information and documents regarding the animal heist. In the original complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Powell, Therrien, and D’Ambrosio, and non-Defendants James Farquhar and Tonya Hadijis, have been “protecting the person who still has possession of” the animals. Id. More specifically, Defendants Powell and Therrien incited Plaintiff’s neighbors to destroy her property and secretly release her animals, and defamed her to local authorities and neighbors by accusing her of animal cruelty. Id. at 6. She insists that these DEC and USDA employees besmirched her business and character, id. at 7, claiming that they have been “passing around rumors that [she] was an animal abuser and starve[d] animals,” id. at 9; ECF No. 50 at 5 (noting an online accusation that Plaintiff had been involved in the abuse of hundreds of animals at a property in Niagara County that she did not own or live at). Plaintiff alleges that “[s]uch covert actions also reveal the inappropriate relationship the two agencies have had with other licensees; especially those willing to extend the DEC’s authority far beyond it’s [sic] limits.” ECF No. 50 at 3. As part of this abuse, Plaintiff alleges that her state licenses “were either denied renewal in a very untimely fashion or revoked.” ECF No. 1 at 9. Similarly, the USDA is instituting a reciprocal proceeding to terminate her federal license based on the termination of her state license. Id. Plaintiff asserts that a similar New York state bill is “targeting me in any future attempt of mine to restart my center in another state.” ECF No. 50 at 4. During the times relevant here, Plaintiff alleges that the DEC — and now the USDA — refused to provide her with any information or notices of actions being taken against her. Plaintiff claims that the USDA did not investigate these actions after she complained.2 ECF No. 1 at 7. Rather, Defendant D’Ambrosio at the USDA and DEC employees continue to protect Plaintiff’s colleague and prevent her from being reunited with her animals. Plaintiff also references court proceedings in 2017 regarding the stolen animals or her licenses and alleged wrongdoing during those proceedings. ECF No. 33 at 13. It is not clear if these proceedings are related to those in which Plaintiff claims she was awarded a preliminary injunction in 2018. DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard To state a valid §1983 claim, a plaintiff “must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. Cty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997). Bivens created a corresponding implied private right of action for plaintiffs to sue federal officials in their individual capacity to redress constitutional violations. Ojo v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 3d 163, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and §1983 suits,…[the plaintiff] must plead that each Government-official defendant, through his own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Here, Defendants move to dismiss the original complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff opposed the motions to dismiss but later responded by moving to amend the complaint pursuant to Rule 15. In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007) (quoting another source), and “draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor.” Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The application of this standard is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “Rule 15(a)(2) instructs that a court ‘should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.’” Willis v. Rochester Police Dep’t, No. 15-CV-6284-FPG, 2018 WL 4637378, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2018) (quoting Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2013)). A court may, however, deny leave to amend where such amendment would be “futile.” Id. Amendment is futile if the proposed claim “could not withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2002). “When — as in this case — a motion to amend is filed in response to a pending motion to dismiss, ‘a court has a variety of ways in which’ to proceed, ‘from denying the motion [to dismiss] as moot to considering the merits of the motion [to dismiss] in light of the [proposed] amended complaint.’” Willis, 2018 WL 4637378, at *2 (quoting Conforti v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 278, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)). Here, the Court elects to consider the merits of the motion to dismiss in light of the proposed amended complaint. Because it concludes that neither the original complaint nor the FAC could withstand a motion to dismiss, the Court grants the motions to dismiss and denies leave to file the FAC. See Pettaway v. National Recovery Solutions, LLC, 955 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2020) (approving of the district court’s approach in granting a motion to dismiss and denying a motion for leave to amend the complaint, filed in response to the motion to dismiss, because the new allegations could not save plaintiff’s claims, i.e., “the amended complaint would not withstand a motion to dismiss”). II. Analysis At the outset, the Court makes a few points that will guide and focus its analysis. First, the Court wishes to emphasize its obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally to raise “the strongest argument that they suggest.” Shepherd v. Sanchez, 27 F. App’x 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2001) (summary order) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Plaintiff’s FAC is not a model of clarity, but the Court is generally able to understand the conduct Plaintiff is seeking to challenge and, in a basic sense, why she finds that conduct wrongful. Once viewed through the correct legal frameworks, at least some of Plaintiff’s claims appear to present rational, yet perhaps not cognizable, theories for relief. Second, one of the difficulties the Court faces is that neither party has fully briefed the myriad legal issues that Plaintiff’s claims implicate. The Court does not necessarily fault the parties for this — as Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and Defendants were faced with responding to a sometimes vague and unclear set of allegations — but it leaves the Court without the benefit of full legal briefing. A. Plaintiff’s Claims may be Time-Barred Plaintiff alleges that the unconstitutional conduct began in November 2015 and continued thereafter. But the Court is only able to discern conduct attributable to Defendants up until December 2017.3 “In an action arising in New York pursuant to Section 1983, the applicable statute of limitations is borrowed from New York’s general statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which is three years.” Ruane v. County of Suffolk, 923 F. Supp. 2d 454, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting another source). Similarly, “[t]he statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in New York is three years.” Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1999). Plaintiff filed this action on December 4, 2020. ECF No. 1. Therefore, assuming, the actionable conduct ended in December 2017, most, if not all of Plaintiff’s claims would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. However, Plaintiff notes that she did not learn of some of the alleged defamatory statements until 2019 or 2020. ECF No. 33 at 17. In any event, because the Court cannot say with certainty when the alleged conduct ended, it will proceed to the merits. B. Merits of the FAC and Original Complaint The Court addresses each of Plaintiff’s claims in the FAC, read together with the original complaint and Plaintiff’s other submissions. 1. First Claim Against the DEC As best as the Court can discern, Plaintiff’s first claim is against the DEC for “wrongfully depriv[ing] the Plaintiff of her property without due process.” ECF No. 42 6. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the DEC subjected her to “administrative citations; property/animal[] seizures, deprivation of licensure under false pretense; and additional ‘[s]pecial’ administrative burdens.” Id. At the outset, the Court notes that this claim is directed at the DEC, not an individual. Although the original complaint lists Basil Seggos, Commissioner of the DEC, as a defendant, it does not allege that he was personally involved in any wrongful conduct. Section “1983 does not permit such vicarious liability. If an individual defendant has not personally violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the plaintiff cannot succeed on a §1983 action against the defendant.” Naumovski v. Norris, 934 F.3d 200, 212 (2d Cir. 2019). Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Defendant Seggos. With respect to the DEC, “[s]tates, state agencies, and state officials sued in their official capacities for monetary relief are not suable ‘persons’ for the purpose of Section 1983.” Frankel v. New York Office of Children & Fam. Servs., No. 11-CV-7973, 2015 WL 1290973, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2015). “The Eleventh Amendment separately bars claims for monetary relief against a state, state agency, or state officials sued in an official capacity.” Id. “The Eleventh Amendment does not bar, however, suits for injunctive or declaratory relief against state officials in their official capacities.” Id. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue the DEC for monetary relief, such relief is not available. To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against the DEC for failure to enforce state law, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim. Fishman v. Daines, 743 F. Supp. 2d 127, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment prevents federal courts from granting declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials for violations of state law.”). It is unclear whether Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against the DEC based on violations of federal constitutional law separate from the writs she seeks. Even if Plaintiff could assert a claim against the DEC for violations of federal law, her due process claim would fail. To state a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff must allege facts plausibly suggesting that government action deprived her of a protected property interest. Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 2002). Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally-protected property interest in exotic animals. Wilkins v. Daniels, 913 F. Supp. 2d 517, 536 (S.D. Ohio 2021), aff’d, 744 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Plaintiffs have a limited property interest in their exotic animals or dangerous wild animals (as described in the Act), such that a fundamental Constitutional right is not implicated.”); Grant v. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, No. 16 CIV. 2765 (ER), 2017 WL 1229737, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Owners of dogs, cats and other types of pets have a property interest in their animals under New York law, although the interest is qualified and subject to regulation.”). Nor does she have a state-protected interest in the possession of wild animals. Evelyn Alexander Wildlife Rescue Ctr. Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conserv., 57 Misc. 3d 1213(A), at *5 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (“ECL §11-0105 clearly establishes that the State of New York owns all fish, game, and wildlife and the right of the State to protect wild animals is too well established to be called into question…. Any purported right petitioners allege over wildlife is not a property right protected by due process.”). Although Plaintiff may have a property interest in her DEC licenses during the term of the license, see Thomas-Ateba v. SAMHSA of U.S. Gov’t, No. 13-cv-4662, 2014 WL 1414577, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2019), she has not specifically challenged the revocation of them,4 see ECF No. 50 (noting that Plaintiff’s last license is still available), or otherwise alleged that the DEC interfered with such an interest. To the extent Plaintiff also suggests that the DEC violated her due process rights by causing the failure of her wildlife rehabilitation center, such allegations do not state a claim because the Fourteenth Amendment “is not so broad as to protect the right to a particular job.” Cityspect Inc. v. Smith, 617 F. Supp. 2d 161, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 2. Second and Third Claims Against Powell and Thomas Plaintiff next asserts that Defendants William Powell and Kevin Thomas,5 employees of DEC, “used [their] power to impose civil administrative punishments on my family and continuedto [sic] constantly threaten tens of thousands of future and/or impending fines/sanctions to intimidate” and “widely making it known around my town…that [they] intended tobe [sic] such an unrelenting burden that [they] would close my farm, business, and force me out of town.” ECF No. 42
