Applicants-Appellants the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its Attorney General (together, “Nigeria”), appeal an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Engelmayer, J.) vacating its earlier grant of Nigeria’s application for discovery from Respondents-Appellees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782. The district court considered Nigeria’s use of §1782 an improper attempt to “circumvent” the procedures set out in the Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Nigeria on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Nigeria, Sept. 13, 1989, T.I.A.S. No. 03-114.1 (“the MLAT”), for obtaining assistance from the United States Department of Justice in gathering evidence for use in criminal matters. The district court’s ruling was based on an error of law. Nothing in the MLAT, §1782, or any source of United States policy identified by the district court requires Nigeria to utilize the MLAT before or instead of §1782. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further consideration of the application. GERARD LYNCH, C.J. Applicants-Appellants the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its Attorney General, Abubakar Malami (together, “Nigeria”), appeal from a November 6, 2020 order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Paul A. Engelmayer, J.) vacating its earlier ex parte grant of Nigeria’s application to compel discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782 from Respondents Appellees VR Advisory Services, Ltd. and related entities and officers (together, “VR”). Section 1782 permits a district court, “pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person,” to compel discovery from a person within its jurisdiction “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation.” Nigeria sought discovery from VR for use in criminal proceedings in Nigeria related to the allegedly fraudulent procurement of a public-utility contract. The district court initially granted the application but later vacated that order, principally because it held that Nigeria’s application constituted an attempt to “circumvent” procedures laid out in the Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Nigeria on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Nigeria, Sept. 13, 1989, T.I.A.S. No. 03-114.1 (“the United States-Nigeria MLAT” or “the MLAT”), under which Nigeria could have sought assistance from the United States Department of Justice. We hold that the district court’s decision was based on an error of law, and thus amounted to an abuse of discretion, because it effectively erected an impermissible “extra-statutory barrier[] to discovery” under §1782. In re Application of Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1993). The United States Nigeria MLAT by its plain terms does not restrict Nigeria’s use of other lawful means to access evidence in the United States for use in criminal matters. To the contrary, it expands such access, supplementing rather than replacing other evidence-gathering tools such as §1782. Nigeria therefore does not “circumvent” the MLAT by applying directly to the district court for discovery under §1782. The district court further erred by concluding that Nigeria’s potential use of the discovery materials sought in a related proceeding challenging an arbitration award before an English court would be “improper” and by considering such potential use as a negative factor in addressing Nigeria’s §1782 application. We therefore VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further consideration of Nigeria’s application. BACKGROUND I. Factual Background This case grows out of a contract dispute between Nigeria and Process & Industrial Developments, Ltd. (“P&ID”), a company in which VR holds a 25 percent ownership stake. P&ID was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands in 2006 by Martin Quinn, an Irish national and former music manager engaged in the Nigerian arms trade, and his associate Brendan Cahill, also an Irish national. At the time of its incorporation, P&ID had no assets and a small number of employees. Nevertheless, within a few years, it convinced a number of Nigerian businesspersons and government officials to help it secure a contract to construct a natural-gas processing plant in Nigeria. That contract, the Gas Supply and Processing Agreement (“GSPA”), was signed in January 2010. Under its terms, P&ID would build a plant in Nigeria to process unrefined “wet gas” supplied by Nigeria into a product suitable for public-utility use and return much of the refined gas to Nigeria; P&ID would be entitled to keep the natural gas liquids stripped from the wet gas. The GSPA provided that legal disputes relating to the contract would be decided by an arbitration panel in London applying Nigerian law. The agreement was to run for a term of 20 years. For reasons that are in dispute, the GSPA fell through. Nigeria alleges that P&ID procured the GSPA by fraud and bribery, and never had any intention or ability to build a natural-gas plant. P&ID has alleged in other proceedings, and VR appears to take the position here, that P&ID secured funding and drew up plans for the plant, but that Nigeria breached the GSPA by refusing to help P&ID secure a source of wet gas. VR, an international investment fund with offices in New York City, acquired a 25-percent ownership interest in P&ID in 2018. Nigeria now seeks discovery principally of documents that VR obtained from P&ID in the course of that acquisition. II. Prior Proceedings The dispute over the failed GSPA has spawned a decade of litigation spanning three continents. In addition to proceedings in the United States, the proceedings most relevant to the present appeal are an arbitration in England (“the Arbitration”) in which P&ID secured a multi-billion-dollar award against Nigeria (“the Arbitration Award” or “the Award”); P&ID’s attempt to enforce that award in England and Nigeria’s attempt to have the English court set the Award aside (“the English Proceeding”); and criminal investigations and prosecutions in Nigeria related to the GSPA and the Arbitration Award (“the Nigerian Proceedings”). A. The Arbitration P&ID initiated an arbitration in London in August 2012, alleging that Nigeria had repudiated the GSPA by failing to make available wet gas as required by its terms, and seeking $5,960,226,233 plus interest in damages for lost profits. The arbitral tribunal held a liability hearing on June 1, 2015, by which time Quinn had died and was thus unavailable to testify in person. At that hearing, P&ID relied heavily on 34 pages of written testimony from Quinn, in which he asserted that P&ID spent years and tens of millions of dollars on preparatory work for the plant, such as drawing up plans and securing the necessary permits, only to have Nigeria cut off communications and refuse to help secure a source of wet gas as required by the GSPA. Nigeria called no witnesses and presented only a single witness statement, which the tribunal determined contained “no relevant evidence”; Nigeria would later allege that its arbitration counsel, Olasupo Shasore, had a conflict of interest and worked to undermine rather than advance Nigeria’s defense. On July 17, 2015, the tribunal found Nigeria liable for breaching the GSPA by repudiation. On January 31, 2017, the tribunal awarded P&ID $6.6 billion in damages for 20 years of lost profits, plus seven percent interest. B. The English Proceeding On March 16, 2018, P&ID applied to the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court in London (“the English Court”) for leave to enforce the Arbitration Award in the United Kingdom. The court granted P&ID leave to enforce the Award on September 26, 2019. Soon thereafter, Nigeria sought to challenge the Arbitration Award. On December 5, 2019, Nigeria applied to the English Court for an extension of time to challenge the Award, alleging that it had uncovered evidence of fraud both in the inducement of the GSPA and in the procurement of the Award. On September 4, 2020, the English Court granted Nigeria’s application for an extension of time to challenge the Award, holding — without making any definitive factual findings — that “Nigeria ha[d] established a strong prima facie case that the GSPA was procured by bribes paid to insiders as part of a larger scheme to defraud Nigeria” and that Quinn had perjured himself in his written testimony, on which the arbitral tribunal had heavily relied. J. App’x at 366. The English Court has scheduled a trial on Nigeria’s fraud claims for January 2023. C. The Nigerian Proceedings Nigerian authorities began investigating P&ID and its procurement of the GSPA in February 2016. In 2019, after the English Court granted P&ID’s application to enforce the Arbitration Award, Nigeria initiated a series of criminal prosecutions against P&ID and its affiliates. P&ID and P&ID Nigeria pleaded guilty to multiple counts, including conspiracy to defraud Nigeria, money laundering, tax evasion, and unauthorized trading. It is unclear whether any additional prosecutions remain pending in Nigeria related to the GSPA or the Arbitration Award, but Nigeria asserts that it is actively investigating criminal wrongdoing in connection with the Award. D. Prior Proceedings in the United States 1. P&ID’s enforcement action in the District of Columbia In 2018, roughly contemporaneously with its enforcement action in England, P&ID brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the Arbitration Award against Nigeria in the United States. See Process and Industrial Developments Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, No. 18-cv-594, 2018 WL 8997443 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2018). Nigeria moved to dismiss the action for want of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) immunized it from even having to brief the merits of the case. Id. at *1. The district court (Christopher R. Cooper, J.) rejected that argument and set a briefing schedule. Id. at *2-3. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded, however, holding that under the FSIA, the district court could not force a foreign sovereign to defend a case on the merits before ruling on a “colorable assertion[] of immunity.” Process and Industrial Developments Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 962 F.3d 576, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2020). On remand, the district court again denied Nigeria’s motion to dismiss, holding that Nigeria had implicitly waived its sovereign immunity by signing the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Process and Industrial Developments Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 506 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6-11 (D.D.C. 2020). Nigeria’s interlocutory appeal of that order is now pending before the District of Columbia Circuit. 2. Nigeria’s first §1782 application in New York On March 25, 2020, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Nigeria applied under §1782 to obtain discovery for use in the Nigerian Proceedings from ten different banks that had done business with P&ID. P&ID intervened in the matter, but it did not oppose the application; rather, it asked the district court to grant it access to any evidence obtained pursuant to the application and to limit the use of such evidence to the Nigerian Proceedings, suggesting that Nigeria actually sought the requested discovery for use in the English Proceeding. In its reply, Nigeria argued that P&ID lacked standing as an “interested party” to seek access to the discovery materials, and characterized P&ID’s insinuation that Nigeria intended to use discovery materials in the English Proceeding as “rank speculation” P&ID claims without support that it is an “interested party” but fails to articulate any cognizable interest it has in the Application, or present any reason why it should be provided with access to discovery materials produced by Bank Respondents. P&ID cites to its September 19, 2019 fraud conviction in Nigeria, but makes no claim that it has or will challenge this conviction, or that it plans to use documents produced by Bank Respondents in connection with any ongoing investigation or proceeding. Rather, P&ID believes it is entitled to discovery produced in these legal proceedings based on rank speculation that Applicants may seek to cite to documents produced by Bank Respondents “in other proceedings.” P&ID’s speculation is insufficient to transform P&ID into an interested party. J. App’x at 275 (citation omitted). Importantly, Nigeria did not assert that it would not use the discovery materials in the English Proceeding; indeed, it argued in the same filing that it had every right to use any discovery the court might order in other proceedings if it so chose. See id. at 276, quoting In re Accent Delight Int’l Ltd., 869 F.3d 121, 135 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Section 1782 does not prevent an applicant who lawfully has obtained discovery under the statute with respect to one foreign proceeding from using the discovery elsewhere.”). On May 7, 2020, the district court (Lorna G. Schofield, J.) granted Nigeria’s §1782 application. Judge Schofield also granted P&ID’s request to have “reasonable access” to materials obtained pursuant to any subpoenas issued, but did not restrict Nigeria’s use of the evidence in the English Proceeding. Order, In re Ex Parte Application of the Fed. Republic of Nigeria, No. 1:20-mc-00169, ECF No. 18, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2020). As it turns out, Nigeria did, in fact, use evidence of alleged bribery in connection with the GSPA that it obtained through that first §1782 application to make out its prima facie case of fraud in the English Proceeding. P&ID wrote to Judge Schofield objecting to that use and to Nigeria’s having allegedly obtained materials outside the scope of the court’s order, and it requested a protective order (1) requiring Nigeria to destroy materials it obtained that were outside the scope of discovery and (2) prohibiting Nigeria from using the materials it obtained through §1782 discovery in the English Proceeding. Judge Schofield never ruled on the requested protective order. She did, however, grant a separate request by JPMorgan Chase (one of the producing parties) for a protective order That order, to which both JPMorgan Chase and Nigeria stipulated, expressly permitted Nigeria to use materials that JPMorgan Chase produced “in proceedings arising out of or in connection with the Nigerian Proceedings, the GSPA, the Award, or the attempted enforcement, confirmation, vacatur, or other challenge of the Award.” Stipulated Protective Order, In re Ex Parte Application of the Fed. Republic of Nigeria, No. 1:20-mc-00169, ECF No. 26, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2020). III. The Present §1782 Application On May 12, 2020, five days after Judge Schofield granted Nigeria’s first §1782 application, Nigeria filed the present §1782 application, also in the Southern District of New York. This time, Nigeria sought discovery from VR Advisory Services, Ltd.; VR Advisory Services (USA) LLC; VR Capital Group, Ltd.; VR Global Onshore Fund, L.P.; VR Argentina Recovery Onshore Fund II, L.P.; and VR directors and officers Richard Dietz, Jeffrey Johnson, and Ashok Raju, “for use…in foreign criminal investigations and criminal judicial proceedings that are pending in the Federal Republic of Nigeria.” J. App’x at 12. Judge Engelmayer, to whom this second application was assigned, initially granted Nigeria’s ex parte application and allowed it to subpoena the various VR respondents. Nigeria then served subpoenas requesting 56 categories of documents, including “[a]ll documents concerning the terms of VR Advisory’s acquisition of Process & Industrial Developments, or any of its assets,” “[a]ll documents and communications concerning the enforcement of any award granted in the Arbitration,” and documents pertaining to transactions with various persons and entities involved in the GSPA affair. J. App’x at 136-42. After those subpoenas were served, VR moved to quash them, to vacate the order granting the application, and to stay discovery. VR argued primarily that by seeking discovery under §1782, Nigeria was attempting to circumvent the procedures of its MLAT with the United States, which allows Nigeria to enlist the help of the United States Department of Justice to gather evidence for use in criminal proceedings. Nigeria argued in response that it did not have to use the procedures provided by the MLAT before seeking discovery for use in criminal matters under §1782, and that in any event, “the arbitral enforcement proceeding in London is a related and independently qualifying foreign proceeding.” Applicant’s Opp’n Mot. Vac., Fed. Republic of Nigeria v. VR Advisory Servs., Ltd., No. 1:20-mc-00209, ECF No. 25, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2020). Nigeria also argued that VR, as a private party, lacked standing to invoke a treaty between two sovereigns as a basis for vacating the grant of the application. On November 6, 2020, the district court granted VR’s motion to quash the subpoenas and vacate the earlier order granting the application. The court followed the prescribed two-step process for evaluating §1782 applications: First it considered the statutory requirements for discovery under §1782, and second, it exercised its discretion to grant or deny the application, considering the four factors that the Supreme Court set out in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004). Beginning with the statutory requirements, the district court determined that if Nigeria had sought discovery for use in the English Proceeding, the application “would fail §1782′s second statutory requirement” — that discovery is sought for use in a proceeding before a foreign or international tribunal — because “[t]he pending English arbitral-enforcement proceeding” was of a “post-judgment character” akin to proceedings that this Court has held did not qualify under §1782. Fed. Republic of Nigeria v. VR Advisory Servs., Ltd., 499 F. Supp. 3d 3, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), citing Euromepa, S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 154 F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, the district court “assume[d] arguendo” that the application sought documents for use in the Nigerian Proceedings, which it determined were qualifying proceedings under §1782, and held that the other statutory requirements were satisfied. Id. at 11. Proceeding to its discretionary balancing of the Intel factors, the court held that the first factor, whether “the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding,” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264, favored granting the application, but “only nominally…because P&ID — which is involved in the Nigerian criminal proceeding — is the likely source of documents held by [VR] relevant to that proceeding.” Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 13. It held that the second factor, “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance,” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264, favored granting the application, because the Nigerian government was clearly receptive to, and in fact sought, the assistance in question, Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 13. The district court held, however, that the third Intel factor, “whether the §1782(a) request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States,” Intel, 542 U.S. at 265, “merit[ed] the greatest weight” and “strongly counsel[ed] against authorizing” the requested discovery. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 14. The court rejected Nigeria’s argument that VR lacked standing to object to Nigeria’s use of §1782 instead of the MLAT. Id. at 15. On the merits, although it acknowledged that “there is no principle of law compelling a foreign nation seeking evidence in this country for use in a criminal case to proceed first via an MLAT,” the district court determined that “there are sound reasons for generally channeling such discovery applications through the MLAT process,” including the promotion of “comity and consistent outcomes,” the protection of “domestic entities” from “foreign prosecutors and criminal investigators,” and the assurance that “the U.S. government’s expertise and analytic rigor is applied to the application, including to assure that the discovery is not sought for ulterior (non-prosecutive) ends.” Id. at 14. It explained that “[t]he U.S.-Nigeria MLAT [] puts in place a regular procedure for Nigeria to request assistance from the United States for discovery in Nigerian criminal cases” and maintained that Nigeria had not “provided a good reason for bypassing the MLAT process.” Id. at 15. The court called it “plausible” that Nigeria was attempting “to avoid scrutiny by U.S. authorities into the integrity of their criminal proceedings, and to avoid scrutiny into whether Nigeria is seeking discovery from the VR entities for the improper purpose of attempting to undermine the arbitral Award issued against it,” because Nigeria had “misled Judge Schofield” about its intentions with the discovery materials. Id. at 16. Finally, the district court held that the fourth factor, whether the request was “unduly intrusive or burdensome,” Intel, 542 U.S. at 265, weighed against the application because “various document requests in the subpoena appear to sweep well beyond [the] subject” of bribery, which Nigeria was ostensibly investigating, possibly evincing an intent to use discovery materials “for purposes outside the contemplation of §1782,” Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 17. Considering the four factors together, the district court vacated its earlier grant of Nigeria’s application and quashed the subpoenas that Nigeria had already served pursuant to that grant. Nigeria filed a notice of appeal on November 17, 2020. DISCUSSION I. Applicable Law A. Section 1782 “We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the statutory requirements of §1782.” Mees v. Buiter, 793 F.3d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 2015). “We review the District Court’s application of the so-called Intel factors and its decision to order discovery for abuse of discretion.” Fund for Protection of Investor Rights in Foreign States v. AlixPartners, LLP, 5 F.4th 216, 224 (2d Cir. 2021). A district court abuses its discretion if it (1) bases its decision on an error of law or uses the wrong legal standard; (2) bases its decision on a clearly erroneous factual finding; or (3) reaches a conclusion that, though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding, “cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Millea v. Metro-North R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011), quoting McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir. 2010). “Section 1782 is the product of congressional efforts, over the span of nearly 150 years, to provide federal-court assistance in gathering evidence for use in foreign tribunals.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 247. The present version of the statute, as enacted in 1964 and amended in 1996, provides in relevant part: The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation. The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court. 28 U.S.C. §1782(a). The 1996 amendment added the phrase “including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation,” thus expanding access to discovery under §1782 in criminal matters. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §1342(b), 110 Stat. 186, 486. “To the extent that the [district court's] order does not prescribe otherwise,” discovery pursuant to §1782 is taken “in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 28 U.S.C. §1782(a). The analysis of a district court hearing an application for discovery pursuant to §1782 proceeds in two steps. First, the court must determine whether the application satisfies §1782′s three statutory requirements: that (1) the person from whom discovery is sought resides (or is found) in the district of the district court to which the application is made, (2) the discovery is for use in a foreign proceeding before a foreign [or international] tribunal, and (3) the application is made by a foreign or international tribunal or any interested person. Mees, 793 F.3d at 297, quoting Brandi-Dohrn v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 673 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original). We have held that in order to satisfy the second statutory requirement, the applicant must seek discovery for use in an “adjudicative” proceeding. See In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Dir. of Inspection of Gov’t of India (“India”), 385 F.2d 1017, 1020-22 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.) (holding that assessment by an Indian tax official was not a “proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal” because of the official’s essentially executive, rather than adjudicative, function). Second, if the district court has determined that the statutory requirements are met, it “may grant discovery under §1782 in its discretion…’in light of the twin aims of the statute: providing efficient means of assistance to participants in international litigation in our federal courts and encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar means of assistance to our courts.’” Mees, 793 F.3d at 297-98, quoting Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2004). To evaluate whether granting an application would further those aims, courts are to consider four factors that the Supreme Court laid out in Intel: (1) whether “the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding,” in which case “the need for §1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent”; (2) “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance”; (3) “whether the §1782(a) request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States”; and (4) whether the request is “unduly intrusive or burdensome.” Mees, 793 F.3d at 298, quoting Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65. While the ultimate decision to grant or deny an application is discretionary, we have cautioned that courts are “not free to read extra-statutory barriers to discovery into section 1782″ under the guise of exercising their discretion. Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d at 59; see also In re Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[D]istrict courts issuing discovery orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782 may impose conditions to minimize the compliance burdens, so long as those conditions do not impose extra-statutory barriers to obtaining discovery such as an exhaustion requirement.”). B. The United States-Nigeria MLAT “We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of a treaty.” Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2010). An MLAT is an agreement between two sovereigns to provide assistance in criminal matters where evidence, persons, or property potentially useful to one sovereign’s prosecutors may be found within the other’s jurisdiction. Nigeria is one of many countries that have an MLAT with the United States. The United States and Nigeria signed their MLAT on September 13, 1989. The Senate approved the treaty on October 18, 2000, the president signed it into law on January 5, 2001, and it took effect on January 14, 2003. The preamble to the United States-Nigeria MLAT states that its purposes are “to improve the effectiveness of the law enforcement authorities of both countries in the investigation, prosecution, and prevention of crime through cooperation and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters,” “[c]onsidering in particular the need to fight against illicit production of and trafficking in narcotic drugs and other controlled substances,” and “to enhance assistance in the fight against crime.” Article I lays out the treaty’s basic functions. The two sovereigns “shall, upon request and in accordance with the provisions of th[e] Treaty, provide mutual assistance in connection with the investigation, prosecution, and prevention of crimes, and in proceedings related to criminal matters.” United States-Nigeria MLAT, art. I, 1. The types of assistance available include: (a) taking the testimony or statements of persons; (b) providing documents, records, and articles of evidence; (c) serving documents; (d) locating and identifying persons; (e) transferring persons in custody for testimony or other purposes; (f) executing requests for searches and seizures; (g) tracing, identifying, and immobilizing criminally obtained assets; (h) assisting in proceedings related to forfeiture, restitution, and collection of fines; and (i) any other form of assistance not prohibited by the laws of the Requested State. Id. art. I, 2. The conduct being investigated in the Requesting State need not be a crime under the laws of the Requested State, and the treaty states that it “is intended solely for mutual legal assistance” between the two sovereigns, expressly disclaiming the creation of any “right on the part of any private party to obtain, suppress, or exclude any evidence, or to impede the execution of a request.” Id. art. I,
3-4. Articles II and IV-VII lay out the procedures by which the Requesting State requests, and the Requested State grants or denies, assistance. Under Article II, each country has a “Central Authority” that handles MLAT requests: “the Attorney General or a person designated by him” for the United States, and “the Attorney General of the Federation or a person designated by him” for Nigeria Id. art. II,
