DECISION & ORDER Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. See dkt. # 12. Defendant opposes the motion, and the parties have briefed the issues. The Court will decide the motion without oral argument. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint in the Supreme Court of Jefferson County, New York. See dkt. # 1-2. Defendant removed the case to this Court, citing diversity of citizenship as the basis for jurisdiction. See dkt. # 1-1 at 4. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that Plaintiff had failed to allege facts sufficient to make plausible his right to relief, and that one of his claims was barred by the statute of limitations. See dkt. # 5. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would have permitted Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint without seeking leave of Court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(B) (“A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course…(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after…service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (c), or (f).”). Instead, however, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the Complaint. Defendant responded, arguing that amendment would be futile. The Court will evaluate the motion for leave to amend in the interest in judicial efficiency, since denying the motion to amend would have the same effect in this matter as granting a motion to dismiss that Defendant could file in response to the Amended Complaint that Plaintiff might have filed as a matter of right.1 The proposed Amended Complaint concerns injuries that Plaintiff Cameron Arnold suffered while working at Ox Industries in Carthange, New York on November 20, 2018. See Proposed Amended Complaint (“Amend. Complt.”), Exh. E to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend, dkt. # 12-7, at 21. On that day, Plaintiff’s co-worker was operating a 2006 Toyota Forklift behind the Plaintiff. Id. at 23. At a some point, “a roll of industrial paper fell off the forklift and crushed Plaintiff’s left leg.” Id. Plaintiff suffered “grave injuries including an amputation of his left leg.” Id. at 23. Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Toyota Material Handling, and/or Toyota Industrial Engineering Manufacturing, Inc. (“Toyota”), “designed, manufactured, distributed, and sold a Toyota Forklift” at some point before 2015, and entered “it into the stream of commerce.” Id. at 11. Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendants warrantied that the forklift would be fit for its ordinary and intended particular use.” Id. at 12. He also contends that Defendants had “a duty to design, manufacture, inspect, and distribute the forklift in a careful manner such that it was not unreasonably dangerous to persons or property.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff further alleges that, “[u]pon information and belief, Defendants were aware that it was common for users in the industry to use the forklift to lift/move large rolls of materials including paper.” Id. at 14. Defendants also allegedly knew “that using the forklift in such a manner to lift large rolls of material was a dangerous and hazardous use and such use caused serious personal injuries.” Id. at 15. At the time Defendants manufactured the forklift, Plaintiff claims, “attachment options” were “available such as ‘paper roll attachments’ and automatic clamp leveling equipment” that would make the forklift safe to use when lifting large rolls of paper. Id. at 16. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to warn of the dangers of using that forklift on large rolls of paper. Id. at 17. Defendants, he claims, did not put warning labels on the forklift that advised “that it should not be used to handle large rolls of materials and that it should only be used with a roll attachment of clamp leveling equipment.” Id. at 18. Defendants further failed to warn that failing to use such equipment “could result in serious injury or death.” Id. Plaintiff alleges “[u]pon information and belief” that “Defendants marketed, sold, and distributed” the “forklift as being intended to handle large roll materials with no attachments or clamp leveling equipment.” Id. at 19. The instruction manual also allegedly failed to contain such warnings. Id. at 20. The proposed Amended Complaint contains three causes of action that all sound in products liability. Plaintiff alleges negligence, strict liability, and a failure to warn. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. The parties have briefed the issues, and the Court will address the motion. II. LEGAL STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “leave to amend the pleadings should be ‘freely give[n]…when justice so requires.’” AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 626 F.3d 699, 725 (2d Cir. 2010)). Generally, courts in this Circuit have permitted “‘a party to amend its pleadings in the absence of a showing by the nonmovant of prejudice or bad faith.’” Id. (quoting Block v. First Blood Assocs., 988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d. Cir. 1993)). Still, “motions to amend should generally be denied in instances of futility, undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or undue prejudice to the non-moving party.” Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). At issue here is whether permitting amendment of the Complaint would be futile. “[T]he standard for leave to amend based on futility is the same as the standard for granting a motion to dismiss.” IBEW Local Union No. 58 Pension Trust Fund & Annuity Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., 783 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2015). In addressing such motions, the Court must accept “all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 2009). This tenet does not apply to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). III. ANALYSIS Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to make plausible his claims, which all sound in product liability under New York law. They contend that Plaintiff “fails to allege how the subject forklift was negligently or improperly designed or manufactured as to make it unreasonably dangerous, or why the warnings accompanying the device were inadequate.” The case involves claims of negligence in a products liability context. “To make a prima facie case for negligence in New York, a plaintiff must show (1) that the manufacturer owed plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care; (2) a breach of duty by failure to use reasonable care so that a product is rendered defective, i.e., reasonably certain to be dangerous; (3) that the defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury; and (4) loss or damage.” Colon v. BIC USA, Inc., 199 F.2d 53, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Plaintiff here alleges different types of strict products liability. In New York, “[a] manufacturer who places into the stream of commerce a defective product which causes injury may be liable for such injury.” Amatulli v. Delhi Constr. Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 525, 532, 571 N.E.2d 645, 648 (1991). Defects in a product “may consist of a mistake in manufacturing, an improper design or the inadequacy or absence of warnings for the use of the product.” Id. “To recover for injuries caused by a defective product, the defect must have been a substantial factor in causing the injury, and ‘the product must have been used for the purpose and in the manner normally intended or in a manner reasonably foreseeable.’” Hartnett v. Chanel, Inc., 97 A.D.3d 416, 419, 948 N.Y.S.2d 282, 285 (1st Dept. 2012) (quoting Amatulli, 77 N.Y.2d at 532). Plaintiff appears to allege each of these types of products liability claims. In opposing the motion to amend, Defendants point to evidence outside the pleadings and argue that Plaintiff’s proposed amended pleading is futile in several ways. The Court will address each of Defendants’ arguments in turn. The Court notes that Defendants’ arguments rely on materials outside the pleadings. Defendants include in their briefing and briefing papers excerpts from the owner’s manual and an accident report produced by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (“OSHA”). Their briefing quotes portions of these documents. The Court notes that this case is in the posture of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion for summary judgment. At this stage of the litigation, “[c]onsideration of materials outside the complaint is not entirely foreclosed,” but the court considers such materials only under certain conditions. Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2006). While the Court can consider materials “integral” to the complaint, such as a contract in a contract action, “it must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document.” Id. “It must also be clear that there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.” Id. The documents that Defendants provide are not the sort of the documents the Court will consider at this stage of the litigation, particularly in a case that involves the adequacy of warnings that the Defendants provided. The adequacy of warnings is not proved by their existence, and Plaintiff will be required to develop a record to prove what failings existed. Considering the warnings without that additional record is not appropriate. Similarly, Plaintiff’s version of the accident may be different than the one provided in the accident report cited in Defendants’ briefing. Resolving such conflicts is not appropriate at this stage. Thus, the Court will not consider these documents in determining whether Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to make his right to recovery plausible. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, “the facts a plaintiff alleges in a complaint may turn out to be self-serving and untrue. But a court at the motion-to-dismiss “stage…is not engaged in an effort to determine the true facts.” Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 2016). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[t]he issue is simply whether the facts the plaintiff alleges, if true, are plausibly sufficient to state a legal claim.” Id. After all, “[i]f the complaint is found sufficient to state a legal claim, the opposing party will then have ample opportunity to contest the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations and to offer its own version.” Id. The Court will consider each of Defendants’ arguments in turn. i. Duty Defendants first contend that “[t]here are no facts upon which to impose a duty on” Toyota. They allege that “[t]here is no relationship between Defendant TMH and the Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s employer Ox Industries.” The proposed Amended Complaint, Defendants insist, does not contain any facts that demonstrate that Defendants were aware of the sale of the forklift from the original owner to Plaintiff’s employer, and offers no factual allegations to show that Defendants were aware of how Ox Industries intended to use the forklift. Besides this lack of knowledge about how the forklift was to be used by Ox Industries, Defendants also contend that Ox Industries violated OSHA rules by failing “to select the optional equipment and attachments depending on its particular use and environment.” According to Defendants, federal regulations place the burden on Ox Industries to contact Defendants about changes in use for the forklift and the modifications that such changes might require. Other than citing to federal regulations, Defendants point to no case law to support this argument. Defendants do not point to any legal or factual deficiency in the proposed Amended Complaint, but instead cite to evidence they have provided to argue that Plaintiff cannot prove that Defendants had any duty to him. Whatever the evidence may reveal, “manufacturers of defective products may be held strictly liable for injury caused by their products, i.e., they may be liable regardless of privity, foreseeability or reasonable care and a product may be considered defective due to a mistake in manufacturing process, defective design or inadequate warnings about the use of the product.” Smith v. 2328 Univ. Ave. Corp., 52 A.D.3d 216, 217 (1st Dept. 2008). In a products liability case, as here, “the duty, broadly speaking, is defined in one of two ways[.]” In re “ Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). If the claim is for “negligence,” the manufacturer has “a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design, manufacture and marketing (including warnings and instruction to consumers) or a product[.]” Id. If the claim is for “ strict liability,” the manufacturer has “a duty not to design, manufacturer or market a defective product — whether or not the defect resulted from the lack of exercise of due care.” Id. In other words, the duty at issue here is the Defendants’ duty to manufacture a product safe for its intended use. In the strict liability context, “a ‘defectively designed product is one which, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, is in a condition not reasonably contemplated by the ultimate consumer and is unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; that is one whose utility does not outweigh the danger inherent in its introduction into the stream of commerce.’” Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, (N.Y. 1983) (quoting Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 479 (N.Y. 1980)). A manufacturer is not always liable for injuries caused by its products; “[w]hile the manufacturer is under a nondelegable duty to design and produce a product that is not defective, that responsibility is gauged at the time the product leaves the manufacturer’s hands,” and “[s]ubstantial modifications…by a third party which render a safe product defective are not the responsibility of the manufacturer.” Robinson, 49 N.Y. 2d at 479. Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants designed the product in question, and that they “placed the forklift into the stream of commerce.” Amend. Complt. at 27. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants breached their duty to use reasonable care in designing the product and the warnings on the product. Id. at 30. Plaintiff also alleges that he and his coworkers were the intended users of the forklift, and Defendants placed “in the stream of commerce” a forklift that had design defects. Id. at
