DECISION and ORDER On remand, the petition to determine parenthood by equitable estoppel is denied; petitioner consistently disavowed any commitment to parent a child after the parties’ personal relationship dissolved and prior to the child’s introduction to the respondent. Petitioner produced no evidence demonstrating parenthood pursuant to the criteria for equitable estoppel established by this Court, agreed to by petitioner, and affirmed on appeal as proper and appropriate criteria. The child’s voice having been effectively and unequivocally heard as represented by his guardian ad litem (“Attorney for the Child”) and the forensic examination and report, demonstrates the child does not now, and has not ever considered petitioner a parent or other family member. The child acknowledges a fondness for petitioner’s dogs. The child acknowledges only the respondent as his mother. The parties agreed on the appointments of the Attorney for the Child and the neutral forensic psychologist. The petitioner’s own evidence demonstrates at no time did respondent consent, facilitate or abide petitioner’s parentage of her son, nor did respondent agree to or facilitate a second-parent adoption by petitioner. Petitioner’s own evidence demonstrates at no time did petitioner hold herself out as the child’s parent in the presence of respondent. Petitioner’s attorneys’ assertion of conflict resulting from the Court’s prior appointment of respondent’s counsel as guardian ad litem in an unrelated matter is summarily dismissed as nonsense and entirely without merit. Proceedings with respect to respondent’s petition for counsel fees in the amount of $2,700.458.09, and related motion for contempt of violation of prior counsel fee orders, continue unabated. This matter is before this Court on remand from the Appellate Division for judicial determination of petitioner’s assertion of parenthood of respondent’s child (hereinafter “the child” or “A” on the grounds of equitable estoppel. 1. On September 1, 2016, K.G. (“petitioner”) petitioned this Court for legal standing as a parent pursuant to DRL §70, with all attendant rights, including custody and visitation of C.H.’s (“respondent”) adopted son A, born December 2009. That petition was solely grounded on a theory that these parties had a plan to adopt and raise a child together. No child was offered to the respondent for adoption until almost fifteen (15) months after the parties’ relationship ended. 2. The hearing on the petition commenced on September 12, 2016 and continued until February 16, 2017, spanning 36 days in court, during which 341 exhibits were introduced into evidence. 3. At the hearing K.G. presented eight witnesses, including her mother, father, and sister, as well as friends familiar with her interaction with respondent and respondent’s son. C.H. presented 18 witnesses, including A’s preschool and elementary school administrators, certain of petitioner’s colleagues and employees, mutual friends, and other individuals familiar with her and her son. 4. The petition did not assert any claim of parenthood by equitable estoppel; however, during the 36-day hearing, the Court permitted K.G. to present evidence supportive of an equitable estoppel claim in the interest of compiling as complete a record as possible in anticipation of an equitable estoppel assertion being pursued post litem motam. 5. Following the conclusion of the hearing, this Court issued a decision entered April 13, 2017 (the “April 2017 Order”) dismissing the petition, finding that the parties’ plan to adopt a child together had been abated by the parties’ personal relationship having effectively dissolved approximately fifteen (15) months before a child was identified as available for adoption by C.H. Therefore, this Court reasoned and the Appellate Division affirmed, that any plan to adopt a child together was abated by the parties’ separation and the extended passage of time before a child was identified as available for adoption by C.H. Consequently, the facts as established at the hearing did not provide a basis for K.G.’s claim to parentage of A pursuant to Brooke SB Elizabeth A C.C., 28 N.Y.3d 1 (2016). 6. This Court determined by its April 2017 Order that “[u]pon the presentation of the evidence of both parties over 36 days of testimony, constituting a hearing transcript of 4,738 pages, 215 exhibits on behalf of petitioner and 126 exhibits on behalf of respondent…petitioner has on numerous occasions stated that she did not want to be a parent and gave no indication to either respondent or third parties that she either wanted this role or acted as a parent.” 7. In that April 2017 Order, the Court also cited an email dated May 18, 2015 in which respondent reminded petitioner that she was not a parent of her son, and that respondent did not consider her a parent, to wit: “You are the Godparent of [A], I am his adoptee [sic] parent. I included you as a close friend…but I honestly thought you had moved on, that we had separated and you were giving as a good friend, rather than an expectation of being a second parent.” (Petitioner’s Exh. 130). 8. Evidence further tending to eviscerate petitioner’s claim to parenthood by equitable estoppel included the following admissions by petitioner, and testimony from individuals in the child’s life and community: a. K.G.’s May 20, 2015 e-mail in which she told C.H.: “I have never inferred or articulated to [A or to anyone] that I am his mother. For the record, I respect and honor your role as mom” (Respondent’s Exh. HH). b. K.G.’s November 5, 2015 e-mail in which she praised C.H.: “You had faith that the rig…kid would come into your life, in the face of so many unknowns. You’re doing a killer job raising a vibrant kid. I admire you for all you’ve done and are doing. How amazing you found each other” (Respondent’s Exh. O). c. Ms. M.F., the Parent Coordinator at P.S. 41, A’s school, testified that C.H. was the only person noted as A’s parent on the school’s record nor was there any indication that K.G. had been registered at any time on the school’s web site for access to information about a student’s schedule or activities at the school, which was only available to parents. (Tr. 3539-48, 3556-65). d. Ms. J.A., the Education Director at the Chelsea Piers Early Learning Center and Pre-School, which A attended before P.S. 41, testified that at no time did the Center know K.G. as A’s parent; she was not listed on any of the school records as a parent. (Tr. 3587-88). e. A’s special education teacher, PB, testified that she had never heard of K.G. until she was subpoenaed to testify. (Tr. 3532). f. SK, A’s audiologist, testified that she did not know who K.G. was. (Tr. 3823). g. AC, who, along with her own adopted son, had very nearly weekly contact with the respondent and A, and in two brief contacts was introduced to petitioner as respondent’s ex-partner and godmother to A. (Tr. 3749-3757). h. DS, whose daughter was enrolled in a dance class with A, testified that petitioner identified herself as his godmother, and stated that “his mom had adopted him from Ethiopia”. (Tr. 3735). i. KST, who worked with both parties, attended a baby shower at respondent’s home, hosted by petitioner and in the company of others, but at which only C.H. was given gifts and congratulated. (Tr. 3608-09). j. AB, an acknowledged good friend of both parties, testified that at no time after the arrival of A did petitioner present herself as his parent, and on the many occasions the witness saw A, she “never heard him talk about [K.G.].” (Tr. 4248). k. The records of Tribeca Pediatrics note C.H. as the [C]hild’s mother and refer to petitioner as an emergency contact. (Respondent’s Exh. CC.) l. The testimony of K.G.’s parents and sister indicated that their roles in the Child’s life were limited to small parts or as babysitters. The record is devoid of proof that this child recognizes these witnesses as part of his family, and he addresses all three by their first names only. m. As noted in this Court’s decision of April 2017, the petitioner’s limited involvement in A’s educational and extracurricular activities, lend no weight to a claim to parenthood. n. K.G. testified that she spent many Thursday nights with the child to provide C.H. with a break from her child-care responsibilities, which allowed C.H. to resume her movie night tradition with friends. (Tr. 736-37). 9. On June 26, 2018, the Appellate Division, First Department issued a Decision and Order affirming this Court’s April 2017 determination that petitioner had failed to establish parental standing based on a preadoption plan to adopt a child together. By that same Order the Appellate Division remanded this matter for a further determination on grounds of equitable estoppel. The First Department further instructed that in a hearing on a claim of parental standing based on equitable estoppel the child’s voice was to be heard, noting “[T]he appointment of an attorney for the child…should be the norm where the issue raised is equitable estoppel.” The First Department further noted alternative means to obtaining vocalization from the child “include[ed] a forensic evaluation or a Lincoln hearing.” (K.G. v. C.H., 163 A.D.3d 67, 83 [1st Dept 2018]) 10. On September 6, 2018 this Court directed the parties to submit suggested criteria applicable to the determination of parentage premised upon a theory of equitable estoppel. 11. On October 1, 2018, counsel for both parties submitted memoranda of law setting forth suggested criteria for an equitable estoppel test. 12. On October 17, 2018, the Court provided counsel for the parties a detailed letter setting forth the criteria anticipated to be applied on the theory of parenthood by equitable estoppel, based upon their submissions and the Court’s own research. The Court also advised counsel that further input with respect to that criteria would be considered at any time. The Court expressed particular concern with — and repeatedly encouraged counsel to address — any criteria that would or could remotely potentially negatively affect the standing and rights of members of LGBTQ or other non-traditional families. By so doing, this Court provided to these parties and their attorneys a singularly unique opportunity to frame the issue of parenthood by equitable estoppel for this case and for all similar future cases, most particularly those affecting our LGBTQ communities. 13. At no time did either counsel raise a concern that the proposed criteria were in any way discriminatory or detrimental to these parties or the broader LGBTQ community. 14. At no time did either counsel raise any concern whatsoever that the proposed criteria presented a heightened scrutiny for the LGBTQ community in comparison to any other community. 15 No further criteria were proposed by counsel for either party for the Court’s consideration with respect to the issue of equitable estoppel. 16. On November 20, 2018, counsel for both parties expressed their satisfaction with the comprehensive criteria established by the Court, on the record. Tr. 11/20/18, at 4474-4475. 17. On December 19, 2018, the Court issued separate orders appointing Dr. Sherill Sigalow as neutral forensic evaluator and attorney Philip Katz as Attorney for the Child. Both of these widely recognized and well-respected professionals were appointed after consultation with, and the agreement of, counsel for both parties. 18. In the Court’s appointment of the neutral forensic evaluator Dr. Sigalow, it was ordered consistent with the criteria established as above-noted that: “the forensic evaluation is to focus specifically on: (1) the relationship between each party and the child [A]; (2) the degree, if any, to which petitioner had been in a parental role with the child; (3) the degree to which, if any, the petitioner is recognized as a parent by the child; (4) otherwise engaged in consistent caretaking of the child; (5) the degree to which the child has an emotional bond with the petitioner; (6) the degree to which, if any, the previous abrupt termination of the relationship between the petitioner and the child has affected the child; (7) the degree to which, if any, the termination from contact with the petitioner has been adversely affected, or will in the future affect, the child; (8) any other issues the forensic evaluator finds should be brought to the attention of the Court solely with respect to the determination of this petition seeking parental standing. The Court noted all issues with respect to custody, access, spheres of influence, or other parental decision-making would be held in abeyance pending the threshold issue: the determination of parenthood. 19. Dr. Sigalow conducted her forensic examinations and evaluations by meeting with the child, the parties, collateral sources, and by conducting psychological testing. Dr. Sigalow accomplished this at locations and under the circumstances she prescribed as best facilitating her professional interactions, observations, analyses, and subsequent report to the Court and the parties. 20. Attorney Philip Katz visited his client, the child A, in the United Kingdom, and represented A’s position in this proceeding, infra. 21. In a Decision and Order on January 18, 2019, the Court directed the parties to appear on March 5, 2019 for the commencement of a hearing on whether A’s best interests would be served by granting petitioner’s request for interim access. (Id. at 3-4). The January 2019 Order set forth, once again, the criteria the Court would use in determining petitioner’s equitable-estoppel theory, the very same criteria the Court set forth on October 17, 2018. The Court noted that, despite the Court’s previous invitations, neither party had offered any objection to the proposed criteria. Nonetheless, in recognition of the extraordinary legal issues presented, this Court further allowed that “the Court remains available to address any objection [to the proposed criteria] which may come to light as this matter proceeds”. 22. Notwithstanding her counsel’s thorough involvement in establishing that criteria against which the assertion of equitable estoppel would be measured and evaluated, petitioner appealed that branch of the January 22, 2019 Order that set forth that very same criteria. Put simply, most remarkably, K.G. appealed K.G.’s very own agreement without having sought any modification or supplementation by this trial Court of that agreement, despite this Court advising the opportunity for any such modification would not be foreclosed. The Appellate Division did, of course, unanimously affirm this Court’s January 22, 2019 Order. (Kelly G. v. Circe H., 178 A.D.3rd 533 [2019]) 23. On March 21, 2019, the attorney for the child sought leave to renew argument of the Court’s December 19, 2018 Order appointing forensic evaluator Dr. Sigalow insofar as it required the child to participate in such evaluation. In his affirmation on the application, Mr. Katz, an attorney and, as such, an officer of the Court stated: “[The child], opposes…the forensic and does not support the theory of parentage by equitable estoppel. “During a recent (7) day trip to the United Kingdom, I met with A. I spent tens of hours meeting with A, going to his school, meeting with his teachers and school administrators, meeting with social service personnel assisting A and his family, meeting A’s friends, and meeting A’s extended family. Through this painstaking process, I was able to get clear guidance from, and an unequivocal understanding of, A’s feelings towards, and view of, both the Petitioner and Respondent. Based upon the time spent with A in the United Kingdom, I can state unequivocally that A’s position is that he only has one parent, the Respondent C.H.” (Emphasis supplied.) 24. Counsellor Katz requested that any forensic evaluation should be at minimal disruption to A’s life. 25. Toward that end, on June 21, 2019, the Court issued a Supplemental Order directing the forensic examination of the child to occur in August 2019 in New York City, at times, places and under circumstances deemed appropriate by Dr. Sigalow. 26. On September 19, 2019, in context of a hearing before a Special Referee concerning the issue of payment requested from petitioner, Attorney Katz again set forth on the court’s record his client A’s position: “[M]eeting with my client and determining what his position was; namely, that [A] only views one person as his mother and that is C.H.…” (Tr. 9/19/19, p. 6). (Emphasis supplied.) 27. Dr. Sigalow submitted a report to the Court, made available to counsel on March 2, 2020 (“Forensic Report”). That Forensic Report was later admitted into evidence on May 11, 2021. 28. Dr. Sigalow’s Forensic Report contained the following observations and findings: a. When asked to draw a picture of his family, the Child drew just two figures — labeled “Mom” (what he calls C.H.) and “Me” (Forensic Report at 93.) b. Asked to draw a picture of his “bigger family,” the Child did not draw, but wrote names and words describing the relationship, such as “Uncle,” “Ayat [grandmother],” “cuzans” [cousins], “grandparents,” “brother” and “sister.” Id. c. When shown a photo of K.G. (along with photos of others), the Child identified “Kee,” described her as his Godmother, and a “friend,” notably, the Child said he did not miss her. Id. at 94. d. The Child identified K.G. and “her mom, her sister [and] her dad,” but, when asked, said they were not related to him. Id. at 94-95. e. Asked specifically whether K.G. was related to him, the Child said she was not. Id at 95. f. LM, who owns Imagine Swimming, where A took lessons, told Dr. Sigalow “[C.H.] was a fantastic, wonderful, caring mother, super committed…single mother,” and “from his perspective, “[the petitioner] was just the caregiver dropping off, not listed as the other mother…” In addition, “[t]he petitioner was said to have inquired about holding a birthday party at the venue (which was not ultimately booked), and in her correspondence [K.G.] reportedly made reference to “A’s mother C.H.” and “Mr. LM noted that only the respondent was listed as a parent in the Imagine Swimming on-line portal, so only she could make changes.” Id. at 96. g. Speech language pathologist JT, SLP, CC conducted sessions with the Child in his West Village home and told Dr. Sigalow “the respondent was the only other adult present during sessions (‘At that time I didn’t even know there was someone else in the picture, I think I met C.H.’s mom once too’)” and Ms. T reported never having met the petitioner. Id. at 96-97. h. JA, Director of CP Kids, a program that the Child attended from 2012 to 2014, reported to Dr. Sigalow that “[o]n the registration information, the respondent was the only named parent, the only person listed under payment information, and she was the one who filled out the enrollment paperwork. The petitioner was ‘listed as escort and Godparent.’” Id. at 98. i. When he met with Dr. Sigalow, the Child made no mention of wanting to see or communicate with K.G., “despite being asked directly when shown photos of her.” Id. at 137. j. SG, a social worker in London who has worked with the Child, told Dr. Sigalow that K.G.’s name has come up only one time in her conversations with the Child, when he said that he would like to recover the toys that he had in K.G.’s home and referred to her as “Mom’s friend,” but said nothing about missing K.G. or wanting to see her. Id. at 112. k. Mr. M.S., petitioner’s dog walker and personal assistant reported C.H. to be a “fine mother”; never heard the child use the term Godmother, but referred to petitioner as “Kee” and the petitioner would refer to the Child as “my boy A”. Mr. S provided an unprofessional assessment that respondent moving to London with her son was “really selfish” because he perceived petitioner’s love for this child as “a parental love.” Mr. S found it noteworthy that he is a child of divorce and, as such, his observations of these parties was causing him to “relive all over again” that disturbing experience. Curiously, Mr. S reports that which no other friend, family member, or even petitioner does: that the child was “much calmer” around petitioner while the respondent’s flat was “chaotic, scrambling to get dinner on the table…directly telling him to go sit in the corner…”and that the child was apparently a master manipulator “really good at pushing C.H.’s boundaries.” Mr. S also opined — unsolicited — that in this litigation the “[child] got lost…all this minutia…[the child] just buried in all of this.” Mr. S’ obvious propensity to declare his own assessments, draw conclusions, conflate his personal experiences with his indisputably biased perceptions of the circumstances here, provides nothing of credible evidentiary or objective value to or for the Court’s analysis. However, Mr. S does acknowledge, adding to the cacophony of overwhelming evidence, that respondent neither held petitioner out as a second parent of her son, nor did respondent ever make the slenderest indication that she desired petitioner to be a second parent to her son. Mr. S’ perception that the child has gotten lost in the minutia of these proceedings demonstrates a remarkable lack of insight by failing to recognize that the child is and, indeed, has always been the focus of these proceedings. l. D.R., another personal collateral proffered on petitioner’s behalf reported her friendship with petitioner developing after an initial business relationship, that both parties made “great parents” that brought essentially complimentary parenting styles to the fore. Ms. R’s perception was that petitioner “certainly functioned as a second parent,” but she did allow that the child only referred to petitioner as Kee and that any reference by petitioner to the child as “my boy A” or as “her son” was at no time in any way approved or tolerated by respondent. Ms. R also noted there were other adults who served in caregiving roles, particularly noting petitioner’s friend “J” (presumably the same “J” who attempted to distance himself during trial from his identification of this child as solely “C.H.]’s little Black baby…” (See K v. C, 55 Misc. 3d 723, 730. April 4, 2017.) m. Dr. Sigalow further provides: “The petitioner acknowledges that subsequent to the [C]hild’s arrival in NY there was never an instance when the respondent expressed any openness to a second-party adoption. Relatedly, when, in 2012, the topic of defining the petitioner’s relationship with the [C]hild specifically came up, the petitioner accepted, albeit reluctantly, the respondent’s suggestion that the term Godmother’ be used to identify her. Even if, as the petitioner reports, this term was never actually used by the [C]hild (or by others in the parties’ circle), the petitioner having engaged in this discussion, as well as her failure to reject the suggestion entirely, is consistent with her having been given a pretty clear message by the respondent, and her being aware on some level of that message (i.e., that the respondent did not see her as a co-parent), as odious and painful as that message must have been for her.” Id. at 131. (Emphasis added.) n. “Whereas there was never a lack of clarity in terms of the respondent’s role with the [C]hild — she acted, and was seen by others, as his parent — the petitioner’s role was, to a large extent, vague and poorly defined…And even though the petitioner now refers to the [C]hild as ‘my kid,’ and reports having done so occasionally in the past (typically if the respondent was not present), this does not change the ‘message’ that was given to most of the people who made up the [C]hild’s world, or to the [C]hild himself. This is not meant to imply that the [C]hild did not perceive the petitioner to be a loving, caring involved adult in his life — this was conveyed through the petitioner’s actions — only that no variant of the label ‘parent’ was ever attached to her.” Id. (Emphasis added). o. “[T]he parties’ communications strongly suggest that the petitioner recognized the need to seek and obtain the permission of the respondent anytime she wished to do something which involved the child…In the opinion of this examiner, the totality of the available information indicate that it was the respondent who was the ultimate decision maker.” Forensic report at 134. p. There are not now, nor have there apparently ever been, any indications that the [C]hild specifically misses the petitioner.” Id. at 137. q. “[I]t should be noted that the child demonstrates the same lack of curiosity and lack of distress when discussing virtually everyone in New York whom he no longer sees. And, he is comfortable discussing the time that he used to spend with the petitioner, portraying that time in positive terms (e.g., nights at her apartment were said to have been ‘cool’). There is no real data to support the hypothesis that the respondent has actively tried to ‘alienate’ the [C]hild, who, notably, does not denigrate or overtly ‘reject’ the petitioner and is instead just matter of fact and neutral when he speaks about her.” Id. at 138. 29. By the foregoing representations by A’s attorney, Mr. Philip Katz, and by the aforenoted evidence established by the report of Forensic Psychologist Sherill Sigalow, the child A’s voice has been heard, and A’s message is unmistakable, A’s message is unequivocal, and A’s message is unimpeachable: he recognizes only the respondent, C.H., as his mother. In view of the foregoing, for any party, any attorney, or any interested observer to suggest that the child’s voice needs further testing, probing, or confirmation by means of a Lincoln hearing would be to suggest visiting a needless further violation of this child’s essence for some adult’s prurient indulgence or self-serving purpose. This Court will engage in no such exercise. Toward the elimination of any possible misperception, misunderstanding or perplexity on the part of anyone, anywhere, the Court reiterates in the easiest of understandable terms: This child, A, has spoken loudly, clearly, and repeatedly: A recognizes only one person as his mother and that person is C.H., the respondent. There is not an iota of credible evidence, in any form whatsoever, that A recognized petitioner, K.G., as his mother at any time. 30. After opportunities were provided to petitioner to present additional witnesses or other evidence with respect to her claim of equitable estoppel (by Skype/Microsoft Teams as a result of COVID restrictions on in-person court presentations) at the hearing on May 11, 2021, counsel for petitioner advised the Court that petitioner would not be presenting “a case” with respect to equitable estoppel. Petitioner’s counsel then strove to instruct this Court that K.G.’s abandonment of her theory of equitable estoppel was an unqualified bar to this Court’s authority to proceed with the hearing as ordered by the Appellate Division. Effectively, petitioner’s counsel thereby advised that after subjecting C.H. and C.H.’s son to untold and unlimited trial and appellate expense; untold and unlimited, intimate and detailed analysis of their lives and family, friends and acquaintances here in New York and London; untold delay in moving on with their lives in London; untold and unlimited access to, assessment by, and representation by an attorney appointed by the Court; and that after production of a 138 page single spaced report presented by the forensic expert appointed with K.G.’s approval, that after many hours of professional legal time and effort (at this trial and the appellate court) establishing and affirming the criteria for issues related to her equitable estoppel assertions, that K.G. has exclusively determined she was going to take her figurative marbles and go home. 31. Perhaps in recognition of the incongruity of his client’s position, in a valiant — albiet incredible — effort to deflect some of the responsibility for her abandonment of her equitable estoppel claim for reasons other than on the merits, petitioner’s counsel represented petitioner no longer had an ability to finance further litigation specifically because of the Appellate Division’s affirmance of this Court’s Order holding her 100 percent responsible for all litigation expenses incurred by both parties (subject to reallocation). By this effort to abandon this action at this advanced stage, K.G.’s unequivocal disregard for the financial disaster and personal disruption these proceedings have visited upon C.H. and her son is, by turns, astounding and revealing. The disregard, if not overt contempt, for this and the appellate court’s processes and severely limited resources is palpable. Whilst the Court appreciates petitioner’s counsel’s robust representation of this client, that recognition does not, and cannot, absolve petitioner of her responsibilities resulting from her voluntarily instituted litigation. 32. The option to permit petitioner’s discontinuance rests solely in the sound discretion of this Court. The law in New York is most mindful of the potential for legal mischief and nefarious legal machinations, particularly where one party’s financial wherewithal can overwhelm the other party, as well as the effect of a discontinuance in prejudice to an opposing party. “When an action or special proceeding has been commenced, the [respondent] may have an interest that it shall be conducted to its termination, and…it lies within the discretion of the court to protect such interest by refusing to permit the action or proceeding to be discontinued.” (Landsman v. Landsman, 278 AD2d 214, 215 [1st Dept. 1951)]. It is an incontestable certainty that respondent and her son have the strongest of interests to assure petitioner’s assertions of parenthood are adjudicated on the merits, and to finality. In the absence of that finality, respondent and her son are unable to proceed with their lives unencumbered by the uncertainty that accompany this petition. Further, permitting a discontinuance at this late stage of the proceedings would only serve to evade the mandate of the Court of Appeals as applied to this matter, an evasion which this Court is unwilling to countenance, to wit: “[T]he ultimate determination of whether those rights [of a person seeking to establish standing as a parent to petition for custody or visitation] shall be granted rests in the sound discretion of the Court, which will determine the best interests of the child.” (Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 28 N.Y.3d 1 [2016]. See also Goikhman v. Biton, 183 A.D.3d 704 [2nd Dept. 2020]; Carl T., Sr., 95 A.D.3d 640 [1st Dept. 2012]). 33. Counsel has advised petitioner would present no further evidence and, further, that petitioner would not agree to discontinue this matter with prejudice to renewal or future claim of parentage of A, in the United States or any judicial tribunal throughout the world. Petitioner thus effectively abandoned, if not rested on, the issue of equitable estoppel. Thereupon, the Court admitted into evidence the report of Dr. Sigalow. No valid objection lies to the report’s admission into evidence, petitioner’s counsel having advised the Court of his and his client’s determination to abort her equitable estoppel claims. 34. At the close of the evidence the Court provided the parties the opportunity to submit proposed findings of fact. Petitioner’s proposals consisted of 48 numbered paragraphs of which only one (number 11) addressed the merits of her petition for parenthood on the theory of equitable estoppel. The remainder of the petitioner’s proposed findings of fact consist 22 of 47 numbered paragraphs dedicated to grievances vis-à-vis attorney fee orders sustained by the Appellate Division, the allocation of other litigation expenses also sustained by the Appellate Division, the pending attorney fee applications of respondent’s counsel, this Court’s refusal to abide by petitioner’s improper procedural preferences, and others equally unhelpful. 35. Be that as it may, to provide as full a picture as possible of the evidence presented on this petition, the Court further notes petitioner conceded at hearing: That she arranged for a baby shower solely for respondent, with gifts and cards for the new mother that were intended solely for respondent (hearing transcript p. 1237 ll. 16-26); That the respondent-mother would never agree to petitioner having any closer relationship with her son than had been established by May 2012, and that she was limited to being relegated to the role of Godmother (p. 1337); She was never introduced to other parents or caretakers of children as a parent of A because “That’s how C.H. wanted to control the situation” (p. 1355); Were she mistaken for a parent of A, C.H. would “absolutely” correct any such misunderstanding “immediately” (p. 1358); C.H. never invited her to any parent-teacher conferences with respect to A (p. 1365); On the child’s pickup card at his public elementary school she was “specifically listed…as Godmother” (p. 1369); C.H. has never condoned or encouraged her representing that she is A’s parent to anyone (p. 1376); That she had met with a teacher of A without C.H.’s approval knowing C.H. would not consent to such a meeting (1381); That “C.H. kept me marginalized…[C.H.] really only wanted to represent herself as the sole parent of A. And she did everything in her power to make sure that’s how she was perceived.” (p. 1387); That she is not aware of any email in which C.H. recognizes her as a parent of her son A (p. 1499); That she assured C.H. “that [I] had never inferred or articulated to A or to any one that [I was] his mother” (p. 1504 ll.19-22); That C.H. refused to permit her to join in a trip to Ethiopia with A, to visit his biological father, because C.H. reiterated petitioner’s relationship to her and her son was no greater than that of “other friends” (pp. 1587-1588); That whilst at a bistro on Fire Island, petitioner, respondent, and A were mistakenly referred to by strangers as “such a beautiful family,” that C.H. being incessantly and persistently protective of her sole parentage of A, “C.H. got up and went over to complete strangers’ table who we’ll never [again] see, made sure that they knew she alone was the adopted mother…”(p. 1652); That her FaceTime access to A was significantly limited by C.H. as “the boss lady” (p. 1667 ll. 17-23); That when A is the subject “[C.H. is] the boss.” (p. 1667 ll. 25-26); That A has never visited petitioner’s family without C.H. in attendance (p. 1680) and, irrespective of any correspondence between petitioner’s family and either party, as reported by Dr. Sigalow, A correctly recognized these lovely people exclusively as “her (petitioner’s) mom, her sister [and] her dad.” When directly asked, A decisively stated they were not related to him. (Para. 28(d), supra.) 36. The facts or impressions of petitioner purporting to establish her standing as a second parent to A, by any measure fail to overcome the evidence opposed to her standing as a second parent. For the most part, petitioner’s evidence was comprised of her recasting or mischaracterizing events in an endeavor to portray ordinary life events as manifestations of parenting A or, equally troubling, that she was part of an intact family with C.H. and A. Among these creations include: The failure to be recognized at the baby shower as a new mother results exclusively from her self-identified status, in which she demonstrates a despairing grasp at standing by invoking the most repugnant of gender-role stereotyping, as the “daddy/mommy,” to wit: “Generally the dads don’t get the baby shower. I am the daddy/mommy. The provider.” (p. 1239 ll. 9-10); That respondent was mistaken when she thanked petitioner for babysitting because petitioner was not babysitting, she was “establishing a [family] schedule actually” (p. 1265) (The Court notes that petitioner’s calendars initially scheduled these encounters as “babysitting” although this notation was, at some later date, changed to “family time”); That respondent’s consultation of her on issues pertaining to A’s education demonstrated some parental deference; That evidence of her parentage was a note in a consulting dermatologist physician’s report within the records of Tribeca Pediatrics that read “both moms also with ringworm”. (While that note was determined to be hearsay, it is noted here only in view of the paucity of evidence in petitioner’s favor); That at Christmastime she would give a present to A jointly with respondent, conceding her failure to know if others did the same (p. 1612-1613); That her celebrating adoption day with A and respondent at his after-school program at CP Kids, and spent “every Mother’s Day” with A imputes motherhood, ipso facto; That she enjoyed Christmas traditions with A that included trips to the theater and train shows, activities that exclusively demonstrate parenthood (p. 1676); That respondent’s limited assessment of her as a good friend was, ironically, “[C.H.'s delusion]” (p. 1676 ll. 17-20). The foregoing are but a few examples of the petitioner’s best efforts to extrapolate parenthood as set forth on her cross-examination. The instances proffered by petitioner on her direct examination fare no better to the establishment of parenthood by equitable estoppel, among the most favorable of which are: The child sat in her lap for hours on his initial plane ride from London to New York; That she would visit with him and take him to restaurants with some frequency, always with the express permission of respondent; That whilst A addressed her by the nickname “ Kee,” on occasion A would call out to her as “ma” or “mom,” as he did with most Caucasian women with whom he came in contact as a toddler (and, again, invoking as convenient the citation of unconstitutional gender stereotyping to derive finality of a determination of parenthood once a toddler references any person as “ma” or “Mom”); That she had hundreds of photos of A in her possession. 37. In further recognition of the weakness of her standing, on more than one occasion on this record petitioner cited the fact that this Court appointed respondent’s counsel, Bonnie Rabin, as attorney to children in an unrelated matter in a “highly lucrative appointment as a law guardian in a high-profile case.”. Petitioner asserted without any support that some “clear conflict [arose] by virtue of” that appointment which, apparently, continues to date. It is unfortunate that experienced counsel must be reminded “[T]he fact that a judge issues a ruling that is not to a party’s liking does not demonstrate either bias or misconduct” (Gonzalez v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 92 AD3d 1158 [3d Dept 2012]; see also Ctr. for Jud. Accountability, Inc. v. Cuomo, 167 AD3d 1406 [3d Dept 2018]). Petitioner never sought this Court’s recusal, as no justification for same ever existed. It is worth repeating “[r]ecusal, as a matter of due process is required only where there exists a direct, personal, substantial or pecuniary interest in reaching a particular conclusion, or where a clash in judicial roles is seen to exist” (People v. Alomar, 93 NY2d 239, 246 [1999] [citation omitted]). Baseless serious accusations against the Court are grounds for sanctions, and additional notice by the Court that sanctions may be imposed for such conduct in not required (Nachbaur v. American. Transit Ins. Co., 300 AD2d 74 [1st Dept 2002]; see also Benefield v. New York City Hous. Auth., 260 AD2d [1st Dept 1999] Petitioner’s assertion that a conflict arises merely because a judge had appointed adversary counsel as guardian ad litem in another matter is, on its face, ludicrous. Indeed, such a situation arises frequently in family law cases, and were this basis for recusal raised with any frequency, in short order there would be no judge available to address any family law matter. The Court is confident the experienced counsel in this matter are all well aware of such reality. If the assertion is that, in this instance, this Court has some pecuniary interest in Ms. Rabin’s appointment as a law guardian in a “high-profile” case that counsel believes to be particularly “lucrative” a motion to recuse should have been made at the appropriate time; and counsel’s failure to make such a motion demonstrates an admission of the weakness of the petition, and a desperate attempt to gain an advantage on appeal by collateral attacks on the Court. Such disgraceful, inartful and, frankly, amateurish advocacy is, itself a sanctionable violation of ethics. Counsel are reminded of Rule 3.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct which instructs, in pertinent part, “A lawyer should not make unfair or derogatory personal references to opposing counsel” and irrefutably by extension to the Court. “[O]ffensive tactics by lawyers interfere with the orderly administration of justice and have no proper place in our legal system.” To further illuminate the record with respect to this Court’s earlier appointment of Ms. Rabin to the repeatedly referenced other “high-profile” case, it is more of a challenge than it should be for a Court to identify counsel with the requisite knowledge, abilities, and professionalism to assure the children in such “high-profile” matters are properly represented (and in that instance litigated by exceptionally astute representation). This is a particular challenge where, as in that “high-profile” case, hundreds of millions of dollars are in issue, and the attorneys and experts in the matter were prepared, professional, and particularly knowledgeable with respect to the relevant law and the voluminous financial and other pertinent facts in the matter. Whether the appointment is ultimately “lucrative” for Ms. Rabin or not, is not of this Court’s concern; indeed, the hourly rate permitted by that appointment of Ms. Rabin — curiously characterized by the more than generously-compensated counsel in the instant matter as “lucrative” — was, in fact, limited to the hourly rate of the attorneys representing the litigants in that matter. While the Justices of this Court are not strangers to such baseless criticism, Ms. Rabin is very much entitled to an apology. 37. That in view of this record, replete with petitioner’s detailed reporting of innumerable and unwavering rejections by respondent of any suggestion that petitioner is, or was in line to become, a second parent to respondent’s son, to pursue a further hearing with respect to equitable estoppel was, on the merits of any reliably established criteria, a likely impossibility. Indeed, that there was a successful argument on appeal for a remand of this matter to address the previously unpled and unpursued theory of equitable estoppel, providing petitioner the axiomatic “second bite at the apple”, reveals an admirable faculty for “lucrative” legal marketing as much as it does for any particular legal acumen. However, in view of the abandonment of this matter on that remand, apart from the establishment of criteria for equitable estoppel, the ultimate waste of judicial resources is disturbingly profound and, of course, unrecoverable by the taxpayers. Equally disturbing would be the abuse of legal process as some intentional strategy to waste the limited assets of a respondent-parent, so that every moment spent in court served to put further economic strain on that parent. In the instant matter, fortunately any such strategy was effectively estopped by the Appellate Division affirmance of this Court’s order directing 100 percent of the expenses of this exercise be attributed to petitioner. 38. This case presents the warning that we must remain vigilant of the potential for meritless petitions seeking judicial declaration of parenthood that embody the economic strong-arming of a parent for concession of parental rights to a well-funded legal stranger. Were such legal and fiscal gamesmanship present and successful, a horrific precedent may well have been established in this early case. 39. Review of the criteria to establish parenthood by equitable estoppel, (that criteria having been affirmed by the Appellate Division as well), reveals: I. The extent to which petitioner undertook full and permanent fiscal responsibilities for the child without expectation of financial compensation. Whilst petitioner provided an avenue of employment and health insurance to respondent for some limited time, there is no evidence that petitioner undertook full and permanent fiscal responsibilities for the child at any time. II. The extent to which petitioner resided with the child. From the time of his adoption until today, A has resided with his mother, C.H. Sleepovers and overnights, even when utilising a dedicated room or setting for such occasions did not constitute a residence for the child. Respondent never consented to, facilitated, acknowledged, or abided that her son was resident at petitioner’s home at any time, petitioner’s aspiration or misplaced perception notwithstanding. III. The extent to which petitioner affirmatively held out the child as her own, or what objective observation of the relationship by others in their community would determine. In acknowledgment of the child’s mother’s objection to any reference by petitioner that the child is her own, petitioner concedes her surreptitiously holding out this child as her own by referring to him as “my son,” or “my boy [A],” when out of the mother’s presence. Whist the petitioner’s use of these terms increased in their frequency with the length of these legal proceedings, they persisted only in the absence of the respondent-mother. The observations of the relationship between K.G. and the child by the unimpeachable testimony of many of the educational, medical and other professionals was that of petitioner’s caretaking in the mother’s temporary absence (arising, for the most part, from instances where petitioner would pick up or drop off the child). The credible testimony of the other adults in the child’s sphere not providing professional services, as to those who were aware of petitioner, recognized her as one of many friends of the child’s mother, and nothing more. Contrary conclusory assertions of all of petitioner’s witnesses were not supported by any credible or objective view of the relevant facts and circumstances. IV. The extent to which petitioner had been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent, parental relationship. The petitioner has never been in a parental role with the child, as already recognized. Further, the child’s voice has been unequivocal and unwavering through his interaction with his attorney and the forensic psychologist that he does not have, nor has he ever had, a bond of childhood or dependency with the petitioner, on those occasions when he acknowledged petitioner’s presence at all. V. The degree to which the child has an emotional bond with the petitioner. No evidence that A has developed an emotional bond with the petitioner has been brought before the Court. It is undisputed that while A had many enjoyable visits with petitioner, the only demonstrated bond related to petitioner that A developed was a bond with her dogs. VI. The extent to which a petitioner is recognized or acknowledged as parental by the child. There is no evidence that A recognizes petitioner as a parent. There is evidence that he only recognizes respondent as his mother and, further, that he affirmatively denies that petitioner is a part of his family. VII. The extent to which a petitioner has a close and deep emotional bond with the child. As evinced through the child’s interactions with and responses to Dr. Sigalow, the clinical psychologist appointed by the Court, and as evidenced by his interactions with other adults in his life including his court-appointed counsel, when the petitioner is referenced the child exhibits absolutely no emotional bond with her. Moreover, in unequivocal demonstration of his knowledge of petitioner and her lack of relationship to him, the child expresses that he would like returned his toys that are at petitioner’s home and expresses his desire to visit with the petitioner’s dogs but, conspicuously and revealingly, makes no reference to respondent herself. Indeed, the forensic report reveals occasions when A has forgotten petitioner’s name. VIII. The extent to which a petitioner bonded a dependent relationship with the child, supported or facilitated affirmatively or impliedly by the legal parent. The legal parent, Respondent C.H. consistently, with much perseverance, and in varied ways, sought to make it unmistakable, unequivocal and as unambiguous as possible that K.G.’s relationship with respondent’s son was nothing more than that of any number of other unrelated adults in his sphere. To her further credit, respondent assigned to petitioner the title of Godmother solely in an attempt to assuage petitioner’s persistent impositions on their lives. While respondent’s concern for petitioner was ultimately revealed as misguided, there is no demonstration that she sought to, or did, facilitate a dependent relationship between her son and petitioner. IX. The extent to which petitioner engaged in decision-making with the legal parent with respect to major issues concerning the child including, but not limited to, health, welfare, education, and any participation in organized religion. While the petitioner enrolled the child in one or two extracurricular activities and accompanied the child and/or his mother to those extracurricular activities, as well as to the occasional medical appointment, petitioner made no decisions respecting major issues involving A; further, at no time was petitioner consulted by the respondent before she, C.H., made any decision affecting a major issue. X. The extent to which a petitioner is or was part of any formalized relationship with the legal parent and/or the child. There has been no formalization of any relationship of petitioner with either the respondent or the respondent’s child. XI. How the abrupt, or continued, termination from any and all contact with the petitioner has, or would continue to, adversely affect the child, if at all. Objective observation and the child’s position as reported by the attorney for child, as well as by the forensic psychologist and her extensive, comprehensive report, demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the child’s relocation to London and contemporaneous termination of his contact with the petitioner has had no adverse effect on this child whatsoever, and this termination from contact with petitioner will, with reasonable certainty, have no future adverse effect on the child. While none of the foregoing criteria for the judicial determination of parenthood by equitable estoppel are singularly dispositive, the extensive evidence adduced in this case establishes not one of them. 40. The Court therefore finds petitioner has failed to establish by any credible evidence that the respondent may be judicially equitably estopped, in law or fact or both, from denying parenthood to petitioner of respondent’s son A. Stated differently: Petitioner having had a full and fair opportunity to establish parenthood by equitable estoppel has failed to do so by any measure in law or equity. It is therefore ORDERED, based upon all the facts, the evidence, and arguments presented by petitioner, respondent, and their respective counsel, including all those submitted prior to and after remand on the issue of equitable estoppel, and after full and careful consideration, THE PETITION IS DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and it is further ORDERED, that the respondent’s counter claim for costs and attorney fees is severed, and proceedings thereunder shall continue unabated. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT. Dated: January 10, 2022
