The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 were read on this motion for PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 003) 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82 were read on this motion for PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 004) 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 103, 104, 105, 106 were read on this motion to INTERVENE. The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 005) 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 108 were read on this motion to/for LEAVE TO FILE. This action arises out of plaintiff Veronique Bich’s efforts to enforce the terms of a postnuptial agreement existing between her and her late husband, defendant Bruno Bich. The marriage bore three children, who now seek to intervene in this action: Gonzalve, Charles, and Guillaume Bich.1 The parties first entered into a marital agreement approved by a court in France in December 2000. They executed a new matrimonial property regime in August 2001, governing the ownership and distribution of their property in France, and then executed a postnuptial agreement in December 2001. That postnuptial agreement was superseded by an amended postnuptial agreement made on May 13, 2008, which provides for the disposition of the couple’s assets in case of a separation short of divorce. The 2008 amended postnuptial agreement is the focus of this action.2 Both parties agree that they are bound by its terms. The dispute here concerns only whether the parties have adhered to those terms. Plaintiff sent defendant written notice in 2017 informing him that she no longer wished to live with him. Plaintiff argues that this mailing constituted an “operative event” under the amended postnuptial agreement, triggering obligations owed by both parties under the agreement. Defendant contends that the 2017 written notice did not constitute an operative event. Each party also claims that the other has breached contractual duties imposed by the agreement. Four motions are now before this court: (1) plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (mot seq 002), (2) the Bich children’s motion to intervene (mot seq 004), (3) defendant’s motion to strike documents submitted by plaintiff and for leave to file a surreply (mot seq 005), and (4) plaintiff’s motion and defendant’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment (mot seq 003). The court consolidates these motions for disposition. DISCUSSION The parties’ 2008 amended postnuptial agreement governs this matter. That agreement is a contract. (See Levine v. Levine, 56 NY2d 42, 47 [1982]; Christian v. Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 72 [1977].) The agreement is binding not only on the parties, but also on their heirs and executors. (See Amended Postnuptial Agreement, NYSCEF No. 51, at 52.) Operation of the amended postnuptial agreement is triggered by the occurrence of an “operative event.” (See Agreement 18 [a].) An operative event under the agreement consists of one of the following: (1) a contractual party’s filing for divorce; (2) a party’s executing a written separation agreement signed by the other party; or (3) a party’s sending written notice to the other party saying that the sending party no longer wished to live with the receiving party, followed by the parties not residing together for at least 30 days after mailing of the notice. (See 18 [a] [i]-[iii].) The amended agreement calls for both parties to split substantial property equally among themselves. (See e.g.
17, 18 [c], 19, 27.) After an operative event occurs, the parties are to allocate and transfer property among themselves so that each party receives 50 percent of the “professionally appraised value of all real property and tangible and intangible personal property held, directly or indirectly, by either or both of them.” ( 17.) To the extent any inequity results from the division and transfer of property under the agreement, the difference is to be made up in cash (or cash equivalents). (See 22 [c].) I. Plaintiff’s Request for a Preliminary Injunction (Mot Seq 002) Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction (1) to stop defendant, his agents, employees, and anyone acting on his behalf from selling, transferring, or disposing property held individually or jointly by the parties; and (2) to require defendant to deposit money earned from stock dividends into an escrow account held by plaintiff’s law firm, pending further order of this court. Under CPLR 6301, preliminary injunctions are granted when an “act in violation of plaintiff’s rights” regarding the subject of the action is likely which would “render [a] judgment ineffectual.” A preliminary injunction is a drastic remedy, granted only to maintain the status quo until there can be a full hearing on the merits. (See Spectrum Stamford, LLC v. 400 Atlantic Title, LLC, 162 AD3d 615, 616 [1st Dept 2018]; 1234 Broadway LLC v. West Side SRO Law Project, 86 AD3d 18, 23 [1st Dept 2011]; Mucchi v. Eli Haddad Corp., 101 AD2d 724, 725 [1st Dept 1984].) A movant may obtain a preliminary injunction on a showing that (1) movant would suffer an irreparable injury absent it, (2) movant is likely to succeed on the merits, and (3) the balance of the equities favors movant. (See Harris v. Patients Med., P.C., 169 AD3d 433, 434 [1st Dept 2019].) Harm is not irreparable if it is compensable by money damages that a court can calculate. (See Chiagkouris v. 201 West 16 Owners Corp., 150 AD3d 442, 442 [1st Dept 2017].) Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief is overly broad and burdensome on defendant. Moreover, this court is unpersuaded that the injury that plaintiff is seeking to ward off would be irreparable by money damages. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment itself seeks damages as an alternative form of relief. The motion is denied. II. The Bich Children’s Motion to Intervene (Mot Seq 004) Intervenors are minority owners of Grenelle LLC. They rely on that ownership status as a basis for their motion to intervene. CPLR 1012 (a) (3) allows intervention as of right in an action involving property when a judgment might adversely affect the moving party. Courts liberally grant requests to intervene. (See Yuppie Puppy Pet Products, Inc v. Street Smart Realty, LLC, 77 AD3d 197, 201 [2010].) Intervenors contend that plaintiff’s claims implicate the interests of Grenelle because plaintiff seeks a declaration that she has the exclusive right to use an apartment in Paris owned by Grenelle. Intervenors argue that this claim thereby affects their interests as minority members of Grenelle, warranting the grant of leave to intervene. (See NYSCEF No. 84 at 5.) This court agrees. Plaintiff maintains that she is not trying to seize Grenelle property, but seeks only the transfer to her of an “indirect beneficial interest” in the Paris apartment. (NYSCEF No. 89 at 5 [plaintiff's mem. of law in opposition].) But plaintiff’s complaint alleges that upon the occurrence of the operative event, she is to “retain or receive title to the Paris Apartment.” (NYSCEF No. 12 at 7.) And plaintiff argues on this motion that the “transfer of [plaintiff's] Grenelle [shares] was intended to effectuate the transfer of ownership of the Paris Apartment.” (NYSCEF No. 62 at 16 [plaintiff's mem. of law in support].) Plaintiff is claiming a property right to Grenelle’s Paris apartment, which implicates intervenors’ rights as Grenelle members. The motion to intervene is granted. III. Defendant’s Motion to Strike Marital Documents and for Leave to File a Surreply (Mot Seq 005) Defendant moves by order to show cause to (1) strike plaintiff’s submission, in her reply papers in support of summary judgment, of an oral-argument transcript from the couple’s divorce proceeding (NYSCEF No. 79); and (2) grant him leave on his cross-motion to file a surreply to plaintiff’s reply. With respect to the oral-argument transcript, defendant argues that plaintiff’s including the transcript breached the confidentiality of matrimonial matters. Defendant argues that Domestic Relations Law (DRL) §235(1) “mandates that all papers filed in a matrimonial matter be designated as confidential.” (NYSCEF No. 91 at 8.) But §235 (1) provides only that an “officer of the court” shall not allow papers filed in a matrimonial matter to be used by anyone other than “a party, or the attorney…except by order of the court.” (DRL §235 [1].) The statute does not require complete confidentiality for all documents in a matrimonial file. Thus, in Tornheim v. Blue & White Food Products Corp., the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s request to sanction defendant for gaining access to deposition testimony given by plaintiff in his matrimonial action, because DRL §235′s prohibition on disseminating matrimonial files applies to court employees, not litigants. (See 73 AD3d 747, 747 [2d Dept 2010].) Kodsi v. Gee (54 AD3d 613, 613 [1st Dept 2008]), relied upon by defendant, is inapposite. That decision concerned whether two separation agreements would be confidential in a later legal malpractice action filed against a third party — not, as here, an action between the formerly married spouses. The motion to strike is denied. Defendant also seeks leave to file a surreply. A trial court has the authority to regulate the motion practice before it, as well as the discretion to determine whether to accept late papers or even surreply papers for good cause. (See U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Rudick, 156 AD3d 841, 842 [2d Dept 2017] [holding that the lower court properly exercised its discretion to consider a surreply]; McMullin v. Walker, 68 AD3d 943, 944 [2d Dept 2009] [holding that the lower court abused its discretion by considering a surreply].) Defendant did not renew this request at oral argument, and this court finds that the record is sufficient to present both parties’ arguments fully and fairly. Defendant’s motion is denied. IV. Plaintiff’s Motion and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Mot Seq 003) Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment. She seeks an order (1) directing defendant to perform specifically his obligation under the postnuptial agreement to transfer to her 50 percent of his Société Bic shares and his 98.983798 percent interest in Grenelle; (2) directing an immediate and expedited hearing if those transfers cannot be accomplished; (3) declaring that plaintiff has exclusive right to the Paris Apartment; (4) declaring that plaintiff is the rightful owner of the New York apartment; and (5) finding that defendant is liable to plaintiff for attorney fees. Defendant cross-moves for partial summary judgment. He seeks an order finding plaintiff liable to defendant for (1) breaching provisions of the amended postnuptial agreement; and (2) breaching fiduciary duties arising out of that postnuptial agreement. Defendant also seeks (3) an order directing plaintiff to (i) perform specifically by obtaining appraisals of the tangible personal property in dispute, (ii) perform specifically by assuming responsibility for two categories of debt set out in 23 of the amended agreement and holding defendant harmless for expenses relating to one of those two debts, and (iii) pay defendant’s reasonable attorney fees. Defendant’s cross-motion seeks significantly broader relief than what he requested in his counterclaims. That broader relief is premised on theories and factual allegations that defendant did not plead in the counterclaim section of his answer. (Compare e.g. NYSCEF No. 27 at 21-24 [counterclaims], with NYSCEF No. 64 [notice of cross-motion].) A court may, however, award a party summary judgment “on an unpleaded cause of action if the proof supports such cause and if the opposing party has not been misled to its prejudice.” (Weinstock v. Handler, 254 AD2d 165, 166 [1st Dept 1998].) Here, neither party identified or discussed the issue that defendant’s cross-motion is seeking summary judgment on unpleaded counterclaims. Beyond not raising this issue as a ground for denying the cross-motion, plaintiff has not suggested that defendant’s reliance on unpleaded claims prejudiced her ability to oppose the motion. To the contrary, the record reflects that plaintiff has been able to respond fully to defendant’s arguments and evidentiary submissions. For that matter, much of the cross-motion is based on the language of the postnuptial agreement between the parties, of which plaintiff has had full notice. This court therefore declines to deny sua sponte requests for relief made in defendant’s cross-motion that are based on unpleaded counterclaims, and instead considers those requests for relief on their merits. CPLR 3212 (e) provides that “summary judgment may be granted as to one or more causes of action, or part thereof, in favor of any one or more parties, to the extent warranted, on such terms as may be just.” The party seeking partial summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. (See Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986].) If movant makes out this showing, nonmovant “must demonstrate by admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue requiring a trial of the action.” (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 560 [1980].) The amended postnuptial agreement at issue here must, as a written contract, be construed according to the parties’ intent; and the best evidence of what contractual parties intend is what they provide for in writing. (See Schron v. Troutman Sanders LLP, 20 NY3d 430, 436 [2013].) When an agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face, the question of intent is one of law decided on a motion for partial summary judgment. (See Babbio v. Babbio, 119 AD3d 474, 475 [1st Dept 2014].) To succeed on a breach-of-contract claim, a party must prove (1) the existence of a binding contract; (2) the injured party’s performance of the contract; (3) breach by the other party; and (4) damages. (See Stonehill Capital Mgmt. LLC v. Bank of the W., 28 NY3d 439, 448-449 [2016]; Nevco Contr. Inc. v. R.P. Brennan Gen. Contrs. & Bldrs., Inc., 139 AD3d 515, 515 [1st Dept 2016].) A. The Timing of the Operative Event The parties dispute the timing of the operative event that would trigger their obligations under the amended postnuptial agreement. The amended postnuptial agreement provides that an operative event occurs when, among other things, one party provides “written notice to the other party, sent by certified or registered mail to the last known address of the party…that he or she no longer intends to reside with the other, followed by such party in fact no longer residing with the other for a period of no less than thirty (30) days.” (Agreement 18 [a] [iii].) Plaintiff argues that an operative event occurred on August 3, 2017, when she sent a written notice to defendant that stated she longer wished to live with him. (See NYSCEF No. 52 at Ex. 2 [plaintiff's written notice to defendant].) Defendant concedes that he received the notice from plaintiff and that he lived apart from plaintiff for more than 30 days thereafter. (See NYSCEF No. 53 at
