DECISION AND ORDER The defendant is charged with Assault in the Second Degree (PL 120.05[2]) and other related charges listed in the indictment. The defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to CPL §30.30 and §210.20. The People filed opposition papers. Upon due consideration of the defendant’s moving papers, the People’s opposition, and the court record, the motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL §30.30 is granted. An indictment must be dismissed on speedy trial grounds where the People are not ready for trial within six months of commencement of the criminal action (CPL §30.30 [1][a]; People v. Chavis, 91 NY2d 500, 504-505 [1998]. If a defendant sufficiently alleges that the People failed to declare their readiness to proceed to trial within the statutorily-prescribed time period, the People bear the burden of demonstrating their entitlement to statutory periods of exclusions (People v. Brown, 28 NY3d 392 [2016]). The defendant was arrested and arraigned on a felony complaint on November 18, 2020. An indictment was filed on November 8, 2021. On November 23, 2021, a Certificate of Compliance was filed. On December 6, 2021, the case appeared for the first time in Supreme Court on for arraignment on the indictment. Executive Order 202.87 suspended CPL §§30.30 and 190.80 of the Criminal Procedure Law to the extent necessary to toll any time periods contained therein for the period during which the criminal action is proceeding on the basis of a felony complaint through arraignment on the indictment.1 The People cite to the Executive Orders and concede that they are chargeable with 184 days of speedy trial time. However, the People seem to argue that the COVID-19 era Executive Orders, which tolled speedy trial time, also controlled when the speedy trial clock started running as well. They argue that the six-month period in which they must be ready did not start until the last Executive Order expired on May 24, 2021 and that they were therefore entitled to 184 days of speedy trial time. However, contrary to the People’s argument, the time limit specified in CPL 30.30 remained fixed and controlled by the timing of the commencement of the criminal action (see People v. Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434 [1998]). The Executive Orders simply created an exclusion which the People could avail themselves to stop speedy trial time from accruing (See e.g., People v. Bowman. 197 AD3d 714 [2nd Dept 2021]). Courts of coordinate jurisdiction that have addressed the COVID-19 Executive Orders have operated under the supposition that the speedy trial limit remained set by the date the accusatory instrument was filed (see e.g., People v. Demonia, [2022 NY Slip Op 22035. County Ct. Ulster County 2022]. The People have provided no argument as to why this court should do otherwise. As such, since the initial accusatory instrument was filed on November 18, 2020, the People had six months speedy trial time to be ready, which amounts to 181 days. Therefore, as the People concede that they are chargeable with 184 days they have exceeded the time allotted to them by CPL 30.30. Accordingly, it is hereby: ORDERED, that as the People are charged with 183 days, and they had 181 days to be ready, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL §30.30 is granted. The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the court. Dated: March 4, 2022
