OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Michael Eisenberg brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and New York State law against defendants the County of Westchester, Commissioner Joseph K. Spano (“Comm’r Spano”), Sergeant Jeffry Deigan (“Sgt. Deigan”) (collectively, the “County Defendants”), as well as unidentified correction officers (the “John Doe correction officers”) and Jahliv Niles. Now pending is the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended complaint (Doc. #14 (“SAC”)) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. #15). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331. BACKGROUND For the purpose of ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the SAC and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor as summarized below. At all relevant times, plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the Westchester County Jail (“WCJ”). Niles was also an inmate at WCJ. Plaintiff alleges that, on May 19, 2020, Niles attacked plaintiff in the recreation room at WCJ. Plaintiff contends that, prior to the altercation, the John Doe correction officers escorted Niles to the recreation room and left him in the room with plaintiff without any correction officers present, in violation of several WCJ policies. Plaintiff also alleges Niles had previously assaulted another inmate and otherwise exhibited violent propensities of which all defendants were aware. According to plaintiff, Niles’s attack continued until the John Doe correction officers returned to the scene, along with Sgt. Deigan, to separate the inmates. Plaintiff contends that, after the altercation, the John Doe correction officers repeatedly delayed their responses to plaintiff’s requests for medical care and then forced plaintiff to walk into a hospital “under his own power” (SAC 62), notwithstanding his purportedly severe injuries. Plaintiff alleges the failure to protect him and provide him with adequate medical care were both indicative of a longstanding pattern of constitutional violations at WCJ identified by the Department of Justice in a report issued on November 19, 2009 (the “DOJ Report”), for which the County entered into a consent decree in 2015 (the “Consent Decree”), designed to monitor and remedy such violations. This action was initially commenced in Supreme Court, Westchester County, and removed to this Court on May 19, 2021, based on the Court’s federal question jurisdiction. Thereafter, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which the County Defendants moved to dismiss. In response, plaintiff filed the SAC, following which the County Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss. As of the date of this Opinion and Order, the John Doe correction officers have not been identified or served. Niles was served on May 26, 2021 (Doc. #13) but has not answered or appeared. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the complaint according to the “two-pronged approach” articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).1 First, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to the assumption of truth and are thus not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678; Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations in the complaint must meet a standard of “plausibility.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In considering a motion to dismiss, “a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). “Where a document is not incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect, thereby rendering the document integral to the complaint.” Id. II. Section 1983 Claims Against Sgt. Deigan The County Defendants argue the Section 1983 claims against Sgt. Deigan must be dismissed because plaintiff fails plausibly to allege Sgt. Deigan’s personal involvement in any federal constitutional deprivation. The Court agrees. A. Legal Standards 1. Personal Involvement To adequately plead a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must “plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. A plaintiff cannot “lump[] all the defendants together in each claim and provid[e] no factual basis to distinguish their conduct.” Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (summary order). Moreover, a defendant’s position as a supervisor does not impute personal involvement to that individual. Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020). Accordingly, a plaintiff must plead “the elements of [each] underlying constitutional violation directly against the official without relying on a special test for supervisory liability.” Id. at 620. 2. Fourteenth Amendment Claims Claims brought by pretrial detainees for failure to protect them from attacks by other inmates and for deliberate indifference to their medical needs are both analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).2 To state either claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege an objective component, that the alleged deprivation was “sufficiently serious,” and a subjective component, that defendants “acted with at least deliberate indifference.” See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d at 29. To plead the objective prong of a failure-to-protect claim, a pretrial detainee must plausibly allege an “unreasonable risk of serious damage to the plaintiff’s health.” See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17 at 30. To plead the objective prong of a medical-needs claim, a pretrial detainee must plausibly allege a “sufficiently serious” deprivation of “adequate medical care.” See Charles v. Orange County, 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2019). The subjective prong of both claims requires a pretrial detainee to allege the defendant “acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known” of the risk. Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d at 35; Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2021). B. Analysis Here, plaintiff fails to plead any facts plausibly raising the inference that Sgt. Deigan, “through [his] own individual actions,” was personally involved in any alleged constitutional deprivation. See Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d at 618. With respect to the failure-to-protect claim, assuming arguendo plaintiff was placed at risk of serious harm by being left alone with Niles, plaintiff fails plausibly to allege Sgt. Deigan played any part in or had any knowledge of the decisions to escort Niles to the recreation room, leave him there with plaintiff without any correction officers present, or permit the comingling of high-risk and low-risk inmates. And although plaintiff alleges Sgt. Deigan arrived at the recreation room after the attack had already begun, plaintiff does not allege Sgt. Deigan stood by and let the attack unfold, or that Sgt. Deigan otherwise was in a position to be on notice of the risk of serious harm posed by Niles to plaintiff in particular.3 Plaintiff is thus left with allegations regarding Sgt. Deigan’s role at WCJ that rely precisely on the type of “special test of supervisory liability” that is insufficient to raise an inference of personal involvement. See Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d at 618. With respect to the deliberate-indifference-to-medical needs claim, plaintiff fails to specifically allege any involvement by Sgt. Deigan in any alleged deprivation of adequate medical care. At most, plaintiff lumps Sgt. Deigan into conclusory, catch-all allegations that “defendants” denied, delayed, and obstructed medical care for plaintiff’s injuries. (See, e.g., SAC
