Kamden-Ouaffo v. Balchem Corp.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Ricky Kamdem-Ouaffo (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Balchem Corporation, Gideon Oenga, Bob Miniger, Renee McComb, Theodore Harris, John Kuehner, Travis Larsen, Michael Sestrick, and John/Jane Does (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff asserts claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), as well as a claim for “tortious interferences.” Because Plaintiff’s claims are duplicative of those already dismissed in a previous action, and this new action is clearly an attempt to circumvent a court order prohibiting him from re-pleading those dismissed claims, this action is dismissed with prejudice. BACKGROUND The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts alleged in this case, as they are essentially identical to the facts already alleged and described in detail in Judge Karas’s prior decisions. (Original Action, Docs. 36, 48). Accordingly, the Court will only wade into the facts and procedural history as necessary to resolve this motion. On April 14, 2017, Plaintiff commenced an action against Defendants¹ captioned Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Balchem Corporation, et al., No. 17-CV-02810 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Original Action”).² Plaintiff’s second amended complaint³ in the Original Action asserted eighteen claims for relief, including claims under Title VII, NYSHRL, and a claim for tortious interference. (Original Action, Doc. 37). On June 27, 2019, Judge Karas⁴ granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. (Original Action, Doc. 48). The claims that Judge Karas dismissed were dismissed with prejudice, as he determined that any “further amendment” of those claims “would be futile.” (Id. at 22). Following a request by Plaintiff to amend his complaint for a third time to add new claims, on September 10, 2019, Judge Karas denied Plaintiff’s request, reasoning that: Plaintiff has already taken multiple bites at the apple, and the Court has already written two opinions addressing motions to dismiss. Plaintiff has offered no persuasive reason he did not bring these putative claims sooner. Further, Plaintiff is not otherwise amending; the claims previously dismissed were dismissed with prejudice, and the parties are now moving on to mediation and a possible motion for summary judgment. (Original Action, Doc. 66). A little over a month later, on October 25, 2019, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint that is essentially identical (in terms of the factual allegations and claims asserted) to the second amended complaint filed in the Original Action. (Compare Doc. 2, with Original Action, Doc. 37). On December 23, 2020, Magistrate Judge Davison issued a Report and Recommendation in the Original Action, in which he recommended to this Court that the Original Action be dismissed with prejudice due to Plaintiff’s discovery misconduct, including his failure to appear for his court-ordered October 13, 2020 video deposition. (Original Action, Doc. 225). On March 23, 2021, this Court issued an order adopting Magistrate Judge Davison’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety, thereby dismissing the Original Action with prejudice. (Original Action, Doc. 244). That same day, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal order. (Doc. 245). The Second Circuit dismissed his appeal on December 16, 2021, “because it ‘present[ed] no arguably meritorious issue for [their] consideration.’” (Doc. 65-6 (quoting Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). On January 18 and 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed motions under Rules 60(a) and (b), again seeking to overturn the dismissal order. (Docs. 256-59). The Court denied those motions on April 4, 2022. (Doc. 274). On February 24, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint in this action. (Doc. 63; Doc. 64; Doc. 65). On March 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed a letter that the Court construes as his opposition. (Doc. 66).⁵ STANDARD OF REVIEW A Rule 12(b)(6) motion enables a court to consider dismissing a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the ple[d] factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Id. The factual allegations pled “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “When there are well-ple[d] factual allegations [in the complaint], a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, a court must “take all well-ple[d] factual allegations as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996). However, the presumption of truth does not extend to “legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of actions.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662). Therefore, a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions” to show entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint submitted by a pro se plaintiff, “however inartfully ple[d], must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because pro se plaintiffs “‘are often unfamiliar with the formalities of pleading requirements,’ courts must apply a more flexible standard in determining the sufficiency of a pro se [complaint] than they would in reviewing a pleading submitted by counsel.’” Smith v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 218 F. Supp. 2d 357 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Platsky v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 953 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1991)). While “[p]ro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers, even following Twombly and Iqbal…dismissal of a pro se complaint is nevertheless appropriate where a plaintiff has clearly failed to meet minimum pleading requirements.” Thomas v. Westchester Cty., No. 12-CV-06718, 2013 WL 3357171, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013) (internal citations omitted); see also Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Even in a pro se case…although a court must accept as true all of the allegations…in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, while the Court must “draw the most favorable inferences that [a plaintiff's] complaint supports, [it] cannot invent factual allegations that [a plaintiff] has not pled.” Chappius, 618 F.3d at 170. The Court also has a duty to interpret “the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally and interpret them ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)). ANALYSIS I. Plaintiff’s Claims are Duplicative and Barred by Res Judicata Plaintiff’s complaint in this action, which is duplicative of his second amended complaint in the Original Action, is dismissed on two independent grounds. First, it is axiomatic that “[a]s part of its general power to administer its docket, a district court may stay or dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another federal court suit.” Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000). Here, the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint are essentially identical to those pled in the second amended complaint in the Original Action. For instance, the second amended complaint in the Original Action alleges that: Although the project that Plaintiff developed at Balchem Corporation remains ‘Active’ as recently testified under oath by the CTO of Balchem Corporation, namely Mr. Michael Sestrick in and [sic] Affidavit before this Court, Plaintiff has re-applied for work at Balchem Corporation and Balchem has not even called Plaintiff for interview and has opposed the rehiring of Plaintiff. (Original Action, Doc. 37